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BETWEEN

THE CHURCH AND SCIENCE;

OR,

THE ANCIENT HEBRAIC IDEA

OF

THE SIX DAYS OF CREATION.

With an Essay

ON THE

LITERARY CHARACTER OF TAYLER LEWIS.

By
William
Francis W. Upham. L.L.D.

ANDOVER:

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CONTENTS.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION, ...	5

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

USE OF THE WORD DAY, ...	9
--------------------------------	---

CHAPTERS II.—IX.

CRITICISMS OF PROFESSOR DANA, ...	25
---	----

CHAPTERS X., XI.

CRITICISMS OF PROFESSOR BARROWS, ...	80
--	----

CHAPTER XII.

CONCLUSION, ...	112
-----------------------	-----

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

THE DEBATE BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND SCIENCE, ...	122
--	-----

CHAPTER II.

NATURAL AGENCIES IN CREATION, ...	135
---	-----

CHAPTER III.

THE FIRST CYCLE IN CREATION, ...	151
--	-----

IV

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER IV.	
THE SECOND CYCLE IN CREATION, ...	PAGE 151
CHAPTER V.	
THE THIRD CYCLE, ...	174
CHAPTER VI.	
THE THIRD, CONTINUED. THE FOURTH, ...	191
CHAPTER VII.	
THE FIFTH. THE SIXTH, ...	202
CHAPTER VIII.	
LIGHT, REPRESENTING THE ONE FORCE IN THE INORGANIC WORLD, .	213
CHAPTER IX.	
ON THE RECORD OF CREATION, ...	227
CHAPTER X.	
WHAT IS CREATION, ...	240
CHAPTER XI.	
THE DEBATE BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND SCIENCE, ...	246
CHAPTER XII.	
THE LOSS OF THE ANCIENT HEBRAIC IDEA OF CREATION, ...	258
CHAPTER XIII.	
EVIDENCE OF THE ANCIENT IDEA, ...	267

PART III.

LITERARY CHARACTER OF TAYLER LEWIS, WITH EXTRACTS FROM HIS WRITINGS, ...	286
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INTRODUCTION.

THIS volume is, in part, a vindication of a treatise, by Professor Tayler Lewis, LL. D., on "The Six Days of Creation"; which treatise, rediscovering the leading ideas in the ancient Hebraic interpretation of the Genesis, proves that creation, as revealed, is a supernatural work, carried on by natural agencies, through indefinite times. These truths, established by Lewis, being in harmony with the conception of creation as deduced from the structure of the world, his treatise settles the greater questions in debate between the Church and Science, and, as to them, ends a most perilous controversy. This, unfolded hereafter, need not be dwelt upon here; but it may conduce to a better understanding of the present volume, which has rather more of unity in its aims than in its execution, to state why and how it was written.

Lewis' treatise is known to some only by a series of papers, entitled "*Science and the Bible*," in Nos. XLIX., LI., LIV., LV., of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, — an organ of the oldest religious denomination in New England, — by Professor J. D. Dana, of Yale College. For reasons hereafter stated, it seemed that these criticisms should be answered. Their character made it necessary not only to vindicate the volume assailed, but also the qualities of its author. Apart from this, it seemed a good service to call attention to other writings of Lewis. Carrying out these views, a volume was written, substantially the same with Part I. and Part III. of the present volume. At length it seemed that the ends aimed at would be more surely reached by re-presenting the discoveries of Lewis, and by pointing out their bearings upon the great controversy between the Church and Science. This is done in Chap. I. of Part I., in Chaps. I., II., and XI., of Part II.

Those to whom knowledge of Lewis makes superfluous any answer to criticisms of a character indicated in the note on pages 26, 27, by passing from Chap. I., Part I., to Part II., may dispense with a discussion to them needless. Still, in Part I., some topics of general interest are touched upon, and some which bear upon the true idea of Creation, especially in Chaps. IX., X., in which are examined papers in Nos. LII. and LIII. of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, by Professor E. P. Barrows of Andover.

"The Six Days of Creation," giving a masterly exposition of the nature of scriptural language on natural subjects, philologically establishes that the cycles of creation were indefinite periods, that

natural agencies were used in the formation of the world, and that such was the ancient oriental idea of Creation as revealed; but it does not explain how this idea was lost. This is done in Chap. XII. of Part II. In Chap. XIII., some evidence from Philo is adduced in confirmation of the discovery, that the ancient Hebraic interpretation differed from the modern.

The treatise on "The Six Days of Creation," it may be said generally, is limited to the great ideas mentioned. It does not follow them out into all their bearings upon what is recorded of the cycles of the forming world. It does not attempt to point out any harmony between Creation as revealed, and as made known by science. Hence two realms of inquiry are opened, but unexplored. The keys are found, the doors thrown wide, but it still remains to survey treasures hidden from generations and ages. The results of an attempt to do this may be found in Chaps. III., IV., V., VI., VII., VIII., IX., X., of Part II. These chapters break in somewhat upon the unity of Part II., as originally written, having been subsequently interposed. For a time the writer hesitated to present ideas so novel, in such close connection with truths established by Lewis, lest it might hinder the reception of the latter; but he seemed to be admonished that he must present them now, if at all. For them he alone is responsible. It should be said, however, that the identity of the Sixth Cycle of Creation with the period commencing after the mesozoic period, and ending with the creation of man, has long been maintained. If established, this establishes the end of the Fifth Cycle. The close resemblance of the geological period previous to that time, as far back at least as the known beginnings of animal life, with the scriptural description of the Fifth Cycle, has been pointed out by President Dawson in his recent admirable treatise.¹

¹ See note, p. 282. From notices of this work in the Westminster Review for April, 1860, we cite sentences, the *tone* of which is somewhat illustrative of ideas hereafter as to the state of the controversy between the Church and Science, though this Review does not represent a large class in England. The objections raised illustrate the importance of the analysis of the word *Day* in Chap. I., and of the discussion of the interval between Plants and Animals.

"Slowly the theologians are yielding the battle-field of the Mosaic Cosmogony; and slowly the would-be reconcilers are learning that the attempt is futile either to bend the facts of Geology into accordance with the words of Genesis, or to force the words of Genesis into accordance with the facts. The scheme of 'periods,' whether visionary or real, is now in most favor with those who are unwilling to surrender altogether Genesis I. as a scientific document. . . . To the unprejudiced reader it appears very violent to turn the Days of Genesis into indefinite periods, indeed to make the word *Day* serve for many distinct significations within the compass of a very few verses; sometimes for periods unmarked by a relation to the sun, then for periods consisting of great lengths of time, measured by natural days and nights; then, as in the institution of the Sabbath, for a single day and night. But besides . . . the appearance of the primeval flora on the third day, before the creation of the sun, and according to the hypothesis of periods, thousands of years before the animals were produced for whose sustenance it was provided, is an insuperable difficulty.

"In fact, in the cause of Scripture *versus* Geology, the relative positions of plaintiff and defendant seem likely to undergo a reversal, so that instead of Geology being on its trial, and theological dogmas being brought in evidence against it, the doctrines of so-called orthodoxy are now being tested by the assured verities of science. It has been, therefore, with real regret that we have received from one of the younger school of geologists, who has already acquired a high scientific reputation, and who occupies a position that gives him great influence in the education of the rising generation of Canadians, a work

The present volume, then, is a vindication of another; it is in some respects supplementary to it; and it is also an exposition of the sacred Record of Creation.

Some of the conclusions it arrives at may thus be summarily presented. In Creation, as revealed, the existence of a primal substanceless substance is assumed. Upon this the Spirit of God puts forth its energies. Matter thus endowed with properties not clearly revealed is subjected to the action of one force, represented in scriptural language by Light, by which force the inorganic world is formed. One principle, Life, forms the organic world. The greater epochs of the forming world are indicated. Creation as revealed is marked by simplicity. But with this simplicity there is definiteness. Thus Life, in the Fifth Cycle, manifests itself in a peculiar form. So, too, another distinctive feature is the immense interval between Life in Plants and Life in Animals.

In the general remarks in Chap. IX., some pages should have been given to the idea, that the chief end of the Record is a lesson of moral truth. It may suffice to indicate some of the bearings of this idea. All those great works of nature which were objects of idolatry, are revealed as creations of the one Deity. The outline of creation, into which these truths are set, as in a frame, is subservient to their manifestation. Hence it is to be expected there would be indefiniteness or reserve, where a more full revelation would not have promoted the overruling design. Hence it is thought there is nothing revealed as to the beginning of the primal substance; — a subject examined in Chap. X., with which the discussion of the meaning of *create*, in Chap. X., Part I., stands in close connection. So, too, the Divine action in the beginning of Creation upon the substanceless substance which was to be the world, may have been mysteriously intimated rather than fully revealed, in part, because polytheism deified not recondite properties of matter, but open displays of supernatural power. It is suggested hereafter that the Record itself throws some light upon this mystery, and that it may be further elucidated by the deepest researches of science, at the point where they were anticipated, by the deepest speculations of the ancient world.

The idea of one force in the inorganic world is rather an inference from all revealed of the essence known under the name Light, than at first a very obvious deduction from the Mosaic Record. But once discerned, the idea appears there very clearly; and, indeed, is almost inseparable from the idea of one creative cycle, involving all the rest, and characterized by the unintermitted action of one principle. Here, too, the representation of the idea in some degree may have been controlled by moral ends. The revelation plainly guards against the deification of Light, and of the lights of heaven; its more recondite ideas would hardly have been required at all,

which carries us back a quarter of a century, and involves us anew in those fruitless discussions, which we had hoped were quietly laid to sleep."

had not the mind been made to feel the need of them by researches into deep things in nature turned to discredit truth revealed.

That one force, acting upon matter, makes the diversified inorganic world, is made so intelligible, and even probable, by the fact that one principle, Life, makes the diversified organic world, that the one idea should have been illustrated by the other. It may, however, suffice to suggest this.

Had it not seemed to the writer that some of his ideas disposed of objections to the sacred Record, else not answered, they had not been presented; but they came to him in musing on Creation, as revealed, without a thought as to whether they agreed with aught science or philosophy might utter. Thus, the ideas in Chap. VIII. were subsequent to those in Chap. III. So, too, the conclusions as to the first verse of Genesis were previous to those in Chap. X.

In presenting so fully ideas on themes so difficult, the writer is well aware that error may be intermingled with truth. But when was it otherwise in the thoughts of men? Absolute and perfect truth is as rare as absolute and perfect righteousness. There is one absolutely pure and perfect life, so there is but one absolutely true and perfect book. The ideas of the individual mind need to be rectified by the common mind. Truth is rather the common result of the common thought acting upon the ideas of the pioneers of truth, than the perfect product of a solitary mind. And, further, throughout this volume, its writer addresses himself only to those who can think for themselves.

Returning to the treatise on "The Six Days of Creation," it may be well to say, it is thought Lewis will not be able even to conjecture who has essayed its vindication; and that the other persons whose papers are examined are known to us only by their writings.

It should also be said that the criticism, examined at length, by no means indicates the opinion in New England as to "The Six Days of Creation." It is evidence of this, and it is interesting in itself, that Rufus Choate chose as companions of his last voyage, the Bible, Patrick and Lowth's Commentaries, Luther and Hengstenberg on the Psalms, Owen on Mark, Lewis on The Six Days of Creation, the Iliad, the Georgics, the Advancement of Learning, the Tempest. Those who mourned in him not only the statesman, but the scholar, will deem thus given the volume on Creation by the appreciating heart of the dying genius as of far more moment than that elaborate misrepresentation of it which we proceed to examine.

THE CHURCH AND SCIENCE.

PART I.

THE CRITICISMS ON "THE SIX DAYS OF CREATION."

CHAPTER I.

It would seem to be a reviewer's duty to present the leading idea in the book reviewed. If the book sprung out of one central formative idea, if its structure was conformed to its elucidation or defence, if it showed how it conformed to modes of thought prevalent in the early ages, but now lost sight of, if the book were the key of a secret which had excited the wonder and baffled the wisdom of an age, and if such a book should be reviewed at length, and criticized with asperity, without the least notice of its controlling idea, such a criticism would well deserve a place among the curiosities of literature.

The criticism of Professor Dana on "The Six Days of Creation" is entitled to this honor. He promises to give "briefly the general course of doctrine in the volume." Presently it will be made to appear how this promise is redeemed.

But, before this, it seems to be necessary to show what is the leading idea referred to. To do this, we must listen for a while to the great debate, with which this century rings, between the Church and Science.

The assertion has sunk deep into the heart of the world, that

geological science contradicts the Mosaic Record of Creation. This assertion covers several points ; the one, now referred to, rests on the use of the word Day in that record. The discoveries and researches, in Lewis' volume on "Creation," bear on the other points also ; but this only need here be noticed.

The argument, which upholds the assertion, need not be stated. It is too well known. It is more important here to indicate the present state of the discussion. Science claims to have discovered that the globe was fitting up for the habitation of man during thousands of years. Fighting this proposition at every step, trying in many ways to avoid the force of it in certain respects, reluctantly, slowly, but at length fully, the Church concedes that Science has proved it. She concedes that this truth does not accord with the way in which she has interpreted her oracles for generations past. She still claims, with undoubting faith, that her own record of Creation, being given her by the Creator, is true. But her power over the human mind is lessened by what she is obliged to concede. A farther concession — only by making which can she keep strongest her hold on the human mind at the point where it is shaken — seems requisite, the frank, unfearing confession, that in some respects she has lost the true interpretation of her record. But it is by no means to be confessed, or to be conceded, for it is by no means true, that the whole interpretation of the document has been lost, but only its full meaning at two or three points. The Church might say that the document is brief, peculiar, old, is sometimes thought to be much the oldest of her records, older than the Flood ; that for ages very little thought has been given to those passages not intelligible in their just, that is, in their full significance ; that the truth which may be in them, though now lost sight of, must be conceived of as having a scientific value, rather than that high moral value which pertains to this record where its full interpretation has been kept ; that, if any truth could, for a time, pass out of her remembrance, it would be such truth ; that this ancient record, so far as now fully interpreted, is crowded with moral

lessons; that, as to these, her interpretation of it will be unaffected by any re-discoveries therein, if ever made, of truth according with the scientific truth. With this full presentation of the case, it would cease to be incredible, or even very strange, that as to a few passages, or more accurately a few terms, as to a few truths of minor value, with nothing to keep attention especially fixed upon them, the interpretation of this ancient document should have been lost in the mutations of human thought silently and unconsciously taking place in the lapse of so many ages, and in so many vicissitudes. And this confession the Church does virtually make, by her efforts at these points to reinterpret it anew.

Of all these attempts, only one need here be considered, as it is not thought that any other has a color of pretence, or any hold on the general mind. The one which has the most to recommend it is this, that in the record the word *Day* may sometimes be used in a figurative sense. But those who put this forward are not satisfied with it. They feel that it does not dispose of the difficulty. It has, however, this in its support, that the term is used in the record with some differences in its import. It might be said, though the language would not be accurate, that it is used in two senses. It certainly is used in one place of sun-measured duration. It is certainly used in another of duration not sun-measured. And, as there is a literal use of the word *Day*, and a figurative use of it for indefinite periods, it seems to some that Moses may have so used the term intending to describe periods longer than solar days: and that once out of that restricted time, there is no trouble. It is readily granted this is somewhat specious, is, perhaps, possible; but there is no need to argue against it, because it has no real hold on any mind: though if time could have given it power, it would have had it, for it was the first thought of the Church when this discussion, now a century old, began.

A few curiously constructed minds forcing the record directly to conform to the facts, on the ground that it is true; that the facts are true, and all truth is consistent; that the periods

in the creation were ages ; and that Moses, by what he called a Day, must have meant, what we would call an age, seem to think that a doubting or denying world may heed this begging of the question in debate. And nothing farther need here be said of these various attempts.

It is something that the Church concedes there was a long duration for the creation of the world. It is something that the Church concedes she cannot now interpret her record in accordance with that truth. It is something to have it agreed upon that the difficulty must be solved philologically, or stand unsolved, however damaging this may be to faith. And the meaning of the record being lost, the question in the Church now should be to re-discover that meaning.

To this problem the author of the volume on "Creation" addressed himself. We hope to convince our readers, who will go with us on to the end of this Essay, that if there was hope in man that this could be done, it might well be reposed in Lewis. But, however this may be, he has done it. The secret is solved. The key to the mystery is found.

If this really be so, it might seem the discovery would at once have arrested the attention of the World. Possibly it might have been so brought forward, as to have had something more than it has had of sudden, decisive effect. But this is doubtful; for, in the moral world, great truths come silently, modestly, and wait their recognition. So it has ever been; so it must needs ever be. For the Kingdom of Heaven cometh not with observation, or, in the best translation¹ of the passage, is *not ushered in with parade*; and as the greater idea must include all the lesser ideas which enter into itself, and as what is true of it must be of them, so then of the truths pertaining to the Kingdom of Heaven. And there are certain marks such truths always bear, though they are not decisive of their character, nor altogether peculiar to them. They win their way slowly for a time, with hard fighting, and even in the Church are much spoken against.

¹ Campbell's translation, approved by Robert Hall.

To comprehend the full, ultimate power of the discovery, there is required thought, and time, one of the best tests of thought; but the solution of the mystery is simple, and may be stated in a few words. Still, for the reception of it, there is required some preparation of the mind.

Have you ever reflected on the mystery of language, on the fact that names must once have been expressive of relations between objects without and the soul within? Yet who can now point out that relation? A fiery orb rises from out the ocean. You cry, Behold the sun! Why the sun? There is some reason. The reason is lost, and very few have any hope it will ever be re-discovered.

You were told to call it so: but there was a first time it was so called, and a reason, not only with the first namer,¹ but with all who named it from him, and handed it down to the coming generations. What was that reason? Doubtless they knew. Doubtless on this very problem of naming was concentrated much of their all of thought. They were wise in this matter, after a wisdom not ours. This is the only lost art. As long as this art was not wholly lost, so long as any traces of it remained, and long afterwards, its influence would determine the soul to search into the deep things of language; and a movement once determined in that direction, might and would long maintain itself by its own energy. And so, for a long time, there must have been clear perceptions as to what ideas entered into the idea named. The limits cannot be set to the length of time in which the clearest ideas as to terms of prime importance may thus have been handed down; but it may well be conjectured, that this was a valuable part of the culture of the earliest ages. Far, very far beyond ours, it is reasonable

¹ If, in the formation of language, the soul were quickened by a divine influence, still it would operate on the ordinary powers, and it is to be presumed the soul would have some consciousness of their workings. So, too, at the bringing of many languages out of the primitive, and the bent of the soul toward language, and much traditionary wisdom as to language, might long survive.

to suppose the early ages may have been in insight into the secret things of language.

The first step to be taken, in coming nearer to their position, is to analyze each of the complex ideas, where several ideas, combined into one, have received a name. This does not, indeed, tend at all towards the primal mystery, but it tends to clear up language; and when that is so cleared up, it is better apprehended how it may have been used by the fathers of the world's speech.

All this is most pertinent; for the document to be interpreted is either older than Moses, perhaps vastly older, or Moses may have recorded what he himself beheld in vision;¹ and, on either supposition, it comes from an age when words were things. However philosophically any term could have been used, it is most reasonably to be presumed, from his culture and his age, that Moses would so have used it. As a general truth, the farther back in time, the more truly philosophical is language. It seems to flow more spontaneously from the soul; to reflect more clearly the images in its depths; to be used more wisely.

It seemed necessary to throw out these thoughts here, suggesting there possibly may have been a vast superiority to ours in the early ages, in some things pertaining to language. Now language is conventional, learned by rote, without its reason, and without clear and exact knowledge as to the constituent elements of terms. Take the word *Day*. You say, "Two days hence," meaning days of twenty-fours, "I shall go to the city, and spend the day," meaning the day of twelve hours. You constantly use the term thus, thinking no explanation required, and hardly realizing that you use it in two different ways.

¹ It is not needed here to attempt to settle certain questions, or even to advance any opinion upon them. For convenience, our language is conformed to the common hypothesis, that Moses recorded what he himself in vision had beheld. Moses authenticates the vision; this is all that is important. It may be that Adam beheld it, or Enoch, and that it was handed down across the flood to Moses, with other records of the earliest ages.

Each is a literal way of using it; the one as much so as the other.

Let us endeavor to find out what are the elementary thoughts to which are given the name Day. Let us, for this purpose, suppose a soul gazing, in the fulness of matured reason, but for the first time, on the phenomena of the world. The hour is the morning twilight. A dusky hue is over the face of earth and sea. Slowly the scene grows clearer to the sight. At length a blazing orb wheels up from the ocean, and ascends the sky. It stops not in the zenith. It sinks towards the west. It is gone. The shades come back as before. A cycle is completed. Sky, earth, and ocean, are in the twilight of eve, as in the twilight of morn. The wheel of Time has brought things round to much the state as before. A natural cycle is perfected. The soul's impulse is to give this its name.

The soul perceives that here there are four ideas, constituting the one idea to be named.

First: There is Time.

Second: There is Cyclicity.

It is only under this idea that Time is conceived of. All time seems to run in cycles. What seem exceptions, are merely segments of cycles, and are explained in the same way as the apparently level surfaces on the great circle of the earth. Time, as not under this law, is an impossible conception; it is Time, as free from this law, which is indicated as Eternity, but cannot be conceived of. All the bounds and measures of time are cycles. All the mechanism of the Cosmos is adjusted to this conception of the Microcosm. All the world without man is conformed to the time-idea in man. Cycles are everywhere in the visible world, as they are all the while in the invisible world of thought. This idea of cyclicity, essential to the idea of time, it is here supposed is awakened by the first cycle in the natural world, the common day.

The idea of cyclicity is involved in the idea of time. The two ideas are here separated, merely because this has become

obscured. The soul conceives of time as a cycle, or as segments of a cycle.

But were these thoughts to be set aside, still here is a natural cycle, bounding and measuring a time. Here is a period. And this is all that our train of thought requires.

Third: This natural cycle is made up of two contrasted states, that of waxing, and that of waning light, the two halves of the one whole.

Fourth: These are caused by the march of the blazing orb. This measures this duration, which is twelve hours.

Let us call this a Day, saith the soul. Why, cannot be known. It is much, in this case, to see how the term may have arisen, and what it must mean.

Meanwhile, deeper fall the shades. Night is veiling the earth and the ocean. Silence and darkness. At length twilight again; in the east, bars of light; the sun; day wheeling through its course of waxing and waning light; twilight again; and again the night.

The soul thinks of this, too, and asks itself, Shall there be two names, or one? With the true art of naming lost, and with dull perception into its laws, a hard question this to answer. But the soul has answered it; one name for both. And, knowing the answer, the reason may be traced. The soul muses thus: Here again is time, with its cyclicity; here is time, bounded, measured, limited, as before. So far, no new name is called for. All circles are still named circles, whatever their radii. If one circle be small, and another great, the radical idea being still the same, the difference does not call for a new name. Great or small, with radius long or short, it is called a circle still. So here. Here, as before, are contrasted states; here, then, is the same radical idea, and by the same rule no new name is called for. Though not the same in appearance, they are in idea. Here is a contrast, alternation, the two halves of the one whole.

The last idea, too, is similar. The march of the blazing orb causes the phenomenon; it measures the duration, which now

is twenty-four hours, instead of twelve. And this complex idea, partly metaphysical and partly physical, is so essentially the same in both cases, that the naming must proceed by similarity, which is essential; and not by difference, which is non-essential; and so one name for both.

And the test of this reasoning is, that language conforms to it. This naming both with one name is universal, though the reason be lost sight of. The term Day is given as readily to the twelve hours as to the twenty-four; to one and to the other in a breath, and without a thought about it. And all language further conforms to these ideas with instinctive quickness. The days of winter and of summer are not of the same length; yet how readily you say they are both days, they are so much alike. There is, perhaps, deeper wisdom in the thought than you are aware. It seems like the soul's instinct in language.

But let a little more thought be given to the fourth element. In the soul's most natural conception of it, it is light that makes the day. She is not now prying into the mysteries of nature, but simply reflecting upon impressions made upon herself; contemplating a phenomenon, partly metaphysical, partly physical, for the purpose of giving it a name. It is an effect of the sun, it is Light, by which she is impressed. As a matter of consciousness, the sun is not always in our thought of a common day, but the sun's light always.

And were the twelve-hour cycle, or the twenty-four-hour cycle, determined and measured in any other way than by the march of the blazing orb, and were there a waxing and waning of light, or its presence and absence, though there were no sun, it would doubtless be called by the name Day.¹

¹ Lewis makes the solar day of twenty-four hours the first and simplest cycle in nature. In this attempt to give a popular view of his discovery, or rather of one of them, the twelve-hour day is taken as such. Lewis' opinion is very decisive; but after long reflection, we think the first cycle is as given in the illustration. The real inquiry would be, Is the phenomena such a seeming round of events as to call out the name? We rely on the fact, as proving the affirmative of this question, that this period, from twilight to twilight, has the name Day; and it seems to us

This last thought may take us out of the planetary relations of the earth, into time before its state was adjusted to the sun, if such time there were; or it may take us out of, and away from, our whole system.

All that is natural is cyclical; it is made so by contrasted states. All these natural cycles, if named from their time aspects alone, would be named Days.

But, it is said, most of the natural cycles are made by Life. Life, waxing and waning, growing and dying, makes the contrasted states. But what if Light and Life be the same? God is said to be Light; he is also said to be Life. We wish merely to bring out the closeness of correspondence between the two, not to assert their identity. Light is the physical image of the metaphysical reality, Life. So close their correspondence, that it may very well be, that where Life produces, like Light, contrasted states, the soul, true to its old thoughts, will call them Days.

All the natural cycles named from their time aspects, would be days. But Life, visible in its effects, impressing the senses, is so individualizing a force, that a new principle begins to make itself felt in the naming, where Life makes the cycle.

But what is to be said of the Year? It is the exception which proves the rule. The multifarious effects of Life in annual growth and decay, give such a predominance to the life aspects of the phenomenon, that, although it is a time cycle, its time aspects are not striking enough to hinder its having a distinctive name. Still, when these disappear in the desolation

most natural that the term should be conceived of as arising in view of it, and then be given to the second larger cycle, rather than that the term of the large cycle could in any way be given to a part of itself, not recognized as a lesser cycle. We lay stress on the divine naming hereafter spoken of. The question does not in the slightest affect the validity of Lewis' reasoning; but our view seems to us to facilitate the reception of it, as we regard this common twofold use of the term Day, as the best illustration of it, and the true starting-point in language, from whence to go on with it as descriptive of all Time-Thought, with its ever widening and widening cycles. The germs of all our thinking on these subjects is in the volume. The unfolding and presenting of it is ours. So far as it seems right to them, our readers should credit it to Lewis; so far as erroneous, attribute it to us.

of the high latitudes, the soul inclines to its old naming, and speaks of the Day of the Pole. And there may be something here deeper than this. The Day is the earth's unit of Time. Its elementary ideas are carried through all the time cycles, and all the natural cycles of the earth. But possibly the year may be the unit of a higher calendar. The instinctive wisdom of the soul may perchance so conceive of it. Its elementary ideas may run through Æonian cycles, of which all the time cycles of this planet, bound into one, make but one of the Years.

Man's life on earth, though far more brief than some, is the highest and most complex of all the natural cycles. If, then, these ideas apply to this natural cycle, they will to all. Here is Time, and, of course, Cyclicity; here are the contrasted states; and here the instinctive wisdom of the soul in naming, applies the term Day in a literal sense. That it is not more generally recognized as a literal sense of the word, that it is so generally taken as a figure of speech, is merely because man's circle of life is so seldom fully rounded out. It is broken, interrupted, and incomplete. But in thinking of the life of some very old person, where the wheel of Time brought round the second childhood, and the natural cycle was perfected, bringing up vividly the childhood in which it began, the soul, when viewing that life in its time aspects chiefly, instinctively thinks of it, and speaks of it, as a Day, whether it fully comprehends the process which results in this naming or not.

It is an instinctive apprehension of the import of the term, which makes a man speak of an event as happening in his Day, which makes him feel that his life on earth is a true Day; and the idea and the term may be carried through all the natural cycles, when the soul is concerned with them chiefly in their time aspects.

This one idea and this one term may go with the soul through all the time cycles of this planet, through all the time cycles before it was a planet, if such there were, and through all the time cycles of all worlds. If, then, the world, in its time

aspects, were to be described, and if there were a mind philosophical enough to comprehend them, or divinely quickened for that purpose, what would it call all the time cycles of this world, that is, what one common name would it give them? Revelation suggested this inquiry to Lewis, and answered it. The name which the soul had given to the first, the simplest, the most common time cycle, its Seers, from beginning to end, give to all time cycles, whether of this world, or of all worlds; and this in view of those elements in the terms which are common to all world cycles of time.

With your ideas of the term, now, suppose there was pictured before your mental vision, vast, completed Time, a cyclical period, of course; this would be simply Time with immense duration. Add to this the idea of contrasted states; and then such a period, whether of twelve hours, or twenty-four hours, or of twenty-four thousand years — what would you name it? You would name it a Day. No other term could define it. Whether its contrasted states were made by the march of a blazing orb, or without one, the only name that can define the phenomenon, the only name that can convey your idea, is the name Day. And this, whether the contrasted states are made by Light, or by Light's counterpart; by the reality of which Light is the image; by Life, the soul of Light: or by both conjoined in one effect; if so there be, in any way, or in every way, division of time and states contrasted, that phenomenon is a Day. And most certainly you would thus name it a Day, were this naming in harmony with the whole system of time-thought around you.

Some such vision Moses beheld; and thus he named the sight. He named it philosophically—if any admire such a term in this connection. And none need wonder at this, who have any just idea of his wonderful mind, or of the power and depth of the thinking of his time. For think not that so great a man, doubtless the greatest in human history, lived in other than a great age. Moses is wonderful enough as he stands in clear historical light; but that idea would make him great

beyond the possibilities, because great against the laws, of humanity. And surely no one need wonder that he used language wisely, who conceives what Wisdom prompted him in its use. And if the vision were older than Moses, this idea may be applied to whomsoever beheld and recorded it; and the farther it was back in time, the nearer was it to the mysterious birth of speech.

The Seer, you might think, in your geological wisdom, should have spoken of vast times, and then there would have been no difficulty. Let us appreciate at last his higher wisdom. It would not have conveyed his idea. Take your geological idea of vast time, and connect it with other related ideas, and you must use the term he used to express it. Creation, by the law of unity and harmony, must have formed a natural cycle; if so, must have had two contrasted states, a lower and a higher; and if so, there must have been a Day in which God made the heavens and the earth, as Moses tells us. He tells us this great Day was made up of six days, the great Cycle, of six cycles; and seeing now so much of his wisdom, it might be well to trust him as to this point. These cycles he also named Days. Thus only could he name them, if true to the philosophy of language.

Thus he named them, and in accordance with his naming is the naming of all the great time thoughts, of all the great time cycles, by divinely inspired Seers. It is no isolated fact, then, but one fact in a great system of thought. The break in the continuous transmission of these thoughts refers itself back to the chasm, not in this age bridged over, between the old Hebraic and the Christian mind, between the mind of the Orient and the Occident. Moses used the term, understanding its use; and we, now for the first time taught, begin to understand his use of this language, and our ignorance.

Now let us glance at some of the evidence in the narrative itself, going to prove that the elementary ideas which enter into the term Day, as they have been set forth, are traceable in this duration, styled by him a Day. He must have regarded the

last element as variable; for he speaks of sun-measured duration, and duration not sun-measured, by the same term, Day. He regarded the element of Time as variable; for to the great creative cycle as a whole — and such from the narrative it could be shown to be — he gives the name Day, as well as to the cycles which composed it. The idea of contrasted states is inwrought into his description, in connection with each of the six periods: "Evening was, morning was, Day one." No doubt this formula, so precise and repeated, was meant primarily to teach that the higher period was the subsequent in order. But it teaches the other idea also. And who will presume to say it was not designed to teach it for the very end of justifying his language?

There is another passage which teaches the same idea, and it would seem it could have been introduced with no other intent: "And God called the light Day." In Scripture language, God's calling or naming a thing is the giving to it those constituting laws which make it what it is, in distinction from everything else; while man's naming is the recognition of those laws. This passage is to be considered in connection with the fact in the record, that the sun was not the cause of this light, that it was produced in some other way. It alone enables us then to know how it was called for and came. It came not as a flash of light, breaking suddenly out of the darkness, and vanishing as suddenly; it was not a fixed, steady, unchanging light, like the light of the new heavens in the Apocalypse, ever maintaining a meridian splendor: it came as Day.

And here its importance would seem to justify the remark, though out of place, that the mention by Moses of the divine naming of the Earth and the Seas, understood in like manner, bears on his conception of the creative times. Being meant to teach that the Earth and the Ocean had the same constituting laws then as they had afterwards in his own time cycle, he must have had a conception of those creative periods as vast cycles. On the theory that they were solar days, twenty-four

hours long, the remark would seem needless, and out of keeping with the grandeur of the record ; on the other, it was something the Seer might well record.

There is a propriety in giving to all cycles made by Nature and Time the name given to the first, as it is universal and striking, and as its elements enter into all. Though to some time cycles a distinctive name, as to the year, is given, this is where, other elements being taken into the account, the dissimilarities become more marked than the similarities ; but when it passes into greater cycles, not so strongly distinguished by peculiar characteristics, obscuring those of time, the soul cannot but cling to its first naming. It is only by this old name that it can re-present the phenomena to others. Hence in the Bible, great cycles, whether of this world, or of the worlds, are Days. Sometimes they have descriptive epithets, implying their vastness. In the same way Moses used the word. The harmonies of divine language required this. He marks the peculiarities of these periods, not by adjectives, as the Seers do, when referring to great historic cycles, or to cycles greater still, but after the true manner of history, by particulars stated as to them, which, while deciding that they were truly Days, and leaving them truly Days, distinguish them into a class by themselves. The difficulty, then, with the Mosaic narrative has not arisen as Science would have it, but in a way just the opposite, from the wisdom of Moses, and from our ignorance.

The early ages of the world never misunderstood him, as the latest age has done ; and some tradition of this thought lingered among the Fathers, till at length its light went out in the darkness. But throughout the ancient Hebraic writings there are traces of the Mosaic thought — and it is the same thought with that of Geology — that there were vast periods in the world's creative history ; and there are more or less traces of it in the thought of all the ancient mind ; and in both, traces of ideas on Time strikingly in harmony with it. Lewis has re-discovered the Time-Thought of the primeval ages. He has shown that the idea of worlds on worlds of time, was as

familiar to them, as the idea of worlds on worlds in space is to us ; that it would not have been in keeping with their time ideas, had the seers of Israel limited their conceptions of the periods of creation to days of twenty-four hours ; and he proves from their thoughts and language, when they go back and recall the birth and growth of the world, that they did not so understand the *Mosaic* record. This discussion of the Time-Thought of the ancients upholds, confirms, and establishes the validity of all his other reasonings. As thus upheld, all the previous investigations in the volume receive decisive force.

CHAPTER II.

BUT what reader ever did glean, or could by any possibility glean, the least idea, intimation, or hint, of any of these things from Professor Dana's criticism on “The Six Days of Creation?” Since that volume was published, Lewis has frankly said, that he had “looked with anxiety to the examination of other biblical scholars in respect to the reasonings about the great time-words, so strangely used in the ancient Shemitic dialects, and the interpretation given them. *Here was the foundation of all the other arguments.* Here, it was thought, was found that peculiar feature in the ancient thinking, which relieved all the other interpretations from the forced, or the mere possible aspect.” Lewis says, this is “the great question, which is the hinge of the whole discussion, What is the fair interpretation of the word Day, as it stands in a very ancient record, dealing in very extraordinary ideas, and expressed in very remarkable language? This inquiry pervades the book; everything is subservient to this issue; all seemingly divergent discussions grow out of it, return to it, and terminate in it.” Thus the author. On the other hand, thus the critic: “Between the fourth and fifth days a discussion again comes in on the word Day, and on time, and on the uses of the sun, which it is here unnecessary to consider.” On searching through the criticism, it is found the “again” is deceptive, the “here” delusive! This sentence is its only allusion to the soul of the volume it professes to review!¹

¹ Prof. D.'s first critique was published January 1856. Subsequently he continued his criticisms. In a third article, a year and a half after the first, he alludes, in a note of five lines, to the discussion of the word Day in the volume, as “worthy of attentive consideration.”

Another fact is connected with this. Lewis groups together the ideas suggested by the creation of the animal and the vegetable races under the Fifth Day. The critic wonders at this, "in a work exegetical, profound," "offered as a contribution to biblical literature," etc. etc., and even asks "Can we be satisfied that the word of God has been sufficiently studied and apprehended, when not even a mention of the creation of quadrupeds is introduced into the chapter on the Sixth Day?" Lewis, bringing to bear his philological and analytical powers upon the record of the creation of vegetables and animals, discloses in it remarkable truths, bearing on the duration Moses intended by the term Day. The terms in different parts of the record are similar, but are most explicit when the fifth day's work is described. At that time, therefore, he stated what he had to say, "preferring economy of reasoning to any useless affectation of chronological order." His reader is foretold of this, and reminded of it. His course, and his reasons for it, are set forth in the proper places. The charge, then, which intimates that the author did not know what even children ought to know, could not have been made by one who heeded the statements or the plan of the work.

The critic not only discards the main design, but also a subordinate one, important in itself, and in its relations to the main design. The book opens with three chapters on Phenomenal Language. These give a philosophical exposition of the language of inspiration on natural subjects. Old as the topic forced on the mind of Christendom by the theories of Copernicus is, it was never so well thought out before. These chapters adjust a perplexing subject, never before adjusted and disposed of. This exposition of scriptural language on natural subjects is the finest piece of thinking ever wrought out on that topic, the perfecting of all the previous right thinking upon it. It often happens that the thought, in the main the right thought of former generations, needs to be wrought out, and placed on an immovable base. To do this, there is required a mind capable of giving a brief, clear, and just presentment of compre-

hensive and difficult truth. The fact that a truth is partially well apprehended, often hinders it from being fully comprehended; for lesser minds are content to take it as it was given to them, and so to hand it down to others. Thus, a half-wrought shape it stands, waiting the eye, the thought, the touch of Phidias.

For these chapters, the volume is invaluable to every scholar, and especially to every divine; but, whatever their worth, they are indispensable to all that follows in the volume. Lewis points this out. On phenomenal language he "must be allowed to dwell;" his "ideas on it are vital to the whole discussion." Yet the critic gives no hint of these noble chapters, preliminary to all the reasoning of the volume.

At this point, we turn from the substance of this criticism to its style. It is supercilious.¹ A very few words, which, detached from their context, seem otherwise, really form no

¹ This is too faint a term. We like not to seem to make more public what the critic has said; but can it be more public? On seeing it, no one can deny a reply to it should be made; and it has met us too often to doubt of this. He is reckless. He opens with twelve pages, which "are trite, and would be out of place," i. e., below the intelligence of his readers, "were it not for lamentable ignorance, of which the book at the head of his article is an example." This style is kept up for two years, and for one hundred and sixty pages. Of the study of nature his author "is ill-prepared to be a self-appointed judge." "He knows nothing of the depths of truth in God's works." "He has a limited comprehension of the Sacred Record" — "a negligent way of following it." His tone is "not at all good-natured" — "arrogant" — "unmannerly." His "unworthy spirit is due to prejudice and ignorance." "His mind is unfit for research." A meaning is put on a clause, such as no one else ever put on it, and then it is said, "This is not in any way or sense true." And things similar to this are done many times. "On almost every page God's works are treated as if the Creator were some ill-natured Genius." "His volume is plainly hostile to man's best interests." "He has done a lasting injury to the cause of the Bible." "His writings are calculated to do valiant service for the Evil One." His "crude speculations" are "miserable," "degraded," "degrading." He is "a subject meriting a psychological examination." Prof. D. exhausts the dictionary of words of reproach, and seems to revel in so doing; returning to the same invectives again and again, as if he never would have done. Yet he says, "Temptations to remark and criticism follow one all through the pages of this work. There is so much to complain of, we have had to cull sparingly, not to run to a tedious length." If he does not think his papers long, he should have lived in the long geological periods, and have had for his auditors the ugly, waddling monsters of the antehuman world.

exception to the general manner. This is in painfully bad taste, and it betrays the critic into unfairness. One illustration is cited here, though not full or very decisive, as to his manner, as showing how unfounded are the impressions made on those who read the criticism only. It is the calling the reading adopted by the author for the third verse of the eleventh of Hebrews, "a liberty taken with the Greek text." Let this expression be weighed, and then read, what it hardly seems the critic could have read, his author's statement of merely the "external evidence" for his reading: "Under this head we may cite the exact concurrence of the Latin Vulgate, and the old Peschito, or Syriac version. The Arabic version follows them; but, being of a later date, is not therefore of so high authority, although still more ancient, than any extant Greek manuscript. We venture to say that the proof, drawn even from a large number of these, is outweighed by this joint testimony of the two oldest versions of the New Testament. Any number of manuscripts may have been copied out one from the other; but it would be exceedingly difficult to explain how both these earliest translations give precisely the same rendering, unless there had been that in the then common reading of the Greek text which fully warranted it. The reader who will take the pains to examine other varying passages, in which these two old versions concur, and to observe how uniformly their joint testimony is supported by the internal evidence, will see ample reason for the deference we pay to them as the best proof of a genuine, ancient reading. In both the Syriac and the Vulgate, the sense is clear and precisely similar: 'So that the things that are seen were made from things that are unseen,' — *ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent*. What adds great weight to this rendering is the fact, that it is sustained by the Greek commentators generally; by Erasmus, Grotius, and other distinguished scholars of former centuries; and by Tholuck, Olshausen, Ebrard, and others of the most modern period."

The impression which the critic labors to give, that his

author had not studied the record, needs no correction with those acquainted with the writings of Lewis; and with all other candid persons it may suffice, on this point, to make these citations. Lewis says: “It is several years since we sat down to study this question.” These earlier investigations seem to have been without any design of writing a book. Of the studies given to the volume, the preface says: “The chief study of two years has been devoted to it. Every part of the Bible having any reference to Creation has been carefully examined, not only in the Hebrew, but in the three oldest versions. Importance has been attached to these, not so much in the light of critical helps, as for their furnishing the best medium through which to study the conceptions, that ever accompanied certain words in the ancient mind. Let any one carefully observe the force of the plural forms and world senses of the great time-words in the Syriac, Septuagint, and Vulgate versions, as well as in the Jewish Targums, and he will need no other argument to convince him that the author has not overstated the aid they truly afford in the discussion of the question. For a similar reason he has resorted to the Apocryphal Books, to the Koran, to whatever fragments he could find of the Samaritan, or of the Coptic, as evidence of the old Egyptian. In search of the same idea, too, he has gone to the remains of the Gothic translation of Ulfilas, as the oldest version in a language nearest related to our own.”

CHAPTER III.

THE critic overlooks the grand aims of the book, and gives the impression it has aims which it has not. Thus circular in error the critique grows, and in twice nine months, it becomes round as the moon.

Professor Dana would give the impression that the design of the book is to abuse science and scientific men; or, in his dialect, "truth and truthful men." The structure of his articles is evidence of this. The first opens with twelve pages on science, which, as he says, "are trite;" the second with twelve similar pages on science, and on the religiousness of savans. He is angry at the abuse of science which he imagines in the book. His wrath makes him long. And by a long process the notion is impressed on the reader's sensorium, left void of the true idea of the book, that its aim is to reprobate science and scientific men.

He says, Lewis "reprobates science in its foundation and essence, and all who dare to believe"—the reader would naturally fill out the blank with, in God, or, in Christianity, but the scroll runs thus, "all who dare to believe—very much indeed in the spirit of the cardinals who condemned Galileo." The sense given to "believe" can now be conjectured; but why the savan needs a daring heart, unless about to descend into the limbo of necromancy, it were hard to tell. He says, "On almost every page we found the study of nature contemned." And again: His "sneers at science" "commence on the first page, and stream out, as from a bitter fountain, all through the volume." And as a striking end to his paper, he indicts the book as "largely infidel," because of imaginary scientific heresies.

Here is the title of the volume: “The Six Days of Creation; or, the Scriptural Cosmology, with the ancient Idea of a Plurality of Time-Worlds, in distinction from Worlds in Space.” Here its first sentence: “The leading design of the following work is to set forth the biblical idea of creation, *philologically ascertained*; or creation *as revealed*.” Our readers exclaim, it is hard to believe a book with such a title; such an avowed design, should have the design imputed to it. Our reader’s idea would be confirmed by the titles of its sections. These make the charge incredible. And all in the book about science and scientific men, printed consecutively, would not make thirty-five pages. This simple answer is enough, in the main, for such an accusation. But the counts in the indictment ought to be plead to, one by one.

The indictment charges that the book is “largely infidel;” infidel through its denunciations of “truth and truthful men,” terms here meaning science and scientific men; “infidel through its teaching that error is the unavoidable end of science;” “infidel through its theory of nature, and its degraded and degrading development theory.”

The indictment should have been preferred before it was argued. In Common Law it is the right of the accused to hear his indictment at the beginning of his trial; for the crime, as charged, may appear impossible or absurd. Such is the case here. What means the word “infidel” in such an indictment as this? Was ever a man in Christendom called “*infidel*” because he did not *believe* in science? Dr. Johnson defines an infidel as “one who rejects Christianity.” That meaning fits to nothing here.

In Common Law it is the right of the accused to have his indictment in the common tongue; and if this indictment be in English, it charges an impossible crime, or else a new Religion has come. We have lived out of the great world of late, and would inquire if the Doctors of the Sorbonne have decided Science to be a Religion, or any such part of the Christian religion, that if a man *believe* not science he shall be

"*infidel?*" Be this as it may, in English the word *infidel* is a word of awful meaning; but the prosecutor uses it so readily, for such slight, imaginary cause, that surely he does not mean anything bad by it.

If, indeed, a new religion has come, a plea might be put in to the jurisdiction. It might be inquired by what Cardinals Dr. Dana has been empowered to print a *bull* anathematizing a man as an "*infidel*," for not believing each and every scientific speculation, theory, or fact, as he believes it, or thinks he believes it.

But, though ill informed as to the new religion, and the modes of procedure in its ecclesiastical courts, relying on the merits of the case, we plead to the count, which charges that the book, teaching "error is the unavoidable end of science," "reprobates science in its foundation and essence;" and present, without a word explanatory of its intent or meaning, a note which, in a condensed, illustrative form, sums up the reasoning of the volume on the matter of science. This ought to be presented, for the prosecutor cites it, calls it "an exhibition of the depth of his author's philosophy," and exclaims after it "then knowledge is not knowledge," etc. etc.

"Let *X* represent the remote initial energy, let *P* represent the ultimate Phenomenon, or last appearance to the senses, and *p*, with its functions, the intermediate causalities. The formula, or series, would then stand thus :

$$P \quad p^1 \quad p^2 \quad p^3 \quad p^4 \quad p^5 \quad \text{-----} \quad p^n \quad \text{-----} \quad X.$$

Here, each intermediate term, though apparently causative of the one that follows, is really itself a Phenomenon; that is, a manifestation of the preceding, and so on. The n^{th} term is ever at a remote distance from *X*, and only stands for the causal energy, as long as no one is discovered behind it. The mind, *a priori*, divines causalities as standing behind all manifestations; science goes to work and discovers them, but only to become in this manner phenomenal in their turn. The ini-

tial energy X is in itself ineffable, and is only named from some of its phenomena or manifestations. In taking, however, for such naming, any but the ultimate P, we run the risk of its being superseded, on equally good grounds, by some other, whilst in every case there is an endorsement of it as a scientific finality. Nothing, therefore, is gained in one way, whilst much is lost in another. Once depart from the ultimate or most outward manifestation, and there is no catholic name the same for all men and for all ages. Making an application of such views to science generally, we might say that the *n*th terms, at the present stage of discovery, are to be found in such words as *gravitation*, *magnetism*, *chrystallization*, *elasticity*, etc. These do yet stand for *energies*, or causalities, because there has not yet been discovered that still more remote energy of which they are *manifestations*, and which, when discovered, will convert them all into phenomena, that is, make them *appear*. When this is done, then instead of being simply *νοούμενα*, or *notions* of the mind, they become *φαινόμενα*; in other words, they *come out*, and take their places ‘among the things that are seen,’ whether by the eye or the telescope, or which are so known that their movements and dispositions can be *conceived*, or represented to the imaging faculty of the mind.”

On this note the critic says, “hence knowledge is not knowledge; since science is necessarily finite and cannot reach nearer to X than *p*ⁿ, ergo, not only its present laws, but all the future may develop, are ephemeral, fated to the last one, or all but the last, to become phenomena in the progress of learning; one charnel house for the whole, ‘cycles,’ ‘epicycles,’ ‘magnetisms,’ ‘gravities,’ etc., — a hopeless prospect ahead for those who reason from or about nature,” as if his author supposed no scientific knowledge possible or lasting. And of ideas similar to those in the note, he says; “the least we can say is, that in his ignorance of science he is not aware that there are any stable laws.”

His error grows out of a misconception of the word *phenomenal*, used by the author to express a high, permanent reality,

but which seems to the critic used to mean something unreal, deceptive, apparitional. This blunder leads him into such strange statements as this, — “in his $P. p^1 p^2 p^3 p^4 \dots p^n \dots X$, representing error succeeding to error as a necessary result of research, — he evidently aims to shake down the whole fabric of science.” This is amusing; and more amusing still, his evident fear that he will. He cannot help feeling there is truth in this formula; and, fearing the dreaded consequence may follow the detested premises, in his excited mood he writes thus: “Is it true, that the human mind is so made, or so adapted to nature, that it can attain only to false theories or laws? or, as regards profounder causes, that the progress of study is tending not, as science claims, to an elimination of error, and a clearing away of doubts, but as Professor Lewis holds, to deeper and deeper errors in endless succession? that the *Systema Naturæ*, which science believes she is bringing out to view, is only a rickety structure, ever tumbling to pieces? that there is no foundation for full faith in the teachings of nature, or the deductions of the human mind therefrom? If such be actually the end of man’s contemplations of the works of his Maker, he would be forced in just indignation to write FALSE over the whole face of nature, and to replace the word GOD with that of DEMON!”

The author could not have imagined such misapprehension of his ideas and language; or, if he had imagined it in some isolated instance, it would have been ridiculous to have made the regularity of nature, or the stability of its laws, the subjects of formal affirmations. They are truths, which the soul awakens to a certain knowledge of, when brought into intelligent relations with the universe; as she does to another *a priori* idea, without which, as their corrective and limitation, they would be erroneous, that all, that is natural, hath its cycle of duration. Still, it is curious, with the critic’s pages beneath the eye, to mark how these truths are taken for granted by the author, as in this sentence: “There is nothing accidental in language. It has its laws, as sure as those of chemistry, or

geology." Or, in this, as to outward phenomena which constitute a great part of the domain of natural science, — "they are the same for all ages and all men — never varying — but, as uniform as God has made the laws of the human senses, to which they are addressed." Or, in this, "The only idea we have of nature is, that of a regular, constant flow of cause and effect, governed by established laws, operating uniformly, or in the same manner under the same circumstances, and with the same accompaniments."

What is said on Science, in the "Six Days of Creation" is necessary to the exposition of the philosophical basis of the language of Scripture, on natural subjects. The key to it is in the chapters on Phenomenal language. These give the reasons why Scripture, in describing natural objects, uses common in preference to scientific language. Their leading idea, the idea out of which the silly charge that the book is infidel, in part, springs, an idea, which before the critic printed his lucubrations, we should have said any man would on the inspection of it have pronounced correct, is, that all, which science can take cognizance of, are certain appearances, which represent powers lying behind them, as it were. The outward appearances in nature may sometimes be passed behind, as it were, and man may seem to stand face to face with the power; yet that seeming power is still but an appearance, which represents a more occult power. It follows that the language of science must be varying; for, although the more outward appearances or facts may remain unaffected by the new disclosures as to their proximate cause, the new conceptions as to the cause will influence the language which describes them. In these ideas there seems nothing derogatory to science to one who has a just comprehension of the aims and limitations of science. Nor is there anything in the author's presentation of them, which will be seriously objected to even by the most sensitive of the scientific hierarchy, who will take the pains to look and see the reasons why they are presented at all.

It is true, that the language of the volume is in cutting con-

trast to that boasting in which some savans love to indulge about natural science, extolling it to a rank not only above higher and more difficult sciences; not only equal to that everlasting moral science whose truths are discernible by man, but profanely styling it a Revelation, and so hinting at its truths approximating in some degree in worth, to Verities which would be ineffable, would be unimaginable by men or by angels, had not God revealed them to archangels as well as to the children of the dust, through the mystery of the Incarnation, and from the lips of his Eternal Son. But the author's defence here rests not alone on a proper feeling of antagonism against these profane babblings; but on the irrefutable truth of propositions by him advanced, and the fact that it was his duty to advance them in the place that he did.

He was called upon to advance them, in showing why inspiration uses the language descriptive of those outward appearances, which are the same to the learned and to the unlearned, and which can be described in language never obsolete, in the common speech of humanity, which describes objects, as they appear to the senses; and in showing why it does not use the language of men's conceptions of occult causes, a language more or less imperfect, and which varies from age to age. He vindicates — when in all the earth such a vindication was needed — the language of God. For this transcendent purpose, and not to upbraid science with its necessary limitations, or its inaccuracies of language, growing out of them; far less to impeach the reality, or to deny the worth of scientific knowledge, Lewis brings out the element of error and change, which inheres in all scientific knowledge.

The critic doubly errs, seeing not his author's design; and imagining a design, he has not. Hence, he seems to him, as he elegantly says, "slashing away at science;" and, losing reason at the sight, the critic thinks he is "placing in antagonism God's word, and his works;" and he falls into a darkness of horror, fearing lest "the youth of our land," "shall scout the former," — Lewis evidently seeming to Dana, notwithstanding

his long-drawn depreciation, one strong to rule the thoughts of men.

There is a point, taken in this part of the criticism, touching upon which the critic is troubled. He cannot endure the hint, that gravities may go the way of vortices and epicycles. He “hardly knows to what to refer the blindness that cannot see the wide gulf between” them. But what does any one know of gravitation? It is not even a name; it is the symbol of — we know not what; it is the veil of our ignorance; the sign of the unknown, behind a known fact. So the old terms, to which this is likened, were conventional symbols of ancient ignorance, as this magical, this all-explaining, this almost hallowed word, is of modern ignorance. Could man seize hold of that unknown, thus symbolized, so as to conceive of it, that is, so as to be able to picture it to the sense, still he would have to call in some other fluid, or force, or what not, farther behind in the arcana of nature, as the ground or cause of that which before was believed, and which now appears, to be; and so again, as before, there would be a word for the fool, and a mystery for the wise.

If it be said, this touches not the Newtonian formula, however knowledge be enlarged, that must remain; it is answered, it passes all prescience to foresee, how far the discovery of a cause may change ideas as to its effect, and may change language. But it is consistent with all the author's language; it forms one of his more important positions, that outward phenomena — and this, that bodies near the earth tend towards its centre with determinable accelerating velocity, is one — are as stable and abiding as man and his dwelling-place. Yet, as what is hinted in the book as to gravitation, though referring to notions as to the cause of certain facts, and not to the facts themselves, has drawn forth such reproach, as by it his critic would especially justify saying, that, the author “in his ignorance of science, was not aware there were any stable laws,” we cite from an Address before the British Association for the

Advancement of Science, delivered by its President, Professor Owen, Sept. 22, 1858 :

Speaking of the *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica* of Newton, he asks, "Has time in any way affected the great result of that masterpiece of human intellect? There are signs, that even Newton's axiom is not exempt from the restless law of progress. The mode of expressing the law of gravitation, as being 'in the inverse proportion of the square of the distances,' involves the idea that the force emanating from or exercised by the sun must become more feeble in proportion to the increased spherical surface over which it is diffused. So indeed it was expressly understood by Halley. Professor Whewell, the ablest historian of natural science, has remarked, that future discoveries may make gravitation a case of some wider law, and may disclose something of the mode in which it operates.' The difficulty, indeed, of conceiving of force acting through nothing from body to body, has of late made itself felt and more especially since Meyer, of Heilbronn, first clearly expressed the principle of the 'conservation of force.' Newton, though apprehending the necessity of a medium, by which the force of gravitation should be conveyed from one body to another, yet appears not to have possessed such an idea of the uncreatability and indestructibility of force, as that which, now possessed by minds of the highest order, seems to some of them to be incompatible with the terms in which Newton enunciated his great law, viz., of matter attracting matter with a force, which varies inversely as the square of the distance."

CHAPTER IV.

THE indictment charges, the book is infidel, “because it denounces truthful men,” meaning scientific men. When this was read, our copy of the book had been presented to a learned divine, and days elapsed before another could be procured. Wondering, meanwhile, that nothing of the sort was remembered, yet from the tenor of the prosecutor’s argument, not doubting that somewhere the book discussed the fact, that only a minority of the scientific class, as of every other, are followers of *the Nazarene*, an argument was written out, proving the book no more infidel for this, than Paul’s epistle is infidel, for laying it down, as a law of the kingdom of *the Nazarene*, that into it “not many wise men are called.” The volume came; the argument was laid aside. Curiosity gave place to amazement. The volume, searched, was found not to give a pretence, even, for this charge. It could not have been conjectured whence it arose, had not the prosecutor referred to this sentence, which he does not quote. “The ultimate fact or power is *ineffable*, and to a higher science in some latter-day of eternity, the language of our books may actually appear as child-like, as erroneous, as that of Moses and Job does to a savan of the nineteenth century.” How grand this idea! How true! And *this* is construed into an attack upon the religiousness of science, of so grave a character, that for it the inquisitor anathematizes the volume as infidel, outraging English language, and English fairness.

It may be doubted, whether the thought which worries the critic is in the sentence at all. The man of science, from his stand-point of science, in his scientific mood, may look on the language of Moses and Job, as he looks on the common

phenomenal language of mankind, as childlike and erroneous, without questioning its propriety, usefulness, or truth, as seen from another point of view. It does not appear, that more than this was in the mind of the writer ; and more than this is not likely to be in the reader's mind filled with the thought, of which this sentence is but a drop, that swells the full, onflowing river.

At most this is only an unqualified clause, such as may be found in all writers (especially where it is not the leading idea of the sentence, which requires to be qualified) and which cannot be avoided without wearisome and useless prolixity. If any general truth may be stated in unlimited form, that may be which, at the utmost, is but hinted at in the sentence. It seems to indicate an ignorance of the laws laid down in the beginning, for the development of the Kingdom of Heaven, when one seems to deny any part of the truth, that skepticism has characterized the science of the world, and must, until the kingdoms of the world become the kingdoms of Christ. Neander well said of Him : " He described the future effects of the truth, which he revealed in a way which no man could comprehend at the time, and which centuries of history have only been contributing to illustrate. Facts, which it required the course of ages to make clear, lay open to his eye ; and history has both explained and verified the laws which he pointed out for the progress of his kingdom." The Founder of the kingdom of heaven declared, in that general manner which suggests its own limitations, that its mysteries were hidden from the wise, and instructed his apostle to make known, that into it few of the wise are called. The ages, as they roll, attest unto Him. The law, as by Him uttered, eighteen centuries ago, and the fact, as it has been, is now, and shall be, agree.

The fact is an admitted fact. Take this sentence from the golden-mouthed author of " Nature and the Supernatural," — who, luckily, need dread no Danaan interdict, no stigma of infidel branded on his book, because he enjoys the immunities of Connecticut : — " From the first moment, or birthtime, of

modern science, — if we could fix the moment, — it has been clear that Christianity must ultimately come into a grand issue of life and death with it, or with the tendencies embodied in its progress; from the time of Galileo and Newton's discoveries down to the present moment of discovery and research in geological science, we have seen, on the side of science, multitudes, especially of the mere dilletanti, boasting almost every month some discovery that was to make a fatal breach upon revealed religion." And according to the rule applied to Lewis, what term of reproach shall be applied to this author?

Or take this from a sermon of Professor Phelps, of Andover. "Assaults upon the Bible have been characteristic of every period of scientific awakening in the learned world. There is something formidable, indeed, at first, in the apparent conspiracy of the sciences against any recognition of a revealed theology. Now by astronomy, and then by geology; on the one side by archæology, and on the other by ethnography; here by philology, and there by comparative anatomy, the Scriptures have been summoned to surrender this chapter and that of their histories, this narrative and that of their biographies, and this one and that of their doctrines, till scarcely a page remains across which the wisdom of the ages has not drawn its mark of erasure." Compare this with the two lines from Lewis, and if Lewis' book is to be called infidel because of those two lines; by what term of warning will you brand this sermon, and the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, which published it?

It is monstrous to call any book infidel for what at most is merely implied; still more so where the implication is a doubtful one; and more so still where the sentence, if regarded as containing a general implication whose qualification common sense supplies, is unobjectionable: and if this be so of any book, far more of a book breathing the childlike trust, the reverential awe, and wonder of the seers of the primeval ages. Another count charges the book with teaching "a degrading and degraded development theory." This charge is brought in on all occasions. It might be refuted by three lines, but it is

necessary to consider it minutely, because it is most persistently alleged.

The volume, interpreting the record of the creation of the vegetable and animal races in its only possible sense teaches, that when the omnific Word went forth creating them, its power was so exerted upon the earth and through the earth, that, in the germination of plants and the birth of animals, the earth was made to exert a causative power, which was an essential link of the chain of causation then originated. The chapter following, on Man's creation, opens thus: "In what has been previously said of the growth of plants, and even of animals, from the earth, it has probably suggested itself to the reader's mind, that the writer is on dangerous ground; or, at all events, pursuing a train of argument and interpretation which, if not well guarded, may lead to some unwelcome conclusions. Carry out this view, it may be said, and we may make man also a product of natural law, divinely vivified, it may be, but still in some way a development, a growth out of the earth or elements. But here, again we say, keep to the only knowledge of the matter, or the only means of knowledge we have or ever can have. Keep to the record God has given us. Had this taught us plainly in respect to man, as we think it has in respect to the plants, and at least some of the inferior animals, that his body, or even his sentient *animal life* had been a natural growth developed from preceding organisms, by a supernatural quickening indeed, yet acting upon and through a former nature, we should have had no difficulty in believing it." Is it credible that a chapter thus opening should teach the development theory as the critic would have men believe? The author says, that had certain things been revealed, he could have believed them; who does not see this implies he does not think they are revealed; and that he wished his readers to see that no dread of the theory, different from that truth he finds revealed, had warped his interpretation?

The author then honestly goes on to state, that the development theory cannot be refuted by the words he "made," or

he "created." "To such a supposition, too, if confirmed from other sources of argument, or other evidence of interpretation, we should find nothing repugnant in the words, he 'made,' or he 'created,' as we have previously explained them. They are only general modes of expressing the fact of the divine production, whether such production be direct or through media." This fair arguing seems to be in part answerable for the critic's delusion.

The author, intimating his opinion from afar, securing the confidence of his readers, conducts the argument well for the purpose of winning their assent, when he points out wherein the creation of the animal races and of man differ. He finds two differences: first, the former "are spoken of generically as races," while God made, not men, not races, but two individuals; second, "He made them in his own image." In this part of his argument, all he contends for is, "that the origin of man, as man, was special and peculiar; by this meaning his distinctive humanity, as separate from all, that he has in common with the lower animals." He thinks his position is established; and then, still taking some pains to show he is not biased by hostility to a different theory (springing, perhaps, out of the fact, that some years since he had assailed it elsewhere), he gives this as his opinion as to the material organization of man. The Bible "seems to imply *an immediate formation even of the material nature, as though man were altogether a new thing, wholly severed from all physical connection with any previous states of being.*" This is decided, but he does not dogmatize. This helps to betray his critic into misapprehension. Had he been trained to the law, like his author, he would have appreciated his style. For when the advocate, interpreting some old decision, says it *seems* to him to mean thus and so, the judge understands this to be his opinion, the best he could form with study and care, and recognizing in it a sense of the fallibility of the human intellect, and a deference to the authority, he none the less entertains it, both as a decided and as a weighty opinion, because modestly expressed.

Had the Record ended here, no one should have mistaken this opinion. But it proceeds; and in what is revealed of the creation of Woman, the author finds that which compels a higher tone, and says, "*The whole language here seems to necessitate the idea not only of a supernatural spirituality, but of a sudden and preternatural formation of the material organism. If we are shut up to this view,*" this can have only this force: if the view taken of this language be, as it seems to me, the only view that can be taken — or as a writer, using a less becoming style, would have said, *since we are shut up to this view,* — "*then was Man widely distinguished from the brute creation in the origin of his lower, as well as that of his higher being.*" This is the conclusion with which the discussion of the creation of the body of Man ends; intimated from afar in its opening; on towards which its reasoning guardedly, honestly, and perseveringly sweeps; the ultimate conclusion no more to be called in question; and the wit of man may be defied to set forth this conclusion in terms more clearly opposed to the idea the critic would fasten on the book.

In a formal summing up of what he calls "prominent points" of his author, the critic charges him with teaching "that mother earth brings forth through her parturitive powers, man, so far as his physical nature goes." The reader will not attribute to Lewis the tautology of the phrase "physical nature." It is no more his than the idea charged. The earth was part of the chain of causation, which God saw fit to originate and establish in the production of the vegetable and animal races; but Lewis denies it was through this the body of man was produced. As has been seen, this is one of his elaborately established propositions. Lewis also holds that the making of the frame of man out of earth must have been a making according to the laws of that material, or else "it would be utterly impossible to discover any reason or meaning in the process." The two propositions are distinct, and by no means contradictory. The line between them is sharply and carefully drawn, still the critic charged his author with teaching that the earth brought forth the frame of man.

In reply to this charge, the author, in a letter, then stated that the book "taught the *direct contrary*." He referred to the remark, that had the Scripture taught it, he could have believed it; and with this connected the passages cited, and also this decisive sentence, — which, referring to the very doctrine afterwards imputed to him, he had written, with superabundant caution — "*We do not say the Bible teaches this; we do not think any one would be warranted in putting such an interpretation upon it;*" and having cited this, he says, "*could I use language more explicit?*"

Whatever course a man might take who had charged an author with teaching the direct contrary of what he did teach, he could not take a worse course than this critic. He says "the quotations he himself makes from his scriptural cosmology leave the reader's mind in a quandary as to the actual opinions held, the assertions looking one way, and the quotations another." The letter states that *the book does not interpret the Bible as teaching that the frame of man is a growth from the earth*; this is its assertion, and this is its quotation from the book as to the same point, "*we do not think the Bible teaches this.*" *These are identical statements.* And this from the critic is even still worse. "Prof. Lewis would now have us to understand that all his development theory was an *if* in his work. There is much virtue in an *if*, and some convenience."

We relieve this discussion by this neat argumentative satire from Lewis, who, tired with being charged with teaching what he never taught, never believed, and has refuted, thus turns on his assailant: "If he does not find the man in the fish, he certainly finds the fish in the man, the mammalia in the man, the monkey in the man, the whole caravan of the lower animation in this single, all-containing *homo*. If it is not a development of man out of the lower animals, it is certainly an envelopment of the lower animals into man; and that equally affects our dignity by making them physically bone of our bone, and flesh of our flesh."

CHAPTER V.

THE last count charges that the book is "infidel" because of its idea of Nature ; but the book merely holds, on scriptural grounds, to the ancient common idea of Nature.

According to the idea of Nature which man was formed to entertain, and which is proved to be true because he is so formed, Nature is from God, is upheld by Him in being, yet has a real existence. Man conceives of matter as without motion, as inert, as dead. Watching the plants springing up out of the earth, the sap climbing up into the boughs, the ascending mist, the descending rain, currents of the air, pulsations of the sea, he seizes hold of the idea of Nature, as matter informed with life, as something living, and holds to the idea of matter as the substratum of a living world. Poetry, the language of human emotion, Language, the rendering of human thought, is full of this. These are the ideas of Lewis. He holds, as a thinker should, what men hold, not seeing clearly all that is of necessity included in the idea. When shallow thinkers attempt to see this, they resolve the phenomena of nature into pantheism ; but the philosophic intellect is driven to the idea of immaterial entities behind the phenomena of the world, capable of being subjects of law. Nothing in these ideas permits them to be called infidel, whether true or false. They are merely the same ideas, philosophically thought out and expressed, which are commonly held in a less philosophical and thorough manner. The "Six Days of Creation" but holds on scriptural grounds, what men hold on other grounds, and generally without having inquired what the Scripture teaches, or whether it teaches anything, on the subject.

This is the prosecutor's idea of Nature. He "conceives

of Nature not only as God's initial work, but as his constant work, ever sustained, and never left to go alone, and therefore *no more requiring rest than God himself; no more capable of self-acting obedience, than as God's own acts are obedient to Himself.*" *This is the pantheistic view of the material world.* He justly claims that he is not a pantheist; but his views and those of the pantheist are the same, so far as the material world is concerned. And his ideas are revolting in connection with what he says elsewhere, namely, that "man's virtues, vices, and various emotions, high and low, are, to a great extent, portrayed in nature."

We enrich our page with Lewis' refutation of this pantheistic idea of the material world. According to those who hold the opinions just cited, "Nature is only apparent, apparent in the most unreal or pantheistical sense, as representing nothing between the appearance and God. They make it simply the common, instead of the uncommon divine manifestation. The natural and the supernatural have no *real* difference. God's *immediate* power carries on every part of the process. All the apparently intermediate steps are as directly His as the beginning; He is as much, and in the same sense, the immediate pervading agent, as He is the originating cause and sustaining ground. In other words, there is no real Nature, no real birth of one thing from another, no true natural or intermediate causality. It is only an appearance, a false appearance, too, for it seems to represent some *mediate* power, when there is really no such mediation between the appearance and Deity — all the apparent links being as much immediate, and in one sense, outward to each other, that is, without real connection, as the one chronologically first; every movement of every wheel and cog being direct from the touching hand of the machine maker, although for the purpose of confounding and deceiving the beholder, he brings out these immediate and tactual effects, in an order of sequence, suggestive of real, inward, connective causality.

"On this view, too, creation *disappears*. If there is not a

nature made, and then in some way left to itself, then there is no difference conceivable between the starting and the on-going. Then, also, of course, creation is as much going on now, and everywhere, both in time and space, as it was at the beginning.

“ But this annihilation of Nature, causality, creation, and the world, cannot stop even here. It must push on, until it takes the position that God *cannot* make a Nature, a causality, a world, objective and real. He cannot make them in any sense self-existent, or possessing anything that may be called a self-hood, or that may in any way be said to be left to itself, or by any withdrawal, in any degree, of the prime originating power. We say, *in any degree* ; for the same difficulty attends a less or greater withdrawal. If in any of the passing phenomena of Nature, there is in any way, *less* of the divine power and presence than in the creative start, then something, or some part, or some degree of the subsequent on-going is ‘left to itself,’ as truly, though not to the same extent, as though there had been a greater withdrawal. It comes, then, to this, — God could not make a Nature ; He could not give a power and a law, that could, in any sense, go by themselves ; for we can just as easily conceive and believe, that God is matter, as that he is an immanent *force*, or that the one is any the less a created, on-going, *ex-isting* entity, than the other. In other words, he could not so make this power and law as to work out an idea without his own immediate finger touching, like an engraver’s tool, at every point and particle of the picture.”

It was well this was printed before the eighty-eight pages of the last Dana paper, for good use is made of it. The critic shows a hopeful aptitude for truth ; he comes over to Lewis’ ground, though he does not confess it. He gives this definition : “ Nature is a progressive work from the beginning, through successive original creations by God, and laws, and ordained free working forces, sustained by God’s power.” God then gives laws, and there are free working forces to obey those laws ; if anything is meant by this, it means about the same as Lewis does. He also says, “ we doubt not, that waves and

running waters move through inherent powers, and not by direct divine action ; that, in a sense, nature carries forward her own work." Here he applies to waves and running waters—whether correctly, or not, will not be inquired—the idea of Lewis, that Nature is not immediate divine action at every step of its course, but that it moves on by inherent powers. His phrase, "in some sense, Nature carries forward her own work," if it means anything, is equivalent to a phrase of Lewis he much objects to, "that Nature is, in some sort, left to herself." Even in his first paper his language is not consistent, for in one place he says, "Nature is not a mere collection of things, of trees, and rocks, and animals, and man, but of living activities."

He qualifies his later statements thus : "but we believe that he who established the forces of matter and their laws, still by his power keeps those forces and laws as they were established, and so Nature pursues his work, while acting under inherent qualities." He was alarmed by the idea, that all things pass through cycles of growth and decay ; for thus there was change ever working, which threatened the stability of all science, and so tended to impair the interest of "the youth of our land therein," its laws seeming from this "mutable as the changing seasons." The vastness of Lewis' time-conceptions, his Day of the World, overarching the generations back to the creation of man, and the unknown of future time, allow these changes to come about so imperceptibly, that no immediate apprehension need be felt in scientific cabinets just now ; still, the idea was not welcome, and this is a caveat against it ; "the laws and forces of nature are kept just as they were established." As it is not to be expected that a neophyte should at once comprehend his master ; it is not strange that Professor Dana, in adopting some of Lewis' principles, did not see how they modified others of his own. Lewis had taught him, that "the constant tendency of Nature, general or partial, is to degenerate from the primal force ; or, in other words, when left to itself to manifest its necessary finiteness ;" and he echoes it back thus : "there is a certain inherent decay of the finite." Now,

if there is inherent decay in the finite, there is decay in nature ; " its inherent forces " are not kept as they were established ; and the consequences of Lewis' idea flow from this last word of the critic which destroys his first.

The neophyte even goes on to point out decay at the centre of the solar system. He says, since " cooling must be still in progress, it is natural to infer, that the suns are getting colder, though imperceptibly so, and must end, as has been urged by some writers, in becoming quite cold. A cold sun would be death to all that lives in our planetary system, and a cold universe, a dark, lifeless Nature." This is not based on ascertained fact, as to the sun itself, for " its cooling is imperceptible," and it implies more knowledge of light and heat than science can be given credit for. Our critic should ponder this, for it is but applying his own criticism to his own speculation to say it tends to discourage " the youth of our land," from scientific pursuits, by teaching them that imperceptible causes are varying all the results they arrive at ; it introduces error into science ; worse still, it threatens to end science by freezing up the savans, to say nothing of the rest of mankind, as stiff as Sir John Franklin and his crew. If then, as the propositions of John Milton were burnt in Oxford, the writings of Tayler Lewis are to be burnt on college green, — burnt as " infidel " for teaching that, looking from the highest plane of thought, and taking into account all the causes working through this great day of eternity, it is seen that science cannot attain to absolute, unchangeable, eternal truth, — then into purgatorial fires the *Bibliotheca Sacra* must go also.

CHAPTER VI.

PROFESSOR LEWIS having designed an appendix to the third edition of "The Six Days," accumulated materials for this purpose, until they exceeded the bounds assigned them; and, not being consistent with the policy of the Review in which his book had been criticized to admit of it there, he incorporated with this, a reply to its criticism, and also to the criticism of the Rev. Mr. Lord, of New York, in a volume entitled "The Bible and Science."¹

Professor Dana reviewed this book as he did the former, as to which he also continued his criticisms. He made it the aim of the first to abuse science, he makes it the aim of the last to abuse himself!² He thinks this book "is remarkable for its personal abuse" of himself, and it would seem, for this only.

This gentleman, so nicely sensitive to personal reflections, strings together a dozen passages, and, after each, asks, with the venom of italics, *is this true?* Examine these passages in all their bearings, and you will find them each and all true. The intent of these interrogatories is to raise a false issue. The question should have been, *is this correct?*; but to ask *is this true*, suited the intent. The learned professor had re-

¹ The Bible and Science; or The World Problem. Schenectady: G. V. Van Deboert. It having been said of this Essay that it may seem to imply that Lewis has not made a good defence, the Essayist would say, First, that this volume does not find its way into New England.

Second, that Mr. Lewis could not answer charges of "ignorance," of "prejudice," of "emptiness," of "doing valiant service for the Evil One," etc., etc.

Third, that the papers against "The Six Days," as well as against "The Bible and Science," continued at great length, after the publication of the latter.

² This is unfair to Mr. Lord. The Rev. Mr. Lord receives as much attention in the book as Dr. Dana, but being merely the editor of the Theological and Literary Review in New York, is properly ignored by the resident in New Haven.

ceived such an intellectual humbling, that nothing occurred to him, but to represent himself as an injured individual to the partial jury of the vicinage; and he "wonders all this could have come from the author of the Six Days of Creation." If his own charge, that he "had labored to throw opprobrium on all the scientific sect," be not erroneous, why should he wonder?

These passages are arrayed with a perverse ingenuity which may well mislead, yet when intelligently weighed there is but one of them which need be excepted to; and this is one of two, which seem most prominently put forward. When commenting on Dr. Dana's remarks about the relations of science to the interpretation of Scripture, in which he compares exegesis to a boat driven by the current of science, Lewis writes sternly, and uses these words: "The professed orthodoxy of his position would lead him to speak well of the Bible, and to be rhetorical about the harmonies; but he is sometimes off his guard." This was hastily penned, for, with amiable inconsistency, he elsewhere says "he has no doubt of Prof. Dana's sincere belief in the Scriptures." He wrote out the thought which flashed through his brain, in view of the censurable language in which exegesis was likened to a boat, driven at its will by the currents of science; and afterwards writes as if not conscious of having uttered it. The apology is, that having been reading the Dana articles, he slid down into the style of this sentence:—"Prof. Lewis would now have us understand, that all his development theory was an *if* in his work. There is much value in an *if*, and some convenience. It appears here like the cautiousness of one afraid that judgment would be passed on his orthodoxy."

The other passage referred to, seems to be cited with an ostensible and an occult purpose. The author, speaking of the Danaan cosmogony, which at its start alludes to the scriptural, says, "A scanty act of homage once rendered to the spiritual power, very much as the Italian Machiavelli makes his appeasing bow to the spiritual conclave, science breathes freer and

passes on." The attempt to explain the Mosaic record, by the nebular hypothesis of creation, is not new ; and the author, in following a borrowed variation of this scientifico-religico theory, just then loses sight of the person re-propounding it, as that person loses sight of Moses. He does not think the Doctor is a Machiavelli ; he does not personify the Doctor as Science, and probably the Doctor does not think he does ; for he seems to cite this to effect something different from its ostensible purpose. His geologico-religico theory had been ruined. He has no defence of it ; but here insinuates what may serve the turn of a reply, by prefacing the citation, thus, " After mentioning inaccurately the relations of geology to the Mosaic narrative laid down by Prof. Dana, he adds, ' this scanty act,' etc ;" by saying this in this incidental way, he shuns the impossible pointing out of this inaccuracy.

There has been no abuse of the Professor, unless putting a Professor down by force of logic is abuse. Lewis has been abused ; but, with one single exception, he is as cool as a man reasoning down a boy. And is it not strange that this gentleman, who from year to year could mock at a scholar's " lamentable ignorance," at a Christian's " unworthy spirit," and " infidel " book, should be so sensitive as to himself ?

" All are men,
Condemned alike to groan, —
The feeling for another's woes,
The unfeeling for his own."

The critic had a theory. The exposition of the genesis in " The Six Days " was in the way of it, and the book was to be put out of the way. This being supposed to be done, the scientific cosmogony is ushered in. The manager had better not have fixed the eye of Lewis on his exhibition. The coolness with which he takes up this cosmogony, looks at it, looks over it, looks under it, looks all round it, walks away from it as a thing of naught, talks of other things, comes back to it, and makes it,

—— “Upwhirled aloft,
Fly over the backside of the world, far off,
Into a limbo large and broad,”

is appalling.

Aghast at the ruin of his cosmogony, the Professor to win sympathy quotes “his cosmology does not lean upon the Bible at all, and he takes no pains to give it that appearance,” and asks, in piteous italics, *is this true?* It is true. He did not try hard, which is the meaning of taking pains, or he could not have so utterly failed. The scheme professes to reconcile Science and Moses. Moses disappears; this is the conciliation. The mighty Seer seems courteously present at the opening of the exhibition; but, offended by the utter neglect of his second day,¹ he departs to muse alone; and, the ancient Seer fairly gone, fancy wanders free and unconfined, regardless not only of his unlucky second Day, but of all his Days; and has a creation in six or sixteen, as it will; and these Days one straight-forward, right-onward, continuous Day, without break or rest, or pause, from elemental star-mist to man.

The Professor, in desperation, would involve Lewis himself in the broken meshes of the nebular-Mosaic cosmology. He says, “he expresses great admiration for the nebular hypothesis, though not asserting actual belief in it; and in *The Six Days of Creation*, the deep, or water, of the second verse was explained as an immense floating nebulosity, or part of some larger nebulosity.” Lewis says of the nebular hypothesis, “he cannot help respecting what has been advocated by a Henry, a Pierce, and an Alexander among ourselves; but at the same time there may be a reasonable doubt, whether it can be forced into any accommodation with the Mosaic creative history.” But in this “*The Bible and Science*” is consistent with “*The Six Days*.” That supposes Creation, as revealed, to begin after the formless mass had been separated from the vast ocean of force, if such there be; to begin when the Spirit

¹ In the Professor's scheme, the second day of Moses is not named in the text. It emerges in a little note at the bottom of the page.

hovered over the chaos,—which chaos, "*before this, or for ages before this*, may have been an immense floating nebulosity, or part of some still larger nebulosity; *but at this period it is a wide fluid mass, or waste of waters*, without a shore, without a bottom, without a sky above, or any terminating solid bound."

The Professor tries hard to prevent "The Bible and Science" from being read. His extracts are ingeniously made for this purpose. This is the rule for some of them. Take any piece of sarcasm. Usually, its point is near the beginning, or before the close; if the former, commence a little below the beginning; if the latter, end a little above it. Thus you can present the invective without its point, or without what moves to it; and thus it may appear without reason. Print it, and after it, "What a frenzy for nothing!" "His mind sees phantoms!" But you should make the extract so as to be intelligible, or the reader may refer to the book; but this depends somewhat on the chance of his having the book; and if you are writing for New Englanders about a book printed in Schenectady, it may be safe.

The reader supposes himself furnished with an analysis, but, on comparing the pages which seem such, with the book, finds this is almost confined to the Introduction. And after pages, which thus set forth the aims of the book, the critic says: "The conclusion of the whole matter is, that 'all science must be excluded from biblical interpretation, as well as all deductions from any science, which we are sure was unknown to the writer;' a plea is afterwards added for the author's favorite faculty; he says, that 'the imagination may be soberly indulged.'" The first citation is but a part of the seventh of nine rules of interpretation; and what is meant by calling this "the conclusion of the whole matter?" The last has no reference to interpretation. The critic overlooks the caution, and here, as usual, wildly indulges the imagination.

About this volume much has the critic written, but from it it is impossible to divine its character. It is a book of thoughts

on these two themes, Science, and the Bible. Without a plan, it has that unity which pervades the meditation of a great mind on kindred themes. It has one chapter on interpretation; one on the word *bara*; one on the question whether the nebular hypothesis can be introduced into the Mosaic creative history; and it presents its author's opinions on many subjects.¹

Some books express all their author's thinking. Not so with those of Lewis. Its meaning is given in "The Six Days" with sufficient fulness; but study the discussion of *bara* in the later volume, when it was necessary to disclose the massiveness of those foundations, on which the former conclusions rested. Look, too, in "The Six Days," at the indication of the opinion, all there needed, that the facts embraced in the nebular hypothesis, or supposed to be, are *extra dies*; and then, in the later volume, see the breadth of the thinking which was back of the two or three lines, over which some readers may have glanced with scarce a thought.

Lewis has lived to seek for truth, not to write it. He has not written that he might think, but because he has thought. His investigations have come from that "pure love of theoretical truth," which, he tells us, is "one of the highest traits of our nature." His writings, instead of being full expressions of them, seem their accidental consequences. Yet they abound in algebraic expressions of his thinking; and in Essays given lightly to the winds, is much of the thought of one of those geniuses, "of whom nature is sparing, whom she creates with centuries between."

¹ The titles of the pages on the Bible and Science are singularly more effective than those in the Table of Contents, to which, in evident haste, there has been given a quaint rather than an attractive air.

CHAPTER VII.

THE passages in this criticism to which exception may be taken, are so numerous, that we have been perplexed between the wish to do justice and the fear of tiring our readers out. Perhaps it would have sufficed to have indicated the great faults of the criticism; but the errors are so many and so strange, that we seemed compelled to correct more of them, than one who does not study the criticism, could think was necessary; and we ask indulgence while out of many we do this for one or two more.

The critic says his author “denies a knowledge of science,” and courteously asks, “Is it not a marvel that a learned Professor should attempt to grasp a subject which required the highest knowledge of natural powers and capabilities, without the least investigation as to what are the actual powers and capabilities of nature.” The author’s ignorance of science has been considered. Knowledge is not to be confounded with wisdom, the remembrance of facts with the perception of principles. The allegation of the author’s ignorance of science seems to have arisen from his critic’s not comprehending some of its great principles. But this charge of ignorance of Geology may deserve a passing glance. The critic would base this, and the charge of ignorance of science, on some intimation from Lewis. We find nothing which gives color to this. If aught there be, it is, no doubt, some line conformed to the usage of classical writers to speak modestly of themselves, — a usage unlike the critic’s, who, speaking of murmurs at his criticisms, personifies himself as science, saying, “religious journals, claiming to be guardians of sacred truth, have been so led away as to abuse science for exposing the doctrines of the author.” The evidence offered to uphold the charge of ignorance of Geology, is the use of the word *fungi*, as thus:

"Why so many years of sea-weed and *fungi*? Why so many unhistorical centuries of zoöphytes, and worms, and monstrous reptiles?" Its first use is italicised, indicating something peculiar. In a geological treatise, this use of it might be bad; but in the places where it is used in the volume, no other one word would so nearly give just the impression meant.

There is also an alleged misunderstanding of certain facts. "The Six Days" holds that nature, general or partial, tends to deteriorate, and speaks "of rests in nature." The critic says intervals of rest "are not in the records of nature." Commenting on which, the author says, "he contradicts himself in the very next sentence: 'the longest suspension of life in North America took place, as near as we can learn, between the coal period and the middle reptilian.' A suspension of life looks very much like a rest in the nature." This argumentative sarcasm, the critic says, is "based upon a misapprehension of the facts." What the author here says is based on the critic's own statement, which he does not endorse. The critic then says this suspension of life was about the middle of the fifth day; and would seem to hint that the author looked upon it as the end of a Mosaic period, and so brings in his abrupt "misapprehension of the facts." But he dared not hazard the assertion.

It is not important to vindicate the author's geological knowledge. Had he known no Geology, his book had been more convincing; for, though he means to interpret unbiased by this science, some will doubt it, as it is impossible its principles should be unknown to him. They are as well known as those of most sciences, and to intimate of him, who began his course with an exposition of the true life of science, which placed him among the first thinkers of his country that he is too ignorant of Geology to interpret the Bible,—is in keeping with the rest of this criticism.

The critic says "the author exhibits a constant fear lest Geology should teach something:" the author says, "he would acknowledge the essential aid which Geology is rendering to *important ideas of revelation.*"

The critic represents his author as describing “the six days as periods indefinite, vast ; still not so long as asserted by geologists.” “It would seem to be a trivial fault in a case where all is acknowledged to be so indefinite. But still it is not pardoned. He does not anywhere mention the exact length of time which, consistently with divine wisdom, these periods could have occupied.” The passage referred to is this : “How long were these creative days ? The question must remain unanswered. Perhaps it could not be answered in any language, or any computations that the human mind could receive. They were *dies ineffabiles*. They were incommensurable by any estimates we could apply. In one aspect, they may have been short ; in another, immensely long. The Bible has not told us anything about it. The geologist thinks he has discovered that they were of vast duration. He talks very flipantly, and very ignorantly, of millions and billions of years. He measures the operations of God and Nature, then, by the movements of the latter, as they come under his present observation.”

Of this the critic can make nothing, but that it charges geologists with making the periods too long. He might as well have said, it charged them with making them too short. The idea in it is just. Geologists measure that for which there is no measure ; periods when there was no sun in heaven to mark the years, no intellect on earth to measure their duration by succession of thoughts ; periods in which the rate of working is and must be unknown. This borne in mind, our time-words may be applied to those periods, and our rates of working now to effects then, for the want of something better. But, if, mindless of this, men walk to and fro in those ineffable times, amid the workings of their unknown powers, with chronometers and foot-rules, they cannot attain to certainty, and they grow insensible to the moral impression made on the reverential mind by the awful hieroglyph which borders the world of man’s destiny.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE charges this critic makes against the volume he professes to review have been examined ; yet there is still a question to consider. Certainly Professor Dana is quite in earnest. The rudeness of his tone, offensive as it is to a correct taste, may be accepted as unpalatable but convincing evidence of sincerity. No doubt he thinks the "Six Days" a bad book. It will be inquired, then, how he gets this opinion of the book ; and this as preliminary to further inquiry into the worth of his opinion concerning it. The last inquiry has in part been answered by proving that he overlooks much in the book, — does not comprehend much ; but this does not fully explain how he gets this bad opinion of it. This is connected with certain religious phenomena.

The drift of the ecclesiastical mind in New England is towards philosophical religionism. Analyzing the ideas expressed by Philosophy and Religion, it appears that the phrase philosophical religion expresses a self-contradictory notion. *Γνωσις* is the essential thing in the one, — Faith, in the other. In a philosophical religion, or where there is a strong tendency that way, the philosophical element tends to kill out the religious ; and in a region infected with philosophical religionism, there will be a general tendency to philosophize, rather than to believe. Men will construct systems for themselves ; and shades of belief, or rather of unbelief, will be developed in gradation from the most orthodox philosophical religionism to undisguised atheism. For there is a logical, though subtle, connection between them. Scripture teachings are interpreted philosophically, which amounts to this : that a philosophical scheme is held, which is thought to be upheld by Scripture. This is more zealously defended from the philosophical than

from the scriptural side. Scripture teachings are, unconsciously, converted into philosophical teachings. But such interpretations being more or less fallacious, the fallacy is discovered or felt by some, who, finding certain parts of the Scripture resist such interpretations, discard those, and, in their revolt, the interpreting philosophy also. And when the Bible is discarded, whether wholly or in part, then come in, in its place, the various systems of pure philosophy, all of which, however variant in their forms, however opposed to each other, run out into atheology.

As philosophical religionism, though the prolific parent of heresies, and of all the schemes of infidel philosophy, is not fruitful in profound or genuine religious emotions, wherever it prevails, multitudes wander to and fro, seeking aliment for their souls wherever they think they can find it. Some fly for refuge to sects where the philosophical mania is not raging; some take shelter in mysticism; some, in their chilly darkness, resort to unhallowed spiritualism, — one of the forms of the heart's manifold protest against the barrenness both of philosophical religionism and of infidel philosophy.

As might have been expected from his pursuits, our critic has turned to a pious naturalism. He feels the coldness, he sees the barrenness of philosophical religionism, and he seeks for something, after which his moral nature pines, in the teachings of Nature. The old religion still inspires him with awe, and kindles him with devotion; but he loves to put into the lips of Nature truths breathed only in revelation. He tinges her pale cheeks with pantheistic rouge; and very dear is his soul's communion with his Egeria, who whispers so much truth, or seems to whisper. Hence the voice from Schenectady, which broke in on his matins and vespers, warning that the Nature-Nymph knows not the supernatural, — has no eternal, unerring word for the soul, — seemed to utter “in his ears words of profound infidelity.” *That warning he heard, and that was all he would hear; that he understood, and that was all he would understand.* Blind and deaf to all but that,

he goes forth *pro aris et focis*. As came the book of Waldense or Bohemian of old to some well-fed, well-comforted, well-honored abbot, warning of the vanity of things to him venerable and personal, and seeming to threaten the passing away of all that was good and profitable on earth, so came to his comfortable study the book from Schenectady; and in the irate professor reappears the abbot, his astonishment, his very sincere rage, his overbearing manner, his bluster, and his barbarous Latin.

Some of his opinions on metaphysical, moral, and religious subjects in his voluminous criticism are now to be examined; but let the reader take courage; for his style, as he loses sight of the hated volume of warning, puts away its roughness, and becomes flowery and meandering.

Our citation is from a "few general thoughts upon nature, as man's assistant in progress." "Although man is immortal, the earth is his appointed place of pupilage. His body is of the dust of the earth, and is under the same laws of growth with animals, and also depends largely upon the laws of Chemistry or inorganic nature. While having senses to put himself in connection with nature, and serve as avenues of knowledge and aid to his thinking mind, *the world is filled with knowledge, — not, it is true, of Greek and Hebrew, but of another language of wider significance and deeper wisdom; the depths of nature being the unfathomable depths of the infinite.*" In this last sentence there may be portrayed more of the writer's soul, than he is aware of. Knowledge of the Hebrew and of the Greek is knowledge of the languages in which the revelation of God is given; and, though the writer did not consciously mean to compare Scripture language with the language of Nature, such a comparison is suggested; and, from what is here said, it logically follows, that nature-language is of deeper significance than scriptural.

For the depths of the infinite are not in a book. The book is the record of Him, in whom, indeed there were the depths of the infinite. To him who will behold the Infinite in Him,

the Spirit reveals it in him, by or through the Book. The idea that the depths of nature are the depths of the infinite, is Pantheism, and poor Pantheism at that; for nature, not including the spiritual here, means only the material universe. This, then, is that new Religion, the idea of which was suggested by the novel use of terms, by the charging as a crime what was unknown as a crime, to Christianity. According to this new Religion, the depths of Nature are the depths of the Infinite. That there should be in Christ the fulness of the Godhead, has been thought the mystery passing the mind of angels; but this is a mystery beyond that! And if the depths of Nature are the depths of the Infinite, some will think Revelations of Nature may very well take the place of those of Scripture.

This instructive passage proceeds thus: "The world is filled with knowledge, not, it is true, of Greek and Hebrew, but of another language of wider significance and deeper wisdom; the depths of nature being the unfathomable depths of the infinite. The earth was thus made the arena from which man was to rise to celestial heights. He was ordered to subdue and have dominion, and so to take strength *from the infinite source within his reach*. While other species reach maturity, within and without, by simple growth, being in a sense made by nature even to the finishing-stroke, man is required to work out his elevation, and is held responsible for his ignorance and weakness. He was to love, love with all his heart; but none the less to search and 'find out knowledge' from the world around him. And thus Science and the Bible were to go hand in hand in man's elevation." Knowledge in the Scripture means moral science; and, if the words quoted from Scripture are used as evidence from Scripture of the ideas advanced, they are no evidence of them. The last sentence cited is in a great degree nullified by the next. It is inconsistent with the rest of the paragraph. He says, "Science and the Bible were to go hand in hand in man's education;" but he goes on to show they did not, and that man, through all the early ages, was left to the

teachings of nature, with one qualification of this assertion. "In that early age, when *the whole Bible*" — and he italicises¹ the words *the whole Bible* — "consisted of merely the first commission, and the first promise, nature was by his side. The beauty of leaf and flower were there, to refine and cultivate; the grandeur of the hoary mountain and the rushing torrent, to quicken his soul to great deeds, and all *the earth sent forth an incense that should bear him upward in devout contemplation*. Beauty found its response in the soul, the sublimity of the vast and unmeasured in time and space had there a sympathetic cord; the order and system in nature answered to the love of harmonies that possessed man's inner being. And under these expanding influences and growth in intellectual and moral truth, a lofty elevation of the individual man was attained. Yet along with these means of growth, there was also a knowledge of nature, that gave man some control of her powers, though that knowledge was not systematized and reduced to scientific order. Thus nations were enabled to rise in intellectual strength."

Evidently the ages described reach to the writing of the Pentateuch; and during these ages, in which it is emphatically said, "*the whole Bible* was merely a commission and a promise," leaves and flowers refined, mountains and torrents quickened, and man was upborne on the incense of the earth! Growth in moral truth is spoken of, but there is no intimation that it was through revelation; — with the exception of a commission and promise, Nature taught man.

The philosophical religionism of New England is remarkable for its want of sound philological training, its narrow historical views, its shallow philosophy; and hence there outset from it impetuous and brief currents, flowing on into Paganism. From the citation above, may be learned the historical idea in vogue at one of its universities, as to the early ages of the world, viz.; that revelation then consisted merely of a commis-

¹ Generally throughout this volume the Italics are the Essayist's.

sion and a promise, and the progress of man was left to Nature down to the writing of the Pentateuch. On a different theory, suggested by the Bible and by History, there was a wide-spread, a universal Revelation in the earliest age; and to this are to be ascribed the ancient civilizations, and those of some existing nations, the roots of whose civilization run far backward towards, and, it is to be presumed, into the patriarchal ages. The moral element in man, enlightened by "the light which enlighteneth every man," is the spring of civilization. When this element is so dead in a race that it degenerates into barbarism, that race can never rise out of barbarism, unless in some way it is brought into finer contact with the chain of influence let down from Him who revealed his Truth to the patriarchs of the infant world, and again to apostles sent by Him to all nations. In vain, without this, the leaves and the torrents; the savage feels no influence from them that exalts him into the civilized state. Those who have no insight into the primitive revelation, its manifold, far-reaching, still existing influences, may ascribe man's advancement to the earth's incense, to nature knowledge, or anything else; but their theory countenances the favorite theory of infidelity, that man made such advance apart from, without, and before the Scriptures, that they cannot be regarded as indispensable to his progress.¹

The writer, doubtless, feeling that leaves and flowers, and nature knowledge would not account for the old civilizations, calls in a third element. "Thus the nations were enabled to rise in intellectual strength, and also to fill their coffers and enlarge their bounds by pillage and rapine. Pillage and rapine were essential to that greatness, while the acquaintance of man with nature remained so meagre." Pillage and rapine, essential to the greatness of the early ages, because man's nature

¹ If the ideas above considered prevail in New England, good service might be done here by Lewis' Essay on "Natural Religion, the Remains of Primitive Revelation." This pamphlet, not now accessible, is not in the Essayist's possession. Like other of Lewis' papers, when out of his hands, it went so fast and far, that it never came back. The selection from Lewis' writings in the Third Part of this Essay was not from a complete collection of them.

knowledge was meagre ! Tell not this in Texas ! — in that nomadic land nature knowledge is sufficiently meagre, and auriferous defenceless realms invite to rapine. They may think their scientific nature knowledge so meagre, that rapine is essential to their greatness. The practice has run before the sermon. It might be inscribed on the banners of armies furious to engage in pillage and rapine, and numerous as those which marched to the preaching of Mohammed. Few Empires have such scientific knowledge, but they may think pillage and rapine essential to their greatness. Their rulers seem as persuaded of this as were Cambyzes or Nimrod ; and historians may vindicate their devastations by the word of our philosopher. What a word it is ! Pillage and rapine essential to greatness in any circumstances ! What is this Christian professor's idea of greatness ?

“ Thus the nations were enabled to rise in intellectual strength, and also to fill their coffers with pillage and rapine. Pillage and rapine were essential to that greatness, while the acquaintance of man with nature remained so meagre. The philosophers of that era, as of others before it, found it vastly more pleasant to be at ease, and dream out worlds, than to study profoundly the world which God had made ; and it was very natural that metaphysics should have preceded physics.” And in this connection we cite this word of the critic : “ The sciences of nature, in a single century, have grown to an extent that reproaches the ancient world for its indolence, and rejoices the modern for its rapid exaltation.” Philosophers of the early ages loved their ease, and hence preferred metaphysics to physics. This is the rationale of the bent of ancient philosophy toward the metaphysical ! The ancient world was lazy ; the modern is industrious ; thus the modern has surpassed the ancient ! These are profound ideas !

In the ancient world, thought may have turned much on things metaphysical, but much of that thinking was on subjects now within the realm of revealed truth. Something of metaphysical speculation was then bent on physics ; a natural error,

and, if wholly error, not abandoned yet;¹ but a strong bent towards metaphysics was then, as now, evidence of vigor of soul. The last thing the lazy undertake is metaphysics.

The early ages of the world had everything to do. Their achievements were great. To civilization, the power to provide for physical wants, and also to adorn life with elegance, is indispensable. The first worker in iron was the father of the arts; the first maker of a musical instrument was the father of the fine arts. Architecture, sculpture, painting, followed in the train of music. And will the critic, who to point his eulogium on this bustling century, reproaches the ancient world with indolence, fix on the man of this century, whose monument should be built beside that of the man who forged the first bar of iron, or of the man who invented the first instrument of music?

This is going back a great way; but we were compelled to go back a great way. The critic started on a historical ramble; we after him. His point of departure was the time when the whole Bible was merely a commission and a promise. We do not go back of that. He also speaks of "an age of pillage and rapine," and says, "then, and for ages before," philosophers loved to lie at ease; and he reproaches the whole ancient world with indolence. These time hints are rather indefinite; but at no time, so far as its state can be known or conjectured, was the ancient world an indolent world. What discoveries the earlier historical ages, before Rome was, or Greece, had made, or at least were in possession of, — for they were made at some time in that ancient world, which is reproached for indolence! This century has brought to high perfection the uses of steam (which it did not discover), but those earlier ages had found out the mechanical powers. Of all the inventions of the last five or six centuries, the printing-press is the most vaunted. But some early age invented the art of writing. And it is well

¹ Prof. Agassiz says: "We trust that the day may yet return when the study of metaphysical and physical science will be, as of old, more closely connected than it is at present."

men invented that magical art when their nerves were strong, for the nation which made such ado about the submarine telegraph would not have survived the shock of such a discovery as that.

Until recently there was much incredulity as to the mechanical skill, — despite of the Pyramids, — and as to the science and art of the earlier historical ages ; but many supposed later inventions can now be traced to the time

“ When Tyber slept beneath the cypress gloom,
And silence held the lonely woods of Rome ;
Or ere to Greece the builder’s skill was known,
Or the light chisel brushed the Parian stone.”¹

Something might be said of beginnings in science or art, of the first idea, of the first process ; something of the area of civilization ; of climate, too, many processes just discovered by the ancients they needed not, as if in colder climes ; something of the perfection of certain arts ; of the colossal greatness of Assyrian architecture ; of the durability of Egyptian ; of Phidias, of the Parthenon ; of the war and the legislation of Rome. But enough has been said of the critic’s view of ancient times.

Incredulous as to the Past, he is credulous as to the Present. “ In these modern times, man has gone beyond facts to principles, which is equivalent to grasping the deep centres of motion in the grand systems of forces, instead of simply using the

¹ Sir Henry Rawlinson thus sketches the range of Assyrian civilization: Among the ornaments are some which anticipate inventions, till lately believed to have been modern. Transparent glass, which, however, was known also in ancient Egypt, is one of these ; but the most remarkable of all is the lens, discovered at Nimrud, of the use of which as a magnifying agent, there is abundant proof. If it be added to this, that the buildings of the Assyrians show them to have been well acquainted with the principle of the arch, that they constructed aqueducts and drains, that they knew the use of the lever and roller, that they understood the arts of inlaying, enamelling, and overlaying with metals, and that they cut gems with the greatest skill and finish, — it will be apparent that their civilization did not fall immeasurably behind the boasted achievements of the moderns. They were, towards the close of their empire, in all the arts and appliances of life, very nearly on a par with ourselves.

outer effects or operations. It is going to the very springs of action, and from them wielding nature's mighty energies." Before, he said, "the depths of nature were the unfathomable depths of the Infinite." Here they seem fathomed. Here man is represented as going to the very springs of action, and from them wielding Nature's mighty energies, grasping the deep centres of motion in the grand systems of forces. If, then, "the depths of nature are the depths of the Infinite," and if man has gone to the very springs of action, and from them is wielding nature's mighty energies—if he is grasping the deep centres of motion in the grand systems of forces, he is grasping **WHAT?** he is wielding **WHAT?** On the line of thought indicated by the philosopher, we *dare not answer*. Will it be said, he does not see how what he says in one place bears on what he says in another—does not understand himself? If thus he is vindicated, so be it.

Our final citation, for the purpose of showing what sort of a mind has been dealing with us, shows it making a very ambitious attempt. It is to solve anew the mystery of Death,—so long since solved forever. He says: "Since death is directly connected with growth, and in a sense grows out of it, the laws of Life are therefore bound up with the laws of decay. A single mullet has been found to contain thirteen millions of eggs, and a codfish eleven millions. These facts give no extravagant view of prolific nature. They exhibit a profusion of life to meet a profusion of death. Life is the inflowing stream; death the outflowing: the inflow in such a world as ours necessitating the outflow, as much as in any current movement."

Like all grand ideas, it is simple. It is an idea adapted to mean capacities. And satisfactory, too! Men must die, because babies must be born. Who would not be made willing to die by such a consideration? How happily fitted to this meridian the illustration! How convincing to Yankees the eggs of a codfish, above all other fish that is eaten! And should we any longer eat the fish who carries in his belly the illustration of so longed-for a truth? Sure some prophetic instinct stir-

ring in their souls, made our fathers hang up an image of the codfish in the temple of legislation, which rises in yellow grandeur above the red walls of the three-hilled city.¹ Perchance when the now busy shores of the Bay shall be silent, and accursed by the shipwrecked mariner, when ten thousand years of change shall have buried all it has of civilization in Assyrian mounds, some swarthy Abyssinian chronicler, lighting on this fact, and painfully connecting it with the lucubrations of our sage, may tell how the ancient Yankees, sinking into barbarism, worshipped the codfish in their chief temple, in which no other image was permitted — having learned from the fish to disbelieve in the Scripture truth, that death is a penalty for sin. Dimly through the future shines ever the glory of the past. Perchance this was the meaning of the Dagon or fish-god worship of the Phœnicians of old; and with the usual accuracy of history, our dusky chronicler may make the lost Yankee race, from the similarity of its pursuits and worship, descendants from the old mariners of the tideless sea. The sudden light of a great idea is apt to lead the imagination far. Let us rather indulge in pleasing dreams. Let us now give up our souls to the rapture of Light. Science, all hail! Glory to the man who, painfully counting the eleven million eggs in the belly of the codfish, solved to man's joyful satisfaction, and forever, the solemn Mystery of Death, which overawes the world!

But alas! fades suddenly the light from our science-illuminated mind. Its bewildering glare forsakes our darkening thoughts, and there comes that solemn awe, that stillness of intensest reason, which the thought of death brings with it to the soul of man. It is delusion. It is like a peal of mocking laughter in a tomb. It is not solved! — the fierce agonies of men in delirium dying; the still midnight of the widow by the corpse of her infant son; the wild, agonizing cry of a nation's despair, when its mighty fall untimely on the high

¹ All who have visited the Hall of the House of Representatives in Boston, must have noticed this codfish.

places of its hope ; the long, long wail of humanity at the portals of the tomb ; the tears which fell from the eyes of the Lord of Life, partaking in the saddest feeling of mortality, the very instant before He repealed for once the death-fraught word He spake in Eden, and sent his life-giving Word through the sepulchre for the confirmation of faith !

Like too much of the speculation offered as a philosophical interpretation of the mysteries of the world, it contradicts Truth revealed. “Death,” the philosopher says, “grows out of the laws of life.” The Scripture saith, “By *sin* death entered into the world.” But, says our philosopher, death preceded Man. The death of Man did not precede Man. His reasoning crosses fixed bounds, which divide worlds of being. This logical man, who so contemned his author for an opinion — his author’s holding to which but existed in his excited brain — that the frame of man was a development out of the lower animals, takes a fact in their estate and carries it into a higher creation, mindless that into the frame of man the Lord breathed his own breath, and gave to man the endowment of immortality. A religious philosophy, if it deemed it wise to philosophize at all in view of so plain a record and so solemn a fact, would presume that an indestructible pure spirit would uphold its frame in unison with, and like itself forever, untouched by time, untainted by decay, — that only when the high and holy life of the formative and upholding spirit was gone, could the body die. The death of the body is a consequence of the death of the higher life of the soul. Revelation affirms that the death of the body, like the death of the soul, is a penalty. The soul knows this right well. No science can unteach the conviction the soul feels that death is unnatural, when for the first time it looks down into the narrow house appointed for all the living, and sees the pale, ghastly face of the corpse, which was once a body — fastens long its horror-fascinated gaze on the changed countenance of the dead. Despite all philosophy, and were there no dread of what comes after death, were all beyond it a blank to feel-

ing, Death would still be King of Terrors, because his work is so unnatural. This profound conviction of the soul of the unnaturalness of death, is in harmony with the fact revealed. It points backward to it. It demands it. It authenticates it when known. It sets its seal upon the record. Our instinctive shuddering at death is a proof of the horror that quivered through our souls in Eden, of the terror that then thrilled through all the deep of our concrete humanity, — a terror never stilled in a soul not insensate, save by a word from the lips of Him who then pronounced upon the soul its doom.

Every feeling of the heart rejects this shallow solution of the terrible Mystery of the Grave. The Soul, in view of Death, demands some more awful, some dread moral cause, sufficient to account for so dread a fact; and every feeling of the soul is answered, explained, and justified by the solution of the mystery — so different — given of old, when to the father of mortal men the Lord God said, "Because thou hast eaten of the tree of which I commanded thee, saying, Thou shalt not eat of it, unto dust shalt thou return."

CHAPTER IX.

It would seem that no one could read the charges and the answers, in the very words of critic and author, without seeing that it is unwise to judge of the book by the papers of Professor Dana. It would seem, too, that this, together with some of the opinions in these papers, goes far to lessen confidence in their author on all subjects. Still it would seem from his position, that his scientific ideas must be entitled to a degree of trust, although when they have been examined they have been found to be on a par with his ideas on other matters.

But the scientific prestige of these papers, whatever it ought to be, is not so arrayed against the book as the critic would have us feel, and as no doubt he thinks. Having utterly failed to grasp its design and to comprehend its reasoning, it may so appear to him, and through him this impression reach others. But the scientific element in the book is so inconsiderable, that it might be conceded that each and every scientific point against it, minor or greater, is well taken, and still the book be the sufficient answer of the Church to Science as to the greater questions touching the Mosaic record.¹

The recollection of the reader will confirm this; for although one point vital in this great debate has been treated at length, yet it comes up as a point omitted in this criticism; and others discussed, though of a certain interest, are evidently not of vital importance. Our readers may think, that to show what has just been asserted, would have been the true line for our

¹ To draw out the evidence of this, with the explanations and exceptions, would be to ask more of our readers than they ought to grant, after the time given to this critic; still, in view of the place claimed for this volume, we ask those who give to this subject thorough examination, to consider this proposition.

argument ; but great ideas are chiefly influential through their connection with great men ; and apart from its justice, it was needful to show that the character and writings of the re-discoverer of truths of such momentous importance were free from those charges which had been alleged against them. And it will appear, to those who will consider the practical difficulties of the handling of this discussion, that the last mode involved the former, and the former comes to the same thing with the latter. For the moment the mind is called to the fact of the omissions of the critic, the truth rises up at once, that these attacks are not on vital points, while it must be felt they are such as, both in justice and reason, should be set aside.

There is another way in which the scientific prestige of these papers is against the book, — a way as entirely proper as it is entirely inconclusive. It is the presentation of a scientific scheme to accomplish what the volume has accomplished. Here and there in this Essay — for its very nature hinders their being together — are remarks upon this scheme. It has met us, and will again. It is cheerfully granted, that in its presentation there are some geological facts of value, irrespective of their place in the scheme ; but the scheme is a failure. Before he has done with it, the writer feels it is breaking to pieces, and calls on Prof. Arnold Guyot to come to his help. It is Guyot's theory, and in a previous number of the review had been set forth in his own language. It is not required here to go into any examination of it ; it is enough here to say, as will be shown hereafter, that it meets with difficulties in the sacred text which it is hopeless for it to attempt to overcome.

In no point of view, then, would there seem to have been any reason why these papers should have occupied one hundred and sixty-five pages of this review.

The case against the critic has not been overstated. A minute examination of numerous small points¹ taken by him,

¹ On these minor points the critic has often made very singular charges. By a few they may all be judged. Thus he makes two points against his author's brief letter. In one he puts a construction on a clause it will not bear, and which,

would, in our judgment, in every case have been the worse for him, and it would have been insufferably tedious. And so, too, to have criticized his language in numerous instances. It has been our wish to state this case as it is; to treat this matter with needful thoroughness, but also with fairness; and nothing here seems to remain to be done save to say, that while, in our judgment, there is no sentence, line, or word in the volume which the author, dying, should wish to blot, it has seemed to some that in a few passages his tone towards science was too severe. This has been already spoken of, and what seemed to us its justification indicated. But there is no weakness in our cause — nothing that shuns the light. And on this point we are willing to avail ourselves of the light of another mind. In some remarks of President Hill on this work it is said: “There is occasionally in it a tendency to misrepresent and be-little the aims of science.” Though coming from one fascinated with scientific pursuits, let this opinion have its full weight. It is due to the judicious and eminent man who utters it. But mark how far it comes short of the tirades of the former critic. It is not that it does misrepresent and be-little the true aims of science, but that it has an occasional tendency in that direction.

And we will cite a sentence which seems to us the most decided illustration of what we suppose to be meant by this in all the volume. “We can get along very well without geology; our intellectual and moral dignity would not have been impaired had no such science existed.” As to this, there may be a difference of opinion. Apart from its context, it seems one thing; in it, another. There it seems to us evidently the strong, unqualified language of deep feeling, the truthful utterance of a soul filled with the earnest train of thoughts to which this

probably, never occurred to any one but the critic. In the other he charges his author with using the very harmless and well sounding word, *mammalia*. On looking into this, we found that, curiously enough, it was the word he had used himself. He had charged that, in treating of certain verses, Lewis did not treat of *mammalia*. and Lewis replied, it did not accord with his plan there to treat of *mammalia*. The word was good enough for Yale College, but not holy enough for Union; proper enough for Dr. Dana, but improper for Dr. Lewis!

comes in antithetically. Let us read it in its connection. He is thinking of the comparative value of moral and natural Truth. "The one class of truths is so immensely above the other, the consequences of the rejection of the one or of any view that sheds darkness upon them are so much more momentous, that we cannot think of their being placed in one balance, or treated as of equal authority. We can get along very well without geology; our intellectual and moral dignity would not have been impaired had no such science ever existed. But where are we without Revelation? and where is Revelation, if the initial record of man and of the earth turns out to be all false — a lying legend, a work of fancy, or designed deception?"

Let us continue to listen to his soul as it thinks aloud; for in this passage, though Professor Dana quotes it not, so far as we can judge after so long study of his criticism, is the spirit and the language which so excites his wrath; and, clearly discerning this, you shall more clearly discern the spirit of the dangerous and evil times in which you live.

"Whatever, therefore, the Scriptures teach, whatever is the fair meaning of those ancient writings to which JESUS the Light — the only Light of the world — gave the sanction of his authority, that is, for us as believers, the truth, wherever it may lead us. 'The grass withereth, the flower fadeth;' nature comes and goes; her laws are ever presenting new aspects; science is ever changing its theories and its language; its most plausible inductions have been often shown to be false; — 'but the word of our God shall stand forever.' It is the record of salvation, with which we cannot dispense without lying down like animals in the dust, and confessing that our highest good is sensuality, our highest knowledge the profitless study of a mere material nature — of an ever-changing, ever-perishing world, whose beginning is in a cloud which no science can hope to penetrate, over whose end hangs thick darkness, and whose design, moral or physical, is an enigma which has baffled, and must forever baffle, all earthly or mere *human philosophy*."

When the spirit which burns in these words meets the gnosticism of scientific religionism, it will kindle its rage. And in the hostility which there must of course be between the two, is the simple and truthful solution of this raging against Lewis.

The earnest utterance of the truth against nature-idolatry, may tend somewhat to an extreme language; but, in judging of Lewis' style, its vitality should be thought of. His is a living voice. It comes from and goes to the soul. This implies almost every quality of style,—the clear thought, the vivid emotion, truthfulness, and eloquence of utterance. But all from the intenseness of its vitality. Hence his words fall upon the soul as spoken, rather than as written words, affecting the soul as with the strange magnetic power of voice, and look, and gesture. There is, too, in Lewis an unknown strength of latent sarcasm, just enough in action to give a biting edge to his words. All these things, in connection with the thoughts before suggested, account for the effect of some passages in the book on those who have fallen into nature-worship.

And, with these explanations, we are willing to accept the judgment of President Hill. And now let us, still bearing in mind the long and bitter denunciations of the former critic, see his full thought. "This occasional tendency," he says "is a blemish of little importance compared with the richness and strength of the whole;" and with high-toned and generous exultation over the "power and beauty" of the work, he says: "It glows with earnestness, and yet is calm and majestic. It carries the reader along with it, as if it were the only utterance of the truth. We thank the author, not only for the light which he has thrown upon the Six Days of Creation, but for his glorious vindication of the dignity and worth of philology."

While busied with the final revision of these pages, there was brought in to us a critique on an Essay just issued by Dr. Lewis, on the Divine Inspiration of the Scriptures,¹ coming from the University at Cambridge. From this appreciative

¹ "The Divine Human in the Scriptures." New York, Carter & Brothers, 1880.

criticism of one most competent to judge, we lay before our readers an estimate of our author, for them to compare it thoughtfully with that estimate of his powers and character, on which we have been compelled so long and painfully to dwell.

"The work of Professor Lewis, proceeding from one of the ripest thinkers, one of the most learned scholars, and one of the most reverential and evangelical believers of our generation and country, it is entitled to as much personal consideration as can be reasonably claimed for any treatise on the profoundest of themes. Besides this, however, it approaches that theme according to a method, we do not hesitate to say, at once the most spiritual, the most erudite, and the most philosophical, which has been applied to it. Taking really the highest ground as respects the doctrine of Divine Inspiration, he comes to it not by the way of dogmatic affirmation, but by the way of religious and intellectual insight. By a simple analysis of the nature of human faith, and by an irresistible appeal to the deeper consciousness of earnest souls, he gains his premises; and then, by an irrefragable drain of logic, he carries his conclusions. The volume opens with an ingenious, and yet a lucid and self-evidencing statement of the analogy between the Written and the Living Word, or between the Bible and Christ, that eternal and incarnate One, who is its glorious sun and central thought. In both there are two elements, not mechanically but organically blended, each necessary to each—the Divine and the Human. In both, the form is not an arbitrary appendage, but a vital part of the whole, an external which the inner spirit must necessarily put on in order to its integrity and normal action. In style, as well as in substance, the Bible is the universal Book, as is here shown by most abundant and beautiful illustrations, as also by a comprehensive historical survey, and by a comparison of this with all the other sacred writings of the world. Professor Lewis proceeds further to trace out, in a rapid but comprehensive and striking examination, the marks of Divine Reality impressed on the entire Record of the Old and New Testaments; the argument being, that even if what we

technically call the miraculous were for the time removed, yet the remaining or human part would still bear in its wonderful character the irresistible tokens of God's inspiration, and would oblige us to take the miraculous element back again. In the course of this strong and beautiful exposition, many old difficulties are resolved, many portions of the sacred text which are commonly thought unedifying, appear charged with heavenly meaning, and the unity of the whole becomes as manifest as the fitness and power of the parts.

“It will thus be seen that the treatise strikes directly at the vital point of several theological questions, especially interesting both to students and to the people at this time. With the latter class the author's fervid yet serene piety, and simple yet eloquent expression, will be a sufficient title to confidence; while the respect of the former will be commanded by his well-known, careful, and thorough scholarship. This scholarship, which is never obtrusively nor pedantically displayed, is often employed to strengthen and bind the reasoning, to flash light on an obscure passage, to give precision and force of stroke to the exposure of a sophism, or to lend symmetry and pertinency to an illustration. It is a scholarship particularly accurate and ample in the departments of the Oriental and Greek languages, versions of the Bible and German criticism.”

CHAPTER X.

THE Essays of Prof. Barrows¹ are independent contributions to the exegesis of the first chapter of Genesis, and not a review of "The Six Days of Creation." Still their discussion of points in that volume, though not of its main points, are long and minute. One point is argued for fifteen pages. Our review of this discussion may seem heavy and prolix; but the subject, though not of prime importance, is one of considerable and immediate moment in the debate between the Church and Science.

Science thinks it has discovered the matter out of which worlds are born. Vast clouds seem to be wreathed along the fields of space, like clouds along the heavens in a summer afternoon. Processes seem to be going on in this nebulous deep; condensations seem there to be taking place; there centres seem to be slowly forming; and the mass to be breaking up into worlds. Language fails to express, thought fails to conceive of, the immense periods, in which these everlasting processes reach the time when a world may be said to begin to be.

There is something in the conception of this attenuated etherealized matter, which reminds of the Grecian philosophical conception of the *Hyle*, or first form of matter; but this ancient idea of matter was of matter as much more ghost-like than this, as this fire-mist is more ghost-like than mountains of granite.

The scientific hypothesis, though but hypothesis, is so probable, is so countenanced by seeming facts, and has such hold on the scientific imagination, that it would relieve the Church of serious embarrassment in its efforts to perfect its power over

1 *Bibliotheca Sacra*, vols. xlii., xlv.

the human mind, were it to appear that this hypothesis does not come into collision with her record of creation.

The question is, if there be such a state of matter, as thus enters into scientific thought, is it embraced in the first verse of Genesis, or not? Does that include this first form of matter, or does it set forth the construction of the world out of something existing? The question is determined by the meaning and power of the Hebrew verb *bara*, rendered *create* in the English version of the first of Genesis.

Some, who hold to the affirmative of this question, think with Guyot, that the Mosaic creative history corresponds with a theory of world-making, conceived of as analogous to vivification, which is an individualizing process, the general distinctions first appearing in the embryo, then the peculiar; they think the Mosaic history sets forth the world's formation in two periods, each of three stages; the first period that of inorganic creation, the second of organic; the first the elimination of the world's substance from the universal substance; the second the formation of the world. But, brilliant as this theory is in itself, it cannot be made philologically to coincide with the Mosaic history.

To find room in the record for the hypothesis, some suppose a chasm between the first and second verses. It is alleged, that this has some countenance in Hebrew usage.¹ But it is an

¹ This is well stated thus: "Moses frequently places events close together, though there were long intervals between. Thus in the second chapter of Exodus the first verse begins, 'And there went a man of the house of Levi and took to wife a daughter of Levi.' The second verse proceeds: 'And the woman conceived and bare a son; and when she saw that he was a goodly child, she hid him three months.' The connective *and*, Hebrew *ו*, is the same as between the first and second verses of Genesis 1. There is as much reason for supposing the events to be consecutive in the one case as in the other. Now the child alluded to, as being born after this marriage, was Moses. But it appears he had a sister old enough to watch over his ark. He had also an older brother, Aaron. There was, then, an interval of some years between the first and second verses, of which no intimation is given. We find it out in other ways. It is the style of the Bible thus to compress vast intervals into connected passages. No notice is given of things which it is not necessary to state." See the Essays of Rev. J. O. Means, *Bib. Sacra*, vol. xii.; in them Guyot's theory may be found.

idea, which seems to have arisen from a difficulty ; it seems an idea resorted to, to escape from it ; it seems arbitrary ; and it does not commend itself to the critical reason. There is no collision between Science and the Record, if the word rendered *create* means simply *to make* ; for, if so, the first of Genesis does not necessarily set forth the creation of the primordial matter. 'This is Lewis' theory as to the meaning of the word ; and it seems to be proved.

But the more commonly received rendering of the word will not be surrendered without pain. It will be felt by many that if the old rendering be changed something of sublimity passes away from the opening of the Word. The Essayist can well appreciate this feeling. But compensating for it there is a train of reflections started by the other rendering, which opens out into a clear and true view of revelation. It would have seemed still more sublime had the Word opened with a declaration of the existence of God as well as of the absolute creation of the first substance. If, then, the one truth be assumed, why not the other also ?

When the decision of the rhetorical faculty is compared with the opening of the Word, it is seen to be erroneous, because it does not accord with the divine way. The reason then perceives that other than rhetorical reasons controlled its form. And reflecting on this, there comes into the mind a truth more valuable than the thought which, with slow reluctance, it lets depart. The Word assumes that these truths are discernible by the mind ; or else that a previous revelation has revealed or confirmed them. And it is possible to arrive at the conviction, that revelation proceeds upon the idea of a preceding revelation, and upon the idea, that there are certain moral truths known to man which it merely confirms and enforces.

A clear perception that there are certain great moral truths which are discernible by the mind, and also that there was a universal revelation long antecedent to the written revelation, is needed by the Church in some places, in its many-sided conflict against the assaults of Philosophy and History. Cer-

tain schools of infidelity, availing themselves of the error, that certain moral truths cannot be known by man, to gain a vantage-ground of attack, prove that certain of these truths are known to man. History, too, points to spiritual truths, whose presence with man cannot be traced to the written Word. The true answer is, to admit what of truth there is in this; and to show its harmony with a high and true conception of the Word; even that conception of its office involved in its utterances, and most clearly so in its opening, when rightly interpreted. This line of thought leads on to the inquiry, *What then does revelation reveal?* and it culminates in the truth set forth in a passage which closes the last citation from Lewis in the Third Part of this Essay; and which we there have ventured to intimate is one of the most profound and instructive words ever uttered as to the Bible.

It ought further to be said, that the Bible contains declarations of the existence of God, and of the creation of all that is by His power, though not formal declarations proceeding on the idea that they are truths not within the compass of human knowledge.

It also should be said, that this line of thought is upheld by the truth, that the existence of God is assumed as known in the Word. And that if the truth, which even seems to be involved in this, that he is the Creator of all things, be also assumed, then the thought has more clearness and power, yet still no more of certainty.

Having thus tried to propitiate a feeling which hinders the reception of what is thought to be the true rendering of the first verse of Genesis, let us attempt to prove that rendering true. Some one argument only is sought for this purpose; and, if found at all, it will be most likely to be found in the analogy of Scripture. For the Word of God is consistent throughout. Where the divine thoughts are the same, the divine language will correspond. Though ages intervene between its utterances, voice answers unto voice. Though thousands of years afterwards, — though one language through

which it spake may have perished, and another been created to embody its utterances,—yet if there be in the Divine Word any farther reference to that of which Moses spake, and the thought there can be ascertained with certainty, it is the thought of the ancient seer. It is written, “By faith we understand that the wrlds were framed by the Word of God.” What is here spoken of is that described in the first of Genesis. All that is there taught is included in these words. And the verb used in this sentence is a simple word of construction, divinely applied in another case to a humble work of man. There is nothing metaphysical about it; nothing suggestive of the most difficult of ideas, that of making out of nothing. And if not in this divine utterance, then not in the other.

The thought of the *Hyle* had brought into the Greek phrases intended to denote creation from nothing, or the contrary, and in view of this, the use of this common, every-day term, constantly used of preëxisting material, is a plain and sure indication that a creation out of nothing is not revealed in that earlier revelation, on which the soul must fall back when it believes that the worlds were framed by the Word of God.¹

Having thus ascertained the import of the word, let us follow the critic in his discussion of his author's rendering of it, premising that our review cannot be made very interesting to those who have not read his essays, but that our points will be taken as briefly and rapidly as may be.

The question between the critic and the author is, whether *bara* is set apart to express “that most difficult of all metaphysical conceptions, the bringing substance from absolute nihility.”

The critic opens the discussion thus: “Prof. Lewis has

¹ On the meaning of *bara*, in the first of Genesis, the reader should consult Chapter IX. of “The Bible and Science,” where he will find the argument above and several profound thoughts on the subject generally. To the seven arguments there formally set forth, as upholding the author's rendering of the word, should be added the argument given above, also that from the first of John. Each of the nine propositions seem decisive, while the collective force of the argument is such that it may safely be pronounced unanswerable. That volume was written before the *Essays* of Professor Barrows were published.

taken the position that the word never denotes making something out of nothing, but always the fashioning of something which already exists.” The critic himself “is conducted to very different results.” He thinks that, in certain of its conjugations, and where material things are the object of the verb, it always carries with it the idea of bringing substance out of nothing; that it has this force in and of itself, and can have no other, and no less. It is not admitted that the critic accurately sets forth his author’s position as to this word; and hereafter it will be proved that, according to Lewis, it denotes in this very verse more than a fashioning of existing things. But here it will suffice to say, that Lewis would admit that it might be the verb of a sentence conveying the critic’s idea. It seems to be held, in his volume, that the use of *bara* is like the use of *make* in English. Make may be the verb of a sentence which expresses a reārranging of material, or the creation of material, or which combines both ideas; so, too, *bara*. Its force in each depends on the context. Though our statement differs from that of the critic, it is confirmed by the following from the supplementary volume. “Should the question be put in this form, What Hebrew word would Moses have probably employed, had he actually wished to convey this idea of an absolute creation of matter from previous non-entity, or of force, activity, and motion, from a previous negation of all these ideas? — we may answer, that it would most likely have been this word *bara*. This, however, would not be on the ground that such is the radical idea of the word, but because it would come as near to it as any other of the formative class; and its use for something new, and before unseen, although without any recognition of the metaphysical idea, would make it yet more suitable. Still the whole question depended on the context.”

Glancing over the critic’s paper, it seems to us that he does not understand the drift of his author’s remark, that there was no word in Hebrew set apart to express the bringing of substance out of nihility; for he goes into an argument to prove,

from their pure monotheism, that the Hebrews must have had this idea, *which is the very thought his author's thought implies*. His author's thought is, that because the Hebrews, in their pure and simple faith, believed there was no matter, no spirit, but through the will of God, therefore they never raised the question about the eternity or non-eternity of matter. "Such speculations were on either side of the children of Shem, beyond the Indus and beyond the Halys. They entered into the early Greek and Hindo philosophy, but the Shemitic mind that lay between was too simply practical in its worship to think much about them;" and, therefore, there was no word or phrase in the Hebrew tongue sealed to the expression of the metaphysical idea of bringing substance into being. Such could not be, till such discussions had arisen; and, with the Hebrews, such discussions never did arise. In the history of philosophical speculations, few things are more certain than this, despite the critic's assertion, that there is no evidence of this. In their degradation from pure theism, the Greek philosophers earnestly debated these questions, and with jarring and difficulty fixed on phrases which, in the schools, passed as the exponents of these thoughts; but the Hebrews never did either.

Lewis says the primary meaning of *bara* is to cut; hence to shave, shape, form, or fashion. The critic contends even against an illustration of this derivation from the German;¹ but at length, though with reluctance, confesses that Lewis' derivation of the Hebrew word is probably right. But, as he does this, a feeling of distrust of Etymology steals over him. "Etymology," he says, "is a good servant, but a bad master.

¹ Prof. Barrows says: "Lewis compares *bara* to the German word *schaffen*, without seeming to see how completely this makes against his own theory;" that is, if his own derivation of the word is allowed, and his own reasoning from it, which last seems inadmissible. And his own admissions justify his author. For he says, "that *schaffen* is in its origin connected with *schaben*, to shave, we doubt not;" though he prefers another origin. As his author's remark is only an illustration of the derivation of a Hebrew word, by that of a German word, to animadvert upon it, as he does, shows the *animus* of the critic.

He who mounts this Pegasus must keep him in with bit and bridle, or he will run away with him.” Thus he moralizes, looking at his author on Pegasus; but at last he ventures upon Pegasus. “We are willing, with our present light, to accept the idea of cutting as its radical signification;” and well he may be, for “it is used of human operations” “five times,” “and the idea of hewing, with its various modifications, suits every passage.”

The accord soon ends. The chief reason for this is, the word is used of human operations in one of its conjugations only; in two others, of divine operation only: in these last forms, he says “it expresses an incommunicable divine prerogative.” These are his conclusions as to the force of the word in these conjugations — Kal and its passive Niphal. “In every case the word is used of bringing into being by divine power. This definition consists of two parts: first, bringing into being; we do not say it always means bringing substance into being from nothing. That which is created may be a miraculous event, as in Numbers 16:30, ‘If the Lord create a creation;’ but in all cases something is produced, that did not exist before. But this does not constitute creation. When the potter moulds clay into a vessel, he produces a new form of matter. But he exerts no immediate and independent power upon matter. He works through its laws, not above and beyond them; and when his vessel is completed, there is nothing whatever new, except only another arrangement of old materials, through old powers and properties. Not so when our Saviour changed water into wine, and called Lazarus from the grave, or when God made plants and animals, or when he now regenerates men. Here is the bringing into material nature and the created spiritual world of a power *without* both, *above* both, and the *author* of both. This is what we mean by divine power; that is, power which is in its quality creative; for it is the quality of the power exercised, and not its mere product in time, to which we must have regard. When God destroyed Korah and his company, he

is said to have *created a creation*; that is, created a new thing. That any new substance was produced in nature, we have no reason to believe. But there was the exertion upon nature of a power wholly without and above nature; the very power that produced nature; and this made it an act of creation, in the proper sense of the word.

"It cannot be by accident that these forms of the verb, so abundantly used, are never once applied to human operations. The only explanation is, that they express the exercise of an incommunicable divine prerogative. This cannot lie in any separating, reërranging, and fashioning of old material. Such a fashioning may often be a result of creative power, but is not itself creation. This word always carries the idea of a divine energy above nature. . . . God has his own incommunicable sphere of activity, and to the expression of this, the Hebrew forms under consideration are consecrated. . . . To avoid misapprehension, however, we wish here to remark, that the Hebrew conception of creation, as of all God's works, is pre-eminently phenomenal. We agree with Prof. Lewis, that he takes the effects, which offer themselves to his senses, and ascribes them directly to God as their author. With this explanation we affirm, that the idea of the word under consideration is always, that of bringing into being by divine power. . . . An examination of all the passages (where these forms are used) will show, that in every instance the idea is that of bringing into being by divine power. Whether that, which is created, is new matter or something else, which is new, must be determined by the context. . . . In not a single one of all the above cases is *bara* the fashioning, constructing, forming or making of something, which already exists to be formed, fashioned, according to Prof. Lewis' definition of the word. We bring this discussion to a close by repeating the words of the Psalmist: 'He commanded, and they were created.' Bringing into being by an act of divine will, this is creation."

The critic, then, would uphold his idea of the power of *bara* by the fact, that in one of its conjugations it is used of human

works only, in two others of divine only. But the explanation of the first part of this is, that in its primitive sense the word means, to cut, to hew, to shave, and in this sense it would not be used of Deity. In its other forms the word takes on a wider significance. In these forms it is used of divine works only; in them, the critic asserts that it expresses a divine power “which cannot lie in any separating, reàrranging, or fashioning of old material.” His reason for this assertion seems to be purely philosophical. It is true, that he attempts to show that the usage conforms to his assertion; but it seems apparent that his idea of the usage is reached philosophically, not philologically. His philosophy here seems to control his exegesis. And, indeed, if his philosophical postulate be taken as true, it would seem it could hardly be otherwise. We cannot believe the critic has tested and thought out his ideas here fully; but they are expressed in plain, unmistakable terms, are used to establish very important conclusions, and it seems proper to ascertain their full import and bearing.

The critic restricts his conception of divine power, till, in some respects, it seems to be less than that of man. “By divine power, we mean,” he says, “power which is in its quality creative; for it is the quality of the power that we must have regard to, and not its mere product in time.” To him who will look steadily into this sentence, and see whence its meaning comes, and whither it tends, it is full of significance. It means that God can only create. The quality of a power is that to which it cannot go contrary, from which it cannot depart, or vary. And it is said that no regard is to be had to the product of the power; the character of the product is to be determined from the quality of the power; and its quality is creative. Hence, though divine power seems to alter, or destroy, regard is not to be had to this seeming result, but to the quality of the power; and change and destruction are to be taken as Protean workings of the same ever life-giving, ever creative force. This seems to be the Brahma hymn of Concord,

When the word Deity is the nominative of *bara*, the verb must express the exercise of a divine power. The critic says this power cannot be exercised in altering or fashioning, as its quality is creative. Why, cannot alter? asks common sense, seeking to pierce to the reason of this reason, and not at once comprehending all that is comprehended in the brevity of the critic. Why cannot destroy?

Certain schools would answer this by saying it cannot be said to alter, for the seeming alteration is itself included in the original creative impact: they would say, this critic is right; divine power is always creative; this is the secret of all things: divine power, philosophically conceived of, is in quality creative; and creating is all that it can philosophically be conceived of as doing; all that seems subsequent to the first creative impact and different was potentially and really present in the one sole originating fiat; all is determined by that: this is the philosophical view of what the uninitiated call change; and as for destruction, the idea is wholly unphilosophical; God creates, it is all he can do; divine power being in its quality creative, which is what we mean by saying, God can only create, all things must roll on in their predestined course, to a lower view seemingly varied, altered, interfered with, but never in reality; divine power, being in quality creative, can never really alter, or destroy, *a fortiori et fortissimo* nothing else can: the only idea we can have of God's acting is of his action at the beginning; beyond that he can be nothing to us, and we are nothing to him.

If, according to the critic's philosophical postulate, divine power is in quality creative, this idea controls every expression of divine power in the sacred volume, whatever be the verb. However the divine act may seem to reveal itself at any instant in time, and whatever its seeming work, it is to be thrown back to the farthest conceivable distance, and is confined to one form of power. And, instead of doing this in each case, why not once for all? This seems to be logical, consistent; but were it right, possible, and meant for us to entertain this idea, God

would become to human thought merely the first impulse of the world; his intervention at points in time, all that is called his providence, would disappear. But though all this may seem philosophical and profound, it finds no countenance in the common thought or language of men. In that thought and that language divine power is not in quality creative; it is power competent to a multiplicity of ends; it is power that can create, can alter, or can annihilate.

To one who looks over the passages where *bara* is used of divine power producing material results, it seems surprising the critic should claim that in any of these cases it denotes bringing substance from nihility, unless in this disputed Genesis 1:1.¹ But he claims this in every such case. His philosophy is his exegesis. Divine power, according to his philosophy, being in quality creative, no modification of the idea, no fashioning of things existing, would come up to it. One of the cases where he ascribes this force to *bara* is, where the Lord is said to have created Tyre. Will any one, save this philosopher, say this language carries the mind farther back than historic Tyre?—than the time when those who were to be Tyrians first gazed on the convenient rock?—that it compels us to trace them back through all their tribes to the common parent of the wandering families of men, and even the particles of their bodies through the long geological, and the possibly longer astronomical ages, to that almost inconceivably remote time when the first form of matter is called into substance? And this same is as true of that which is said of the creating of the animals. The Scripture says they were created in the sixth creative age. The Scripture restricts the conception of

¹ The Essayist, after having come to this conclusion, was gratified to find Bush saying of all the cases where *bara* is used, "the act implied is exerted upon a preëxisting substance, and cannot therefore strictly signify to create out of nothing. And as in no other instance throughout the sacred writings, if this of Genesis be excepted, has the word necessarily, or naturally, this signification, we perceive no sufficient ground for so interpreting it here, for the *usus loquendi*, or prevailing usage, is the only sure guide in determining the import of words." To the same effect other Hebraists might be cited.

this fact to this period ; and the mind cannot, without violence to its spirit and its letter, carry back the idea to when the particles, which were to become the bodies of animals, were, in some far preceding age, and in some inconceivably diverse form, called into substance.

The Hebrews did not interpret their Scriptures thus. The critic quotes from the Hymn of Moses — to adopt his remark about his author — “without seeming to see how completely this works against the theory he is maintaining.” Moses says, “Lord, thou hast been our dwelling-place in all generations. Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth, and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God.” Musing on the brief date of all created things, in contrast with the eternity of God, his mind journeys back through the generations of men ; through the period in which the mountains were born ; in which the earth was made ; in which the visible universe was fashioned ; through periods indicated as from *olam* to *olam* ; and through each of these ages, and through all, his thought is, “Thou art God.” The course of his thought is, in some measure, determined by the creative vision. But as it begins after it in the period of the generations of men, so it transcends it and intimates something of great times not included in that vision. It touches on one great fact in the creation, the building of the mountains, whose aspect suggests the idea of vast times in their formation, even as it does of vast times for their duration. But the period in which the mountains were born is but one of the stages through which passes his journeying thought. This conforms to his vision. For the birth of the mountains was but one fact in this world’s building, and not even the entire work of one age. The growth of the mountains began in the third age of the world. According to this critic, disregarding the order of the fact in time as revealed, the seer, in thinking of the slow birth of the “earth o’er gazing mountains,” should have traced back their very substance, which, during two slowly revolving cycles of the earth, was not born as



Sinai or Lebanon, which ages on ages before had floated un-solidified in chaos, through changes and times inconceivable, to the instant when it was summoned forth into existence. But the birth of the mountains did not, and could not, so long as his poetic mood was faithful to his vision, carry him back to that first instant of time. It marked but one stage of his journey through eternities.

The insoluble exegetical difficulties which the critic has to meet, he would fain solve by the truth presented by his author, that the Hebraic conception of creation was phenomenal; that outward phenomena were taken as representative of its great facts, and God revealed, as the author of that which the most outward phenomena represents. Were this application of it correct, the idea would have to be rejected. The drift and intent of modern skepticism is to remove the idea of the action of God back to the farthest conceivable distance, is merely to accept, from a logical necessity, the idea of a Power which, by one volition, sets in motion an ever-moving course of events, never varied by its Cause, —all seeming variations being in its first unrepeated volition. This is as near atheism as can be. It is opposed by the Scripture, by the Church, by the convictions of the heart, by the dictates of reason. It has no countenance from Lewis on the Phenomenal Language of Scripture. In creation he applies the idea to the steps of the creative process. Thus, in the building of the heavens, the blue vault on high is taken in Scripture as the representative of processes farther back; and through it the mind apprehends this divine sky building as one step in the world's building; but this was in the second period; in following the record of the making of the sky on the second day, the mind is not carried back to the elimination of its substance from nothingness. The mind may thus go back, but it is not called upon to do so by the record. The spirit and fact of the record are in the way of it. The Deity is represented as addressing himself to the work of making the sky, in the second age, out of material prepared in a pre-

ceding age, as beginning and finishing this sky building in the second age.

"We bring this discussion to a close by repeating the words of the Psalmist: 'He commanded, and they were created.' Bringing into being by an act of the divine will, this is creation." Several of the creative works named in the one hundred and forty-eighth Psalm, here cited, are in Genesis referred to different periods in the world's formation.

Some of the critic's scriptural illustrations of his idea of the use of *bara* are fatal to the idea itself. Of the destruction of Korah, to which he refers, it is said in Scripture that then God created a creation. This expression is used where there was no bringing of a substance out of nothingness. It describes a miracle which, on any theory the critic would adopt, was the separating of old material, the cleaving of the sands of the desert. To this miracle *bara* is applied in the Scripture, though our critic says *bara* "expresses the exercise of a power which cannot lie in any separating of old material."

As a case where *bara* might be used, he selects the changing of water into wine. That was no creating of substance out of nothing. If so, the language seems deceptive, delusive. Water was made wine. By divine power, particles as before arranged, water, as afterward arranged, were wine. Our critic thinks *bara* might be used in describing this; and yet thinks the power expressed by *bara* "cannot lie in any reërranging of old material."

The critic's speculations are not a consistent whole. In the long citation which has been made, sentences war on sentences. The formal controlling propositions have been considered; but among them are other propositions which, though contradicted by them, are correct. And these are consistent with Lewis' idea of the force of *bara* in Gen. 1:1, and bring the critic to his position. In the case of the destruction of Korah, he says, "there was the exertion upon nature of a power wholly without and above nature; the very power that produced nature, and this made it an act of creation, in

the proper sense of the word.” In the miracle at Cana, he says, “there was the bringing into material nature a power without it, above it, and the author of it.” It was thus, he thinks, an act of creation; and in each case he would use *bara*, though such use of it be contrary to his formal statements as to the restricted use of this verb. Now, these definite statements, as to creation, as looked at in themselves, or in the light of these illustrations, and taken as setting forth the force of *bara*, express the force Lewis gives to *bara* in the first of Genesis. In his opening, the critic said his author’s position was, that “this word always denoted the fashioning of something which already exists.” It was then excepted to, and it will now be shown he has not apprehended the force Lewis gives this word in the very verse under discussion. His readers are shut up to the idea that, according to Lewis, creation as revealed to Moses, was a mere fashioning of old material. This is far from the fact. The critic takes him up where, against those who hold that, *per se*, *bara* denotes bringing substance out of nothing, he traces it to its root. He finds the primitive meaning is *to cut*, and thence *to make*. Its primitive sense fits it well to express this world’s building, when used in its wider sense. But in Gen. 1 : 1, Lewis thinks it means far more than a fashioning. As to his idea of what *bara* there means, his all-important remark is this: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth; *this language covers the whole process that follows*,” and the volume is filled with the idea that the process which follows was no mere fashioning of existing material, but with this the informing it with absolutely new principles and powers. This first prominently appears in interpreting the words, “and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.” Almost in the words in which his critic defines what creation is, Lewis describes this primeval act of divine power: “*It was an act above nature, a beginning of nature, or a beginning in nature of a new order of events, a new energy, that never could have been developed out of the antecedent chaos.*” “This Ruah

Elohim, or Breath of God, is the going forth of the divine power, energizing in nature, and the source of the vegetable and animal, as well as the rational and moral life. We have rendered it *brooded*, or it might be translated *hovered*. Milton's idea, although in poetry, is more accurate than our prose translation :

'Dove-like, sat brooding o'er the vast abyss.'

"We get the general image from Deuteronomy 32 : 11 ; but by comparing it with Jeremiah 23 : 9, we arrive at the more inward or radical conception of the word : 'My heart is broken within me, all my bones *quivered*.' It denotes, primarily, a fluttering, a tremulous motion, acting and reacting, a vibrating, an undulating, a communicating by pulsation or throbbing ; in other words, that conception of life we find in the earliest languages, and from which the highest physiological and physical science is ever deriving its most expressive technical terms. It is the same elemental process, on the great scale of the earth's commencing organism, that is exhibited in the types and processes of all lesser vivification.

"So far we have only followed the most literal exegesis. If permitted, however, to indulge in that sober speculation which it so readily suggests, we might say that before this the chaos was a mere mass, acting and acted upon mechanically ; now it is beginning to be a nature strictly, with an inward law and life, or whatever else may be implied in the word nature. As far as our earth is concerned, this new energizing power is the first beating of Nature's pulse, the first throbbing of her mighty heart. Or, to change the metaphor, yet keep as its ground the same primary image, the tremulous pulsations denoted by the intensive *piel* significance of the Hebrew verb, are the first note in the grand diapason, the first low trembling barytones in that ascending scale of harmonies, that were to terminate at last in Eden and humanity."

It is needless to go through the volume, showing how it

represents the Spirit and the Word, endowing the material, which was before the beginning of this world's building, with new powers, quickening into being immaterial entities subject to law, quickening the life of animals, the soul of man; showing that it represents that there was put forth, on the formless and void chaos, "a power without it, and above it," a divine power, doing what nature could not do, bringing into nature what was not before. And, Lewis says, all these sublime works of God in this world's building, are in the words, "God created the heavens and the earth;" "*this language covers the whole process.*"

CHAPTER XI.

It would be hypercritical to note that Prof. Barrows does not mention that his author's exegesis of the first of Genesis is sustained by a power of authority, were it not for the exigences of that war for and against the Record, to swell the volume of which the author and his critics contribute. Neither in the repeated sneers of the first critic at his exegesis, nor in the long discussion of it by the second, is this fact recognized; nor the farther fact that it relieves the record from an objection, which, though not of the first magnitude, now presses hard against it. The nebular theory of world-making has no place in the divine record of this world's building; — since the author's later volume this will not be denied; — and on their exegesis the startling hypothesis is required, that, between the closely connected first and the second verses of Genesis, there is a chasm, as wide as the ages between the completed world and the night of chaos. On the author's exegesis, all the phenomena embraced in the nebular theory — and it matters little whether that theory be correct or not, so long as it has so many advocates — are *extra dies*; the record commencing after that supposed process had so far run its course, that what was afterwards to become the world had been separated from the ocean of force, to be, as described in the record, fitted up to be the world of man. The critics, then, would have evinced a wiser appreciation of the conflict between Christianity and Science, had they reflected that, however correct their exegesis might seem to them, it opened the record to a serious objection; and had they therefore shown there was another rendering, held by many Hebraists, not open to the same objection. Here, and not here alone, it is some

confirmation of the volume, that within the lines its exegesis draws, Christianity may stand against her scientific foes.

Those who read the Essays of Prof. Barrows, might conclude that the rendering of *bara* by Lewis was peculiar to him. It has been said that many Hebraists so render it, and it is now said that most of them do. This point is of interest enough for some little evidence of it to be adduced. Prof. Powell, who has made a survey of the thought which centres in the word Creation, for the very purpose of setting forth fairly and dispassionately on each point the prevalent opinion, states that the best critics think there is little or no foundation for the idea of a creation out of nothing in the use of *bara*. As cited by him, Dr. Pusey, Professor of Hebrew at Oxford, states as his opinion that *bara* implies neither positively on the one hand a formation out of nothing, nor, on the other, positively a formation out of existing materials; but that it is absolutely indefinite and neutral as to either of these conditions. And this opinion, as to the force of *bara*, coincides, with mathematical precision, with the opinion of Lewis.

On Lewis' version of the second verse the critic's tone is grand, but with what reason shall presently appear from his own words. He says, "Prof. Lewis renders *for* the earth was without form, and explains the force of *for*, which he has substituted for *and*, thus: 'in the beginning God created, that is, fashioned, formed, reduced to order; and why? because the earth, which was to be created, was then without form and void. It was a fit subject for such a process.' This is wholly arbitrary and ungrammatical. The conjunction [*vav*] never has in itself the signification of *for*, any more than of *but*, therefore. If in rendering we substitute one of these words for it, it is because we wish to indicate the connection more definitely, than the Hebrew has done. But this connection we never learn from the (*vav*) alone, which still means *and*. It must be manifest from the nature of the clause, and its relation to the preceding, even when the word *and* is retained. This is the decisive test. We subjoin some examples. 'Let them curse,

and do thou bless,' that is, as every one sees, but do thou bless. 'How excellent is thy loving kindness, O God, and the children of men put their trust under the shadow of thy wings,' where our translators have put *therefore* for *and*. Arbitrarily to substitute *for* instead of *and*, is to reduce the Hebrew language to the very chaos described in the present verse."

Here the critic leads his readers to imagine that Lewis did not know the difference between *and* and *for*. And one sentence so grandiloquent, that the passage seems toned to admit of its introduction, instructs the awe-struck mind, that to substitute *for* for *and* is to reduce the Hebrew to the chaos of the genesis. Yet only mark how Lewis, and most Hebraists, render the first verse, and mark what Professor Barrows himself says of the connecting particle, and Lewis is justified. For the critic says in certain cases this particle means *but*, *therefore*, *for*; that either of these may be known to be its meaning, from the nature of the clause and its relation to what precedes; and evidently would render the particle as Lewis does, if he adopted with him a common rendering of the first verse. Why then give the impression that his author did not know that this particle, uninfluenced by the context, means *and*; did not know the difference between *and* and *for*?

Lewis' remarks show so fairly the difference made in the interpretation of this particle by the interpretation of the preceding verse, and the substantial agreement between him and his censor, that justice is not done without citing them. "The Hebrew is very scanty in its conjunctions, and therefore the particle [*vav*] is often employed not only to denote sequence or connection in order of time, but to show the ground, reason, or motive for what is said. *In one view of the passage*, the first verse contains an action separate from those that follow; *in another*, it only expresses the same events in a condensed titular form. *According to this latter interpretation*, the conjunction shows the ground or reason of the preceding. In the beginning God created, that is, fashioned, formed, reduced to order; and why? because the earth was without form and void. It

was a fit subject for such a process. *On the other supposition*, the conjunction would seem quite unnatural and could only be defended on the ground that these particles in Hebrew may often denote the slightest transitions, in the style of the narrative as well as in the order of the events."

On minor points the two critics sometimes agree, sometimes differ. Both carp at a very unimportant matter. In following out the idea, that the creative work should measure the day, rather than the day the work, and speaking of the duration required for the growth of the races of animals, the author says: "Our views of such duration would be modified in no slight degree, according as we adopt one or the other of two theories of growth and development:" one being the theory of the growth of individuals, the other of the growth or development of species from species; one connected with lesser, and the other with greater cycles. In his allusion to a far-prevailing theory, showing how it should be guarded, he says: "This theory may have as many divine interpositions as any other; though if it acknowledge no divine origination, it is indeed atheism; or if it acknowledge only one, and this from the logical necessity of getting a starting-point for its physical speculation, it is as near atheism as can be." While it was almost inevitable that his mind should glance at this theory, he dwells not on it, avows not belief in it; and of the controversy between the theories, says, "there is no place for it here," "since, as far as our philological argument is concerned, either view satisfies its requirements." On this allusion to this theory, the scientific critic is bitter; and, as if this were not enough, the theological critic adds a note as to this theory, which sharply ends: "It has neither reason nor science in its favor." Both give the impression that he espouses some manifestly absurd, or unheard-of hypothesis. After the pronunciamientos of these savans, the larger science of a writer in a late *Edinburgh Review*¹ is refreshing. "We come," says this writer, "to a class of ques-

¹ *Life and Organization, Edinburgh Review, Jan. 1, 1859.*

tions, *which have been and yet are the subjects of warm controversy*—questions, each so large in its objects and details, *that volumes have failed to exhaust the argument.* First among these questions comes that of the nature and permanence of species. *Our scientific readers need not be told how warmly this question has lately been agitated by naturalists.* The controversy, which had its birth in France and there provoked personal animosity, as well as scientific dispute, was translated to England in a mitigated form; but has here also stirred up the depths of an argument stretching beyond the limits of former inquiry. Are species to be considered fixed and immutable, or is there an inherent liability to or faculty of change either from accident, or the operation of common laws, which can and does in the course of time create new species out of antecedent ones. The great name of Cuvier appears in the foreground in behalf of the former opinion. Geoffrey St. Hilaire made himself the chief of the opposite party. Many of our most eminent naturalists, our geologists especially, have entered with earnestness into a controversy rendered inevitable from the progress of their science, and the new classes of phenomena coming before them. Looking generally on this conflict, as it now stands in this country, we see distinctly a predominance of opinion for the fixity and permanence of species. But at the same time we notice a certain cautious reserve in announcing any absolute or final opinion on the subject.”

The difference of these critics on another minor point is perhaps worth noticing. The earlier critic says he leaves it to others to criticize the text adopted in Heb. 11:3. The later critic does this; he admits that the Syriac and the Vulgate render in accordance with this text; and the first critic, seeing this goes far to establish the reading, is dissatisfied, and invokes a personage, who looms up in misty grandeur as a “profoundest biblical scholar.” “We are informed,” says the critic, “by one of our profoundest biblical scholars, that not one known Greek MS. sustains the reading;”—of this information the volume itself might have long before informed his inquiring

mind; — "that it is as possible and more probable, that the *ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent* of the Vulgate and the corresponding phrase of the Syriac were translations from a text like our own;" on this point the two critics may fight it out between them, but few, who can construe Latin, will deny, that the Vulgate agrees with "The Six Days;" — and farther "that *ἐκ μὴ φαινόμενα* cannot be correct, as the Greeks would not use the negative *μὴ* in such a case, but the negative *οὐ*;" whereupon the scientific man, intoxicated with borrowed Greek, with a terse elegance, which may well excite in sophomores the envy of despair, cries out, — "So this reading is not only bad Paul, but bad Greek." At this concluding word of the commended shadow, — irrelevant as it is to the point in controversy, since with either negative the sense intended in the phrase varies not, — at this word which, if seriously meant, is in the silliest style of the pedantic school — that a phrase which comes within Buttmann's rule for the use of *μὴ*, which Griesbach prints as a conjectural emendation, which scholars of various ages adopt, the like of which frequently occurs in Attic and Hellenistic writings is not Greek, it may be surmised, this Greek liked not this war on a brother Greek, and not dreaming he would print it, hoaxed the saven.

As to the creation of immaterial entities apart from the material forms, only by holding to which can we conceive of the Life in Nature, the critic holds against his author, that this is not taught in Scripture; but holds to the fact. As soon as these critics cease contending with him about basing the idea on Scripture, they both admit the truth, for which their author contends. This has been shown as to one; and will be as to the other. As quoted by Prof. Barrows, his author holds, "there are invisible immaterial vital powers, principles, laws, *σπερματικοὶ λόγοι*, spermatik words or ideas, call them what we will, which are themselves the first and immediate creations of the Divine Will, going forth before any new agency of nature, whether the universal or any particular nature." Prof. Barrows says, "if we hold to seminal principles lying back of all

outward organization, we travel out of the record, and are no longer upon the field of revelation, but upon that of human speculation ;” nor is this strange after his exegesis of the words, “ God made every plant of the field, before it was in the earth, and every herb of the field before it grew.” He dissents then from Lewis, who holds it as truth revealed, and from his tone in some places seems not to think his idea plausible, yet in these words he advances it: “ We naturally conceive of [created life] as an invisible formative power, manifesting itself through visible material organizations. And since these organizations have their different specific forms and properties, which are incapable of being permanently confounded with each other, we justly assume original differences in their seminal principles.” “ To suppose that life consists in any juxtaposition or arrangement of the original atoms of matter, is sheer materialism.” But he asks, who shall say of life, “ it existed in its beginning a single moment without connection with matter, or without putting forth its formative powers upon matter ?” As he does not accept his author’s exposition of those verses, which speak of the plant being created before it was in the field, an exposition bringing out from various scriptural teachings the harmony of truth, it might be difficult to show him the answer from Holy Writ ; but the question is not when did these formative life powers begin to exist, but do they exist ? and that they do exist, this critic asserts. They are then : and certainly in the order of ideas, if not in the order of time, are anterior to matter.

It is the common idea of man, that matter in some of its forms is informed with life — life which, in obedience to law, brings forth the glory and garniture of material things. The last truth seems as certain as the truth that matter exists. It is held with the same universality, the same certainty, though not as distinctly present to the consciousness. It is held by some more clearly than by others, but man cannot free himself from it. Now, that it would be recognized in revelation, seems probable, if we may reason as to what would or would not

be found in a revelation. The author finds it in the record of the creative birth and growth of this order of things; but had his limits and his plan permitted, it might have facilitated the reception of his idea, had he deduced it from the many other passages where it is recognized; and made less prominent and alone his citation of the third verse of the eleventh of Hebrews. But, in re-discovering the true sense of the creative record, he was so beset with difficulties, that it seems ungracious to object to the form of his presentment of the truth, especially so in a volume which has enlarged man's conceptions of the revealing glory of the Word in the material world.

As Prof. Barrows, though not admitting the proof of his author's idea in the sacred volume, yet declares it is atheism to deny it, he cannot approve of denouncing the book as "infidel" because of this idea—as Prof. Dana does, though he believes in the idea himself.

A leading idea in *The Six Days* is, that in the genesis are revealed supernatural beginnings, followed by natural growths. The genesis has commonly been thought purely supernatural. In correcting this idea, the volume renders a service *not less great than that as to the word Day*. On the question of the presence of the Natural in the Creative process, the discoveries of Geology and the common view of Creation come into dangerous conflict, more dangerous even than on the question of Time. As a writer on the Mosaic Cosmogony in the "New Englander" says, "The line of truth cannot lie athwart the very initiatory idea of Geological Science, the action of natural causes in the history of creation." The "Six Days" proves that the line of revealed truth does not lie athwart this idea, but coincides with it. This proof is brought out by its close and literal exegesis of the description of the creation of the vegetable and animal races.

But this truth of the presence of the Natural in Creation finds small confirmation from our critic. On the words—"God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature," he says,— "The earth is said to bring forth living souls, in the

sense in which we now say that it produces animals. They have their origin upon it and are nourished from its products." This critical opinion is an explanation of a very extraordinary passage in Holy Writ, in which the Creator has been pleased to make known a fact as to the mode in which he created animals, and which carries human knowledge on the subject far beyond any point to which Science has attained, or perhaps ever will attain. The critic thinks God meant to command the earth to *nourish* the animals. The indisputable fact is, that he did command the earth to *bring forth* the animals, and the imagination can hardly conceive of things more different.

This critical opinion is as to a passage of Holy Writ, of whose obvious import one man can judge as well as another. The reader of the original and of the version are equal here. Both alike hear the earth commanded to bring forth the animals, by a Voice not to be disobeyed. The *modus operandi* of that obedience passes experience, perhaps conjecture. Most will conclude that the fact pertains not to this cycle of the world, in which the power has ceased, or is held in abeyance. Some may think there are traces of the same, or of an analogous power in some very low rudimentary forms. Some may think the ongoings of this power dimly traceable in the ages before man, from lower births through higher, till, after that God created man, the earth ceased to put forth the animal producing power, which God had commanded her and enabled her to put forth before. Still all is doubt, with all but the critic. He thinks the earth produced animals then, just as now; that is, it nourished them. The critic attributes to men the use of the same language with the same meaning! It is true that the Egyptians of old said that the slime of their river bred little reptiles. And the first families of Athens, having no "Conqueror" to "come in with," said they came out of the Attic soil; but this would hardly prove the existence of what he declares now to be the common language of men. There is no such language on earth. There never was any such. It

would be hardly possible to conceive of a greater misuse of speech. It was never heard in any race or tribe.

Prof. Barrows' series of papers seems to have been prepared for the purpose of propounding a theory as to the word Day. He knew that a peculiar interest would be felt as to his ideas. He knew the subject had been considered for more than half a century — that the Church, confessedly at fault here, had not come to any conclusion. It cannot then be that he is unaware of the importance which belongs to what he is about to do. It cannot be but that his opinions will be thoroughly considered. And there lies before him a volume written by a philologist who by insight into the constituent thoughts embraced in the term establishes for it a meaning, which answers the difficulty on philological grounds, shows that Moses must have used it with this idea of its significance, and confirms this position by a survey of the compass of Hebraic literature, and of the thought of the ancient world bearing on the subject. To all this the critic seems indifferent, so tired perhaps is his mind with the subject, or so occupied with his own theory. The theory then, whatever it may be, must have been long and earnestly considered. On such a subject, at such a time, no one would propound a theory without bringing to bear upon it all his intellectual being.

His theory is, that the Hebrews were taught that the heavens and the earth were created in six days, of twenty-four hours each, though the fact was not so: that the word Day was a misnomer: that it meant one thing in the utterance, another in the hearing; and it was intended it should.

Here is the theory in his own words: “These six periods of creation are in our view symbolical of higher periods of time. In the mind and purpose of God they were symbolical from the beginning; but it does not follow, that they to whom the revelation was made saw beyond the six literal days of the symbol. It is in harmony with the general analogy of God's dealings with man, to suppose that the human mind may have been left to rest with the symbol itself, until in the wisdom of

God the higher ideas which it covered, should be revealed. God having in his infinite wisdom determined to make known to man the outward form of the work of creation, as a foundation for the outward form of the Sabbath, it seems to us altogether contrary to the general course of his proceedings, that he should bewilder and amaze them with immense periods, stretching over many thousands, it may be many hundreds of thousands of years. If their minds rested with the symbol, and saw nothing beyond it, the error was not essential, as it respects the Sabbath; and it was such an error as he has in other cases suffered to remain uncorrected, till the appointed time for its removal should come."

He has some sentences showing how well his theory disposes of the controversy which has raged so widely and so long as to this word. And his theory has at least this to commend it to the weary mind. If received within the Church, it would be the end of all controversy. It would be the last word of Faith. There would be an end of reading the volumes which for so many years in long and hopeless succession have claimed the ear and wearied the heart on this prolific debate of the Church and Science. But surely it never could be received elsewhere than in the Church, it would seem that it must surrender the world to a confirmed skepticism.

But what evidence is there adduced that the Days were symbols? None at all. What evidence can there be adduced? The assertor proves the direct contrary of his assertion by saying, that which he calls a symbol was given out as a fact, and received as a fact. To call that, uttered as a fact and heard as a fact, a symbol, is a contradiction in terms. According to his theory, the word Day was not given to the Hebrews as a symbol; not taken by them as such; the utterance of that word was a deception kept up until it was found out. Such a theory is not fit to be propounded. Nothing quite so objectionable concerning the record of creation has ever been set forth. There has been charged upon Moses deception; here the charge is in substance brought against One greater than Moses.

Most unquestionably the writer did not see this. The thought as to such a man is not to be permitted for an instant. The solution of this theory is not a personal one. The state of mind in which such a theory could be propounded connects itself with the whole thought of the Church, and may receive some elucidation from the second part of this Essay. Here it will only be characterized as the darkened utterance of Faith in despair.

Prof. Barrows does not supply the omissions of the criticism of Prof. Dana. As if aware that this might be looked for, he disclaims the design of reviewing "The Six Days of Creation." No fault is to be found with this; yet it must remain as a curious fact in the annals of critical literature, that in the same review, a volume has been written upon, during two years, and for more than two hundred pages, and yet he who reads through it all shall not be able to know from it what there is in the book.¹

Though one of the thirteen gentlemen whose names were then blazoned on the title-page of the Review, it is presumed that, as one of the eleven assistant editors, Prof. Barrows aided by his own contributions rather than by supervising those of others. And the Review itself, publishing the names of its contributors, throws the direct responsibility of opinions on those advancing them.

That Professor Barrows does not accord with Professor Dana in his estimate of the book may be inferred from this fact, that while the one denounces it as infidel, the other, on the ques-

¹ Beside omissions referred to, in the criticisms of Prof. Dana there is no allusion to these chapters, which are storehouses of learning: Antiquity of the Mosaic Account; Heathen Cosmogonies derived from it; Ancient Idea of Creation; Plurality of Time-Worlds; Time aspect of the Universe; Hebrew Words of Duration; Hebrew Ideas of Natural Law.

There is a chapter interpreting the 8th of Proverbs. Of this, President Hill, though of a different school, says: "We have never met with an argument for the Eternal Generation of the Son, which seemed to us so strong as one which is incidentally brought into the discussion of Scripture references to Creation." If this chapter be laid side by side with a recent Essay of Prof. Barrows, on the same subject, it will be found that it anticipates the greater part of it.

tion of questions as to the meaning of the Mosaic Record everywhere debated with an earnestness as if on the debate depended the fate of this generation, says: "For a full development of the internal evidence against the theory of six literal days, we refer the reader to Professor Lewis' book." Either, then, Professor Barrows condemns Professor Dana, or else a largely infidel book finds large favor in his eyes. And the same must be said of the *New Englander*, published hard by Yale College, which, in a paper on the Mosaic economy, not wishing to enter into an argument on the word Day, refers its readers to the "profound exegetical argument, in the Six Days of Creation, by Professor Tayler Lewis."

Professor Barrows seems to us to intimate a feeling of dislike to the course of the former critic, by saying to Professor Lewis, that he "fully sympathizes with him in his reverence for the Divine Record." We are struck with what seems to us as the peculiarity of this expression. To sympathize is to feel with another, so Johnson defines it, and primarily the word does not indicate anything as to the class of emotions in view of which it is used. But common and good usage seems to have appropriated the word for emotions unwonted, and mingled with something of pain. It would be more readily used towards one in humiliation than in glory, in suffering than in joy. All deep emotions have in them something solemn; some touches even of sadness, and to such this word seems appropriated. Milton fixes the import of the word in this passage:

"It was the winter wild,
While the heaven-born child,
All meanly wrapt, in the rude manger lies;
Nature, in awe to Him,
Had doffed her gaudy trim,
With her great Master so to sympathize."

A divine might very well say to a layman, we commend, honor, admire your reverence, or we rejoice in your reverence; but to say we sympathize in your reverence, has rather a

strange sound in Christendom. When this word is now used in view of reverence for the divine word, it seems, at first, more befitting the ages of dominant heathenism. But if by some chance, reverence for the Divine Word had, as in this case, exposed to tortures to which those of Polycarp were brief, the expression used towards the sufferer, even if used somewhat unconsciously, involuntarily, and without being chosen for that purpose, would seem to illuminate the heart out of which it came, and in view of all the unwonted circumstances is very felicitous.

CHAPTER XII.

THE admission of papers such as those of Professor Dana into the Review, was an error.¹ Such a condemnation should have been an act most solemn. The plea that opinions only are condemned, is delusive. Assaults on the man, and on his works, are so blended, that no analysis can separate them.

The plea, that it is the act of but one person, is delusive. It does not meet the facts. The Review does and must have a certain prestige, which extends in some degree to all the opinions it publishes. It wields within the circle of its influence a power so great, that in such a way as this it should not be thoughtlessly exercised. The Church, of which it is a voice, should not suffer it to be heedlessly put forth; perhaps not suffer it at all, when the power is so tremendous, so irresponsible, and the condemned must be silent.

It has sometimes seemed to us, in thinking of the defamation of such a man as in our heart of hearts we believe Lewis to be, that if no voice was here raised against it, the stones would cry out. These calumnies, commended by a great power of ecclesiastical prestige, are bound up in ponderous, enduring volumes, which are a part of the great record of these times. They are in the libraries of the country; and shall there not

¹ After these papers began, Lewis was suffered to insert in the Review a letter of six pages. It seems contracted, as if by want of space. This may have arisen from the stage of printing, for the letter is out of place, as if inserted at the last moment. Then the New England Professor is allowed twenty-six pages more in the same style, lengthening his attack without varying it. He was permitted to go farther. But the editors issued a card, stating that they were not to be considered as endorsing what they published. They did not say, however, that this referred to these persistent attacks on Lewis, for which they gave facilities not equally given to him. The third paper on "The Six Days," as well as on the later volume, in the same style with the preceding papers, was of twenty-six pages, and in the number following it continued for sixty-three pages more.

go into them an answer strong in the logic of truth? In future times, when the thoughts of this Thinker are fighting with error, shall it here be said, his writings were here branded as infidel by high authority in the Church in his time, and no voice was lifted up in their vindication; there was no man to deny it; it passed as a truth confessed? Shall it be left to history to do him the tardy, insufficient, unsatisfying justice with which the future redeems the errors of the present?

In efforts to commend the writings of Lewis to the earnest attention of others, we have become convinced that these charges must be crushed. Lewis evidently thinks little of fame, and might dispense with honor; but the results of his earnest, laborious life, the lessons of his mature wisdom, the discoveries of his genius, the intuitions of his faith, cannot be dispensed with. His writings meet the moral needs of the many in this distracted and evil time, when pernicious modes of education and false forms of philosophy are about to bring forth their legitimate fruit of social convulsions. Ceasing to look upon Christianity as the sufficient cure for human ills, too many have begun to worship other gods, thinking they will do what she alone can do. Ceasing in some degree from its veneration for Christianity, the public heart has necessarily ceased also, in some degree, from its veneration for the Spirit of Law. Anarchy in the Church is becoming, as it ever must be, the precursor of misery in the State.

Before that social revolution, which now threatens to destroy our government and precipitate disunited communities into Mexican anarchy, had begun, in view of the intestine war and the rending asunder of one of the greatest ecclesiastical communions of this country, we thought we foresaw in the future eminent danger to the unity of the State, though unable to forecast the form of its manifestation. Years afterwards, in listening to the last words of the dying Calhoun, we heard from the lips of this philosophic, deep-thinking statesman, speaking of the disruption of nearly all the great ecclesiastical communities of the country, the utterance of the same thought, of the

close connection of the spiritual and the social life of the State. And it is apparent to those who meditate on the great problems of social life, by the light which has been shed upon them by the wise and good of preceding ages, that the common faith, the common charity, the common life of one universal Church, however different in its outward forms, alone can give unity to a nation; and that its spirit of reverence for the Eternal Law can alone uphold in a nation a spirit of reverence for Human Law, which can preserve its power over the human soul only so long as it is perceived to be allied to the spiritual and the eternal.

The dangers which threaten us spring not, as in other countries, from the restlessness of the people, but out of the rashness of the intellectual classes, untrained in that wise and cautious respect for existing institutions, and that spirit of reverence for Human Law, without which learning, instead of being a blessing to society, becomes its exterminating curse. The evils which threaten our social existence, if cured at all, must be cured in their source. Correctives of them may be found in the writings of this genius, commending themselves as they do to scholars and statesmen by their intellectual power and their commanding learning. Thus, as one illustration of trains of thought to be resumed hereafter, if political anarchy is to be shunned, it must be by the coming back of thinking minds to that True Idea of the State, which Lewis, as if forecasting the times which were to come, years ago set before an assembly of divines, in the heart of New England. It has passed too much away even from the thoughts of men, that the State is divine in its origin, that its sanction is from higher than human authority, that Law is allied in its essence to the Spiritual and the Eternal, that it is an image of the Divine Reason. The lessons of Lewis on The True Idea of the State, on the Spirit of Law,¹

¹ The leading thoughts of his Essay on the State are to be found in the Third Part of this Essay. To them we would call the attention of the legal profession especially, as presenting most philosophical, lucid, timely views on the Origin, the Functions, the Forms of Government.

must become household truths in New England, if she would escape most terrible calamities to herself, as well as being the cause of them to the country.

It has been intimated to us that we ought not to essay the vindication of Lewis unauthorized. On this subject we have thought closely from the first, and without varying in our convictions of duty and right. There are sometimes things which ought to be done for a man which he cannot do for himself, which he can neither solicit nor authorize. To charges such as have been brought in this case, no man could answer in his own person. And his enforced silence gives to all others the right to speak. There is something due to the strong craving of a human heart for justice. Its silence is an appeal. It is our right, our duty to listen to it, for the riches of his mind are a part of our intellectual being. But we take broader and higher ground. We scorn the idea that we are unauthorized. This is not to be thought of as a personal quarrel; it is not a thing of interest only at the moment; or in which only the parties have something at stake. The fame of so true, so great a man, is the common property of all. It belongs to his country. It belongs to mankind.

Surely time enough has passed, and no one has done that which should be done. We will look on no longer in sorrow and in silence. We will not see the sun of his life sinking through these clouds of infamy to its setting. We have no fears as to the results. There comes into our thoughts the remembered music of the eloquence of England's most eloquent divine. "Distinguished merit will draw lustre from reproach. The vapors which gather round the rising sun, and follow it in its course, seldom fail, at the close of it, to form a magnificent theatre for its reception, and to invest with variegated tints, and with a softened effulgence, the luminary which they cannot hide."

We are aware that this Review is not upheld in that position it has maintained so long without a constantly recurring, exhaustive, and ill-compensated toil; that in every year of its cycle it has published papers which no scholar can dispense

with, and that Lewis himself, while protesting against its injustice, frankly admitted its worth. And in that spirit of fairness, most just towards such a Review, we would say, this error in part may have arisen, in the first instance, from trusting to the judgment of one in whom its Editors had reason to think they could repose confidence; and then from adhering to a line which ought promptly to have been abandoned. And now that some time has passed, and these errors can be looked at with some degree of calmness, it is not for the best interests of the Review itself that these things should longer be passed over in silence. Nor in times so restless and unsettled as these, or in any times whatever, will it harm its Editors, but rather stimulate their efforts, to feel that there is a latent spirit of scrutiny into their Review, which, though generally reposing in the power that upholds it, may come forth at any moment, from any quarter, for sufficient cause, to inquire into their proceedings. It should be a point of honor with the learned class to see that literary justice is done. This, like every Review, should be made to feel it is amenable at the bar of a just public sentiment. And it may be well for the literature of New England, that a voice should be heard against its course in this matter; and it is believed there is enough of old English fairness in the blood of New England to respond to such a voice.

It is most right that there should be such a voice; for Lewis, the son of a patriot of the Revolution,—a gentleman, too, by inborn tendencies, and by the influences of ennobling pursuits,—has ever shown a generous appreciation of men of science, or of letters. When the Professor of Greek Literature in the University at Cambridge was rudely assailed by a pedant in the metropolis,¹ Lewis, then Professor of Greek and Latin Lit-

¹ Lewis seized the occasion of a criticism on himself to redress a wrong. The punishment was severe; the tact in the paper admirable. It defended Prof. Felton not directly, which would have given the attack undue importance, but by exposing its motives, and laying open the shallowness of that school from which it emanated. His vindication of his own words is worthy of study. The critic saw a singularity, and pounced upon it as a blunder. The defence lets a scholar into the secret of that profound thinking which crops out in the sentences

erature in the University in the city of New York, exposed the folly and petty malignity which ever seem to accompany the pedantic school to which the critic belonged, and more than counterpoised his studied depreciation of Professor Felton's classics by saying that they "were an honor to the scholarship of the country, and admirable for their accurate and discriminating learning." Though not lavish of words, and meaning what he utters, what praise he has given men of New England! — to the critic and poet, R. H. Dana — to Hitchcock — Hackett — Woolsey; praise so ill-requited in these provinces, which would fain lead the opinions and tone the manners of the country.

While these things are mortifying in their literary aspects, in their religious aspects they are still more painful. The ideas imputed to Lewis, as the basis of the charge that his book was infidel, are scientific. And how could a Christian Review countenance this placing of religious truth and natural truth on the same exalted grounds? Nor does it materially intensify this aspect of the case, that the charges are without evidence and in the face of evidence. The moral bearings of the case in this view, are such as to excite wonder not unmingled with some degree of alarm. If men are to be anathematized for disbelieving in Agassiz, Humboldt, or La Place, as if they disbelieved in the Prophets, the Evangelists, and the Apostles, it would seem that some change had insidiously taken place in that reverence for Prophets, Evangelists, and Apostles, which once gave them among men a place, God-given, commanding, and alone.

In other points of view the religious aspects of this case are painful and bewildering. What is misnamed Science, while meditating its attack upon the Divine Record of the Unity of the Human Race, now concentrates its force against the Record

of Lewis, indicating massive strata beneath. This characteristic will hereafter be noticed. A good illustration of it is his proving, in this case, where his words were carped at as blundering, that "they were most deliberately chosen, under the conviction that no others in the English language could so well express the idea."

of Creation. The skill and vigor of the defence has not been proportioned to the attack. There was truth, as well as modesty, in the excuse of Lewis for attempting, though a layman, to aid in this defence, that "theologians were in a great measure standing aloof." It would seem that those stationed on watch-towers in the beleaguered city of Faith should have admired the clearness with which he gave the warning. In war a perception of near and great danger sometimes rouses a conquering energy of despair; in this war it kindles the conquering energy of Faith. There is a moral power, needed in Christendom, in such a word as this, — "There would be no belief in revelation worth the name one generation after the common rejection of the absolute verity of the Mosaic account" of creation: and in this soul-moving warning, so living with emotion, so true, so grandly said.

"The momentous question, involving nothing less than the degree of hearty credence to be given to the very first page in God's written revelation, this must be settled and settled from the Bible side; or there comes in a flood of unbelief in all Scripture, too fearful to contemplate. We say all Scripture; for there is really no other place after this where any holding barrier can be erected. At any point lower down, the torrent comes rushing on with the accumulated force of all that has given away above. Creation gone, — its place in the Scripture left a blank, or what is worse, a lying myth, — who will give credence to the account of the flood in the demands of its historic exactness, or regard the succeeding events in any other than their loosest legendary aspect? The Patriarchs become dim mythological shadows. The God of the Patriarchs a *θεὸς πατριώτης*, a patrial deity, to rank hereafter with Baal, or Thor, or Jupiter. Sinai can never wholly lose its grandeur, but it is the grandeur of a gloomy and terrible myth. Moses vanishes through the 'Ivory Gate,' and prophets follow him to the land of lying dreams. And so of Him, of whom Moses and the Prophets wrote. The historical Jesus departs with the rest of the long ghostly procession. All is gone, but the

babble of the ideal Christ; and how long would that poor shadow linger in the rapidly deepening twilight, that must follow the real setting sun?”

From disbelieving the Mosaic account of Creation, a large part of the people of New England have gone on to disbelieve all Scripture. Could a census of the faith of these provinces be taken, it would disclose that one-tenth of its inhabitants do not believe the Scripture in any sense whatever. Yet while denser, blacker than the fog of its coast, there is gathering over this region the miasma of skepticism, these watchmen look drowsily and askance on a faithful defender of the worst defended gate in the Christian lines. Had they marked how many were ready to make terms with the insulting, treacherous enemy, and were unwilling to engage in open battle for the Mosaic account of creation, surely they would have appreciated his unfearing faith. While a clamorous multitude are shouting that the papyrus record of the Egyptian-taught Moses is refuted by the everlasting records of the rocks, he waves out of sight, as in comparison nothing, the few facts men have picked up as to the ongoings of the originating train of events, and reads the record of creation in the sense in which it was apprehended by the long-since-departed age, to which it was given; reads it in harmony with the rest of the super-celestial Word; and this is the only answer he will deign to give. His spirit—no less admirable than his argument—is almost decisive in such a controversy; for it is never the strength of their case which makes infidels boast, but the consternation its presentment strikes into the ranks of the faithful. Lewis discerns its difficulties as clearly as they do, and hides them not; but his faith in the Record is as sincere, as his knowledge of it profound; and the moral power of this union of frankness, intellect, and mastery of the meaning of the Record in debate with his faith in the Record is such, that a skeptic can hardly read his volume without an awe-inspired doubt whether a fortress, which in such a mind creates such an impression of strength, be not indeed a fortress no human hands have built.

In this battle, on the one side so silent, on the other so loud, so admirable has been the bearing of Lewis, that his reception by these divines is almost an unbelievable fact. Why men, searching the Hebraic history, as they search the legendary lore of Scandinavia, for a certain diligence, and for what they have done unwittingly against their intent, to promote true knowledge, receive from them no stinted praise; yet this layman, of a faith seldom equalled among all the many millions whose hearts

—— “have burned and stirred,
And quivered to the Eternal Word,”—

this man of rarest critical insight, severely, thoroughly skilled in philology, philosophy, and science; of a mind acute, logical, comprehensive; of soaring genius and strong common sense, who has concentrated on the study of the Bible all the powers of his being, is treated by these divines as if he were an ignorant intruder, unbidden, unwelcome in those vast and ill-explored fields of sacred learning, where the harvest is so plenteous, and the laborers are so few. To these knights, gayly attired in fresh armor from the bran-new arsenals of Berlin, his weapons taken down from the old walls where they hung rusting and unthought of, his mail eked out from Damascus and Tyre, may have seemed old-fashioned; yet they might have seen it was fitted to keep the oldest of the wall; that he had found out wherein the strength of the place lay; and that his old Syrian blade, with edge and circle of fire, held the enemy at bay. With a killing mortification, that whitens our blood, we see from them no honors to the champion whom God hath sent to retrieve the wavering fortunes of this desperate fight. We look on with painful wonder, till we almost fear the deadly miasma of this region has begun to paralyze their brains.

But this cannot be. It must be rather the apathy of faith in despair. Through half the century they have seen so many theories come like shadows, and depart, that they have ceased any longer to feel hope in them. Their thought is tired. They have curiously piled up in their Review the unburied bones of

theory on theory, as elaborately and as uselessly as are piled the bones of the virgins in the churches of Cologne. They looked on this theory at best but as another tenant for the charnel house, and thought little of indignities wreaked on what seemed to them dead. They themselves deny all hope in their last word to the Church, which sounds rather like the word of Death than Life. They have been so often dosed with useless nostrums, that when at last the Physician comes, they look on him with the listless eyes and utter apathy of long waiting changed into the indifference of despair.

Out of the midnight breaks the morn. The treatise on “The Six Days of Creation” will in due time be accepted by the common Christianity of the nineteenth century, as in substance its sufficient answer, through all centuries to come, to the chief objections raised in this century in the name of Science, against the Divine record of Creation. It will be accepted as such by the reason of mankind. It will end, on these points, the great Debate between the Church and Science, which thus far has gone on so disastrously for the Church, that it has weakened and imperilled her power over the human mind. To the further elucidation of these last thoughts, the Second Part of this Essay is given.

PART II.

THE DEBATE BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND SCIENCE.

CHAPTER I.

It was not our original design to do more than to put out of the way certain objections to the volume on the Creation (objections which scarcely touched at all on its discoveries), that the volume might have a fair chance to be heard. But a suggestion having reached us, that this Essay, as originally constructed, entered into the conflict so abruptly, that few would incline to a discussion so minute, protracted, and apparently so merely personal, it then seemed to us better to open it with such a presentation of one of the great truths re-discovered by Lewis, as to give to the whole matter more of its real importance, than a reader would perceive, who had not surveyed the field of battle between the Church and Science, and studied the volume to see how it met the exigencies of the strife. This might have been done in the first instance, had we not feared some might rest on our statements, instead of searching into the volume ; but having come to the opinion, that it will rather tend to draw to it the attention which is its due, we proceed to bring out¹ its second great re-discovery ; and also to present some independent ideas.

It is necessary again to glance at the great debate between the Church and Science. Before, we endeavored to present it

¹ For the differences, the reader must consult the volume: they consist chiefly in the suggestion that the power given to the earth was general, and in the ideas based on the fifth verse. Others will be pointed out hereafter.

fairly, as far as we went; and on the question of time in the Creation, did not overrate the assault. Let us therefore be the more earnestly heard, as we open farther the state of things with saying, that up to this time the battle goes heavily and disastrously against the Church.

The lines of the Truth extend in unbroken continuity from the beginning to the end of the world; and no one ever has seen, or ever will see, the lines of Divine truth and Divine life, in their unbroken continuity, without a sentiment of reverence, and a feeling of belief in their supernatural origin.

The one is extended with historical definiteness in time and space, from the desert of Sinai to the isle of Patmos. But the Seer who first began to trace in written characters the Divine line of Truth corresponding with the Divine line of Life, gathered all the Truth in the past; and as he thus looked backward to the beginning, so the last Seer looked onward to the end. Thus the line of Truth extends through all of this great cycle of Time. The line of Life runs from the beginning in like unbroken continuity, and will so continue to the end.

Upon the perception, more or less perfect, of this unbroken continuity, and whether of the true line or of some faint adumbration of it, or ray shooting from it afar, depends the belief of man in the supernatural as a constant presence and power in the earth; *and upon such belief depends the existence of civilization and of the World.* For the outward life of the world is in accordance with the inner spiritual principle of belief. In virtue of its presence, states have grown to a high civilization, and of its absence have decayed. All the phenomena of history conform to this one truth. Whether civilization rises to a wonderful height, as in the Greek Republics, or remains stationary for immense periods, as in the East, or dies, as in the Roman Empire, it is because the effect corresponds with this cause; it grows, is stationary, or dies with it. All the history of man connects itself with the true spiritual or divine life. Beyond where that ceases to make itself felt sufficiently to constitute society and some form, however low, of civilization,

history has, and can have, no existence. Barbarism is the consequence of the dying out of belief. Barbarism has no history. Day has its laws ; but it is not given man to conceive of the laws of night, other than as the negation of those of day. To carry the idea of order into the realms of darkness is not possible. As time begins with Day, so history begins with Life ; not regarding as life that state of man where the absence of the spiritual principle leaves the soul so deadened that it can no longer manifest itself in society. The life of man, as man, is only maintained by its relation to the Divine life in man. All forms of civilization connect themselves with this, either through the Primeval, the Patriarchal, the Hebraic, or the Christian forms of this life.

Hence the conception of the World, as coincident only with civilization, has a ground in fact and truth ; and in its last analysis, it falls back on the divine life in man, as the upholding ground of the whole. If, then, the spiritual life wanes, the social life sickens ; if it passes away, society dies with it, and there is barbarism, the negation of life and light. The whole life of the World, then, is indissolubly bound up with a higher life. There are low existing forms of life in the World, deriving their principle of vitality from the very oldest manifestations of divine life ; but they are so far below the highest plane of life, that the conception of the World but faintly includes them within it ; and it does this as much from their past relation, or their future possible relation to the true life, as from any other cause. For us the World is only the circle of civilization, whenever and wherever that is, excluding all that in no way enters into it ; and for the profound reason, whether distinctly comprehended or not, that all who are without it, have so far ceased to feel influences from the true life of the World as no longer to partake of any real life, that is of any social life, and have become dwellers in an outer darkness, which pertaineth not to the circle of the thoughts of man.

The application of these thoughts to the World enables us to perceive that the death of the spiritual life would be the death

of civilization and the end of the World. Whether it would be the end of the material world or not, it would be the end of our conception of the World. What we mean by the World would have ceased to exist. For as Faith is the constituting law of the Church, so belief is the constituting law of the World. Wheresoever belief is dying out in any part of the World, it tends to pass into barbarism; that is, to pass out of the World. And when this has gone very far, such part ceases to be included in the idea of the World. If then all belief were to die out, the World would have passed away. Belief is bound up with the idea of a continuous divine Truth and Life running onward from the beginning to the point in time where in a soul it gives rise to belief. The line perceived so to extend in Greece through the early ages, ceased at last to be visible, and Grecian civilization died. So, too, with the wider civilization of the Roman Empire. The line they saw was a faint adumbration of the true; as its vibrations were more intense, the outer life of their civilization flamed upward; when the line, stretching its continuity farther than it could transmit the primal fire, ceased to be seen or felt, the outer fire went out. The perception of the true line thought of as divinely traced from the beginning to the end of the cycle of man, and of the true life corresponding with it in the past and in the present is to the World what the perception of the fainter line was to these elder nations. It is bound up with belief as its effect and cause; and belief is bound up with civilization as effect and cause; and civilization is bound up with the World as effect and cause. If one perishes, all perish, and the World ceases to exist.

The life in the Church and the life in the World are, then, in correspondence; and so vital is the relation that they react powerfully upon each other. Civilization, an effect, takes on the nature of a cause towards its own cause, which is Faith. Belief destroyed in the world, the life in the Church would be destroyed also. Its life must quicken that semblance of life, which is termed civilization, or the death around it will reach

its own life. It is conceivable, then, that the Church might feel a fatal effect from the world. At least so the phenomena outwardly present themselves to human thought, though in the last analysis it may be found it is decaying life in the Church, which is the cause of that in the World, which seems to present itself in relation to the Church, as a cause of decay in its vitality.

Belief is life to the world; Unbelief, death: and whether it manifests itself in the decaying life of the Church first, or first appears in the world, is immaterial. If the phenomenon be on a scale sufficiently great in either case, it is a decisive indication of the end. Unbelief may be partial, and run through its course in individuals, in fractions of states, in sects, and in nations, scarcely touching the world; while passing through this cycle they are dying parts of the whole, and when, if not arrested, the cycle is complete, they are regarded as dead, and no longer go to make up that living whole, conceived of the World.

Within that whole, in distinction from its individual minds, or from its national minds, or from its mind as manifested in any way or form less than universal, is what may be conceived of as the World-mind. While some ideas make a lodgment only in some part thereof, others affect the World-mind. Of these is the idea of a divine line of Truth, unbroken in continuity from the beginning, and a divine line of Life equally unbroken. The two combine in the idea of an infallible Church, with an unbroken continuity of thought and life, from the beginning to the end of the world. A break perceived in either is fatal to both, so bound up are they together in one Idea. The outer line of the Truth is the guard, even as it is the true measure of the inner line of Life.

Within the line of the Truth unbroken, the Church safely abides the assaults of the World upon itself. The peculiar nature of her relations to the World makes her position complicate, yet simple. She is the World's life; even as One higher than herself is her life. But the World, though faintly con-

scious of this Truth, ever antagonizes against her, preferring her lower life to that higher, into which the Church would transform it. Hence there is ever between them aggressive war, and to meet it repressive war, in its turn becoming aggressive. But the aggressive war of the World is ever turned back by that spiritually drawn line of Truth, which runs from the beginning to the end of Time. That unbroken, the Church is not really assailable. The missiles of her foes may rain in clouds over that line, but have no power but that of annoyance.

A clear perception of this state of the case (whence suggested need not here be inquired) seems, within the memory of man, to have dawned on the armies of the World; and at the same time with a dim idea that there was a point where it could be broken through. On various points, assaults were vigorously made as feints or tentatives, and occasional shouts of success evinced a local feeling of success; but none of these things touched the World-mind. Fierce and desperate attacks were made by single chiefs, and for a time with local effects; but there was no combining together on a grand scale, caused by a fore-intimation of probable success. All was unorganized and transitory. Over the graves of these chiefs the Church built its own temples, and consecrated the desecrated ground anew.

But at length there began to appear something more than this. Something like an accord appeared; arrangement, as well as sympathy; and there could be seen all the Sciences marshalling themselves in place and order, and what was more significant, there was a softening of tone without any relenting of purpose; and all seemed as if something had filled them with new confidence, as if the hour was foreseen which was to be taken advantage of, and was to find them all in readiness. Something of security the Church seemed to infer from the altered tone, but without sufficient reason. For at length the meaning of all these mysterious movements appears. A science youngest of all the sciences, and of power as yet untried in this long war, it is thought can break through the line; and

wide to right and left, and far in thick ranks behind, all human thoughts are ranged with more than human skill, all trained with more than human art to seize the occasion, and ready to move on when the line shall have been visibly broken. This was the hour when before we glanced at this scene.

The assault was sufficiently formidable; still there was a consideration that went far to nullify its force. On the plainest laws of interpretation, applied to facts open to all, learned or unlearned, there arose, the instant the raising of the question of Time turned the mind of the world earnestly to the record of Creation, a doubt whether it was certain that Moses did mean by the Days periods of twenty-four hours. By the argument, therefore, the credence the world had been accustomed to give the sacred oracles, though weakened, could not be destroyed. A strong impression against their accuracy was made, but they had the benefit of the doubt. That large class of learned men who, though not partaking in the spiritual life, which has an intuition of the divine origin of the Word, had been trained up to reverence it, who were wisely impressed with the importance of religion to society, and would have been pained and alarmed at the destruction of the world's reverence for it, could still maintain towards it something of their old tone of respect, and give to it a certain support against those of their own class, less reverential and less wise in comprehending the relations of religion and civilization.

The line of Truth seemed weakened by the assault, but not broken. The wedge pierced, but did not divide it. But at length another assault opened on the same point in the line, uniting with and doubling the power of the first.

Science proved that Creation was a work carried on through a series of natural growths, processes, developments, call them what you will, with laws, phases, successions, phenomena, analogous to those of the present order of things. It was no longer a difference as to a single point, but the whole conception of the whole process was changed. The difference was so great that the word Creation immediately came to be used

in two senses, one expressing the idea of the Church, the other of Science.¹

It is not to be understood that Science (for it is out of her province to affirm or deny anything on the point) denies that God is the originator of what she calls the Creation, meaning the fitting up of the world for man's dwelling-place, or that He may have interposed at points where new phenomena seem to appear; these truths she in the main assumes to be truths; but the issue is thus joined, — that the whole idea of the mode in which the building of this world was wrought out, as read off from the volume of Nature, is different from the idea of Creation, as read off from the volume of the Church.

How the world rings with the power of Ideas! To this age they are what armed hosts were when the Saracens swept round more than half the circle of civilization, and emperilled the rest with a present danger, felt in every hamlet and hall. Thoughts rule the world. The thought of the man who first thought of Creation as a procession of events, an outcoming of one thing from another, as a maturing of the world, as a true growth, as much so as that of a tree or a man, and who verified the thought by reading off its proof from the volume of Nature, struck a decisive, fatal blow at the universal, the accredited idea in the Church, that Creation was an instantaneous work of the Deity, rising at his fiat into that order and harmony which we embrace in the idea of the world. Such *was* the idea. Six creative fiats instantaneously obeyed in each day, and distributed through the days of a single week of the world's present calendar. The brief week was but to lay in human reverence the basis of the Sabbath. The grand thought, in connection with the Creation, was ever that of the swiftness of the Divine Word. Whatever objections might now arise to this idea, on comparing it closely with the Record, none troubled the mind of man before this thinker was born, at whose bidding the old Thought retired.

¹ In each of these senses we are obliged to use the word in this Essay.

Before, in the case of the new Thought, it was intimated that it seemed to be of minor worth ; that for any discoverable value it would seem as well the idea of six days as of six thousand years ; and it might even be deemed not inappropriate to Him, with whom a thousand years are as one day, to call them days — his days when He worked alone, with no intelligent mind in the vast realms of his working to admire his swiftness or wonder at his delay ; and that the slightest intimation of anything anomalous in the days, — and there was such, — weakened the whole force of the objection and left Faith undaunted to confront Science.

But no such thoughts avail now. It is not a single variable phenomenon which needs to take on a new aspect. The whole conception of Creation is to be changed. It assumes the definiteness of a long, grand procession of events, ruled by laws. Long Times are filled up with long Processes. As cycles on cycles slowly roll away, other and still other growths succeed. At each step the world grows more and more perfect. At length, as the crowning work of a long succession alike in the vegetable and the animal worlds, both pointing to him, both prophesying of him, connected in his organic structure with both, the microcosm of the worlds below and before him, Man appears. Creation ends. History begins. And this is truth. And of this the Church knows nothing. As by her taught, Creation is instantaneous and complete, — six flats distributed through a week of common time.

The youngest of the sciences, then, has proved, in addition to what it had before proved, that the true idea of the Creation is as different from that taught in the Church, as the true idea of the Time. The double wedge, piercing the same point in the line, came on with resistless force. To all eyes, save the eye of Faith, it was broken. The prestige of the Church was destroyed. In her long life of thousands of years, nothing like this had ever taken place before. The charm of infallibility, even, seemed to pass over to Science.

The change which the new Thought made in the relations

of the Church to the world was immediate and immense. There were multitudes of objections to her truths, which seemed wholly inefficient against a claim of infallibility so well and so long maintained. And this on sound principles of reasoning. Everything was to be presumed in favor of that infallibility, which for so many ages had so established itself as to command the assent of the civilized world. But the moment that fact disappeared, the instant that charm was dissolved, a new rule of logic became reasonable; the old rule was reversed; and objections which, before, common sense treated as naught, common sense now allowed had great power.

The full power of these changes is not yet everywhere felt. There are ranks and places into which it has not penetrated. A mighty power is not overthrown in an instant. A city so vast is not traversed in a day. There are quarters and streets in it which have not heard the sound of the tumult.

But it is utterly in vain to deny, it is perfectly well known to all intelligent men, that Christianity has met in this century a check, a defeat, a seeming overthrow, the like of which she never before encountered. The hour of peril, when the Moslem hosts mustered on the plain of Tours, or beneath the walls of Vienna, was not as dark as now, when the bannered hosts of all the Sciences seem marching through the defenceless city.

Effects are to be studied in their causes, as well as in their developments. The effect is not yet felt to the full power of the cause; but it is easy to see what is taking and what must go on to take place. It is the abandonment of Christianity by the World.

It may be said, the World never did embrace Christianity. And this is true. And yet, there is a true sense, and, though a lower, a most important sense, in which it did. There was a Christendom which revered and confided in the Church; though it would not yield its heart to its dictates, it respected them as divinely authoritative. That Christendom has ceased to exist. That semblance of Faith in the world, the conviction of the divine origin of the Church, so serviceable as an

outermost wall, so helpful to aid the weaker forms of the higher Faith, is gone. Faith no longer exists, except as a miraculous power in the earth.

Faith's victory over the World is lost. It is powerless to carry its power through the world. If the infallible Church made so little way against the world confessing its ignorance and revering her claims, what can she do now that their positions are so changed?

The inference the awe-struck world has drawn, must draw, from these momentous truths, is that the voice believed to be the voice of God speaking to man, begins with the utterance of fable, of untruth! Before the power of such a thought, the long procession of all the glories of the Church fades and dissolves, like the cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces, the solemn temples, in that great day of wrath, when heaven and earth shall pass away.

Set as the world is against Christianity, this conviction saddens the world. Though the war is remorseless, there is no exultation. Undefined and fearful forebodings pervade the heart of humanity. But such feelings will not turn the course of human thought. The heart of man may fail for fear, when the sun is turning into darkness; but this will not rekindle the light. The arm on which man in his heart had secretly relied to save him is now thought to have no power to save. The civilized world rejects Christ again; and there remaineth for humanity only a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation.

Some may imagine it possible for belief in the creative vision of the Almighty to be abandoned by the world-mind, and for Faith to survive. It will not be put to the test. The abandonment of all belief in that, will be followed with startling swiftness by the abandonment of all belief in Christianity; and civilization will perish. That which we now conceive of as the World, will cease to exist. Nor will its material frame be suffered to survive. This stately mausoleum of vanished life will not be left for perishing barbarians to roam through,

with no true organizing principle of social life in their frames. Christ not obscurely intimated, that the dying out of faith in the earth would synchronize with his coming. Faith is dependent on the spirit of Divine mercy in the earth. And if the world be fallen into such disorder, that Truth gives to Eternal Truth the lie, Faith will not long have to endure the reproach. The spirit of mercy is abandoning mankind; and despite every hope, omen, or misinterpreted prophecy, the judgment is nigh, even at the doors. The world shudders on the brink of ruin. She will not shudder long. As she plunges into the darkness of Atheism, she will be arrested on her downward way by the voice of the archangel, and the trump of God, calling back Man to judgment.

It would seem to be a crisis in which Heaven might interfere. Man's extreme need called forth Revelation; it would seem it might call forth its miraculous vindication. The crisis might seem to justify it; and if so, it will be, or else the end of all things is at hand. But it would seem that here human means, under God, would be the means, and would avail. When the fate of Christendom hung suspended on the battle, Martel was commissioned to win the fight. When the bulwark of Christendom was in peril, there was raised up to deliver the city the "man sent from God." Why should it not be so now? If such has been and is the power of one THOUGHT to destroy, may there not be measured against it a Thought with power to save? If there be a Thought so to meet this Thought, the shock of battle is nothing to the moral sublimity of this scene. If one Thinker have wrought this ruin, why may not another stay the march of this destroying Idea, before which all sacred, venerable glories pass away, like visions of the night? Why not, if all things that make life holy be not deceitful dreams? if Life itself be not the most cruel of mockeries? Why not now deliverance come? Why not to-day, as well as to-morrow? Why not now, when all who have eyes to see, see the danger? The Church hath waited long. The World, troubled at its own triumph, might almost be ready to welcome it,

before it plunges into the unknown of its woes, without the only presence that in the past availed to save, — that Presence in the earth, robed in garments made white in the blood of the Lamb, standing between her and the wrath of God, and suffering even her to make no absolutely fatal error. Why not deliverance come in this land, whose history has been a continuous miracle? — this land which, though rent with feuds, and, it may be, like the twelve tribes of Israel, about to divide into belligerent kingdoms, is still an Israel of God? Why may not, out of her, from one of hers, go forth the answer to the World, saddened with its victory over the Church? So hath the answer gone forth. It may seem to some, this should have been given by the Abana and the Pharpar, in Berlin, or Oxford; but it hath pleased God that it should be given when, and where, and by whom it has been.

CHAPTER II.

THE Truth which Science has discovered, is to be discovered in the Record. The Truth is not only to be pointed out therein; but the fact that it really is there, must be upheld by some recognition of it there by the Church, — some once universal recognition, and running back to the age when the record was given.

Here it is proposed to point out the Truth in the record. And the attempt is prefaced with a single remark. In reference to the first, second, and fourth great creative works set forth in the Mosaic account, the Creation of Light, of the Atmosphere, of the Starry World, Science knows little or nothing. Analogy, and a few facts, are all she can bring to bear on the creation of either of these. She takes her stand on the Earth, and points to the long succession of planets, to the races on races of animals, with changes in the globe conforming to them; and, deducing thus the idea of preparation of the globe immensely slow as measured in human time, of its maturing, of its growth, carries the truth known here as a presumptive truth into all the phenomena of creative power. The same is to be done here. For, if it be proved that in any one of the creative works in the Mosaic Record this same idea of a natural process, of an out-coming through natural laws, of a nature working from and under God as its author, of a growth, is inwrought into the record of the work recorded, the idea, with a like force of analogy, runs into all the other works and all the other Days.

Everything here depends on the terms. And here the reader of any version ever made need not err. In the work

of the third Day are two great acts,—the appearing of the land, and the appearing of the plants. To the last we direct our thoughts. How did the plants appear?—instantaneously covering the earth? grasses clothing the fields? forests waving on a thousand mountains? roses of Sharon along the plain, by the sea? majestic cedars on glorious Lebanon? The drapery of this question has been inadvertently adjusted to the present cycle of Time; but the question cannot be misunderstood, and for convenience sake similar language will continue to be used. Milton, in his grand poem, setting the thought of the Church to music, answers the question affirmatively. The completed wonder follows instantaneously upon the Word.

*"He scarce had said, when the bare Earth, till then
Desert and bare, unsightly, unadorned,
Brought forth the tender grass, whose verdure clad
Her universal face with pleasant green.
Then herbs of every leaf, that sudden flowered,
Opening their various colors, and made gay
Her bosom smelling sweet; and these scarce blown,
Forth flourished thick the clustering vine, forth crept
The swelling gourd, up stood the corny reed,
Embattled in her field, and the humble shrub
And bush with frizzled hair implicit: last
Rose, as in dance, the stately trees, and spread
Their branches hung with copious fruits, or gemm'd
Their blossoms; with high woods the hills were crown'd."*

Milton thinks the Earth brought forth the plants, with what, perhaps, it would be justifiable to call a magical celerity. Others, basing their idea also on Scripture, think that God made them full formed, and set them in the earth. But with all it has been one common, undisputed idea, that the earth was instantly covered with full-grown vegetation; was arrayed in the twinkling of an eye, in all the pomp and garniture of the floral realm. Is this so, according to the Record? If it be, then, by one fact judging of all the facts in the record, the war of Science and the Church is over. The truth is known; and the Record, contradicted by the Truth,—such is the world's

reasoning,—is not the Truth ; and so its power over the world-mind is gone forever.

What is the Record, then ? Simply, undeniably this : The Earth was commanded to bring forth the plants. Instantaneously ? There is no evidence of it : there is evidence against it. Evidence against it !—there is *proof* against it. The idea of germination is inwrought into the original words ; both into the verb which conveys the command, and into the verb which describes the effect. A plant-germinating power was, in the third age of the world, given to the Earth by the Omnic Word. These plants, then, were *born, and grew*.

What consequences follow from the Record thus understood in its plain, literal, and it would seem, its irresistible and necessary import ? First : The restricted Time-idea passes away before its thought. The cedars, which attain to maturity in centuries, were not produced in a day. The cedars grew.

But there is more in its thought. A plant-germinating power was given to the Earth : then, if it brings forth one cycle of plants, does this exhaust the power ? or, as they pass through their cycle and pass away, may other cycles of plants succeed, through the same power which produces the first ? Why not ? What limit is there in the power given, limiting it to one single production, any more than in that Power behind the power ? Why is it more strange, more incredible, that it might stretch on indefinitely, ever varying at great eras with the varying conditions of light and heat, and all the varying powers working in accord with this power, than that at one time it should be competent, to such a manifold and wonderful effect as it puts forth in the thousand varieties of plants beginning to grow over all the continents and all the islands, in all the zones and all the latitudes, covering at once the whole face of the earth ?

Change, now, certain of the conditions of growth, and from the earth you get new growths, unlike those before grown on the same spot. Cut down the trees, and other species grow up from out the same circle of the plant-nourishing earth. Is

there here nothing hinting at the old law? at least, is there not here something which makes more conceivable that fulness of power which seems to follow the true idea in this old record — so old, that the ideas it once conveyed to all have silently given place to others, now to give place to the old and the true?

The Bible is not interpreted on the same principle as other books are interpreted, till a due regard is had to the divinity of its Author. His words are to be presumed to be full to their very depths with force and power, and to have the utmost exactness of meaning. If He has made known how in the beginning He instituted the plant kingdom, his words must be presupposed to have a meaning corresponding, as far as human words can correspond, to his idea; must be presupposed to picture, as faithfully as human language could picture, his thought. Had God directly, and not mediately through earth by making the earth directly causative in their germination, created the plants, there was no lack of words to convey this truth. Had he himself clothed the earth with vegetation, as a robe is thrown over a bride; had he set the finely chased, the curiously wrought gems on her robes, and put on her head the chaplet of flowers; there were words choice, apt, from any of the decorative arts of man, to have conveyed the idea; or it might have been expressed in simple, unmistakable language, without any figure. But no; to adorn the earth, God works through a second power, made such by him — the Earth itself. The Earth, like an expectant bride, is commanded to begin to adorn herself, with all the beauty of the spring, for that husband who awaits to greet the full perfection of her loveliness, far down in the unborn ages. With the mind once open to it, there is no mistaking here the word or the idea. The plants are germinations, growths of the Earth.

And the idea once known, the mode once fixed, we again say, it is more compatible with a true idea of the speaker to suppose not only — as we must suppose — that the earth produced for once only, beginning the instant that the Word vitalized her frame, many plants, but that she went on through that

whole cycle in its successions vast, from age to age, to give birth to new generations of plants; and also, as may well be supposed, carried the same power into other cycles of time.

The whole rests on two words. But those words all, who have seen the birth of a plant from the earth, and traced its growth, can apprehend. On a few words, but words of God.

And even leaving out of sight for the instant the power that thus clothes these words, and letting this stand as the word of an ancient man, wise in all the wisdom of his age, — a man whose ideas have had the mightiest and the most enduring power of any one in human history, — let us ask, what he must have meant by his terms. Certainly nothing other than what we first supposed: not that the earth was instantaneously clothed with vegetation, but that it clothed itself, bringing forth the species of plants from its own bosom, each in accordance with its own times, laws, and peculiarities of growth. He certainly, as we, now more wisely taught of his wisdom, know, was, judging him by his own terms, free from the restricted time limits, in which we fettered his mightiest of intellects. He very well knew the cedar never grew in a common day. And how shall we fairly presume to limit his language to one form of growth pertaining to one cycle of time; or say that he regarded the vegetation of those anomalous days, when there was no sun in heaven, as the same as in the subsequent cycles of the creative times, or as in the Day of man?

But, whether he fathomed the full depth of the thought and word of God or not (we think he may have done so essentially, and that he did), the thought in the words is before us, and from them we may draw our conclusion. And that conclusion is, that power divinely given to the earth to bring forth plants, unlimited in terms, is only supposed in accordance with the Power giving it; with the unlimitedness of the terms, the greatness of the epoch, and the linking together of subsequent periods to this, in which this power is given, so as to form the cycles one continuing Day when it is made as unlimited as the human mind can properly, that is easily, naturally, conceive of

it ; and that would seem to be not merely as a power in that instant, and for once only, to germinate certain plants, and to reproduce those from their seeds, according to the law then enunciated ; but to go on producing new and other cycles of plants, as its plant-producing power was affected by the vitalizing influences of vegetation, vitalized and decaying ; or by the altered conditions of light, air, and moisture, or of the more subtle elementary agencies ; or by great changes in its own state, as the vast cycle in which this power was given wheeled through its immense circuit, and still to carry with it the same power into cycles of related time.

And thus seen, the idea and the word of the record, the very Truth uttered by Moses of old, is that Truth which Science now utters, we will no longer say confuting, but confirming Moses.

If it so be, that the Church has been so negligent as not to keep all the ideas she was divinely inspired to convey, she may well be compelled to relearn them from her own oracles, through the quickening influence on the heed she gives to them, from those who bring them, learned elsewhere, into her temples to confound her with them. But they are her own divinely-taught truths, well known to her, as will hereafter appear, of old.

But, not only in this third age of the world is there a natural power divinely originated, that it may work on to fit up the world, and so by analogy, not only in this age, but in all the ages ; but there is an equally decisive, though a more anomalous and wonderful instance of it in the sixth age of the world. There the Creator of all that is, is pleased to make known something of the mode in which he created animals.

That the earth should have had divinely-given power to grow plants, far back in one of the old creative Days, seems really no more wonderful than that she should have power to develop them from out their seeds, and to nourish them. There is, one would think, no more of a mystery (it is not at all a matter of degree) in growing a seed itself, than in growing an

oak out of an acorn ; or, to give to the thought its full power, in growing the oak that grows the oak-producing acorns. The earth seems to feel the seed in its bosom, to appreciate, sympathize with its laws of life ; by a subtle chemistry, which no eye or thought of man has ever detected in its finer workings, it supplies delicate influences accordant with its unfolding life, nourishes its growth ; and so, from the tiny seed, and from the seemingly inert but wisely-cherishing mould, up shoots the well-woven fabric of the palm. And the seemingly dull, dead clod hath the wisdom so to adapt its invisibly fine and subtle influences to every seed that seeks its bosom, that every plant comes from it with its own peculiar structure, and tints, and perfume. And plants and trees are by the earth so made to grow, that they shall grow each its own distinct, peculiar seed, by which it shall from the earth thus grow again. And can it be thought incredible that a God, which hath given such power and wisdom to the Earth as this, could have given power to the Earth to grow the seed itself ? Certainly not less mysterious this, which is a matter of direct observation, than the growing of the seed, and helping the mind somewhat to take hold of the idea of the Earth as a plant-producing power.

But still there is one thought as yet wanting. It is possible to conceive of a plant-producing, or, to go back farther, a seed-growing earth, but not of a seed-creating earth. We must dwell a little on this, for its own sake, and because certain ideas, best learned here, are to be carried into another cycle of time. In the seed, wrapped around with folds, which give to it a local habitation, is the entity which constitutes the plant. That is there which makes the plant what it is, in distinction from everything else. Leaves, flowers, twigs, may be torn away from the plant ; but something there is in it — something developed out of the seed, so indivisible, that, if it be divided, the plant becomes dead matter. There is life there.

We perceive it there as an effect, and seek for its cause. The language in the record teaches that the earth *brought forth* the plants ; birth, germination is predicated of it. But

birth, germination, implies a previous beginning to those entities known to be in the seeds, and which in full development are the plants. It is known in what they are in the present cycle, though man cannot pierce into the mystery of how they are. They are in curious cells; and, though sealed up, some of them, for thousands of years, these powers have not escaped or expired, but can be called out by the mysterious cherishing of mother Earth. Something like these powers the mind seeks for, before it can well hold on to the idea of a plant-producing earth; it would seem to seek some knowledge of the facts as facts; or else of some cause, from which it might deduce them, as facts.

It has a right to seek for this, for the record suggests it. The idea it presents is that of birth; but where is that which answers to the idea of conceiving, in the figure? The idea is of germination; but where is the beginning of those potentialities now wrapped up in every seed? It has a right to seek for it in this record; for in this record — which seems to contain within itself every possible thought on the complicate subject of which it treats, as every limb and leaf and flower of an oak is folded up in an acorn — there is language, which seems to answer this, and tell whence were those entities, through which in her appointed time the earth could give birth to all the varieties of the plant-world. How they could exist except in distinct cells, all fenced off from other powers, all sealed up, is quite out of our observation; but that which is sought is not the mode of their being, — of which nothing is now known, — but the fact, or else some cause, from which the fact may be inferred. Something is sought for back of their birth. Give us this, the mind seems to say; either the fact, or some intimation of something, which we may accept as the cause of the fact. Establish it either by the effect or by the cause. There is, as yet, a missing idea here. The record would tell us how the plants came; but, as yet, there is revealed but part of what must be presupposed from the language given.

That idea — so important because the logic inhering in the

soul itself rejects the idea of the earth as a plant-creating power—which would make the earth share in a power not to be conceived of as delegated,—that idea, not to be dispensed with, seems to appear in the record, where it speaks of the Spirit brooding on the face of the deep. The idea is unmistakable. It comes out with perfect distinctness in all the Cosmogonies, borrowed from this most ancient of all. It is imitated in all the ancient thought on the creation of the world. The thought is lost in our version, but it is instantly restored by the word here used—a familiar, expressive, well-understood word; and if any feel it is too much so, the reply is, it conveys the very idea the Father of Life was pleased to convey; it is the word He was pleased to use to men to whom the word was as familiar as to us.

Here, then, the record completes itself. In the primeval Night the Spirit hovered over the deep, and imparted to it those potentialities which might afterwards take to themselves the outer forms and visible properties of life. Traditions of this, spread through all the East, found their way into the classic world. In all the mythologies, the Night precedes the Day, and is revered as the Mother of Creation. In this Night, would seem to have been that quickening which, three cycles afterwards, was followed by the command, "Let the earth bring forth the plants"; and then the plants were born and grew. Light in the intervening time was born; light, and, if so, then heat; and all the wondrous powers that seem to be but different manifestations of this wonder of wonders, Light. The air was born. And how may light and air have affected these potentialities which, carried in the womb of the earth, awaited the word which said, "Let the earth bring forth!"

This sacred and most ancient revelation originated the Oriental conception of world-making. It is accordant with much of the thought of the East. It is not accordant with the thought of the West,—unless there be excepted some traces of it, of Eastern origin, in the classic mind. It is not accordant at all with the modern thought of the West, till that thought wrought

out its own difficult way to a new conception of creation, to find itself at the height of its achievements standing face to face with the ancient thought of the East, born of primeval revelation.

That which now opens to our view, in what is revealed of the mode of the creation of the animals, is at first seemingly so far beyond what has been considered, and so remote from known analogies, that it requires some boldness, in the silence of recent commentators on the Mosaic account as to this point, to reënnunciate the lost sight of truth in the clearness and boldness of the record. Yet what can be clearer, plainer, to all alike who read the original or the version, than this, that the animals were not direct creations of God; but, like the plants, were produced through the mediate power of the earth?

And here might be taken up again each and all of the trains of thought followed in thinking of the birth of the plants; or it might be shown how the very same language is used and the same ideas arise in the account of the waters swarming with living things, and of the ocean-born birds of the air; but only one thought, which this idea of the creation of the animals is likely to suggest, that it is something very startling and strange, can be dwelt upon. It is strange most certainly, in the sense of something unfamiliar to us, but not in the least incredible, and no more a mystery than the power before given. That the dull clod should give birth to the shapely flower, or to the oak, or the elm, is no less a mystery than that it should produce a higher form of growth, structures not rooted to one spot of earth.

No less a mystery, for the mystery is the same. Say you these are living things? And is not the plant with the blood circulating through all its frame, the sensitive flower that blushes red at the warm kisses of the sun, and plays with the caressing breeze, a living thing? Is there no truth in all the thought of the elder nations, who lived in the presence of nature, that there is a life in every plant and tree? And has not science confirmed this old thought. Shall we say there is life in the very lowest forms of what we term animate nature, and deny

it in the very highest forms of the creative cycle below? There is life in the plant as truly as there is life in the animal; this would even be a fair inference from this most wonderful word, which seems absolutely exhaustless in its profound intimations or clear disclosures of natural truths. There is life in the plant, and, though beyond our dull senses to perceive it, doubtless some dim consciousness of pleasure and pain; and grant that the Earth could bring forth a plant, and why does it not follow that possibly it might bring forth a higher form of life?

Still, you repeat, it is a strange thing that the earth should produce living things. The thought is, no doubt, profound and true, but it does not distinguish between two ideas. It is strange, it is incredible, and it is in no wise to be believed, that the Earth could *create* living things, which is the thought, which, though using our language, stands opposing so persistently and so wisely, what seems to it our thought; it is impossible that the Earth should *create* life, not that it should bring it forth. *The Earth is the Mother of living things, not the Father of the least particle of Life. She can carry in her bosom principles of Life imparted to her, which may by her aid take to themselves visible material forms, but they come from some higher source.

How different, let it be said again, this whole conception of Creation, from that which has for ages been received by the mind of the West. In the primeval night the Spirit brooding over the world; the long gestation; the birth of life, that is born to grow; and, as may hereafter appear, life in lower, and then in higher and still higher forms. Open Milton, in whose pages may be read the thoughts of the West, for the great Poets utter the mind of the world. Milton's more truthful imagination here and there slightly departs from the prevailing forms of conceiving of the Creation, and his faithfulness in adhering to the Hebrew makes his description in some points come nearer to the divine than that of most commentators. The idea of a direct production of the animal king-

dom from the earth comes out in it as plainly as in the original. But it is instantaneous. It is a miracle. There is no trace in it of any natural process. Out of the earth they come; but, though his language keeps so close to Scripture that there is a semblance of its idea in this great poet's thought, the earth really has no natural connection with it, even as there was none in the mind of that Western world, which he interprets. And, hence, the picture is so incongruous. With the idea he tried to set forth, the genius of Milton could do nothing but fail magnificently.

We quote the passage, in part, to show his idea of the instantaneousness of full growth, so utterly at war with the idea of any true birth, though he uses the term.

The earth obeyed; and straight
Opening her fertile womb, teem'd at a birth
Innumerable living creatures; *perfect forms*
Limbed and full grown: out of the earth uprose,
As from his lair the wild beast. ———
The cattle in the fields and meadows green,
Those rare and solitary, these in flocks
Pasturing at once, and in broad herds upsprung,
The grassy clods now calved; now half appeared
The tawny lion pawing to get free
His hinder parts. ———

The swift stag from underground
Bore up his branching head; scarce from his mould
Behemoth, biggest born of Earth, upheaved his vastness.
Fleeced the flocks and bleating rose.

There is a curious power in the world-mind of silently and unconsciously modifying ideas which somehow it feels are not right. This picture never suited the feelings of the world, and somehow or other the part the earth seems to play in it quite passed out of the picture of creation in the world-mind. By some popular recent commentators the thought is not alluded to at all. They close their eyes and glide over the place in silence. The picture is to be made congruous some way, and it is done by leaving entirely out one of the elements, and pic-

turing the creation of animals as a direct and instant creation of God without any thought of Mother Earth at all.

The objection to this, and to Milton's unreal, incongruous, but more faithful picture, is not to the instantaneousness of the work, nor to the directness of the Divine agency. Such a mode of creation is conceivable, and it may seem to some the most glorious that can be thought of. So far as it holds to a power of God therein it is perfectly correct. And this idea is involved also in the true idea, and in it, too, the birth is instantaneous. But the fault in the former is, there is no birth. It is a miracle, an instantaneous work of God, with no antecedent working in space and time of any cause, and nothing subsequent for its perfection. There is no gestation, and no growth. It is all perfect in the twinkling of an eye. It is no birth at all.

There is no possible way of connecting it with long series of times. It neither requires, nor admits of them.

The true idea is inseparable from long time. The restricted time idea, as was said before of similar phenomena, passes away before the thought. And the time expands indefinitely in connection with another thought there considered, and now, to be applied here. This power to bring forth living creatures, like the power to bring forth plants, may be conceived of as general, or as it was then called, defining the term, an unlimited power. And if it be such, then from the general tenor of the record, which evidently describes a related and ascending series, the first putting forth of this power would be attended with lower and less perfect results than the later. Taking the thought of the vast and unmeasured, which we contend it must have suggested and did suggest to those to whom it was given, and entering into the spirit of the record, this would lead to the conclusion that the plant and animal kingdoms, the fishes, too, of the seas, and the ocean-born birds of the air, were related to, but not the same, as those in the age of man. This would naturally follow from the conception of the power as general and running on through these closely related cycles of time, all tending to the complete and highest cycle, in which

man is created; in which, the world being finished, History begins.

It seems that such would be the fair conclusion of one who interprets the record in harmony with its spirit. But let a doubt at this point be admitted, and then how does the case stand? The power may be general, or special; it may extend to many acts, or be limited to one instant; and the question is, how shall its character in this respect be determined? An attempt has been made to arrive at its decision from *a priori* considerations. But it may, perchance, be determined in another way, which may be illustrated thus: A master gives his tenant a command to sow his fields. There may be circumstances going to show whether this be a general or a special power. Thus, if it be at some beginning; if the master leaves the country for a period of years; if it connect itself with some improvement of the estate, going on for years; then these considerations would have a bearing upon it. But if such considerations were not thought to decide it, it would be decided, one would think, by inquiring into the subsequent facts; by ascertaining whether the tenant did go on to repeat the sowing from year to year, or not. If he did, the power given would be known to be a general and not a special power.

At this point, then, Science might be called in to testify how the subsequent facts were. She has traversed some of these Days, and studied this producing power of the Earth, and if she finds it stretching on through vast periods, and repeating itself, her testimony is sufficiently decisive of the question. No matter whether she recognizes it as the scriptural power or not, it is known what the power is. Its beginning is known from Divine Revelation; it is only farther to be known whether it be special or general; and the testimony of Science, good on this point, is that it is a general power.

It would seem, then, that science upholds what is here supposed to be the true interpretation, and reason has nothing that contravenes it.

If it might be permitted here to touch on one point, which

might have been adverted to before, we would say: It is very difficult to conceive how the life principles could have been preserved during the long cycles previous to their manifestation in a visible vesture of materiality, subjected, as it would seem they must have been, to the intense power of the agencies known to have been then in action. But may not this come from the fact, that now we ever see their local habitation in some gross and easily destructible form? Is not the idea really that of the difficulty of the preservation of that which gave them locality and distinction, and which is conceived of as something grossly material, the idea coming from what is seen now? But why necessarily conceive of this as something which, as in the seemingly analogous cases now, can be easily changed and destroyed? Is there nothing which can resist the intensest action of fire? Or what if these life-seeds, borne in the womb of Nature, were seeds of fire itself; that is, of fire outwardly covering the inner life? There are, too, wonderfully potent and mysteriously fine essences, which are material, but on which no outer force might be able to work the least harm. But let all this be left to the Divine power, which can work greater wonders in nature than this.

As to the thought within this thought, the probable destruction of the principles themselves in their very essence, in the intense conflict of fire and water, known to mark the growth of the world, there need be no trouble. Possibly that which it is feared would destroy them, may have been requisite to their perfection. And the idea of the absolute indestructibility of all force — that is, apart from some Divine volition — is taking more and more hold on the scientific thought of the world. And life is force; what else it may be, is unknown; but it is certainly force, indestructible force.

Science and reason, then, cannot allege aught against these ideas. But all revealed of Creation is wonderful, and at this point in the cycles where animal life is first visibly manifested, most wonderful. Wonder is the parent of adoration. The creation of the animals is truly wonderful. Wonder, but be-

lieve. If ever fell on human ears words plain and certain in their import, they are these: "And God said, let the Earth bring forth the living creature;" and if the Church heeded and kept not their import, be their value less or more in comparison with higher truths she kept, she might well fall into extreme peril, through so doing, to learn that the least word of God is higher than the highest word of man.

It has been supposed that this power must have been commensurate with the cycle in which it was given, and have been carried into other cycles of time. And if Science tells of births strange and rude, then higher and more complicate; or if she be not altogether sure of this, is at least sure that races came and passed away, and new appeared and vanished again; and others came in succession long, till cabinets cannot contain their fossil bones; and language, with its complications, fails to express their varieties and almost interminable succession,—all this might follow from such a power as here is seen to be given to the Earth.

CHAPTER III.

THESE truths being philologically established, that the Days of Creation are indefinite in duration, and that the natural, as truly as the supernatural, enters into Creation, the two grand arguments raised by Science in its debate with the Church as to the Divine Record of Creation, are answered.

But the answer must be clothed in the authority of the ever-existing and divinely-taught Church, before it can avail. Before attempting to show that this is possible, we stop here to unfold certain ideas, whose presentation seems requisite for the elucidation of the scriptural history of Creation; to draw out the correspondence between Nature and Revelation; and to show what, in the true sense of the term, Creation is.

Closely as the Record of Creation has been studied, there is one fact in it of which it may be paradoxically said, it has received much attention, and none. Some minds have been struck with it,—minds, too, of different schools and ages,—while most have seen nothing in it. But every peculiarity in divine language is significant; and, if what has seemed a slight peculiarity, furnishes, in connection with other truths, an answer to several of the arguments against the Mosaic Creation, which remain after the two grand arguments against it have been answered, then that truth may receive new illustration.

The fact is this: while Moses describes certain of the Days of creation as second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth, he does not describe the Day which preceded them as the *first Day*, but as *Day one*. If this be, as some think, merely a cardinal number for an ordinal, nothing need be said about it; but, his language is so condensed, that it would seem wiser to heed everything in it. This idea gathers strength from the fact,

that the early ages seem to have had a Time-science, and might have seen a decisive intimation in what now is passed over without thought. It also gains strength from the fact, that this document is remarkable for precision. In a rhetorical view, this is one of its marked characteristics. It is both complete and concise. It is a mathematical expression for the world.

If this seemingly slight peculiarity means anything, its meaning is important.

Six cycles of time are described. That which followed the beginning of the earliest, stood to it in the relation of second. Had that which preceded stood to the second in such a relation that it could have been described as the first, it must have begun *and ended* before the second began ; as must have been the fact as to the second with reference to the third, as to the third with reference to the fourth, and so on to the end. But while five of these periods are described as second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, that whose beginning was before their beginning is not described as *first* ; which, in such a series, would imply it terminated before the second began : and, not being thus described, it is certain that it began, but did not end before the second began ; and as its termination is not indicated as synchronizing with any one of the subsequent Days, this is equivalent to saying it terminated at the end of the whole period described. The language of Moses sets all this forth with mathematical precision. If one familiar with Time-thinking were told that a Seer had indicated certain facts as to certain times by describing them as Day one, Day second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth, he would say, Here one period involves all the periods ; they form a series constructed through the first ; except the first, each begins and ends before the next begins ; the language is full, yet precise, and admits of no other meaning ; pages of description would not give these ideas with more clearness ; and to state them more fully, would be like writing out the complications of two lines of the multiplication table.

This peculiarity, then, in his description of the Day of Light, is thought to be a decisive intimation that *Moses conceived of it as running through all the Days of Creation*. And this accords with his speaking of a "Day in which the Lord made the heavens and the earth." Should his former language be thought altogether too indefinite and undecisive for him to have rested so important a truth upon it, it is to be said he may have thought it explained by this language. And should any one still think the interpretation given the former language is trifling, fanciful, or bordering on the cabalistical, let them mark this. "Some of the Fathers were struck by this language in Genesis, and were led on account of it to regard the first day as somehow including all the rest, being in fact the day of days mentioned in the beginning of the second chapter, or the 'day in which the Lord made the heavens and the earth.'"

Let them also mark that Josephus, alluding to what they deem a slight peculiarity, meaning nothing, said that he knew the reason of it; and promised in a future treatise to give the explanation of it. It will hardly do, in the face of such facts,—in the face of the subsequent language of Moses, of the manifest condensation of this complex document, of the wisdom of its Divine Author,—to hold this peculiarity meaningless, and to reject conclusions deduced from it with mathematical certainty, as trifling, fanciful, or cabalistical.

The idea supposed to be in this language, is not without entire confirmation from other Scripture. It is implied in the Record that there was light on the second and third Days; and in this it is implied that the Day of Light, or Fire, was still going on. The question, Whence came that light? except on this supposition, cannot be answered. And there is one idea, as to the Bible, the proofs of which, if drawn out, would fill a volume, that it suggests no inquiry to which it does not somewhere suggest an answer—a truth which is one of the thousand minor evidences of its origin.

Scripture proves this Day was going on in the third Day. The upheaving of the land was through the agency of fire.

"Over the mountains stood the waters; at thy rebuke they fled; at the voice of thy *thunder* they hasted away."¹

The idea of this Day rests, then, on the language which describes the Day that opened the creative age; on the implied continuance of the element then created in the second and third cycles; on proof from Scripture of its action in the third cycle; on the assertion that in one Day all things were made. It rests also on this scriptural idea, very important in the elucidation and confirmation of Revelation from Nature, that each great creative work was created to remain through all time. The Mosaic conception of the Creation holds to the presence of the five great later works of Creation in the completed world. By analogy, the same is true of the first. Like the Air element, the Earth element, and the Water element, the Fire element, then, was to remain everlastingly. But how can the Fire element remain inactive in a changing, forming, growing world? Even in this stationary cycle, the breathings and pantings of this chained element terrify the world. How natural, then, the thought, that, ministering to the world's growth, it was free to range through all the Creation! For this anomalous element there must have been an anomalous work, and an anomalous Day. Its Day would be "Day one," a peculiar Day, a Day in some way unlike the other Days; and this thought is in harmony with other related ideas in the Record, where this Day is conceived of as running through all the other Days.

This idea is in harmony with the agency of this element in all vivification. If there was a Day of Light, there was a Day of Heat. If Creation be a birth and growth, — and Moses so conceived of it, as will hereafter appear, — then, by all analogy, as through every creative process within the world, as through all the stages of forming life everywhere, however well marked the cycles, so through the creative processes of the world must have run the cherishing, forming, never-dispensed-with Heat.

And this idea is confirmed by discoveries tracing the march of Fire through all creative time.

¹ Psalm civ. 7.

The ideas of vast Time, and of the Natural in Creation, are related ; they call for each other ; yet the conjoined application of them to the ages of the forming world is a little difficult, when the mind, long under the influence of a different idea of creation, begins to apply them. The old idea was of light shining suddenly in its strength, — a thought sublime, but not scriptural. That light came as comes the dusky, dubious, early twilight, the slowly brightening morn, the daybreak, the Day. This harmonizes better with a long time than the old idea ; still, on this can hardly be based the conception of a Day in harmony with the other Days of Creation : and although it need not be supposed those Days were of the same length, still the harmony of the vision, and other decisive considerations, seem to require in each immense duration.

The fact as to the first, may be accepted without its reason ; but undoubtedly this vision proceeds upon the idea that it is to be understood ; it rather invites than rejects the elucidation of its brief outline ; and the idea of Light shining for thousands on thousands of years over a solitary waste, with naught else doing, is a conception hard to be held.

Light, in the strict sense of the term, exists only where there are eyes to see ; but some idea of the element itself is conveyed under this name ; and the Seer makes the element known, just as it still is most universally known, by its effect of Light. His language is phenomenal ; that is, the most outward aspect of the ultimate fact is taken as the representative of all involved in it ; and hence, if there was a day of Light, there was a day of Heat, of Fire, of all the potencies that are involved in this many-sided element. This is in harmony with Hebraic modes of conceiving of Light ; for, like every other people, the Hebrews gave one name to solar light, the "light of the cloud," and all Promethean fire. They thought of light as one. They thought of it as a creative, vivifying, life-cherishing element. And can science really carry the mind beyond these ideas ?

Light which, though the cause of vision, is in itself invis-

ible, is the most inscrutable of material things, because it is the most spiritual. As the mind muses on earth, water, air, light, life and spirit, it finds this element so placed between two realms of being, that it stands wondering and in doubt to which to assign it.¹

The Lord's challenge of old to man is ever new. Man cannot tell "where light dwelleth," nor trace "the path to its house." But, as to this most mysterious of material things, the Scripture reveals truths in whose presence all that science teaches, all that mind has ever thought concerning it, loses all sublimity. It is the material semblance of the immaterial Deity. It is a visible image of the invisible God. "God is LIGHT, and in him is no darkness at all." It is the semblance of ineffable mystery. The Logos is the Eternal beam of the uncreated ray. Light is the robe of God. It is the oldest of things created.

The Scripture places it not with other material things. Earth, sea, and air, were created out of that existing at the beginning of this creation. Light on Earth was also created then, but not thus. It shone not out of the waters, but (*ἐκ σκότους*²) out of the darkness.

Before this, as will hereafter appear, there was nothing to which the term "creation" can be applied. Light — that is, the

¹ Some, wreaking their despair of piercing into its secret chamber on the element itself, doubt if it be at all; and would make it an effect of some condition of other bodies. Such is the pronunciamento in the scientific part of those papers, which so painfully fascinated our gaze, in the first part of this Essay. Light is there "molecular action," which, as a definition, is molecular nonsense. It is just as good a definition of everything, as of anything material. There is nothing material which cannot be described in these very terms, which, describing everything, mean nothing. Everything is molecular action. To something in their atomic condition, is to be referred every effect produced by particles of matter.

Low views in the higher spiritual realms tend to the darkening of all other realms of thought. The instant the mind begins to pass away from the presence of quickening, spiritual Truth, it begins to cease from its true suggestive power, and to wrap itself in a vestment of words. Science, utterly departing from Faith, would soon cease to be science at all. It would take up its dwelling forever in starless night.

² 2 Cor. iv. 6.

invisible element known by this and by other names — makes all in the material world that which it is. There is no substance in nature in which it is not. It can be disengaged with marvellous rapidity from all substances, however diverse in character and form. From the moist bosom of the unsubstantial cloud it issues in bolts of fire. It flashes from out the solid rock. It enters into combination with all that is. The lungs drink in air ; taken up into the blood, it becomes incorporated into the solids and fluids of the human frame ; but the whole body drinks in the element known as light, or heat. It instantly unites with every nerve, and tissue, and muscle, and bone. The most diverse substances drink it in with delight — the snow as the plant. Unseen, unfelt, it constitutes ice in the icebergs of the polar seas : it is the very being of the rocky wall of the globe. Combining with the greatest ease with all substances, separated with the greatest ease from all, it is the universal solvent which solves every substance ; and it can be separated from none. It imparts itself to whatever is colder. Exhaust it to the last possible degree, and thought has only to conceive a substance from which it has been more exhausted, and this inscrutable element, existent where it seemed not, with a prodigality of love will pour its mysteriously exhaustless abundance into that want, till it brings round a harmony of states of being.

Light is the first-born of created things. It is before all other material things, and by it all material things consist. It is the element on which every other element depends. It is the universal ground of all material existence. In it all other material things live and move and have their being. True image of a truer reality than itself, by it all things were made, and without it there was not anything made that was made.

It is the mystery of mysteries in creation, till that greater mystery of which it is prophecy and image — the mystery of Life — appears. And the twofold mystery of light and fire in the natural creation, is representative of the twofold mystery of light and life in the spiritual creation, of Him by whom "all

things were made, and without whom was not anything made that was made; in whom was life, and the life was the light of men." The ancient Seer, who looked on the creating of the material world, saw in this material beginning the counterpart, the symbol of that higher vision, which was seen of the spiritual beginning by that last Seer, who completed the harmony of perfect truth.

During the first, and, perhaps, the second age, Light was doing its creating work; and when by it other things were ready to be formed, and the Word went forth with His creating energies, it becomes a cherishing and an arranging power. And though the finer potencies of this many-sided element present themselves to the mind musing on Creation, it chiefly takes to itself the guise of Fire. As Fire, it runs exulting before the Artificer,¹ it rejoices to do his bidding, even as He, the wisdom of God, the World-builder, standing with God, rejoices to fulfil his thoughts in the orb of the earth. And when He, in the likeness of man, said, "I came to send fire on the earth," then was fulfilled that which was prefigured and prophesied in the eternities of old.

In its triumphant hours, when, beneath the eye of the Artificer, Fire wrought free and alone, it seems to have burned from the centre to the circumference of the nascent world, then a ball of fire, as it will be again when the elements melt with fervent heat.

From the order in this Vision, it would seem that the work of the fire, before the second Day began, had some reference to the work of that Day. In the great Laboratory, it may then be thought of as working to eliminate the substance out of which the life-giving Word was to constitute the Air.

And as, during the first cycle, this element seems to have been preparing the material of the atmosphere, so during the second, that which was to become the Land and the Sea. In the third Day of eternity, the world-making Word goes forth

¹ This seems to be the true rendering in Prov. viii. 30, and there involves the idea of a World-builder.

again, and out of this material creates the Land, creates the Sea. The element which had wrought on the material was suffered to fix the new creations in their respective positions. At the voice of thunder, the Land rose and took its station above the Sea.

To this Day is applied this formula, "Evening was, morning was, Day One." It has commonly been said the evening was the night of chaos. But it is rather strange that two names should be given, in the same breath, to the same thing. Even the condensation of the document, and the desirableness of one formula for all the Days, hardly makes this natural or credible, when it is found that the difficulty reduplicates itself. The language is: "God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night; evening was, morning was, Day One." With this alone before the mind, there could be no doubt that the Day, in these closely connected passages, was the same. It seems to teach that God called the darkness Night, and the light Day; and not that night was, and morning was, making a Day different from that spoken of; but evening was, and morning was, making the Day just then spoken of. If clear at all, this is clear on the inspection of the language, and not to be made more so; and, despite the unanimity of commentators to the contrary, it seems so clear, that the mind is free to seek for an evening elsewhere than in the night of Chaos, and in something more in harmony with the use of the term as applied to the other Days. As this Day runs through the Days, its evening and morning must be sought for in some division of the whole time; and in the Day of Creation there is a change as to the light, which ends the search. On the fourth Day, solar light is diffused over the surface of the Earth. Light is one. Such was the Hebraic conception of it. Such is the fact. Viewed, then, as to its light, this great Day had two divisions made by the same element: the lurid, fitful, darkened splendors of the close of its evening of terrene light, were transformed into the mild, steady, ordered solar light of its morning.

In the third Age, the Land and the Sea could exist. The

Fire cannot liquefy the earth. It cannot drive off the ocean in vapor. In the fourth Age, through the purer air of the cooling globe, the sun, and at length the moon, and then the stars, are visible; and by the fifth Age, there could be a Sea swarming with life: yet, through all these changes, till the end of creation, the Fire is not weary with running before the Lord. It modifies the forms of the Land, and the bounds of the Sea. It throws up ranges of mountains. It rolls the sea over where land was, and upheaves land from the sea. It shakes what it cannot destroy. It changes climate; it affects vegetation and life. It has much to do with their forms and their times. It destroys them, but it cannot destroy the powers which produced them. Calmed, as by a look from its Master's eye, it does much of its work quietly; slowly, tenderly uplifting the bed of the ocean, so as to disturb nothing that had been deposited or formed in the waters. At other times it sweeps forth with wild fury; it seems bent on destroying all things. But in the creative Days, though one species of plants or animals perish, others are born. It is, perhaps, not suffered to destroy all life at once. It is pent up more and more. Still it breaks in upon, and breaks up, the very arrangements it perfects; confusing and effacing the marks of order, and ploughing its lines through the later days.

At last this Day ends. As a creative element, the Fire is bound. From the time human life began, not only the elements remain, but the plants, animals, and man, abide according to the laws of their institution. The free element is chained until the time when six periods of disintegration will complete this cycle of this planet. Then each creative Day will have its dread counterpart in a Day of destruction; then, not as once creating, but destroying, not less and less, but more and more, till the elements melt with heat, beginning before these Days of Ruin, running through them all, and ending all, one great Day of Fire will burn.

CHAPTER IV.

THE idea of instantaneous Creation, which ruled the ecclesiastical mind of the West, was upheld by the idea of the creation of Air, as well as of Light. For each of these elements seems to suggest that it was suddenly made. Air, thought of as invisible, imponderable, and of one substance, seems as if it might have been an instantaneous creation. And its creation was instantaneous. There was an instant when the air was not; and then an instant when it was. But the Scripture pictures each creation, as well as the creation as a whole, as a birth; and this figure implies an instant when that which is born, is, and before which it is not; and also it implies processes tending towards it, and processes perfecting it.

As to other ages of Creation, so to the second age, the ideas of vast time, and of a natural process apply. Science weighing, measuring the air, and resolving it into component parts, enables the mind to see that these ideas may apply here; but it cannot picture the preëxisting substance; it can think only in the most vague manner of the processes which formed that out of which the Omnific Word constituted the Atmosphere; and therefore those ideas must be upheld, as to this age, chiefly by the grandeur and complexity of the wonderful result.

It is revealed, as to the work of the second age, that what he then created, God called into being as the Heavens.

There must be, in every language, some word which sums up and expresses all the phenomena of the Atmosphere. Such is the word Heavens used in this formula. The creation of all that Maury's chapter on the Atmosphere sets forth as pertaining to the Air, is implied in the divine use of this one word. And it is only necessary to read that chapter to feel that the

Day of this creation, in point of time, may well have been in harmony with the known duration of other Days of the World.

The common ideas in every age as to the uses of atmosphere, have been essentially the same with those portrayed in that chapter. Its composition, as disclosed by Chemistry, is really no part of the *idea* of the atmosphere; for, although complex, and to a degree perhaps unknown, it is one in itself. The aërial phenomena — mists, clouds, rain, winds, storms, lightning and thunder — were as impressive, as suggestive, to the earlier mind as to the later. All, then, that man knows of this element, looking at it as one of the four great elements in the constitution of the world, is summed up in the brief divine formula.

Since these things are so, if there be any further revelation as to this element, it must go over ideas in this statement again, or point out something not included in it, or, at least, not in the more common idea of the uses or ends of the atmosphere, and yet so important as properly to be recognized in a description of the great processes in the formation of the world. Therefore, when it was written, "God said, Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters," some truth was revealed other than that summed up in the revelation, that God called the firmament into being as the Heavens. The full force of this idea will appear when it is considered that this description of the creation of a world covers but a single page; and that, while the grand outlines are drawn with wonderful minuteness, the description also reveals moral truths of higher moment than the revelation of any natural truths. And as the common interpretation of its sixth and seventh verses makes them reveal only what is revealed in the eighth, it would seem, from the wonderful condensation which characterizes this document, that it must be wrong.

It is very commonly thought to be enunciated in the former verses, that a solid arch upholds the waters of the heavens; but it does not seem to have been felt, that the idea of a solid

arch, impervious to rain, is incongruous in any connection with rain. On this theory as to the meaning of this term, a poetical figure must have been embodied in the word ; and that word have become part of the common language. But, even if this were so, which is very doubtful, the figure could have been suggested only by a rainless sky. The instant rain is thought of in connection with it, it ceases to be a natural image. On tracing the derivation of the word, the idea of an expanse seems to be the idea it suggests ; and the language, as a whole, points to durability, rather than solidity. With the idea of solidity, or without it, the language does not seem to represent the natural phenomena commonly thought to be indicated by it. The word is hardly found, excepting in the page which describes the Creation ; it occurs there more times than in all the rest of the sacred volume. It is possible this peculiar language may convey the common idea associated with it, but it does not seem a natural or probable way of conveying it ; and that seems sufficiently proved, as, before it could be thought clearly to express this idea, the suggestion had to be made, although ineffectually, and even absurdly, that it might describe a solid arch, which it does not describe. And yet the idea thought to be conveyed is one which language could convey without any difficulty. Not only, then, is the idea supposed to be revealed here, revealed again in the same instant, but the language does not seem such as would have been used for this purpose.

To these considerations there is to be added another, which seems decisive against the common interpretation. It is revealed that the sea was created in the third age. But whatever it was which the firmament divided, it was in existence when the firmament was made.

It will be said that *waters* are named in the second verse. But, from the necessity of the case, words which essay the almost impossible description of the primal mystery of substance, must have meanings differing from their common meaning ; for the description of that which *is*, must keep steadily in view that

which it is to *become*. The idea of identity of substance through all its changes must not be lost sight of; and, therefore, the most general words which convey the idea of the whole, the description of whose forming is thus begun, are the words which properly must be used; yet no error can be more palpable than that which takes their meaning at the final stage of the process, and carries it back unchanged to the first stage, though almost infinitely remote. This error is expressly guarded against in their description. The term *waters* is used; but those waters, whatever they may have been, were formless and void. This language does not describe the element known to us as water. It does not describe an ocean-bound sphere. The Seer used the word *waters*; but when he used it, he so defined it, that it must be taken in a sense different from that in the common use of the term. Two slowly revolving cycles of eternity roll away, and then he indicates the creation of the well-known element. This, then, is the argument from which the mind is free to seek the idea conveyed, and which, though perhaps not difficult in itself, yet when the reason of it is sought for, leads into regions of thought where all is conjecture, all is possibility; yet where, to some minds, conjecture and possibility will seem like certainty; but to which Humboldt's words may be applied, when, alluding to deep mysteries in the creative forces of nature, he says: "There are regions turned away from us, and apparently unattainable, of which only a narrow margin has revealed itself, for thousands of years, to the human mind, appearing from time to time, either glimmering in true or delusive light."

The waters named in connection with the firmament are described in the verse which describes the substance of the world in the earliest condition in which it is revealed. That substance was without form and void. Language, though divinely taught, and to the wisest of the wise, could not picture that which was in the beginning. It was not cognizable under the forms of sense. Hence the description is by negatives, until the only idea left, after every other material idea is denied,

is that of fluidity. Such is the mind's conception of space. The mind does not conceive of space as having either outward form or inward division. Yet it cannot conceive of space otherwise than as something dependent upon that which constitutes it as space; that is, it perceives there can be no space where there is not something which constitutes the space; that is, which fills the space. The term *void space* really means only space, as compared with that in which matter is seen or felt to be present in its grosser forms. Space was never well described but once; and still, as the only representatives of this necessary conception of the soul, the old terms must be used: it is formless, and void. A description of what is described as substance, yet without form and void; as subsisting, yet presenting no outline, and opposing no resistance; with two contrasted ideas brought out by applying to it the term Earth pointing to stability, and the term Water to mobility; presenting it also as a deep, or, as best rendered, as an abyss, which negatives the idea of height or depth as applicable to it, — such a description is incongruous, if the impossibility be attempted of picturing it to the sense; yet there is answering to it a natural intuitive idea of the soul.

If it be said, this is forcing upon the Mosaic terms any preconceived idea, it is utterly denied. The meaning given them is that fixed by lexicographers; or, rather, — for they can aid but little here, — by the three passages in which only in Hebrew one of these terms is found, and in each of which these terms are conjoined.¹ If it be said that this is giving to Moses a precision

¹ Perhaps some notice should be taken of other renderings of the words, *tohu* and *bohu*. The English version of the phrase, "without form and void," is more than felicitous; it is the phrase itself. Word and thought are reproduced. The Septuagint substitutes "*unwrought and invisible*." Some critics, following where this points, and thinking the invisibility refers to absence of light, come to Ovid's chaos, — *rudis indigestaque moles*. When this classic heathen idea is joined to a crude scientific idea, there is the chemical chaos. Some critics make *tohu* nothing, and *bohu* the same. One says *tohu* "denotes nothingness," and *bohu* is "of similar signification." Others, seemingly unable to form an idea of what *tohu* is, pronounce that whatever *tohu* means, *bohu* means the same. It does not occur to them to answer this objection, that while in poetry repetitions of the

of thought foreign to him, and to his age, it might be replied: the argument errs as to the man and his time. And it may be said, that doubtless the same idea applies to whomsoever God may have honored with this transcendent vision of his own great workings, and to whatever age he may have been pleased to make it known. For, in truth, the idea thought to be so difficult that it could not have entered into the mind of this Seer, is a natural conception; it is more; it is a necessary conception, from which the mind cannot altogether divert itself; though it may be obscured by a misleading philosophy, itself misled by erroneous ecclesiastical thought.

But, though the idea here is not difficult, its just and apt expression is exceedingly so. The difficulty, however, is completely overcome; and in the light of this thought the wisdom of the method appears.

From this method it would seem that if a division of space

same word — which are somewhat like what they suppose — are found, they hardly belong to history; nor the objection that it is improbable that in a very old and scanty language, two words have the same meaning, when the like is so rarely, if ever, to be found in over-copious composite languages; nor to explain how many Hebraists, from Isaiah 84:11, deduce precise meanings for each of these words. It would seem that where that described is hard to be imagined, and the word describing it is used thrice only, one who is not able to see a precise meaning in a term, should be estopped from the assumption, opposed to the laws of composition and of language, that it means just what another word there used means. The positive statement should have decisive weight against the negative; for differences in philological insight are as great as those of the eye in colors, or of the ear in sounds.

The passage in Isaiah fixes — and no doubt it was divinely meant it should — the meaning of the phrase in Genesis. The words are there so associated with the *line* and the *weight*, as to determine their meaning. They describe something where the *line* and the *weight* must be laid aside. The words conjoined give the idea of something that is, yet having no outline, and opposing no resistance. Is there aught like this? Undoubtedly there is. The contradictions here are in the language, and are unavoidably incident to its imperfection. Words are too material for such ideas. There is such an idea in the soul. It would seem that it approaches so near to an idea of nothingness, that it could not inspire any emotion. Yet no gross material substance, no thought of the largest worlds is so overawing. The soul dreads this substanceless something, which has no property of matter, no attribute of spirit, and yet which is; and the universal awe it inspires is proof that it is a high reality. It is easier to say what it is not, than what it is. The soul pronounces that it is, and refuses to confound it with aught else that exists.

were to be imagined as the area of a world, and this were to be described, there could be no better method than to take one of the four well-known elements, and treat it as is here done. Light would not answer—it is too inscrutable and changeable; and the ideas of simplicity and permanency are here required. Air, too, would be liable to much the same objections. And there is this decisive objection to both, that they are suggestive of something occult, the very idea most to be guarded against. In Hebrew there was no term for the gaseous, or aëriform; but, had it possessed the whole nomenclature of Chemistry, there would have been this fatal objection to any term from thence,—that to all such terms the idea of something occult inevitably clings. If Moses had taken the fourth element, his description must have proceeded by negatives until it exhausted every property of matter, and then have added that of fluidity. This very course he was obliged to take from the peculiarity of the case; for, having to use the term *Earth* as the only term that could indicate all that then was, and also keep in view what it was to be, he proceeds to exhaust the word of every material property, and then adds the idea of fluidity by giving as another name, descriptive of the whole, the term *Waters*. Retaining this sole idea, he denies to what he describes outward extent and inward content. His thought thus comes out complete, and with algebraic precision, owing to the perfect manner in which it is described. On attempting to describe it in any other mode, not only the superiority of his description appears, but its perfection.

The language describing that which was in the beginning may seem to some to fail to convey any clear idea, and this may be referred to the intrinsic difficulty of the thought; but this misconceives alike the naturalness of the thought and the felicity of its expression. What thus seems its failure, is its success; that is, its utter exclusion of all other properties of matter, save one, from that which it conceives of as existing, is its perfection as a description.

That the term *waters* is here used in some peculiar man-

ner, might well occur to the musing mind, as it meditates on the beginning of the world — as it stands in thought at the well-spring of the universal fountain, from whence, however, without the creating power of God, nothing could flow. To meet there with the familiar, well-known, and somewhat gross elements, Earth and Water,—to meet them there when as yet even light is unborn,—would indeed be surprising; and when to this natural idea is superadded the idea that millions of years rolled away before there was the life of the humblest moss or fern, it may well seem a thing incredible. But the Seer has not left the mind to a mere inference here, however natural or irresistible. Twice over he points out that this term is used in a peculiar manner. Once, by indicating the creation of water far down in the interminable ages; once, by denying to that represented by it every property of the element save one.

He makes that which is set forth by the term, as by him defined, coincident with the area of the world; but he does not conceive of that which was beyond this as a vacuity of being.

The ecclesiastical error as to Creation, leading on to the famous postulate that the world was created out of nothing, confused all philosophic and all natural thinking; and hence there came about a mode of speaking and of trying to think of that which was beyond the borders of our world, and between it and the planets, as a void; and a common conception of the atmosphere seems to have been that of air melting away, by imperceptible gradations, into utter nothingness. Against this conception, logically connected with that of the creation of the world out of nothing, scientific thought, reacting at first feebly, and then with more power, at length begins to conduct the mind back to its natural mode of thinking of space as filled with some all-pervading medium. That this was the ancient, universal mode of thinking, there is good reason to conclude, both from positive evidence, and from the fact that it is a natural, and even a necessary idea. Science seems to indicate proof that there is an ocean of force around the world, from sun to sun, from star to star, coincident with space.

Whether science can prove this or not, the soul knows its existence, in virtue of the same power by which it knows that God is, that itself is,—it being unto itself, as to these truths, its own evidence, knowing and believing them without other evidence. That which, as yet, science hints rather than proclaims, though sure that it is so, the soul, unmisled by authoritative error, has always affirmed, without hesitation or doubt. In supposing, then, that this ancient Record enunciates one of the higher thoughts of modern science, nothing is attributed to it beyond the natural modes of thought, nothing beyond what was familiar to the thinking of the ancient world. When the revealing spirit annunciated to the recording Seer the idea of a crystalline wall to separate the forming world from the vast ocean of force, inseparable from the idea of space, it may safely be presumed it was no thought foreign to his thoughts.

And the thought was one which God, revealing the wonders of Creation, might well reveal. It was the simple and grand thought of the seclusion of the world, of the permanently constituting it an island in space. Before this, its outline had been marked and circumscribed by the quickening energies of the Spirit, by the creating agency of Light; but when these were to cease, the finger of the great Artificer sweeps round the globe its air-drawn line of everlasting seclusion. This was the firmament which divided the waters from the waters. This was the firmament, which He called into being as the Heavens.

To this the Record, read in the light of its own words, read in the light of the facts which it reveals, read in the light of the soul's intuitions, has brought us. Thus the Scripture seems to reveal the seclusion of the world; but not its reason, save, perchance, where it reveals that the universe is peopled with spirits superior in rank to those which inhabit this planet; where it reveals a vision of thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers; of orders on orders of beings, rising in interminable gradations above us, as numberless, perhaps, as those which sink in gradations of littleness far below our senses.

The seclusion of the spiritual beings of this world from

every other world, is a great fact in their estate. It seems effectually provided for by the immense distance that intervenes between this and the nearest planet; and yet the soul, when cut off from the fulness of the thought revealed as to its abode, could not rest secure in its isolation, till it had annihilated all that was around, and interposed between the world and all beside, a vacuity of being, a sheltering void, absolute and immense. In this it erred. This planet is in direct contact with every other. There is no void in the universe. Man's world is isolated, but not isolated thus. Around it flows an aerial ocean; and around that expands an ocean in which all worlds appear as islands, and to which thought cannot imagine a shore. The aerial ocean is adapted to the material organization of the spirits who inhabit this planet. Its uses are manifold; but it may be that its highest spiritual end is, that it constitutes a great fact or law of their limitation as spiritual beings. Here thought enters regions of conjecture, of possibility, as it tries to imagine what might be if the soul were in contact with the ocean of force, from which it is so effectually shut out. Many questions may easily be asked here, none of which can be answered; for of that which envelops the world, only that it is, is known. Its potencies and laws are unknown. If one chooses to think of it as so substanceless that it is hardly more than a notion of the mind, there is nothing which can confute this. On the other hand, if the imagination chooses to deem that as it recedes from substance it is clothed in power, what shall confute this idea? What if it can transmit thought without opposing to it appreciable resistance, and so become a medium of communication throughout the universe!

It may be so; and force-filled space may not be a secluding, separating fact for a spirit in contact with it. The speech of human eyes and lips has wings of air: with such a medium for a spirit, it might be said,

"Away, away, without a wing,
Through all, o'er all, its thought would fly,"

and interchange itself with the thoughts of other spirits in the most distant parts of the universe. And such, for the human spirit, might have been the consequence, had it been brought into contact with the universal medium. This might have effected for man that which many intimations seem to foretell of the disembodied soul, when, in virtue of its immateriality, it rises above the secluding law of the ærial ocean, and is free of the universe.

Whether, indeed, it would be given to spirits, even of the highest order, to be in absolute communication with such a medium, if such there be, is a most reasonable doubt; they too, it would seem, must be under some law of limitation, or this would seem to clothe them with something like ubiquity, and to give to them attributes approaching those of Divinity. It would seem there must be some law of limitation even for them; but if it come short of a prohibition, it might well be that the contact of the universal medium with the world of man was to be guarded against. The fact, then, that man's dwelling-place is assigned him on a circle of this planet, enclosed within an outer circle, which divides the inner from the universe, may have for its most ultimate and most spiritual cause, that it not only secludes man, but that it excludes from him.

It is a humiliating thought for man in his pride, that he must live at the very bottom of an ærial ocean; but it may be that this fact shuts out, not absolutely, yet something of the influences of beings of other worlds, else for good or for ill too potent for his individuality; it may be that for this reason there was breathed around his dwelling-place an atmosphere not more of loneliness than of defence. Thus while, in one view of this creative work, the All-wise Artificer seems to be secluding man, in another, he seems extending over him the crystalline shield of his protection.

It may be reasonably believed, that the seclusion of the world would not have been effected by the number of miles intervening between it and other worlds; though to vulgar minds

this may seem, against any intercourse between man and the rest of the universe, not only a most sufficient, but the only barrier. For many ends, it obviously is a most sufficient barrier; but man is a spirit, and in this lies the difficulty of his seclusion in a peopled universe without a void; whether this great fact be thought of in view of the unimaginable powers mysteriously folded up in him, and waiting but the occasion for their unfolding; or in view of the spiritual world which seems bent on seeking him, and which, alike for good and ill, has found him out even in his secluded abode.

However opposed the meaning here given to the words of the Seer may be to the long array of the opinions of the wise, it has come to us, consciously at least, from no preconceived idea as to what his words might or should mean, but directly and solely from his own terms, as by him defined; and the thought, when thus learned, so commends itself to the mind, that it need not be supposed it was any strange or difficult thought to the Seer, but rather one to which his unaided musings might have led, as probably one of the first wonders of creating power; and the communication of this thought seems as worthy of a place in the Record of the creation of the world, as the great fact in the making of the world itself.

The firmament in the midst of the waters, which divided the waters from the waters, called into being as the Heavens, as if compensating for its highest, its most spiritual office, becomes to man the medium of communication through which he may be safely trained up for higher powers of communion, which this appears to symbolize and prophecy.

It melts away, not into nothingness, but into a most attenuated form of itself. It seems to come as near in being to the ocean of force as it can be while it is. The harmonies and the diversities of the universe with exactness are preserved. Faint as seems the limit of the atmosphere in the mind's conception of it, it is distinctly drawn. On the outermost of the expanse, where the circle of the world ceases, on that crystalline pavement the feet of angels may tread, and leave no more imprint

than the feet of their Master on the crystalline wave of Galilee.

Through this translucent separation come messengers from the spheres, telling of the unity, as of the diversity, of the universe; but come accommodated to the world through whose shield they are permitted to pierce, while by it they are made to adorn and glorify the world. It effects the miracle of a world separated, yet rejoicing in some communion with the universe. Thus the world becomes a prophecy of man, a secluded, yet a related being; and, to whatever heights he may attain, ever to be an independent being, though perchance to become a citizen of the universe.

The language which speaks of the making of the firmament, seems to point to its ultimate cause. But this is not all that is said of it in the Record of Creation. It is also said that God called it the Heavens; that is, gave to it the laws which constitute it the Air which feeds life; gathers to itself the bitter waters of the sea, and distributes them as sweet waters over the land; gives the twilight of morning and evening; and forms the ever-varying expression of the earth and the ocean. Thus this Vision unites with the highest conception of it, the most comprehensive and minute conception of the second creative work of the Almighty.

CHAPTER V.

GEOLOGICAL phenomena cannot be measured in astronomical time ; but, beyond all doubt, the duration they indicate is such as cannot be adequately conceived ; and, if merely for the sake of something like a definite idea, a million years be supposed to express, in astronomical time, a Day of Creation, such duration is far less than the phenomena seem to indicate. But duration of the cycles of creation, vast beyond conception, is an idea of revelation as truly as of science ; for the goings forth of the Word were from everlasting to everlasting ; and when this passage is read with others which illustrate it, it appears it may properly be paraphrased, as from the Days of eternity.

These thoughts are introduced here because they bear upon the interval which divides the Third Day from the beginning of creation. In that Day the Land and Sea were created. As if to guard against an error, to which the necessary use of the words earth and waters, in describing phenomena in the far remote beginning, might lead, this is expressly revealed. Equally decisive as to this are these words of the Lord : " Who shut up the sea with doors, when it brake forth as if it had issued from the womb."¹ Here, it may be noted, is that figure of a birth, so frequent in Creation as revealed, and which marks this as a new creation. The time of this birth appears in these words : " When I brake up for it my decreed place, and set bars and doors, and said, hitherto shalt thou come, but no further, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed." This describes the bounding of the restless by the stable element,

¹ Job xxxviii. 8, 9.

which here, as in the vision of the Seer, is the great feature in the picture; in each the sea appears as a new creation, and therefore this language can refer only to that which the Seer refers to the third Day of eternity.

It may be well here to bring together what the Scripture reveals, or intimates, as to this scene. The sea swept round the globe, so rejoicing as to awaken something like exultation in the bosom of its Lord. Such is the impression his own language makes. Then was, what in the beginning there was not, an ocean-bound sphere. "The waters stood above the mountains." The rock beneath the ocean was thrown up above it by the agency of Fire. The sea hears the words, "Here shall thy proud waves be stayed," and rolls against the rock forever in vain. The cloud was "a garment for the sea," and thickest darkness covered it. Over the land was shed a pale, fitful light, an unstable semblance of day, streaked with the red light of fire-breathing mountains. The ocean was as heated as could consist with the existence of the element; for out of the darkness which clothed it, rolled a mist, which, of course, in the phenomenal description of the Seer, seems to come from the earth, and which waters the whole face of the ground.

That which was in the beginning, was so mysterious as almost to defy an expression of it; and though language has done its work well, the unknown overshadows the known; and if the soul finds any firm ground, it seems like rock in the sea; or like a light on the ocean, which reveals itself as a point in an immensity of darkness, which it makes the more impressively felt. The earliest cycle is that of the most inscrutable of all things in the inorganic world; the cycle following, in mystery is next like unto it; and it is only in the third cycle that things begin to look a little familiar, when, after long wanderings, we come in sight of the sea.

At this point, then, the natural truth in the Record begins to brighten. And here may be set forth some thoughts which might preface meditations on the whole Record.

It much concerns the soul to know at what points the super-

natural interposes in the natural. Until those points are known in Humanity and in Nature, all seems formless and void; an abyss of darkness. All things converge to those points, or from them diverge; they rule all that is before them, and all that is after them. If the soul would comprehend its own life, it must know these. If it would truly know the history of man, these must be determined. If it would know the world, the same is true. But whether in the individual life, or in the life of the race, or in Nature, there seems but one will,—to know and see nothing, hear and believe nothing, of these things; and hence the wisdom of the world is foolishness. For, though a man know all history and all science, these unknown, there is neither history nor science. Only when these points are known, is aught else truly known. Before them and after them is the natural, traceable by the intellect, and intelligible if seen in relation to them, and otherwise not.

But it is not easy to determine them; for man shrinks from beholding the manifestation of the will of God. As his voice is heard going forth in the world of matter or of spirit, he fears, and hides. All history and all science are in conspiracy against God, as if bound with an oath that he shall not be known.¹ So far from either seeking first of all the imprint of his will, both labor together to make it needlessly difficult to discover it.

Needlessly difficult, for great the difficulty in itself. God is a God who hideth himself. It is his glory to conceal a thing. His footsteps leave no imprint on the waves of time, that the eye of sense can discern. Nevertheless, upon finding them out, all wisdom depends.

Cosmological truth is the sum of all natural truth. To point out, therefore, in the creation where the Divine Being comes forth from the hiding-place of his power, is to make nature intel-

¹ Thus in Buckle's *History of Civilization*, and in Humboldt's *Cosmos*, all that labor could do is done to exclude the idea of God from the world, and from History. These books indicate the spirit of two of the sciences. If any should think the sentence above exaggerated, it is confirmed by the extract on the 41st page; and by this, from Dr. Hickok: "The world's Philosophies are to-day all radically materialistic, and are thus necessarily, in the end, Atheistic or Pantheistic."

ligible and consistent, is to show it working from a beginning, and working on to beginnings, with a purpose, a rule; in a word, with dependence upon God. This raises natural history to the dignity of a science; while otherwise, it is an endless accumulation of facts, tending ever to moral confusion and darkness; having no end or aim which can be interpreted to the spirit, though of use to man as an animal.

If, then, it can be shown that any one such point has been fixed in nature, the intellect of Newton or Kepler alone could appreciate the height of the achievement. The Record determines all these points in creation; and it is for nature-knowledge to verify its determinations, doing which it will become a true science, with its lines of thought in accordance with those of the Creator of nature, with ultimate generalizations, and with its volume on the Cosmos not tending, as now, to confuse the idea of the Cosmos, but reproducing it as it is.

The attempt is here to be made to ascertain where these points are fixed in the third age, and to show that the natural phenomena depending directly upon them, are such as to verify the record.

“And God said, Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry *land* appear: and it was so. And God called the dry *land*, Earth; and the gathering together of the waters called he Seas: and God saw that *it was good*.”

It is here revealed that God came from the hiding-place of his power to give to the agent he was pleased to employ for that end the law which was to regulate the shape of the land and the boundaries of the sea. From another part of the sacred volume it may be known what the agency was to which the command was addressed; while from the volume of nature it may be known how faithfully, for thousands of centuries, that command has been obeyed. The most seemingly fitful and unreliable agency in nature — that of subterranean fire — has followed the idea which at this momentous instant it received from its Lord. The revelation here is brief, but is full to over-

flowing with the idea of an orderly arrangement of the two elements. Brief as it is, the thought is precisely expressed. The sea is to have its own place, which conveys the whole idea. An additional idea is inwrought into the verb *appear*—that the land was to maintain its position above the sea.

The annals, which nature has kept for hundreds of thousands of centuries since that fiat went forth, have been read; and though lands have sunk and risen, and sunk to rise again, it has never been disobeyed.

It is a recent idea, that the size and distribution of the land evinces especial wisdom; yet upon that depends whether or not it could be habitable. There are lines of variation, no doubt, within which this was possible, but they are not so wide apart as might be supposed. It is easy to imagine changes which would have so affected climate and moisture that the earth would have been utterly unfit for man; nor would it be difficult to indicate very small changes now, which would bring about this very result. This, then, was one of the things to be regulated in a forming world, though this has been recognized within the memory of this generation.

After the area of the globe was opened by the geographical discoveries of Columbus and DeGama, it would seem that this truth might have been seen at once; and as it was not, it is evident that it lies out of the track of common thought.

But here in this ancient record is the idea; and whatever doubt or variance of opinion there may be as to its other teachings, this is as plain as language can make it: and it is as prominent as it is plain. It is deemed so important a truth, that it is placed side by side with the very creation of the Land and Sea, and is referred as directly to the wise ordering of the Creator. Yet when this idea was enunciated, four-fifths of the globe was unknown; and from that time to this, the idea in the volume of the revealed truth has laid unfruitful, though any one might have seen it there.

Had it, however, been sooner recognized, the earlier discoveries of Geology would seemingly have contradicted the Record;

for the first land was small in extent, and its area was changing from its beginning. But all these changes followed some law; so that the continents may be said to have been shaped in the beginning; for the idea of a continent is not dependent on size, but form. No sooner, however, does this appear, than it is held by many that the shape and distribution of the land could have been no other than it is. There is some truth in this; the line between its truth and its error runs here. There was a time when this law was ordained by the Great Artificer. After the law was fixed, after the natural process of continent-making began, then all followed, of course.

The agency at work to upheave the land out of the sea, might have given to it almost any possible configuration; and the number of those possibilities is the number of the chances against the land assuming its present form and size. Here, then, the wisdom of the Architect might well intervene to determine the result. Yet the idea is one not likely to occur to the mind, as is proved by its late recognition by science, and the failure to recognize it on the Mosaic page, though as plain as any recorded there. The idea is there; and while all honor is due to those who have read the idea from off the volume of Nature, none can deny it is an idea prominent in the volume of the Church.

Thus far attention has been directed to the thought in the words "into one place;" but that is but part of what is revealed in this brief passage, in which the condensation of truth is marvellous and divine. The creative power of God is twice revealed in it, and it is put forth upon something preëxisting.

If the natural record of the formation of the world was wholly before the eye of man, it is not impossible he might, if he chose to see nothing else, see only a regular succession of events, which he could sum up as the work of nature. For, perchance, the supernatural results may be so nicely grafted into the natural, that no suture will appear at the junction; that the divine act is to be inferred from new fruit hanging upon the branches growing out of the old stock; so that if the eye

will look only at the point where the new is interblended with the old so as to form one whole, it may persist in seeing the unity and not the difference. And this may very well be ; for all the parts, or stages, or sequences of the world, as revealed, are one unbroken whole. This is indicated by the use of the general term for the globe in its beginning, and by the evident design to describe the formation of the present system of things, which ever presents itself to the mind as a whole. Hence there is relation as well as sequence in the stages ; and in some of them, no doubt, the preceding stands directly to the subsequent thus far in the relation of a cause, that nature might be working towards something she could not compass ; towards a time when the intervention of God was required that a new series of events might be born from out of the old.

In Nature the natural is expressed, the supernatural indicated. In Revelation it is the reverse. There the time and the end for which the supernatural intervenes is pointed out, and sometimes the agency employed ; but the course of the agent must be learned elsewhere, if at all. Yet the records of nature are the complement of what is revealed ; and, were they completely before the mind, they would indicate not only the processes subsequent to the interventions of the supernatural, but those that were precedent.

As the mind goes back to where these sequences begin to be unrolled, it perceives substance, which it can no more shape to itself than the Idumean sage could shape the outline of that spirit which passed before him. A cycle of eternity rolls away, and through the agency of that mysterious element, invisible, inscrutable, yet protean in its effects, one of whose many names is Light, that exists out of which the Word creates the ærial, ocean with its two known, and perchance many unknown elements. Could the action of the first element, working towards the creation of the Atmosphere be traced, this might appear as a natural process ; but the agency was not competent to effect this creation ; it was a result superior to the height of nature's energies. In the third age the Word goes forth again, and

some idea may be formed of that to which the agency in action was then tending, and of what was existing.

The records of nature indicate that at a remote period this planet was a globe of molten fire, the exterior of which at length cooled and solidified. This solid exterior is a belt of hard and crystalline rock, of much the same general character, and presenting few varieties. Potentially, this rock is earth. But, out of the myriad million possible forms that the solid exterior of the solidifying globe might have assumed, what calculus can compute the chances that it would have assumed that which could become soil? It may be said, as well rock as anything; for aught known; and so, too, it may be said, as well anything else as rock, on the idea of blind chance,—if, indeed, any sane mind holds, or ever held, such an idea. But let us think a little further here; let us use the old figure of nature, which, doubtless, is a true one, and see what she seems to have been doing. For interminable ages she seems to have worked steadily towards the forming of this rocky mass, which is crystalline in its structure, and here and there is wrought into crystals; and it would seem as if her aim was to produce something which should be — what rock is often said to be — everlasting; that is, a rock not disintegratable, not convertible into earth by any agencies which she could bring to bear upon it. Precisely where this idea opens upon the mind, precisely where this danger appears, the line of her chief working bends back, until it seems to run parallel, but in the opposite direction, to that along which she had wrought. She never goes any farther in the direction she was pursuing, and her chief energies are turned to something quite different. That which she was making so hard, so enduring, — which she was working so earnestly to perfect into a perfection that would have ruined everything, — she now begins to make back again into something soft, pliable, and plastic. In the long time of her previous working toward this rocky substance, and in the long line of her subsequent working it over, all is so harmonious, that the eye may refuse to see where the line curves; but, as

Nature, for thousands of centuries had kept one end in view, which here and there she had perfected, and to which she is everywhere approximating, certainly the chances are millions to one against her powers failing at this point, so as just to come short of it. And the marvel repeats itself when they now take a direction contrary to that before, which is equally as necessary; for great results are consequent upon this arrest of nature in her course, and this direction of her chief powers, from the making of rock harder than rock, to the opposite process of forming it into soil.

Soil, in its first form, is rock. All the soil of the globe has flowed down from the rock, as from rocky mountains flow down rivers of water. And the soil makes the Earth what it appears to the eye; for, on looking out over it, the mind takes little thought of the rock beneath, which upholds the ground, and out of the like of which the ground was formed. The wealth of man, in its last analysis, comes out of this soil, which came out of rock. Even the visible wealth of man, in other forms, is much less than that in the form of soil; for all the castles and towers that "the Earth buildeth on the Earth," all its cities on the land, its fleets on the sea, all the unperished riches of dead generations, the aggregate of all the other opulence of the wealthiest kingdoms, is less than the value of the acres of those kingdoms. The diversity of soil surprises even more than the excess of its value over that of all the products of human toil. It makes each little farm seem a miniature kingdom, each kingdom a miniature world. But though the thought may be varied in many ways, nothing can add to the power of the first form in which it presents itself, that had rock been unsusceptible of decomposing into a life-sustaining mould, there could have been no soil, and without soil man could not have lived on the Earth.

On looking at one of the primitive rocks, truly there seems nothing promising about it. The intellect of man is abashed at the idea of its subserving any earthly purpose, unless that of a shield from the fire it encloses. Yet out of this rock comes

earth; and nature, seeming to get a new idea as to what is to be done, sets about it in earnest. She begins what must have seemed to her very much like the undoing of what she had so long and patiently been doing; and the change in the line of her working, changes the globe from the laboratory of a chemist to the shop of a machinist. The machinery is on a vast scale. Two mighty agencies, fire and water, in seeming conflict, work in concert. The water mantles the rock in mist, and all is water above, all is fire below, while land and sea from time to time interchange their places, as the slow transmutation of rock into soil, often through a making over in the first instance of old rock into new, goes on. The melting, grinding, filing, pulverizing of the rock, the transporting it from place to place, the strewing it evenly in fine dust along the ocean floor, the heating it over and altering its properties, the agglomerating together of masses, the sinking of land to subject the half-finished process to water, the elevating the land, sometimes as a plain rising equally above the sea, sometimes as ranges of hills and mountains, — all this, and much more, forms one interminable work of Nature, who, as if wishing to give to man some idea of her long toiling to accomplish the thought of her Lord, still repeats and exemplifies something of her process.

From these considerations, it may appear how important and how marked the change in the line of nature's operations. It seems indicated, in the annals of nature, that her Lord may have intervened to arrest her course in forming this crystalline rock at the instant when it had attained a hardness that could stand against the fire which formed it; when it had acquired those qualities which fitted it to be the vehicle of life; when it had within it this inexhaustible possibility of good; and yet was so plastic, that nature could mould it over, and make it into earth; and also indicated that he may have intervened to bend the line of nature's working to a new result.

All this seems revealed in these words, "And God said, Let the dry land appear." "And God called the dry land Earth." Something is finished; something new is begun. Nature is

stopped in some process. The last stage of it is indicated to her; a limit is pointed out to her which she is never to pass in that direction. The end of her toil has come, perhaps much sooner than she thought. Her process, seemingly incomplete, is complete, and the work is called for. And, at the same time, a new process is indicated to her. God calls the dry land Earth. He decrees that that which nature heretofore was making shall become Earth. He calls for it at such a moment that it instantly disintegrates under the dissolving touch of the agencies which instantly begin to act upon it. All the change from rock to soil is in this instantaneous disintegration, even though it be but of a film of rock. And the change from rock to soil is indicated in the words God called the dry land Earth. He ordains that this shall be, and that what he thus ordains, nature shall execute. The carrying out of the law is presupposed in the giving of the law, and the language reads as if all were done at once. Nature desists from carrying on what she had been doing, beyond the point indicated, and puts forth her energies along the new line. God is said, then, to have called the dry land Earth, because he so called it into being that it is Earth potentially, and because he set in motion the agencies through which it may become actually that which it is potentially.

This rock, thrown down before man for his observation at the point in time most remote, and in the form most diverse from the potential result, seems to challenge his attention to these thoughts; and seeing that had this rock, in whose elementary particles is locked up the secret of the completion of the inorganic world, varied from what it is, no habitable world could have been, he discerns a moment on which hung the future of Creation. He may go back of this creation in thought, and behold the fine characters of the fire written as it were beneath the seal of Him who caused the fire to go before him; but this agrees with Revelation, which sets forth each creation as a birth, with forming periods, and perfecting periods, between

which is the mysterious birth, the point in time, and the result for which the Omnific Word goes forth.

There yet remains to be considered the creation in the third age, coincident in time with the calling into being of Earth, that of the element known as Water ; for the birth-point of this element is fixed by the divine naming of the Seas, — the term Seas here including all the water of the globe.

Something further must here be said concerning the calling, or naming, so often spoken of in the record ; for here, if anywhere, the common idea that this calling was merely uttering the names which men were to use for certain familiar objects, receives most countenance from the language. The discussion of the subject, however, must be so brief, that only the lines of the argument can be indicated here. This naming seems far back in the depths of the eternities ; and the common idea is really consistent only with the idea, that the Divine Being uses a human language. If it be thought, by way of giving some color of reason to the common idea, that these terms were communicated to the father of the race, and the fact recorded to indicate the divine origin of language, which is wholly an assumption, with nothing in the language on which to base it, then it must be supposed that this sublime history of the creation of a World, whose excellence as a description the dullest mind must perceive, the most skeptical heart must feel, is five times interrupted to announce five times over, in the very same language, an ill-timed idea, not related in the least to the train of thought. The philological difficulties in the way of this theory are also insuperable. If the terms were Hebraic, then Hebrew was spoken in Paradise. If the terms were not Hebrew, this instructing the Hebrews to give new Divine names to familiar objects, would have been useless, and worse than useless, for it would have coincided with old cabalistical notions. In short, every line of thought which starts from any such idea of this naming, runs into absurdity. Yet there seems but one other theory possible ; and if so, that must be the true.

All idea, then, that this naming has anything to do with

human language being dismissed as profane, or as puerile and ridiculous, there opens on the mind another idea of it, in harmony with the time, the events, the grand aim of the description. The phrase here connects itself with all the Hebraic thought as to naming, of which a familiar illustration is in the Lord's Prayer, where all that can be known of God is summed up in the adoration of these words: "Hallowed be thy name." Man, in view of the relations, the properties, the essence of a thing, names it. When the Divine Being names a thing, he fixes its relations, or changes its properties, or creates its essence. Hence the formula has a wide range, and perhaps in this may be the reason why it is so repeatedly found in this phenomenal description, giving to it a precision and a flexibility which otherwise it would not have.

Here, too, it is necessary to recall what has been said of the use in the beginning of those general terms, which indicate the identity of the world in its earliest, with the world in its latest stage; for never, in the interpretation of language, is it more necessary than in the Record of Creation to see distinctly the principles which guide, to keep them in mind at once, and to follow them to whatever consequences they lead. One effect, however, of this language is, that those terms may be taken as representative of any stage of the process, and by making the subsequent changes conform to that, there may appear a tolerably harmonious whole. Thus some, taking the term *Earth* as representative of all the solids and fluids of the globe, much as they now exist, but all confused together, then suppose a subsequent ordering of them, as much conformed to the language as the theory will admit. This, however, meets with difficulties, arising out of the language, which it cannot overcome. As to Water, it supposes this element to have been in the very "beginning" just what it is now; that combustion commencing in chaos, — which, by the way, is a word not scriptural, for this theory requires a heathen word for its enunciation, — the water transformed itself into vapor, in which transformed state it remained for everlasting ages, and resumed its original com-

posure after the subsiding of the conflagration, which, by chemical affinities, happily reduced all chaos to order.

The words describing that which was in the beginning, exclude any gross conception of the earth and of water, such as that which has been referred to. These general terms are there so defined as to describe a state which harmonized the two propositions in the schools of old; for in it all stands and all flows. All, then, is fluid, and yet something there is which subsists as the upholding ground of the fluidity. It is a ghost-like state of matter, in which the conception of solid and fluid interblend. If the figure of birth can be applied to the formation of the world, if in creation there were natural processes, then that which was in the beginning, and which was there set forth in the only mode in which its identity through all its changes could well be indicated, must be conceived of as very different from those elements which represent it, as they finally appear.

The identity of that appearing at first with that which appears at last, is predicated. What is identity? is one of the most difficult of questions; but it is certain that it may consist with almost any conceivable outward change of substance, as is well illustrated in the changes through which the human body passes. At each step in the process, these ideas must be kept in mind, until the record definitely announces substance as appearing in forms in which it now appears; and the principle, somewhat modified, applies even after the birth-time of air, earth and water; for they undergo subsequent minor changes. Before that point in time, thought might recognize their identity with what was after it, but probably the senses would not; while after it, the senses would testify to their identity through all their stages, notwithstanding the differences. Any difference, then, in the meaning of the term *waters*, which is consistent with identity, is admissible previous to this point, and great variations from their final appearance must be firmly assumed.

At the instant when the opening scene of the third age is revealed, the term *waters*, it is thought, still retains that uni-

versality of meaning which it had when used of previous stages of the world. The globe, which still is fluid, with the exception of a circle of rock separating the waters of fire from the waters of air, was then all fluid.

The divine naming of the Seas being coincident with the gathering of the waters together, the element water was then created out of that preëxistent fluid, the same out of which the dry appears, which on its appearing is named earth. In endeavoring to arrive at some stage in the records of the earth corresponding in its great features with this period as revealed, we found that this planet, at an early period, was encircled with a band of crystalline rock, seemingly solidified from a previous state of fusion. Its transformation into that state seemed coincident with a point beyond which, if the formation of the crystalline structure had proceeded, it would not have been convertible into soil. The process seemed as if it might have been suddenly disturbed; and it farther appeared that this rock was such that it instantly began to disintegrate when open to atmospheric agencies. This very general view was approached from the side of solidity, but in thought it might have been approached from the side of fluidity, and thus have reached an idea more exactly coincident with the point indicated in Revelation, where the whole mass seems to present itself as fluid above, and where the absolute solidification of that which is beneath in perhaps a denser form, may have resulted from the command, "Let the dry appear," and where the language may indicate the more solid parts of a semi-fluid mass, generally homogeneous in composition. It seems, then, the same basis may be assumed for the earth and the water; and that basis is Rock; though the rock does not assume absolutely its present form till an instant succeeding. This change, however, is only in its solidity; while that subsequent change which results in earth, is a change in rock itself, and seemingly consequent upon its appearing, when looked at solely in its natural aspects, though in truth a direct result of Divine command.

Assuming, then, a rocky basis as the one source of both these elements, thought is free to elect, among all the known forms of this basis, that which most harmonizes with the idea that it was the preëxisting form of that substance which in the third age God called into water; nor could it do better than to take that whose resemblance to water is such that Seneca and Pliny supposed its crystals were water, so solidified by intense cold. This clear crystal rock is one of the few forms of those oldest rocks, out of whose disintegrated particles, combined anew, other rocks were formed by aqueous action. One of its known elements is one of the constituent elements of water; what the other element in it may hold concealed, so long as it appears a simple substance, is of course unknown. But no stress is laid upon this. It is not put forth as an argument, further than to show that nature herself seemed, to some of old, so clearly to intimate a relationship between the crystal water and the crystal of rock, that they did not hesitate to affirm it as a fact; and further, to show that verification of the general idea from the side of nature is not impossible. And though the idea has to encounter all the difficulties arising from novelty, it cannot be pronounced inconceivable, that as the soil flows out of the rock, so out of crystalline rock, not then solidified, the crystal element flowed at the Divine command.

The idea is thought to come from the Record itself. The term used is thought, in conformity with its previous use, to convey the idea of some universally fluid substance, whose nature is not specified. This fluid is solidified into something which is convertible into earth. Here no other change appears, and hence in that state its previous state discloses itself. But in the change into water there was more; and it was a calling from out of that preëxisting substance, which at the same instant solidified, of a new element; this was coincident with the gathering of the waters, which was coincident with the appearing. This preëxisting substance then, which, solidified, is rock, is, by the creating power of the Word, in the same instant not only solidified into rock, but called into water. It might be thought

that the language denotes a separation of the solid and fluid particles, and hence that there might be ground of thinking that no inference could be drawn from the solid, as to what preceded it. The fact may be so ; but the homogeneousness of its composition is implied in the term which describes it before it hardened into rock, or flowed into water.

These conclusions bring to mind the miracle wrought in the primitive rock of Horeb. There, certainly, from the rock the water flowed ; there, the affinity between the two is neither fanciful nor doubtful. The mighty Seer might have raised his wand to the dry, hot air, and summoned forth in streams its ever-present rain, or called up from their deep hiding the waters which flow even beneath desert rocks, and sands. But this miracle is far greater. It carries the mind back to the mysteries of Creation. It impresses the soul with the idea that this wonder and sign was equal and like to the sign and wonder it could not transcend—the creation of the element. God is revealed there, as he is revealed in no other miracle. He says, “I will stand before thee there upon the rock in Horeb ; and thou shalt smite the rock, and there shall come water out of it.”¹ Moses, then, a type of Christ, standing in time between the creating Word and the redeeming Word, repeated the sign of old, when he caused water to flow from the rock ; and in creation, Christ, the Word, prefigured himself as Christ the Redeemer, the living Rock out of which comes living water and living bread.

¹ Exodus xvii. 6. See also 1 Cor. x. 4.

CHAPTER VI.

MOSES conceives of Creation as summed up in Light, Life, and Man. The first word which God pronounces in Creation is Light, the second great word is Life, the final word is Man.

Reason, reflecting upon that many-sided force, with many names, which creates the inorganic world, and tracing its presence into the secret chambers of organic existence, marvels whether it be not itself the cause of that mysterious phenomenon. Life never exists separate from Light. In view of this constant presence of the one with the other, science and reason are utterly unable to decide, whether, as the many forms of the one power are convertible into each other, even so the power and the principle may not also be convertible into each other; that is, whether they are not, in the highest conception of them, one and the same. Is life the product of organization, or is it the cause? Around this question has ever vainly wrought the unresting intellect of man, doomed forever to seek and never to find, forever to question and never to know, unless, in the lower sphere of scientific research, where things are seen in their forms, it avails itself of the light of the higher region of Revealed truth, where all things are disclosed as they really exist.

From the side of reason or science, this question, which in one form or another has engaged thinking minds from earliest time, never can be decided. For the principle and the power can never be found separate, and neither reason nor science can pierce into the essence of either. The power and the principle are alike inscrutable. If Light, as the Scripture intimates, is forever to be a marvel and a mystery, Life must be,

of which it is the forerunner and herald, the symbol and prophecy. It is only in what the Scriptures reveal, that the material world can really be known. In the Scriptures, Light and Life are revealed as distinct essences; but Life is never separated from Light.

In like manner as the dividing line between Light and Life, so the dividing line between Life and Spirit eludes the eye of reason and science; and there, too, the soul again stands wondering and in doubt, knowing nothing.

No certain line of distinction can be drawn between animal and vegetable life, and even the microscopic eye cannot discern the line which separates the lowest forms of life from inorganic existence. This wonderful truth is indicated in the Record by placing the first development of organic life in the same Day in which the creation of the inorganic world was completed. The record also places the creation of man in the same day with that of the animals, thereby intimating that the circles of being intersect each other; that new principles are introduced in such harmony with what was before them, and so interblend with them, as to form an orderly and related whole. Man is distinguished from the animal creation by the "inspiration of the Almighty" which "giveth him understanding." His sentient life is like that of the animals, his organic structure like that of the plants, the material of his frame is inorganic earth. But he is not made *by* the earth. Into the temple of his body are inwrought every form, order, and law of all previous earthly being, but all to constitute it the curiously wrought and richly adorned shrine of a spiritual principle, which pertains not to the preceding realms of existence.

The record points out with precision the difference between the kingdom which lies close to it below, and the kingdom of Life. In the kingdom of Life, everything reproduces itself. This expresses the exact line of division between this kingdom and that below it. Concerning this line, science has inquired with the greatest earnestness, the finest research; but its most

ultimate conclusions have been anticipated in this Record, for those who have eyes to see and hearts to believe.

The truth the record enunciates, marks the line of separation in the only possible way. To every other distinction some exception may be taken; every other fails to express such difference that absolute diversity can be predicated upon it. This is ultimate. That which can reproduce itself belongs to the organic, all else to the inorganic world. The clear enunciation of this is one of the marvels of this ancient record. And the record not only marks the line, but it lays down the law. In the kingdom of life, like produces like. It is the universal law, and it symbolizes the law of a still higher kingdom. That which is born of flesh is flesh only; and only that which is born of the spirit is spirit. As the power is not convertible into the principle, so no form of the principle is convertible into any other. In the domain of scientific research, no question is more earnestly inquired into than this — whether one form of life can pass into another; but, though all beneath the sun is changing, this law, as the general law of all organized existences, is unchangeable.

But it does not seem to have been noticed, that in the lower of the three divisions of vegetative life the law is not revealed; the inference is, that there the realms of being interblend; the circles of existence intersect; and if it shall yet appear that there is no visible line of vision between the inorganic world and the organic, this discovery which research seems bent with insane eagerness to make, as it were the pearl of great price, will not in the least confuse the distinctions of being — will not in the least tend to link matter and spirit into one chain, so as to be convertible into each other, and to bring all spirituality under the law of an ever-changing nature; it will not in the least efface the dividing line of the separated orders of being, nor contradict the eternal truth, to which this record pledges itself, that the kingdom of life is distinguished from and superior to the kingdom below.

The wisdom of this record at these points, around which

have always centred all philosophical and all scientific thought, is so manifest as to prepare the mind to heed lightly the argument which science raises against the last creation as revealed in the Third Age. It finds animal and vegetable life, the latter especially in humble form, appearing together. The oldest fossiliferous rocks contain fossils of a few marine animals, and of sea-weeds. From this it has been hastily and generally inferred that animal and vegetable life began there, and began together. The two inferences are distinct, and only the last need here be considered.

The evidence of the proposition from these facts, is overruled at once by evidence higher in kind and decisive in degree. Plants feed on inorganized substances; animals, on organized. Plants, therefore, in an orderly growth of the world, must have come before animals, or else the idea of order in creation must be abandoned; and the mind will not abandon that idea anywhere, until it abandons itself.

The full strength of the evidence of the proposition here argued against, is not, however, in the fact that life is not found in the record of nature before this period, but also that it appears, though not in the lowest form, yet in such form upon the whole, especially in vegetation, as suggests that it begins here; and seems to prove there could not have been before this a full development of the kingdom of Plants in its variety and glory. But it is certain that these fossils do not indicate the commencement of the first age of organic existence. Carbon is not an ingredient of the primitive rocks, yet beds of limestone, known to be very extensive though not yet fully explored, exist in strata much older than those which contain the fossils referred to. Lime comes from the atmosphere, and its presence indicates vegetable or animal growth. The argument, then, that these humble forms of life indicate the commencement of organic existence, is answered. The phenomenon itself is suggestive and significant. It may connect itself with the idea of cyclicity in creation; it may find its explanation in the fact, that here are the commencings of a

new period; but whatever be the solution of the wonder, life did not here begin; it existed in power ages on ages before.

The evidence, then, offered to prove the simultaneous beginning of animal and vegetable life on this planet, is not only set aside by rational considerations, but is proved to be no evidence of it whatever.

But while, then, in the record of Nature, there is no evidence for this proposition, there is presumptive evidence that plants long preceded animals. The existence of the beds of limestone, of vast but unknown extent, which have been referred to, makes it probable that when the carbonic acid gas now sealed up in these rocks was diffused throughout the atmosphere, plants only could have lived in it. They would have been the fitting agents to purify such an atmosphere, and to fit the earth, and perhaps the sea also, for a higher order of life. There is, then, not only no evidence to the contrary, but a very strong probability from facts in nature, that there was a full development of the Plant kingdom before animals existed.

Revelation and nature both indicate that there was a period unfit for animal life, and yet fit for vegetation. The earliest aqueous rock was formed in the bed of a highly heated ocean; and what is revealed of the third age, indicates the same fact. The supply of carbonic acid gas was immense. The earth was shrouded in mist. The first land, small in extent, and low, did not present those inequalities of surface which cause those sudden and great changes of temperature, which at once empty all the quivers of the arrowy rain. Even now, in cold and still days of December, the ocean, warmer than the land, steams like a caldron boiling over a fire. Such a sea the Seer beholds. It sends up a mist which rolls over the land, covering it with moisture, that feeds the plants.

" Its unemptied cloud of gentle rain
Is an eternal April to the ground,
Making it all one emerald." ¹

¹ The *Archais* points out how incompatible this statement is with the theory

The unfailing moisture, the great heat, the abundant supply of carbonic acid gas, would rapidly develop vegetation. The first vegetation, clinging to the rock, would aid heat, light, and water, in their disintegrating properties. Each plant would become a chemist, boring into the rock, taking up its particles, and working them over into soil. Dying, the plants themselves form the soil. Vegetation is an assimilating power, and acts directly to purify air and water. Diffused through the ocean, which was to be the first scene of the next higher life, they would render the waters habitable. On the land, they would tend to make that habitable for animals, and to purify the atmosphere. These great uses plants might subserve, and in them may be the explanation of their creation, long before the creation of animal life.

In these favorable conditions, the Plant kingdom may have flourished with a rank luxuriance, surpassing even the marvellous growth of the carboniferous period; yet, perhaps, with a less finely organized, less compact structure, and less capable of preservation. But, whatever their texture, the rocks which now contain their ashes have been subjected to such intense action of fire, that the eye of man will never behold the plants which flourished in the third and fourth ages of the world. In undiscoverable forms, they constitute part of the framework of the globe. As Nature seems to delight in preserving the mementoes of the past, some few traces of them may yet be brought to light; but, as a whole, this flora has perished. Yet the ideas which controlled its development are known; for, if nature keeps not this secret, it is revealed that in this flora were anticipated all the classes of plants that now grow on the earth.

The classification of the plants in the Record is that which,

of a creation in six solar days. This idea would apply to whomsoever recorded the Vision; but it is especially incredible, that if Moses supposed creation began on Sunday and ended on Friday, he should mark that no rain fell on Sunday or Monday; and he, too, born in rainless Egypt and writing in rainless Arabia. It is one of several similar evidences that he must have conceived of the days as ages. See, also, for a similar idea, page 22, Part I.

through the eye, is suggested to the universal mind; and, despite the Botanists, it is the only one that will ever have any hold upon it. For though the various scientific divisions of the plants are curiously wise, there will ever be for man this natural, precise, exhaustive division, which the Record makes; a division appealing to every eye, into plants without visible seeds, seed-bearing shrubs, and fruit-bearing trees.¹ All these seem to have been created in the Third Age; and in the order in which they are named they must have begun to grow; first, plants clinging to the naked rock, and growing without proper soil, and without visible seeds, and then seed-bearing plants.

The work of the Fourth Age is in harmony with the truth that the floral preceded the animal kingdom. The orderly succession of periods for action and repose, the arrangement of the seasons, and possibly some peculiar influences of sunlight required for the latter, were not indispensable to the earlier diversities of vegetable life. The lines of thought which have been traced, lead on from the third age to the work of the fourth, interpreted in accordance with the rule of phenomenal language. According to that rule, revelation is committed only to the appearing, at that time, of celestial light at the surface of this planet. For aught in the record, the sun, moon, and stars, may have been created before, or created then; or they may have been created before, and then have become luminous. Were that naming, so often referred to in these pages, found here,—were it recorded that God named the great light the sun,—it would be certain that it was then created, at least as a luminous body. No such naming is recorded; and this is very significant, if not decisive, as to the interpretation.

The record, then, decides only that the sun, moon, and stars first shone visibly through the atmosphere of this world in the

¹ The first plants described are not the grasses, but the cryptogams; the second includes some where the seed is in the earth, as appears from the last class, of which it is said, "their seed is upon the earth." The law that they reproduce after their kind, is not laid down for the first class which is named.

fourth age. The change which resulted in their visibility, may have been in the atmosphere of this planet. This idea is in harmony with the general aims of the description. The idea repeatedly suggests itself in this description, that each stage is related to the subsequent; so that a mind patiently following its thoughts one by one, would be led to pause long and dwell upon that stage which is precedent to the shining of these luminaries, as if it held the secret of their visibility; and to such a mind it would seem as if the air, dark with vapors and the continuing mist, must have excluded the light of the sun.

It may be said, that if, as a luminous body, the sun was then in existence, its light in the second age would have pierced through the atmosphere. But the known changes in the land subsequent to its birth, suggests that in the nascent world there may have been many changes in the atmosphere after its birth, if such as did not alter its radical idea. It need not, then, be presumed that the atmosphere was in such a state that the sunlight could pierce through it, till there is proof that it was so. There was present in it gas, in such abundance at the time when land was forming, as to constitute, when reduced to a solid form, a considerable part of the rock of the globe. There may, therefore, be supposed, at the close of the third age, such an atmosphere as accords with the theory, that the cause of the appearing of the luminaries at that time was in the atmosphere, and not in the luminaries themselves.

The few bold statements of the Record phenomenally read, as more fully understood from the volume of nature, are in harmony. If it had to be assumed that the atmosphere of the second age was just the same as that of the fifth, it would seem that the creation of the sun, at least, as a luminous body, must be referred to the fourth age. But this does not follow, when what is revealed is read by the light thrown upon it from nature. If it be said, this is making the Record conform to ideas from other sources of knowledge, it is replied, as to the mode it is, but not as to the idea. For, as here interpreted, creation as a whole is a birth; and this figure applies also to

stages in the creation: that which is created is formed, it is born, it grows; and from this idea it follows there may have been great changes subsequent to each creation, after the time when it began to be. Something of what those changes were, may be read in nature; the idea of such changes is in creation as revealed.

If the change which resulted in the light of day was on the surface of this planet, if it was in its atmosphere, it was such as could have been brought about by the purifying of vegetation. The vegetation of the carboniferous period, attested by vast regions of coal,¹ sufficiently shows what mighty effects this seemingly very humble instrumentality was competent to accomplish.

The wisdom of this Record is strikingly displayed in its enumeration of the offices of the celestial luminaries. Their giving light, which is to the common mind their most prominent office, is not so much dwelt upon as their regulating time, — something far less imposing, but not less indispensable to rational beings.² They are made to rule the day and to rule the night; made for signs and for seasons, for days and for years. And in all the references to them by inspired men, the thought is not that of their giving light, so much as of their office in ordering time. The scriptural language as a whole, as to their creation, is conformed to the language of the Record, which dwells chiefly on an idea compatible with their earlier creation; and the force of this will be felt, when it is considered how probable it is, that, unless divinely controlled to this very end, their language, even phenomenally understood, would have been inconsistent with any idea, save that of their creation in the fourth age.

It may be felt, however, that a glory passes away from the

¹ The coal-fields of North America alone are estimated to cover 200,000 square miles.

² For the full development of this thought, the reader should consult Lewis' fifteenth chapter, on The Creation of Time; especially the grand passage on pages 186, 187.

Record, if this view which has been given must be taken of the creation of the sun, moon, and stars. But, while the thought of their creation at some time remains in all its sublimity, this interpretation makes the Record harmonious in the thoughts it inspires. It is this world, and this world alone, it undertakes to describe. It has no concern with the rest of the universe. Its second great work, it is thought, though having many other ends, is to make its seclusion from the universe most effectual and complete. It has nothing to do with the heavenly bodies, but as they affect man. When their light comes to him,—when they regulate his day and his night, his seasons, and his years,—then, in virtue of this, they become part of his world: then for him they are created.

This is in harmony with other truths, and it teaches lessons fraught with more needed wisdom than even the idea of their absolute creation. The Sun in the natural world is the image of the Sun in the spiritual world. The figure becomes sublimely true when He is thought of as shining before he is revealed in the darkened world. The change made by his appearing, is not in the light, but in the recipient of the light. When through the mists and darkness of the soul breaks the beams of the Sun of Righteousness, though it seems for that little world newly created, the change is not in the luminary, but in that on which it shines.

On any interpretation other than that here advanced, there seems to be in the Record—though we do not know that it has ever been pointed out before.—a very strong argument against itself; for then, after the creation of plants, there seems a hiatus in the growth of the world—a pause, immense in its duration, when there was nothing doing on the earth;—on the earth, be it noted, for on any other interpretation the work of the fourth age was far away from the earth; and this seems utterly to destroy the harmony of the vision. Though plants may well be thought to have come forth in order before the animals which were to feed upon them, it seems strange indeed that ages on ages almost interminable rolled away,

after the plants prophesied of a higher life, before that which was thus written in nature was fulfilled. That there was a development of this kingdom by itself, is in keeping with the orderly growth of the world. But it seems not so, when, beside part of the third cycle, there is given them a cycle more, a duration which, if in harmony with that of other days of creation, was thousands on thousands of centuries. But, on the interpretation which has been given, the wisdom of the Record can be vindicated. These facts pertain to this period. The atmosphere was dense with vapors; the surface of the globe was rock; there were plants. To purify the air, and to convert rock into soil, the plants were adapted; but the time required was immense; *and precisely here the Record indicates one-fourth of all creative time.*

CHAPTER VII.

IN the Fifth Day of Creation, the second period of organic existence, a wave of life rolls through the breadth and depth of the Seas ; its billows break along the shores, and dash their spray over the land. This figure truthfully pictures that which the description of this Day definitely reveals.

The divine command to the ocean, literally rendered, is: "Let the sea swarm with swarming creatures." The language, evidently very general, seems indefinite ; but, on examination, it is found that its meaning can be determined in a satisfactory manner, as this language enters into the requirements of the ceremonial law, and so may be said to be defined by statute. Its meaning, as thus determined, points chiefly to Fishes, including, also, all creatures that in any way belong to the seas ; including also some of the lizards, of the insect tribes, and — what in a philological point of view is remarkable — a few humble mammals. The general idea which binds together so many, and such diverse forms of life, is the idea of prolific generation. Besides these, in the Fifth Day Reptiles and Birds were created. This Day is said to have had its evening and its morning, — language here indicating a lower form of life, followed by a higher.

As before there was pointed out in the Record itself a seeming argument against it in connection with the third and fourth ages, so now there may be pointed out another, which also seems to have been heretofore unnoticed. With the exception before referred to, the ideas in creation as revealed, authenticate themselves to the soul till the fifth age is revealed. This Age seems superfluous. Strike it out, merge its ideas in those of the sixth period, conceive of life as simultaneously

appearing over the land and through the sea, and the Record seems to be more simple and grand. The soul does not feel the loss of the fifth Day, and finds the scheme as thus altered more harmonious and admirable. It might, however, be said that, in the nascent world, the waters may have been fitted for life earlier than the land; that oceanic life seems not to be of so high and complicate an order as terrestrial, which harmonizes with this idea; and that, as the earth gives birth to its inhabitants, it is in harmony with this that the ocean peoples its own world. It may further be said, the idea that the birds are ocean-born, harmonizes with certain impressions of the soul, which will be considered hereafter. But, after all, it seems necessary to admit that these ideas but give an air of possibility to the statement, and that it would still have to be said, were it not that the divine wisdom of the Record overrules and silences all such speculations, that this scheme of creation were better if this fifth Day were not in it. Adopting then, for the moment, and for reasons which will instantly appear, a style towards this Record which has become too common, it is said that here its conception of creation seems at fault. All its other ideas, with the exception of the one before referred to, commend themselves to the soul; but here its self-authenticating power, for the second time, fails. But, before, what seemed a defect was upheld by powerful considerations, and the Mosaic conception of the second age of organic existence is not merely countenanced by facts, but is demonstrated by them to be absolutely right; and yet it is not credible that Moses could have had any knowledge whatever of the facts in nature which prove the truth of that which he recorded.

A great period of marine life, when there was no life beside, — an age of oceanic existence, constituting one of the stages of the growth of the world in duration, harmonizing with the five other periods of the Creation, — has been revealed in the volume of the Church for thousands of years. To the existence of such a period, that volume is as decisively committed as to any fact it reveals. And to this statement, which — if a

statement in the Bible can be thought to need confirmation — especially seems to require it, Geology, which so many hoped and believed had destroyed the credibility of creation as revealed, brings confirmation precise and full. In nature's great book there is a chapter which corresponds, page by page, and line by line, with the verses in God's great book, which describe the second age of organic existence. In the annals of nature there is written out in full the history of an almost interminable age, unlike any other, yet like the fifth age in the vision of the Seer. And in view of the general wisdom pervading his description of creation, its accord at this point, with facts which Moses could not know, should be, with candid minds, strong presumptive evidence that his wisdom was superhuman and divine.

If it be asked why this was not recognized from the first period of geological discovery, the answer but confirms the idea just advanced. The interpretation of the Record in harmony with the idea of instantaneous creation, and the excluding of natural agencies from its idea of Creation, of course prevented that recognition of its thought as to the fifth Age, which at once would have elucidated the discoveries of Geology. But Geology itself may be paradoxically said to have discovered and not to have discovered this Age. The records were discovered of a period so unlike every other, so varied and diverse in its forms of existence, so interrupted by terrible life-destroying catastrophes, that it bewildered the mind. It was broken up into many epochs. It was felt, in view of it, as if the idea of any sixfold arrangement in creation must be abandoned; for here were more than six periods, each of a duration such as the mind could not adequately conceive of, and all after the third Age of the Seer. Phenomena so strange seemed almost to shake the idea of any order at all in creation. Still, Geology could discern progress; and, sweeping her eye along the whole period, it seemed to her that the wave of existence, rolling on through it all, widened and deepened as it rolled.

Alike for the proper combination and generalization of all

these phenomena, and for the harmonizing of them with Scripture, there were required the ideas heretofore laid down in these pages, of a general power given to the ocean to produce life, not once only, but from time to time, through all the life-cycles of the forming world;¹ and also the idea of the element of fire left free through all creative time to break in upon, and to break up, the developments of life; to do its own work, as it were, unheeding that of the higher principle, though undoubtedly working in wise accordance with it. Each of these ideas coming from Revelation, are in most striking accord with what science reveals; nor does it seem that without them the harmony of Revelation and Nature can be made to appear. Each of these ideas are required here. The necessity of the latter need not be pointed out. It was our design to have enlarged upon this idea; but no one, at all acquainted with the facts as to the geological periods, can read the third chapter of this Essay and not see how closely it bears upon them. As to the former, its bearing seems almost equally evident. The idea of a life-producing power in the Earth, which has here been claimed to be an idea of revelation, seems at last to have forced itself upon the scientific mind, and is fully put forth on the basis of facts, in an Essay on "The Laws of Development in the Organic World," by Dr. Bronn, which received the

¹ In dwelling upon the life-producing power of the Earth, in the first and second chapters, Part Second, of this Essay, one argument against it was not touched upon. It is written, that God made the living creatures, as well as that the Earth brought them forth. But the one revelation cannot be meant to do away with the other. Both are true, but can only be so when God is conceived of as doing what he does by delegating power to the earth. It should also have there been most explicitly stated that Lewis holds that plants and living creatures were produced by the earth; but that in each of the creations subsequent to the first, it was, as in that, by the going forth of the Word. And to the idea that the general outline in the Record, as more fully developed in the volume of nature, is to be explained by many divine works, immediately such, we rather incline; but the idea seems to come rather from the Record scripturally illustrated, than from its own words. Its general outline may conform to the facts as they appear to the common mind; and yet there may be more recondite ideas in the Scripture, revealed to the eye of Faith. But either view seems equally consistent with the Divine glory. Whatever is done by Him, or by his agents acting from Him and in obedience to Him, is the work of the same Creator and Lord.

prize of the French Academy in 1856. Commencing with the first appearing of Life known to Geology, and thence tracing its development onwards, he enunciates these conclusions :

“ The regular process in carrying out the same plan, through the whole series of development of organic forms, from the beginning to the end of a period of millions of years, can only be accounted for in one of two ways.

“ Either this course of successive development during millions of years has been the regular immediate result of the systematic action of a conscious Creator, who, on every occasion, settled and carried out not only the order of appearance, formation, organization, and terrestrial object of each of the countless numbers of species of plants and animals, but also the number of the first individuals, the place of their settlement in every instance, although it was in his power to create everything at once, — or there existed *some natural power hitherto entirely unknown to us*, which, by means of its own laws, formed the species of plants and animals, and arranged and regulated all those countless individual conditions ; which power, however, must, in this case, have stood in the most immediate connection with, and in perfect subordination to, those powers which caused the gradually progressing perfection of the crust of the earth, and the gradual development of the outward conditions of life for the constantly increasing numbers and higher classes of organic forms in consequence of this perfection. Only in this way can we explain how the development of the organic world could have regularly kept pace with that of the inorganic. Such a power, although we know it not, would not only be in perfect accordance with all the other functions of nature, but the Creator, who regulated the development of organic nature by means of such a force, so implanted in it, as he guides that of the inorganic world by the mere coöperation of attraction and affinity, must appear to us more exalted and imposing than if we assumed that he must always be giving the same care to the introduction and change of the vegetable and animal world on the surface of the

earth, as a gardener daily bestows on each individual plant in the arrangement of his garden." He concludes: "We believe that all species of plants and animals were originally produced by some natural power unknown to us, and not by transformation from a few original forms, and that that power was in the closest and most necessary connection with those powers and circumstances which effected the perfection of the earth's surface."

The two ideas, then, of a life-producing power in nature, and of an element working in the life-producing cycles, breaking in upon and changing its manifestation, bring certain facts in nature into harmony with truth revealed.

And by one other idea in Revelation, the geological phenomena, for ages on ages, from the beginning of the Palæozoic to the end of the Mesozoic periods — confused, interrupted, and in strange disorder as those phenomena at first seem to be — are generalized at once, and made to disclose their entire accordance with the Fifth Day of Creation as revealed. It is the idea of a period of oceanic life previous to the period when terrestrial and oceanic life were simultaneous. Science was bewildered by the multifariousness and diversity of her facts, which through ages unrolled their long succession. The phenomena she could not gather under any general idea, even when the imagination bridged over the rivers, or rather seas, of fire, which then separated continents of life. There were the marine animals, the fishes filling the seas; there were insects swarming in the air, and strange creatures flying through it, reminding of the Hydras which darted through the deep; there, too, wading in the mud, seeking their food on the borders of primeval seas, were birds of elephantine size. Wonders were there, which brought to mind those wild tales which cheer the nights of the Arabian desert; and it is not strange that science could not at once grasp hold of any idea which could hold all these ages and all these diversified marvels together. She saw that one part of this period was different from the other; that there was an age of fishes, and

that after this an age of reptiles developed itself; but she knew not how to connect all these facts together. She even discovered on the surface of the globe traces of a fire-drawn line of demarcation, separating the age of the earlier oceanic brood from the age of terrestrial life; but, unable to trace life to its source, she could not group under one idea those forms of life which, by community of origin, properly belong together. She could not know that God had ordained that this world should be peopled with living creatures through two subordinate agencies. The idea which she required, but to which she could not attain, is revealed. It is made known to man in that volume wherein are written the thoughts of the Lord and Giver of Life in Creation. Man, studying the terms there used, and seeing that the waters not only gave birth to the fishes which swam through the seas, but to all marine animals,—to the lizards which lurk along the shores, to the clouds of insects along the water's edge, to some mammals even, and to the birds,—perceives that the record in nature bears full and perfect witness to that which the Record of God reveals as to the life-producing power of the ocean. Divinely taught how to solve the mystery, he casts his eyes over the strange world of the two earlier epochs of geological discovery, and generalizes at once all the facts collected through a century in thousands of volumes, concerning the second age of organic existence; he gathers together all the phenomena under one idea, by tracing them all to one source; he marks the place of this wondrously diversified, yet strangely similar age of being, in the unrolling scroll of creation, and interprets the whole to his reason by pronouncing the words: *this is oceanic life*.

Were a geologist to characterize the age which includes the Palæozoic and Mesozoic epochs as concisely, yet as fully as the Seer does the fifth age which he beheld, he could not do better than to use his terms. It may be doubted if any language but the Hebrew could furnish for this purpose words so general, yet so few; so comprehensive and various in their

meaning, yet so specific and certain. The terms first used designate creatures of prolific generation. As has been said, they point to fishes, and to all marine creatures, but include other creatures, and even a few small mammals. Besides these, are especially mentioned, and apparently as coming later in time and higher in order, reptiles and birds.

Such, and in such order, is one grand age of Geology, — an age of Fishes, of Hydras, of Dragons, and of Birds. Its fishes were of a magnitude never equalled since; its reptiles, such as neither earth nor ocean has since beheld; its birds surpassed in size the hugest animals now on earth.

It had two well-marked divisions. Generally, its first division may be characterized as the age of Fishes, preceded at the earliest periods by small marine animals, coming at first few in number, then numberless and vast. Then there is what seems like a fracture in the chain of existence; and after it an age of mighty reptiles, swiftly furrowing the foaming sea, — leviathans of the deep, — or flying over the land, more monstrous than dragons of classic fables or of medieval romance; and birds, too, on the same unearthly scale of greatness; among them a few mammals appear, prophetic of the next higher stage of being. This last is a higher period of organic existence than the former; and the two, making the full cycle of oceanic life, explain the formula of the Seer: "Evening was and morning was, Day fifth."

In the vision of the Seer, to an Age of Ocean-born life, an Age of Earth-born life succeeds. His language describes the Animals as it described the Plants. It proceeds upon plain distinctions, obvious to the common eye. It presents the animal kingdom as it is in the common thought of man. Its divisions are the larger grass-eating animals, and the flesh-eating animals; that is, the herbivorous and carnivorous beasts, and all other living things, save those he had seen to have been ocean-born.

The Seer beholds an Age of animals and of man. His appearing in the same cycle indicates his relation with the

lower orders of life; yet he appears distinct, superior, an especial work of God, and the last. With him the vision of the Seer fades into the light of history.

As to the Sixth Age of the World, Revelation and Nature are undeniably in the most absolute harmony. Distinctly marking in her annals where it begins, Nature keeps the monuments of an age of beasts of the earth. They come, gigantic in form. They disappear. Others come, better fitted to be the attendants of man; and with them come plants, that were to grow near the habitations of man, in the garden and the ploughed field. Man comes; and after his creation no new forms of life, from earth or ocean, break the rest of creative energy. In the Record of Nature, and in the Record of God, this age has its two divisions, its opening and its close. In each is illustrated the wonderful formula: "Evening was, Morning was." It may be summed up as the Age of the Mastodon and of Man.

The geological annals of the last two creative ages, with their succession of Fishes, Reptilians, Animals, Man; and through these ages till their close, Fire at its work, correspond, then, with the utmost exactitude, to the Vision of the Seer.

But an argument has been raised against the whole idea of Creation, as something ended or complete. It alleges that many of the animals now existing were created long before man; and that great changes in the globe, like those before man, such as the rising and the sinking of the earth's surface, are yet going on. It says that no well-defined epoch can be pointed out when the present state of things began, and that there has been no cessation of change.

The ancient Seer deemed the creation of man an equivalent to that of all the brutes. How different his idea from this, which illustrates how science tends to degradation when it departs from faith! Some, in form and likeness men, wise too in such wisdom as schools can teach, do not feel that the appearing of Man amid his vassals of the mute creation is an

era, though not unwilling to deem as such the appearing of some monstrous Fish, or Bird, or Beast.

The appearing of Man, to all who deserve the name of men, certainly marks the one grandest epoch in the creation of our world ; but, without the idea of vast time in its Days, it might seem, from the Record of Creation, that the same plants and animals, as first created, lived with man. With that idea, it becomes probable their forms varied ; and it is more in harmony with it to suppose that some of the plants and animals existing at man's creation lived also before him, than the contrary.

To give to this argument against the very idea of Creation anything of plausibility, some mighty dragon, as in the fables of romance, should be born from the sea, or some mammoth from the earth. There should be somewhere seen, something breaking in upon that continuing Day of rest from creative working, which is so marked a feature in the scriptural idea of the present age of the world, and to which all science, and all scientific men who deserve the name, uniformly attest. The truth revealed by the Spirit to the Church, thousands of years ago, that in the age of man there would be in the natural world no creation subsequent to that of man, has been confirmed by every passing hour. As to this truth, science is in perfect accord with the ancient documents of the Church.

It is true, as the argument alleges, that the world changes ; but those changes are so balanced among themselves, or else so almost imperceptibly slow and small, as not to make against this being man's world. The world is sufficiently stable for man's purposes ; and the question whether it be really man's world, may be left to common sense. The argument under-rates the changes in the creative ages ; it fixes on single cycles, and does not comprehend the creative work as a whole. It overrates the changes now. The earth's tremulous motions are no more to it than pulse-beatings and heart-throbbings are to the body of man, proving its beginning, foretelling its end.

The world is not unchangeable. If it were, it would be an

eternal reality. No creation could be predicated of it. It could have no beginning of days, no end of years. That this is a changing world, needs no outward evidence. It is an *à priori* truth ; a thought as old as man. It is a truth revealed. The world, like all that is natural, passeth through its cycle ; or else it is eternal, and hath attributes which pertain only to God.

This argument against the very idea of Creation, although so weak as to provoke wonder and scorn, is yet better than the feeling that there can be no great change in the earth, because "since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were." It comes from the dim gropings of the natural mind among phenomena to which the Church holds the key. The Age of Ocean-born life passed away ; so, too, the Age of Beasts ; so, too, will pass away the Age of Man. Of this, Nature hints to Man. Of this she gives him warning. And what shall be beyond ? To this inquiry, these warnings of Nature should lead the meditative mind ; and such will find all that will be revealed till time is no more, in that Volume which holds the secret of all future ages, as of all ages past.

CHAPTER VIII.

IN the Chapter on Light, there was presented, on the authority of revelation, the idea of one force in the inorganic world; but, as it is our purpose to indicate somewhat of the coincidence between truth as made known in revelation and in nature, we here proceed to show that the highest generalizations of scientific thought tend to the same idea.

The seeming properties of matter are so variable, that, in itself, it must be different from what it appears to be. This idea, suggested by color, and by other phenomena of matter, has been a fruitful germ of thought, as far back as the history of thought can be traced; and the power of the soul to generalize correctly from a few facts, and by reasoning to outrun science, has been displayed in a striking manner along the line here indicated; for the great truth of a distinction between matter, and the forces which act upon it, which suggested itself to the earliest minds, is the basis of Chemistry, which, as a science, is hardly more than a century old, though some of its processes are as old as man.

For a time, it almost seemed as if Chemistry, addressing itself to the forces operating on matter, would refer all the appearances which matter presents, to those forces; such as heat, light, attraction, electricity, magnetism, chemical affinity, and gravitation. And further, its varied discoveries and complication of facts tended to bury the idea of unity in nature under that of diversity, and to turn thought from generalizing to the multiplying of facts.

But nature, even where she first opens to man the idea of forces acting on matter, hints at the great physical secret, that of their unity. For nearly all that force operating on matter

can effect, appears through the action of heat. Heat dwells in all bodies: if its normal quantity be sufficiently increased, it changes structure and form; it transforms the solid to a liquid, and the liquid into a gaseous or aëriform body. But increasing heat, at a certain point, manifests light, suggesting the idea of the same power in a different manifestation; and thus in the most common phenomena of the material world, known to all men from the beginning, is disclosed not only the idea of matter and force, but of the diversity and the unity of force; and from heat and light, mind, though knowing no other occult forces, can generalize till it reaches the unity of force; as with certain forces, once occult, in addition to these, it generalizes now. And if it be assumed that there are yet occult powers in nature, then the modern sage, with his highest and most ultimate conclusions from all the forms of force new and old, is just where the earliest of the sages was, with fewer forms of force. The superiority of the latest to the earliest philosopher, so far as this truth is concerned, is more seeming than real; for if the whole list of forces known to modern science — heat, light, homogeneous attraction, heterogeneous attraction, capillary attraction, electricity, galvanism, magnetism, and the rest — were read off to an ancient sage, he would reason as the modern sage would, if some new force, heretofore unsuspected, were to present itself in the laboratory, and say: Heat and light are the same power in different manifestations; and seeing that one power is competent to diverse results, and that such is nature's way in one case, it may be so in all; and till the contrary shall be proved, it must be supposed, from analogy, that all these seemingly new forces are but manifestations of the one.

The germ, then, of the latest thinking on this subject, is in the earliest; and on the supposition that the list of forces does not yet embrace all there are in nature, the truth may have been as clearly, as thoroughly apprehended, and on as conclusive grounds, by sages nineteen centuries before Christ, or twice nineteen centuries before him, as in the nineteenth century after

him. Ancient thought cannot be apprehended until it is clearly seen that the sages of ancient times, through generalizations of a few facts, often come to the same grand ideas with those of modern times, and doubtless with as sure conviction as the latter; because, if the latter have more facts from which to draw conclusions, they are embarrassed by their multiplicity. This is so much the case with them at this moment, that they would hardly dare to avow belief in it, were it not that nature rather discloses than keeps the secret of unity. She revealed it from the first through heat and light, and no sooner was the discovery of electricity followed by that of galvanism, and then by magnetism, than man was compelled to feel they were identical; and the experimental verification of this notion followed rapidly. This was the beginning of a generalization, based upon experiment, which in boldness and grandeur equals the speculations of the ancient mind, and begins to draw nigh to the generalization of the sacred oracle itself, elucidating and confirming it.

All known forces in nature, except gravitation, are convertible into each other. Each force can produce each other, and can be reproduced by it. No force ever ceases to be; but when one disappears, there instantly appears another, which in power is its exact equivalent, and which, appearing as an effect of a cause, can be made to change places with its cause, making that appear in its turn as its effect; hence the demonstration of their unity is as complete, as decisive, as the mind, whose range of investigation is limited, and which cannot take cognizance of anything in its essence, requires or permits. This is illustrated when chemical action puts in motion a current, which, as it flows through its circuit, evokes each of the other forces in nature in such a way as compels the idea that they are different workings of itself. In the inorganic world, then, a few wizard forces playing around matter invest it with most of the properties by which it is commonly known; and these forces are the protean playings of the same force. Towards this idea of the unity of force tend the highest generalizations and the finest researches of science. The exception is gravitation, which, ever

appearing with all the other forces in nature, as yet owns kindred with none. But its anomalous isolation may be due to ignorance of what it is; for science, though familiar with some of its laws, and basing astronomy upon them, has not succeeded in apprehending this force, as it has done that of electricity, and is unable to suggest any experiment which determines whether it be identical with other force or not. If this force shall ever be made to disclose something of the mode in which it operates, it will be in harmony with all analogy, and with all discovery, if it be found to be identical with those forces, from which it is never separate.

As, then, with this exception, the idea of the unity of force, even if it be not conceded that it is absolutely demonstrated, is upheld by very decisive experiments, and commends itself to the highest scientific thought, it enables us to perceive a close resemblance between the Mosaic idea of the inorganic world, and the scientific. That which science holds as very probably true, as the conclusion to which her experiments and her reasonings irresistibly tend, Moses reveals; and going beyond those results to which she has as yet arrived, where she is yet compelled to take cognizance of two forces in nature, he pronounces there is but one; and science bringing to his idea, in part, decisive confirmation, owns that what he reveals is eminently reasonable and probable. It is so strongly impressed with the conviction of the unity of all agencies in the inorganic world, that, were it not for its wise determination to enunciate no truth within its own domain not established by experiment, it would be ready to anticipate the full verification of the idea, and, like him, to sum the inorganic creation in the words — one substanceless substance, and one organizing force.¹

¹ There are ample indications of this feeling among men of the highest rank as cautious experimentalists. It appears in the delight at every experiment which tends to identify different forms of force, and in the fact, that around the question which such experiments tend to settle, is concentrated the attention of the inner circles of thought. As one illustration of the decisive language which this feeling inspires, we give a sentence from the address to the British Association, in the autumn of 1853, by President Owen, when, having alluded to the

In treating of subjects so complicate, it is necessary to follow one line of thought at a time; and here there must be connected with that which has been traced another, which, at first view, seems to destroy the harmony between Revelation and Nature, just indicated as in part scientifically established, and in part as scientifically probable. For a time, chemistry tended to make the force which acts around matter almost everything in the inorganic world; but new discoveries, opening new truths, seemed almost to reverse this, and to disclose matter, not indeed as it appears to the common eye, but as endowed in itself with properties not less wonderful. Science experimentally verified the atomic theory of ancient philosophy, and proved that matter consisted of atoms almost infinitely small, but of definite magnitude and form. The ancient idea that God made the world by weight and measure, was proved. Newton's idea of the primitive particles of matter, "as solids incomparably harder than any porous bodies compounded of them, even so very hard as never to wear out, or break in pieces, no ordinary power being able to divide what God himself made one in the beginning," seemed to be verified. For the truth of the atomic theory, though concerning particles that the microscope cannot make apparent, being established, its truth consists well with the idea, that before any agency upon them from without, the atoms of matter were shaped, measured, and numbered by a Divine decree. Matter then ceased to appear formless and void, when rigid and exact geometrical laws were found impressed upon its particles. Substance then appeared not sub-

progress of electricity from Gilbert to Oersted, and to the discovery made by the latter in 1820, thirteen years after he first endeavored to ascertain whether electricity had any effect on the magnet, he says: "The generalization was established, and with a rapidity unexampled, regard being had to its greatness, that magnetism and electricity are but different effects of one common cause. This has proved the first step to still grander abstractions,—to that which conceives the reduction of all the species of imponderable fluids of the Chemistry of our student days, together with gravitation and neuricity, to interchangeable modes of action of one and the same all-pervading life-essence." This sentence makes gravitation itself a form of one universal force, and verges on the idea that physical and vital force are the same.

stanceless, but as defined and measurable reality ; the geometrical basis of all reality in the inorganic world. No sooner did these facts disclose themselves, than a tendency appeared to reverse the previous thinking about matter, and to ascribe to something in the atomic constitution of bodies all that had been ascribed to force acting around them. But, as before, the mind, though hardly recognizing aught in matter, firmly held to its existence, so it will continue to hold to the idea of force as operating on the atoms of matter. In the former case, it was held to the idea by its own laws. So it will be in the latter ; for it must by its own constitution recognize matter as something, into the idea of which motion cannot enter. If, then, it be claimed, as it is by some, that the atoms of matter rotating on their axes cause heat, and all the phenomena of force, there is not only the difficulty of supposing how such effects could follow, but also the antecedent impossibility of conceiving of matter in motion at all, without some force which imparts to it motion. For the intuition of the soul as to this truth is certain. Matter, then, does indeed assume a definiteness of reality which was threatening to disappear before the idea of force, yet the idea of force remains. It is not a property of matter. The term *material*, if applied to it, as formerly it was in scientific treatises, must be used only as indicating that this agency comes not into the order of things spiritual. It is but the shadow of the coming substance, and pertains not to the spiritual world ; neither does it belong to matter ; it is a distinct and subsequent creation. Important, then, as this discovery of the definite proportions in which atoms combine is to exact knowledge, and in practical results, neither the fact, nor the speculation growing out of it, essentially alter preëxisting ideas, or facts supposed to be known as to matter or force.

But while thus the scientific ideas remain in several respects essentially as before, it is apparent that this conception of matter differs from the Mosaic idea of it in the beginning. In the Record there is revealed the idea of force acting on matter, and the idea of matter without the properties commonly ascribed to

it ; but here comes in a new idea, which, though still harmonizing well in some respects with the old ideas, indicates a Divine work put forth upon the formless and void substance, which was in the beginning, and which, with the reverential Newton, the soul feels, must be referred to God himself. But the harmonies of revealed truth fail not here ; for there is revealed between the time when matter was substanceless and void, and the time when force put forth its energies on matter, the mysterious work of the Spirit of God, to which may be ascribed this wonder, doubtless the most ultimate that physical science will ever verify in the material creation.

But while, so far as has been indicated, human thought is approaching very near to the absolute verities of revealed truth, it is now receding from them in another direction, so far as its tendency is to pronounce the identity of physical and vital force. This tendency naturally should manifest itself at the present state of research into the deep secrets of the natural world, for the resemblance is close and the union everlasting. To use the term which stands in the scriptural representation of God's creative work as the name for the great agency which precedes that of Life, Light is the shadow which foreruns the substance Life ; and after that substance appears, the two are inseparable. Science, therefore, cannot disunite them. Still, the scientific tendency to confound them, is so opposed to ideas which have almost intuitive force, that it is hardly to be supposed that this tendency will establish the identity of the two as a scientific idea ; though, if so, science will end in materialism ; for, mind so lost as not to be able to distinguish between physical and vital force, past all doubt, will confound vital force and spiritual, and so bring the soul under the degradation of a perishing materiality. Something, then, of the tendency of science is towards Moses, and in some respects it is away from him ; but over it he stretches the line and the weight ; and from what he reveals may be known all that man now knows, all he ever will know, of the mysterious work of God, alike in the inorganic and the organic world.

This harmony, between truth revealed as to the inorganic world, and truth in nature, is one of the most remarkable results to which the ideas of vast time and of natural agency in creation open the way. It was before said that it is difficult to hold to the idea of Light shining for millions of years over the world without any imaginable effect correspondent with its duration; it may now further be said, it is impossible to hold to it; while that which has been pointed out as the action of this agent accords with the time, with the manner of its appearing, and with those sublime ideas which this inscrutable element ever enkindles in minds inspired to reveal the sublime verities of natural and moral truth, the close resemblance of which make each to illustrate the other.

There are facts in the present condition of the globe which harmonize with the Mosaic idea of the earth as self-luminous, before the manifestation of the light of the sun made the morning of the one great Day coincident with all creative time. The importance of the idea before referred to, that Days of Creation are represented in the complete world in elucidating the Days themselves, meets us here; for the Mosaic idea of light before the sun, is an idea which is thus confirmed. If it be self-luminous, the Earth that now is, is like the Earth as it is revealed down to the fourth Age; and such is the fact. The Earth is luminous at all times, with a faint light imperceptible in the light of day. This is obvious from the facts that in moonless and starless nights there is still diffused through the air a faint light,¹ and that the earth is luminous at the poles. One of the Mosaic ideas, then, as to the Day of Light, is so verified in nature, which seems determined to preserve some evidence of all his truths, that if the skeptic asks whence or what the light of the world for three ages before the manifestation of the sun, it can be answered: From itself, even as now.

It may also be possible further to verify the other greater

¹ Arago notes this fact. Humboldt, speaking of the Aurora, says: "This phenomenon derives the greater part of its importance from the fact that the earth becomes self-luminous, and shows itself capable in itself of developing light."

Mosaic idea which reveals the inscrutable essence, represented by its most obvious effect of light, as making the inorganic world. Even if magnitude only be taken into account, the element of fire is now the preponderating element of the globe. Save an exterior crust, so thin as hardly to be taken into account at all, to an eye which could traverse at once the whole diameter of its orb, the Earth would now appear a ball of fire, such as it was in its first age. But it can by no means be but that its interior has a decisive relation to its exterior. If not, no mere assumption of false philosophy, that it is naught to Omnipotence to create, can prevent the mind from truly pronouncing, that here there was a waste of creative energy. There must be a relation between the mass of the globe, and the ends for which the globe was created; and, as the natural ends for which the globe was created manifest themselves only on the outer circle of the world, where life appears, there must be some necessary relation between that inner fiery mass and that outer circle. And the relation is obvious; the central heat must diffuse itself through the exterior circle; and apart from this unceasing effluence, life, which in its manifold forms is the natural end of creation, could not maintain itself there. The language in which the poet pictures his vision of the world without the heat and light of the sun, describes some of the first effects which would attend a decisive diminution of the effluence of the central heat.

“The world was void,
Seasonless, herbless, treeless, manless, lifeless —
A lump of death.
The rivers, lakes, and ocean, all stood still;
And nothing stirred within their silent depths.
The waves were dead, the tides were in their grave;
The winds withered in the stagnant air,
And the clouds perished.”

But this terrible conception, involving universal death, pictures only the beginning of the wonderful transformation of existence which would follow the absolute annihilation of the

primeval formative force in nature, called into being by the first great word pronounced in creation. Heat is but one manifestation of the inscrutable, invisible, many-sided force, which, dwelling in the unvisited fire-chamber of the globe, causes the beating of the flaming heart of the world. All force acting upon the exterior of the earth had there its secret spring, has there its unintermitting fountain. This force appearing in its highest manifestation at the outer circle of the world at once as heat, light, cohesive, electrical, magnetic, and chemical force, constituted all inorganic existences from the first, and ever upholds them in existence, as they now present themselves to the senses. Were it then to cease, there would be nothing within the circle of this planet save motionless atoms in absolute contact, yet not cohering together; and every known appearance, or conceivable manifestation of matter, would have utterly passed away. Thus, through the idea of the unity of force, traced through its first development as revealed, to its present centre and place of abode, indicated in the present constitution of the globe, and through its diversified effects at the outer circle of the world, where the perfect inorganic creation is fitted to be the recipient of the principle of life, we come round from the side of nature to the same idea before enunciated as truth revealed, that in the invisible force, in science nameless, but from its most outward effect called in Scripture Light, the material world lives and moves and has its being.

Should it seem that the word Light could not have represented to him who recorded it an idea so universal as has been here ascribed to it in the Mosaic record (not wholly indeed from what there appears, but from all the scriptural language as to this element), it may be said, that the thoughts which this element may have suggested to him in connection with its apparent identity with heat, are the germs of all possible thinking upon the subject of one force imparting various properties to matter, and causing it to present those phenomena which go so far to make up the common idea of it. Man, if he reasons at all, may reason very far from a very few facts. Certainly no one

will pretend that until the very recent time when electrical and magnetic force is generally supposed to have been recognized, it was impossible for a philosophic mind to have discriminated between matter and force; or from the forces then perceived to be operating upon matter, to have reasoned to their unity; and yet, until this supposed recent discovery, there was but little in the forces manifest in nature, if there was anything, which can be considered as wholly unthought of. It is a common error to suppose that correct generalization was unknown to ancient thought. Ancient thought was characterized by a tendency to generalize in a more marked degree than modern thought, — probably because the latter, entering upon a vast field of experimental observation, found there felicitous rewards, — not because experimental observation was unknown to sages of old, as is attested by many processes in art, some of which modern science cannot imitate, but because that the time predicted “when knowledge should be increased” had come. Finding, then, great results followed experimental observation, it rather discouraged and undervalued truth which did not rest wholly upon this basis; not fully apprehending that such is the correspondence between the worlds of matter and of mind, that metaphysical cannot be wisely dissevered from physical science. It has prosecuted its inquiries in sight of some of the highest truths in the material world; but this by no means justifies the idea that they are wholly inaccessible by any other mode. The evidence is all the other way; for there is no great scientific idea now, based upon experiment, some glimpse of which cannot be proved to have shown itself to sages of old, who generalized from a few truths, or who boldly uttered, from the higher world of mind, the laws of the lower world of the senses.

These general ideas might be expanded; but, returning to the point immediately before us, it may be repeated, that light and heat in every age may have suggested, to those who have reflected upon natural phenomena, anticipations of all that is now known of a subtle power at work in the very constitution of matter, and producing marvellous and great transformations

in its outward form ; and it may be confidently anticipated, that the word which indicates the earliest, the most universal, and perhaps the highest manifestation of this power, will be taken as its proper exponent, when science shall have established the sublime idea it so confidently indulges, of the unity of all forces in the inorganic world ; and that thus the word Light will ultimately have the same commanding place in the volume of Science, which it now has in the volume of the Church.

It must, then, be apparent, that, had science in time past fully realized its present great hope, the old interpretation of the Record of creation would have been in as direct and threatening collision with its idea, as with the idea of Geology, as to time, in the creation. It may be confidently predicted, from intimations in the sacred oracles, that in these last days man will arrive at ultimate and truthful conclusions as to material things, and will verify that to which the indications of nature have pointed from earliest time ; yet it will then have to be said, as was before said of his geological discoveries, that at the very height of his achievements, man will but find himself face to face with the truth of primeval Revelation.

In writing the preceding, there has been somewhat in mind the question, which doubtless suggests itself to some, whether Moses could have had any conception of the truths here supposed to have been revealed. On this point there need be no doubt ; assuredly he may have had the idea. The germ of all possible thought on the subject of the unity of force is in the idea that Light, the only power revealed in the inorganic world, put forth a formative power on matter. Essentially this is the whole of what has been supposed to be revealed. If the Seer had this idea, he had it all.

That he may have had this idea, will not be questioned by any one at all familiar with the primal ideas as to Light, which come out distinctly in all the old mythologies. The barren and unfruitful idea of Light as merely something to see by, is beneath the primeval and Eastern conception of this essence. Under the figure of Light, the primeval Revelation must have *made* known its vision of the Godhead. For the earliest de-

parture from primitive truth seems to have been the confounding of shadow and substance, leading on to the worship of Darkness and Light, adored as creating and destroying powers. In all primeval, Eastern mythological thought, always so closely connected with cosmological, there is always a power to give heat and light, and a substance to receive it, an active and a passive principle; the former is everywhere Light, and the two are adored, as in the Sun and the Earth, in Osiris and Isis. Light, then, so universally impressed the primeval mind as the primitive power in nature, that the sublime words, "God said, Let there be light," could not have been heard by any oriental Seer, without seeming to him full of mysterious truth. The highest cosmological function for Light which even an oriental mind could form, short of the deification of this essence, everywhere worshipped around him, he must entertain; and very different must have been the impression which the words made on him from what they now make on the Occidental mind; and it should be added, far more in accordance with the idea they were fitted and intended to make.

In reading the Divine Oracles, it is important to distinguish between the fulness of the thought of the Revealing Spirit, and the conception of it by the recipient mind of him who recorded it. His idea must indeed be taken as standing in some direct and truthful relation to the fulness of the idea. It must be a miniature of it; but the more it can be expanded, preserving the same outline and proportion, the more it approaches that which it was intended to reveal. We present an admirable passage from Lewis, bearing on this subject, which, though written in view of another part of Scripture, well applies to what is revealed of Creation:

"In reading and interpreting Holy Writ, we are not shut up to the precise measure of the conception as it may have darkly existed in the mind of the ancient writer or speaker, through whom any parts have been transmitted to us. To put ourselves just in their position, according to what some have styled the great law of Biblical hermeneutics, would be to forget that inspired revelation was actually in some high sense the product

of the Eternal Spirit, and that therefore its fulness of meaning cannot be wholly bounded by the inadequate conceptions of those who were used as the mediums of its utterance. Some check, of course, must be interposed to extravagant and false interpretation; and this is found in the safe principle, that the law above mentioned must be carefully applied, to limit and define the external and internal circumstances attending the origin of the thought, and the true conditions under which it was first given forth. These must certainly be regarded as indicative and regulative of its true nature, if not of its extent, and as presenting the true germ of subsequent development. But when this has been carefully determined, then we are to make a distinction — and a most important distinction it is — between the thought or idea, which may be expanded *ad infinitum*, and the inadequate conception, by which it may have been at first represented, or by which it may afterwards have been measured, according to the varying knowledge, or capacities, or circumstances of human readers. The former, in the largest extent to which it can be carried by finite faculties, and even far beyond them, may be regarded as the mind of the Spirit. This may be taken as the true word, in a sense as real and as much intended by the author of the inspired volume, as the more limited view of its meaning which may have attended its first utterance recorded in the Bible. We may even say, in a sense still more real and true, rising higher and higher (after having thus been grounded in a true hermeneutical foundation, as the security against cabalistical, mystical, or visionary interpretations), according to the reader's spiritual-mindedness, or his communion with that Spirit of Truth through whom all *γραφή θεόπνευστος* was given to mankind. In other words, we are bound to get at the sacred writer's true thought, as distinguished from every other, and as built upon the true historical or hermeneutical sense of the passage; but then we are not limited by his measurement of the thought, or to take his objective conception as the full interpretation of his own idea, so as to regard this conception, and nothing more, as being alone the *word*, or as all God intended to say to the Church through him."

CHAPTER IX.

THAT the Church had her records from the foundation of the world, is presupposed in Genesis. It is a truth patent on the very face of the Mosaic history, and it has decisive confirmation from other sources. The week of seven days is a time cycle which does not correspond with any cycle, or any part of a cycle in nature ; it is not based upon any natural phenomena ; yet it was a common mode of reckoning time among the most ancient nations of the East ; and if a sufficient antiquity and authority be assumed for the sacred record of creation, it accounts for this historical fact, which otherwise is without any imaginable cause. The sacred history of the deluge is reproduced so closely by Berosus, Manetho, and Abydenus, that, as there is no probability that they copied from Moses, it is evident there was a version of that judgment closely resembling his, which was known to them ; this idea receives some confirmation from other traditions of the flood. The most ancient cosmogonies, in some curious particulars, so resemble the Divine, as to prove its high antiquity. The aggregate evidence of all the facts bearing upon the subject, establishes the truth, that the sacred record of creation is older than Moses ; and there is no reason to doubt that it came across the flood. Moses authenticates it ; it is, therefore, properly associated with his name. But the Church existed before Moses, having then her records, as truly as now.

It is of some consequence to determine the style of this document. To some it reads as a poem ; to others, as a vision. Poetry it is not, neither is there a word or line in it from which it can be shown to have been a vision. Yet had it been a vision, beyond all doubt it would at once appear to be such.

As, like all Scripture, it describes natural events phenomenally, the language is of course somewhat the same as if it had been a vision; but the distinguishing marks of a vision are wanting, and the fact that there is no evidence for it, is proof against it. For convenience' sake we have used the term, and spoken of it as the Mosaic vision; but Moses was not the author of it, neither was it a vision. It was a direct communication from God to some more ancient man, perchance to Adam, or Seth, or Enoch, who walked with God, or to Noah, much below whose age it cannot have been annunciated, while every probability carries it back to the time when the Church first began to be.

It is not a record of the Hebraic Church, but of the Church primeval, a record coëval with her existence; and the influence of it has been, and is, felt in all the earth. On it was based the division of days into weeks, and on it the idea of the unity of God, which everywhere appears in the midst of, and contending against, the polytheism of the earliest nations. No ancient word of the Most High had more prevailing power in the earth than this revelation of one God creating all things. It is the origin of cosmological thought throughout the East. If, then, it was thought to teach a creation in a single week, undoubtedly some trace of this idea would appear in the world's memory, which, wherever in the ancient world there was a week of seven days, witnesses to some remembrance of this vision; and if no such trace appears, it proves no such idea was associated with it; and as none such appears also in the ancient Hebraic mind, then certainly no such idea ever should have been associated with it. It is evidently a recent error.

The idea that only through belief in a creation in six literal days could the seventh have been revered, will not bear examination. The idea revealed, that in six ages God made the world, and rested on the seventh, gives an equally sure basis for the Sabbath as the modern idea. If the Occidental mind had not been emerging from barbarism, if it had not been weakened and degraded by its antecedent heathenism to a degree far below that of the primeval nations of the earth, it

never could have taken up with an idea so puerile and absurd, but would have pronounced the days of God unlike in duration to the days of man, and have found in the idea of Divine working and repose, of six periods of labor and one of rest, as strong a reason as it seemed to find for its veneration for the Sabbath.

The modern idea of instantaneous creation is neither natural, rational, nor scriptural. It has no analogy. There is no trace of it in human thought. It is one of the marvels of human error that it should have gained even a hearing; and had the mind of the Occident been as philosophical, as metaphysical, as it is practical, it never would.

With this idea of instantaneous creation, the idea of the employment of natural agencies in creation was, of course, incompatible. Error led on to error, and so the words of God were taken as absolutely meaningless. Though the earth and the ocean are set forth as having some part in the production of life, the language was utterly disregarded. The annals of human thought furnish decisive proof of the inability of the human intellect to understand the word of God. They show that even the Divine Record would not meet the wants of man, were there not a divinely inspired Church, coëval with the Record, and illuminated by the same Spirit from which the Record came, to interpret it; for, as will hereafter appear, in this solitary instance there was a break in the transmission of thought, through the double line of an infallible oracle and an interpreting Church.

Human reason, enkindled and strengthened by the power of faith, proved competent partially to rectify both errors, and established the truths of a creation in indefinite time, and through natural processes. This must be regarded as the highest of its achievements, as something which it never equalled before, and never will surpass. But though in this a correct result was reached, yet the view of all the speculations which crowded in to fill the void left in thought by the misinterpretation of the sacred oracle, is humiliating. The physical

investigations of man, tracing out the record of the Divine plan in nature, and following its indications with docility, did effect something, because they had something to guide them ; but metaphysical speculations, busied about the primal mysteries of being, having no guide at all, wandered in wild and monstrous aberrations. The wildest legends of some of their heathen ancestry were solid sense and veritable history compared with the speculations of some of these more heathenish philosophers. Human thought, unguided by the Church aright, and venturing upon audacious hypotheses, produced such monstrous concoctions of blasphemy, arrogance, and imbecility, that the most startling proofs of the deep disease of the human intellect are to be found, not among the heathen, but in philosophical systems which have been propounded among the foremost nations of modern Europe, and which are all traceable to the defective and erroneous interpretation of the first of Genesis, though indulged in by those who rejoiced that they were delivered from the thralldom of Shemitic ideas.

The rediscovery of the two grand ideas revealed as to Creation, are no doubt destined to work great changes in thought. The tenor of the old error was at once towards Atheism and towards Pantheism. Once in the depths of eternity, it conceived of God as coming forth to create the universe ; a solitary act, with naught before it, and naught after, like unto it. Such an idea almost necessarily tended towards Atheism ; for it was an idea which could not attach itself to anything in the character of the Divine Being. It did not permit the mind to conceive of him as a Being who delights in his constructive energies. The mind, cut off from this truth, which is clearly revealed, found it difficult to believe that He should thus have come forth at all. Many denied there ever could have been any such fact, and somewhat logically, looking only at what was thus presented ; others, finding proof of some divine action, and unconsciously, perhaps, referring it to some necessity, went to the other extreme, and resolved everything into immediate divine action, thus confounding God with the universe. The

cause and the extent of this error appear from the fact, that it insidiously invaded the Church, showing its cause to have been some error as to its oracles. The safeguard against each is in the scriptural idea of a God who delights in Creation, as shown by repeated creative acts, and in repose, as shown by his ceasing to create. If it be said this makes God like man, we reply, Not at all. It makes man like God, which is a very different thing. God works, and it is impossible to resist the idea from the language of Scripture, that he takes pleasure in this working. Equally impossible is it to resist the idea that he takes pleasure in repose. No necessity constrains him; if it did, either he would never create, which is the root of Atheism; or would create forever, which is the root of Pantheism. In the Scripture is revealed a deity who creates, because it pleases him well; who ceases from creating, because that also pleases him. The idea of an apathetic Being, or of a Being constrained everlastingly to create, are alike fatal errors. The more simple idea is known to be ultimate and true, because it is the idea revealed. It runs through the kingdoms of nature and of grace.

The scientific ideas, as well as ecclesiastical, are destined to feel a great influence from the true interpretation of the record of Creation. Science, whose office it is to explore the world, has, in this record of the creation of the world, the rule by which to determine its lines of working, by which to test its results; a rule conforming to which its conclusions are known to be correct and ultimate. Science is not to confirm the record, but to be confirmed by it. It is no doubt true that a perfect natural science would go far to confirm it, though it would be the confirmation of the greater by the less, and therefore imperfect. But a perfect physical science there cannot be without a perfect metaphysical science; this cannot be without a perfect moral science; and this cannot be without a revelation from God. There is no science which is isolated; and on the perfection of all, the perfection of each depends. But, as yet, all are very much isolated; all, therefore, are ex-

ceedingly imperfect, and all are in open revolt against Revelation. It must be long before the harmonies of truth will silence the discords of error. Nor will this ever be until theology shall rule the sciences with absolute and undisputed sovereignty. She alone can pronounce the true answer to the most important questions of science. Thus, physical science cannot decide whether life be an entity in itself, or an effect of physical force. Metaphysical science cannot decide whether there be a spiritual principle in man, distinct in any essential characteristic from the life of the mute creation. Moral science can decide nothing until it be determined whether man be a spirit or not; until the immortality of the soul is established, there is no basis for morality, and, except from Revelation, there is no proof of immortality. There can, therefore, be no harmony of truth, no perfection of science, until Revelation shall rule the mind of the world. Therefore any idea of such confirmation of Revelation by science as it might be possible for it to give in its fulness, is a hope indefinite as to its time; and when that time shall arrive, its confirmation will cease to be of much importance, the causes of its perfection being in the antecedent submission of the human mind to Revelation. Those who look, then, for any very important aid from science in establishing the belief of the world in Revelation, are deceived. Natural science cannot prove the truth of a revelation whose chief office is to make known where the supernatural intervenes in the natural. Revelation is to sit in judgment on science, not science on Revelation. Science must come to Revelation for light on all those questions where it most concerns the soul to know what is the truth.

In endeavoring thus to show coincidence between Nature and Revelation, there is no reasonable expectation of making it so appear as to convince any, except those who are antecedently persuaded of it on other grounds. The infallibility of the Record has to be assumed in the process. It is much to be able to prove there is no direct collision between truth in Revelation and in Nature, on so broad a scale that the mind must give up

one or the other ; but this is very different from such a visible correspondence between the two as to compel the belief of the scientific world in Revelation ; and such a general correspondence as to be in a high degree authoritative, might not involve a correspondence as to each and every minor point, which implies an absolutely correct interpretation as to every particular, and an absolutely perfect science. Science will ever be more or less imperfect. Thus, take the question of the unity of the human race, there will always be evidence against it. It will never be established from the side of reason, any more than it will ever be overthrown. No doubt the evidence is decisively one way, but there is evidence to the contrary. And the accord of Revelation and Science, as to the unity of the human race, will only come by the submission of Reason to Revelation. The ground of this, it is easy to believe, is that this world is the place where man is to be trained up in Faith, not in knowledge. Hence, with all his subtlety, his patience, and vast acquisitions on all great points, man is shut up to Revelation, or left very free to err. Few errors lead to such demoralizing consequences as the error as to the unity of the race ; but the only absolute safeguard against it is the word from on high. More generally, it may be said, that science can never do more than to make it probable that at certain eras in the course of events God has intervened ; but these must be decisively determined by himself, or left in some degree undetermined forever. And no doubt, on many minor points, there will always be more or less of seeming conflict between truth in Science and truth in Revelation. Skepticism will always find something to say ; or if not, it will not be difficult for her to alter facts, so as to have them suit her own purposes, and to have her own version accepted by those, who “love darkness rather than light.” Error, too, will be propounded in good faith ; and seeming discoveries will from time to time confuse the real coincidence of truth with itself.¹ But such things need cause

¹ The following incident, as it illustrates several supposed discoveries of the same sort, ought to be widely known. At a meeting of the British Association,

no great alarm. They may be left with considerable confidence to the human mind itself, which, in matters so indifferent to its passions as natural science, will not long prefer error to truth; and with entire confidence they may be left to the providence of God. The great danger over, these minor things will not be for the destruction, but merely for the trial, of Faith.

From science, in this respect, the church has not much to fear, or much to expect. In other things she may receive much aid from her labors, but not in the confirmation of her records. The evidence for them is of a character above that to which science can contribute anything very decisive or important. And apart from this, the Scriptures address the universal mind, not the scientific. They are replete with recondite truth for the philosophic intellect; their self-authenticating power is as strong for the scientific as for the unscientific intellect, and perhaps more so; yet the reverence of the world-mind for Scripture, returning with its true interpretation, though perhaps not until some centuries have passed over, — for the work one century has wrought it may take more than one to undo, — will not be upheld by science so much as by general ideas common to all, and reached with little or no scientific aid. The Record of the Church follows too much the necessary lines of human

at Leeds, in 1858, Prof. Owen stated, that "some time ago he was sent for to the North to examine a fossilized tree, which had been found in digging the Jarrow dock, which bore undoubted evidence of having been cut by human hands. It was supposed to be a most important discovery, as showing the antiquity of the human race, and at first everything appeared satisfactory. On prosecuting his inquiries, however, he learned that one of the navvies, not then on the works, was said to have discovered a similar tree in another part of the dock, which he cut to lay down a sleeper. The man was sent for, and on his arrival he declared that the tree pointed out was the one he had cut. It was endeavored to be explained that it was impossible, as the place had not been excavated before; but, looking with supreme contempt upon the assembly of Geologists and Engineers, the man persisted in the identification of his own work, and exclaimed, 'The top of the tree must be somewhere;' upon which Prof. Owen offered half-a-crown to the first navvy who would produce it. Away ran half a dozen of them, and in a few minutes they returned with the top. This explained the mystery. The man had cut off the top with his spade, the stump afterward got covered up with soil, and on being again uncovered, it was supposed to be a great discovery. Never had he so narrow an escape from introducing a 'new discovery' into science, and never had he a more fortunate escape."

thought as to creation, either to be very much strengthened in their hold upon the mind by science, or to be much disturbed by aught in its testimony seemingly against it. The idea of order in creation cannot be shaken. Its roots are too deep in the soul ; it has had too healthy a growth ; and this idea of order will forever uphold the Mosaic succession of creative events, they being so coincident with what the soul pronounces the necessary order, that were science to bring forward any array of facts against them, reason would still conclude they must have been so ; not, it is true, because of the Mosaic Record, but because that reason is a law unto itself. Thus, whatever facts are brought to show that animals were before plants, or coincident with them, reason will pronounce that plants grew before animals were nourished by them ; so, too, whatever proof may be brought to show that man was created earlier than the animals, the evidence will be at once overruled by higher considerations.

That the idea of a primitive power at work in the very constitution of the world is a natural one, is attested by the belief of all antiquity, as well as confirmed by what science believes as to the unity of force. That the heavens were of old, before the rolling sea or solid land, is a natural idea.¹ The grosser elements of Land and Water seem born in order after its birth. Land and sea must have been at first azoic ; and that the principle of life should have put forth its unfolding energies in plants, fishes, reptiles, birds, animals, — that is, in the order in the record of creation seems so natural that the soul will never listen to any contradiction of it.

The natural world, made with man in view, is wonderfully conformed to the spiritual ; hence the true history of its creation is in wonderful accord with the feelings of the soul in view of the phenomena of the world ; and hence, no sooner does the soul seize upon the idea of natural agencies as revealed in the bringing forth of life in visible, material forms, than it finds that

¹ It is this feeling which gives such wonderful power and sublimity to old King Lear's apostrophe to the heavens — "*Ye, too, are old!*"

certain impressions made by the phenomena themselves accord with this truth.

The Earth herself, still growing the Plants, seems to hint that she may once have been empowered of God to originate more perfect recipients of the life-principle, endowed with motion and intelligence; and, though very remote from the ways of thought which have become common, the idea of the Earth as in some sense the mother of terrestrial life, is a very natural idea. Traces of it are found everywhere. The quickness with which animated earth resolves itself to earth again when life is gone, may suggest and uphold the conception; but it is too widely spread, and too peculiar, to be fairly accounted for other than as an idea which the soul was formed to entertain. The relation which is revealed between life and the elements, in like manner commends itself to the soul. It seems natural that the quick and restless element first swarmed with life as restless as itself, and that the quadrupeds were later-born and earth-born. There is revealed a closer affinity between the fishes and the birds, than between the latter and the animals; and the soul readily recognizes the kinship of the birds flying through the crystal air, with fishes darting through the crystal element, rather than with the slow-motioned beasts of the field.

Some interpreters, in simple confidingness of trust in the obvious meaning of the Record, teach that the birds were ocean-born, while a more timid style of interpretation tries to escape from what seems to it so strange an idea; but one who, journeying days and nights on the unsocial deep, long out of sight of land, has been startled by flocks of little birds coming through the mist and rain, feels that they belong to the element. The thought comes, too, when there is heard —

“ Along the solitary shore
Of craggy rock and sandy bay,
No sound but ocean’s roar,
Save where the wild, bold sea-bird makes her home —
Her shrill cry coming through the sparkling foam.”

And when the restless, moaning sea, the rising wind, the gathering clouds, the saddening day, the white waves forebode the storm, and the white sea-gulls are seen soaring amid the mist and cloud, — the birds, like the clouds, seem ocean-born.

It is hard to tell how fully the soul could respond to the Mosaic ideas of creation, because the wrong interpretation of them has so checked and fettered the free moving of thought among the wonders of nature. This checking and fettering of the soul is, perchance, the secret of the skepticism, which woos nature in her secret haunts, seeking the glory in which she was arrayed by the poetic fancy of the classic mind. It misses something which belongs to a true conception of nature. There are feelings of the soul in her presence, to which Revelation, as now interpreted, does not minister. Hence poetic thought so loves the fancies of old, so mourns for the Oread in the mountain, the Dryad in the grove, the Naiad in her crystal fountain, —

“The intelligible forms of ancient Poets,
The fair humanities of old Religion,
The Power, the Beauty, and the Majesty
That had her haunts in dale or piny mountain,
Or forest by slow stream or pebbly spring,
Or chasms and watery depths.”

The thoughts, impressions, facts, out of which came these old and beautiful fancies, still live to reason, though they have died to faith. There is, in this human thinking and feeling about nature, a want of harmony between the truth of reason and the truth of Revelation, owing to some ideas which have passed away from the latter; and hence there may well be some sympathy with these votaries of Nature, some reason for their love of ancient fables, for the coming back of the poetry of the old religion.

These unconquerable ideas, which never will depart, must be propitiated, must be baptized and have Christian names. The soul must be allowed its loving converse with living nature. It must no longer be driven into Pantheism to account for its life;

and the true interpretation of the Creative Vision does this. It justifies and makes intelligible the feelings of the soul in the presence of Nature, which authenticate so much of the Creative Vision, and authenticate it most fully when it is most boldly interpreted.

Some of the more important ideas by whose aid the Record of Creation has here been interpreted, may as well be set forth here as anywhere, though it is not necessary to name them all.

First. That whatever is revealed of Creation should be read as constituting part of the Record in Genesis, fixing the meaning of its terms, enlarging its facts, and elucidating it. Thus the meaning of *bara* is determined by the use of the word *καταπύζω* in Hebrews. Thus, from Corinthians, it appears that Light shone, not out of the waters, but out of darkness.

Second. The idea that the divine naming of a thing is the giving to it properties answering to the name in human thought. Thus the naming of the gathered waters, seas, is thought to decide that the creation of the element known as water, was in the third age of the world.

Third. The idea of indefinite times in creation, coming directly from the word Day, and also from facts bearing upon the duration intended by that term. These indefinite periods are thought to have been of vast duration, because thus they are in harmony with the grandeur of the works, with the natural agencies, and with the goings forth of the Word, revealed to have been from the Days of Eternity.

Fourth. The idea of natural agencies. Without this idea, although the times be thought indefinite and vast, the idea of instantaneousness in Creation remains, and the more incongruous with the time, the longer the time is supposed to be. The agency of the natural, of Nature, is required to fill up the times. It is thought the Deity had agents working under Him to create the world, even as man now works under Him to develop, improve, beautify, and perfect the world. This idea is not resorted to, to escape a difficulty, but comes from the Divine

language interpreted in the only way in which it can have any meaning at all.

Fifth. The idea of One Day of Creation, "the Day in which the Lord made the Heavens and the Earth." This Day, commencing before the other Days, could be numbered with them; and thus it could be said, "The Lord made the Heavens and the Earth in Six Days," and it could also be said He made them in one Day. This Day is studied through the power then called into being, named from its most outward and common manifestation, Light; and working through all creative time, diverse in its effects, but one in itself, constructing the inorganic world, but inseparable from the organic; — Light and Life being supposed to be the two great agencies which form the world.

Sixth. The idea of a continuous, progressive, ascending series of related events from the beginning, until creation is complete.

Seventh. All these ideas come directly from the Record itself, either from the terms used in it, or from the narration.

Eighth. The Record is read by the light of Science. Thus, the time appearing from the Record to be indefinite, it is made more vast from scientific considerations than otherwise it might have seemed. Questions which the Record suggests and answers generally, are thus answered more specifically. Thus, when a Day interposed between the Life of Plants and of Animals, it is inquired if any possible or probable reason for this can be assigned. Thus, when the Record is thought to recognize one force only in the inorganic world, it is inquired if science can elucidate or confirm this idea. Thus, too, its description of the Fifth Day is elucidated from science. This use of scientific data has been repeatedly resorted to, but in no case is the interpretation made to depend upon it. All the ideas are thought to be in the record itself.

CHAPTER X.

As the Record of Creation has here been interpreted, there is one philosophical argument against it, which will at once suggest itself to some. It is the omission of the idea meant to be expressed by the famous philosophical word, *the world was created out of nothing*; an idea by them considered the most important of all cosmological ideas. They think the Divine Record must have enunciated the creation of that preëxisting substance, on which, at the beginning, as the Record is here interpreted, the Creator is revealed as putting forth his omnific energies. The importance of the subject is such, that a chapter must be given to it, before the train of thought from which we diverged in the third chapter is resumed.

It seems to be a sufficient answer to the objection to what has been thought to be the true interpretation of the first verse of Genesis, that the Record of Creation was given chiefly for moral ends — was designed for the general mind; that its lesson of the Divine Omnipotence is impressively taught by it; that the soul, in view of the great creations it sets forth, feels that He, who made them, could make, and did make, all that was made; still, it may be said, the missing idea would have made the Record more complete, and have given satisfaction to philosophic minds.

But the Scripture seems to have an opinion of the value of this truth, different from that of philosophy. Its great appeal to man, through natural objects, calling on him to worship God, is through the Creation as described by Moses. It nowhere holds up the philosophical idea of the creation of first force, or primal matter, as the wonder of wonders in the natural world. This is not because the idea is so difficult to be understood,

which is something very different from picturing it to the sense. That may be impossible ; but all there is in it which it concerns man to know, is readily and firmly grasped by the mind. Had then this truth been so very important, it would seem that a more prominent place would have been given to it in Scripture. It is involved in ascriptions of omnipotence to God, but it hardly has a distinctive place in the Bible, while Creation has a very prominent place. The reason may be in the facts.

The primordial act contains not the mystery of creation. It contains hardly any more of mystery, if any more at all, than there is in everything ; for everywhere there is that which reminds of the much that might be known, yet is beyond the possibilities of knowledge. This is said, because it seems paralleled in what man does so constantly and so readily, that he does not stop to think about it. He is constantly creating force. It is a product of his own spirit. As it is conveyed along the medium of the nerves, if it impinges against a body, it becomes incorporate in it ; it dwells in it, cut off from, and independent of the soul from which it went forth. Viewed with reference to the spirit which originated it, it is a separate entity, a self-existent force. Though this, like everything else, is a mystery, it is one of the simplest, commonest things that spirit effects. It seems to be done instantaneously ; to be done perfectly ; and, on the idea of the indestructibility of force, being once done, it may be said to be done forever. Nor is it done by man only. It is done by all the mute creation. It is done wherever there is life. Every plant that grows puts in motion tides of force, that roll on everlastingly.

Humbly, reverently, mindful of the vast remove of Deity from man, it may be said this act of man seems like the primordial act. But not this, and not like unto this, was creation in the scriptural sense ; though this seems like unto that, if not asserting which, it would seem to many the highest glory would be wanting to the Record of Creation.

As one consequence of the interpretation which made Creation instantaneous, whether those who were thus influenced by

it were aware of it or not, philosophical thought set itself to explore, not creation in the scriptural sense, but the primordial act, as if this was the mystery of mysteries, and key to all wisdom. As man has no creative power, the attempt to pierce into that high, inscrutable, eternal mystery of God, the mystery of creation, must fail. But the Church having conceived of Creation as a simple, instantaneous fiat of Deity, the philosophic mind, misled by its guide the ecclesiastical mind, presumed the mystery of creation lay in the simple, instantaneous creation of force; it supposed it could grasp the idea, which seemed somewhat cognizable by the human mind, recognizing, whether consciously or not, something so like its own acts; and so it set itself to trace all actual results out of that which seemed to it to contain everything. The boldness with which the philosophers who attempted this problem enunciated their ideas in the face of a world not devoid of common sense, might be admired, had it not been accompanied with a spirit of gnosticism, that rioted in blasphemy, and a pride which bordered on the exaltation of lunacy. Yet their errors may excite commiseration; for, wild as they were, they came directly from a single error of the Church, on a single point, and their aberrations but show, as the most valuable lesson of their laboriously learned philosophizing, the potency of ecclesiastical thought over the mind, even when it seems to itself free from its power. These philosophical attempts resulted in the famous postulate, that nothing is everything, and everything nothing. And it can now be seen how this was arrived at. This strange conclusion of these philosophers is very nearly coincident with the fact as seen from their point of view, and in the exclusion of scriptural light from the subject. For they sought to find everything in an act which reached a result only infinitesimally above nothing, which is not the world-germ, which has not the least tendency toward a world, which is not in the least prophetic of the world; so it is not so strange as at first it seems, that these blind Titans of intellectual chaos, groping in outer

darkness, should have named it nothing, and, knowing of nothing else, should have come to conceive of it as everything.

In view of these aberrations of the philosophical intellect, it may seem wise that the Record assumes the truth which has led to such error; and the reason may have been that in whatever terms set forth, man would confound it with a higher reality. The idea itself is one which requires not the confirmation of Revelation. For the idea of force as originated by spirit, and becoming an existing entity, lies near to man. It is not a solitary act of his spirit. It rather seems to be an unintermitted effect. The motive power in man, in its ultimate analysis, is the spirit. This is the wheel within the wheel, the mainspring, the prime motor, and seems never to cease from the effluence of force. This seems to be the status, or law, or condition of spirit, and inseparable from it, so far as its status comes under human observation.

Of force in its simplest or lowest form, as an entity separate from the originating spirit, so as to be an existing entity, the mind has no difficulty of conceiving; it believes in it as readily and as firmly as in anything, though of course it is to be said of this, as of everything, there is that in it which it does not comprehend.

But it does not believe in this as something which comes out of nothing. As an accepted expression for the idea that the world is not eternal, this phrase, though liable to great perversion, and closely related to false ideas of the creation of the world, may be used; and indeed it cannot well be avoided, in the present state of language, without needless prolixity, or the coinage of some new term or phrase; but strictly construed, it is absurd, for that out of nothing nothing comes, is the dictate of reason; and hence the absence of this phrase from the sacred Record, need provoke no wonder and no regret.

Neither should the absence of the idea of the origination of the first force, or primordial matter, be thought to detract from the glory of the Record of Creation. Not only is there not in it those mysterious potentialities or possibilities which have mis-

led some into thinking that with this idea the farther power of God in the great and manifold mystery of Creation, his highest work in the natural world might be dispensed with; but it is by no means to be thought of as having the least indirect, or even slightest possible tendency toward a world. To call this creation, is to take a stand in the outer darkness. It is not creation, nor any part of creation; and this is the reason why it forms no part of the Divine Record of Creation.

Contrasting it with this idea of Creation, read in the Scripture what Creation is. Study it, meditate upon it, till it opens on the soul in its complexity, its duration, its manifold order, in all its wonder as a great work of God, and you may then appreciate the wisdom of the Scriptures in making so naught of the one, and everything of the other. And you will see that the impression of the soul was wise and just when it felt that the Being who could do this, could do anything; that He who did this, did everything. Think of the work of the Spirit; of the going forth of the Eternal Word, not once, but many times; the mighty agencies; the interminable ages; all this was the creation of the World. And as thus created, the World, in all its manifold beauty and glory, is a great epistle of God to man. "The invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his Eternal Power and Godhead."

Of these things the Scriptures speak. In this Creation the Eternal Wisdom exults. "From eternity was I anointed, away before the beginning, the beginning of the oldest parts of the earth. When there was no chaos was I born, before there were any deeps swelling with waters; before the mountains, before the hills was I born. When he had not made the earth, or the parts beyond, or the beginnings of the dust of the world. When he prepared the heavens I was there; when he established the skies above, when he made strong the foundations of the deep, when he made a law for the sea, even when he ordained the supports of the earth. I was ever with Him, as the world-builder. Day on day was I his delight, rejoicing

ever before him. Glad was I in the orb of his earth. My great joy was with the sons of Adam.”¹

The whole scriptural idea of Creation is different from the conception of it as the result of an instantaneous fiat of the Almighty, and far removed, and infinitely above all those speculations concerning creation, confounding it with the primordial act, to which the Western mind has come, departing from the interpretation of the East, and the thought of the primeval world.

¹ Proverbs viii. 22—31.

CHAPTER XI.

BEFORE commencing in the third chapter to treat of coincidences between the Record and Science, it was made to appear that the two leading objections of Science to the Record, namely, that its teachings were opposed to the scientific ideas of vast times, and also of the Natural in Creation, were disposed of by the interpretation propounded in "The Six Days of Creation." But opposed to this there is one consideration, which must have been suggested to every mind that followed that discussion, and which, if unanswerable, prevails against that interpretation with decisive force.

It seems to be new truth, truth never found in the Record before. If so, its seeming discovery there but deludes. New truth may shine out of the Record, but still it must ever be born from the old truth — must be the widening and deepening of itself; it must be the increasing, the brightening more and more of the same light. But this, it is alleged, is contradictory to the old interpretation, to all old interpretation; and, if it be so, this is fatal to its truth. Let the thought be conceived of in all its power, let the mind be fully opened to its force. It is a decisive thought. However satisfactory in every other point of view, however glorious in its results, though it could save the World, the discovery is a miserable cheat, a delusion, a mockery, if this can be alleged against it, that it is an absolutely new interpretation, is Truth unheard of in the Church, is Truth never discovered in the sacred oracles before. The rule which leads to this conclusion, as a general rule, is most stringent, and this is not a case where shelter from its consequences can be had in the exceptions to it.

The conception of creation is something of too much impor-

tance to rank with casual errors as to words and phrases. And such a line of thought would be powerless to meet the state of the World-mind.

But let us, between the discovery and its proof in an old interpretation, avail ourselves of the recurrence here of that idea of the present relations of the Church and the World, which has before met us, to think farther of the change which has taken place in the position of the Church. We need hardly take into account the schools of infidelity, regarding them as insignificant in respectability and mental power, as warnings rather than seductions to the World. But it appears that the intellect of the World, which looks with dislike on the noisy, malignant, infidel brood, and in its heart holds in high contempt the Positive Philosophy, the Absolute Religion, the Ideal Christianity, not because it does see these vaunting nothings, but because it sees through them, has become affected differently towards Christianity from what it ever was before. It is true enough that all the infidel schools do succeed in making sure the destruction of some; but it would seem, for the most part, of those who are destroyed already. It would seem that intellectual and moral degradation must have gone far in the soul before it could find aught in such things on which it could fasten. The mind of the World is above any general influence from such schools. It casts a listless eye over their low, irrational, destructive propensities, too deeply moved by its own great thoughts to care much about them; but it is strangely affected by its own consciousness, that it is withdrawing from the spiritual power, without which it cannot live.

Its state is comprehensible through a somewhat analogous state in Greece, and later in Rome, when the classic mind was compelled by natural science to give up its oracles and its shrines. There was then a possibility that there might be spiritual divine truth somewhere in the earth; there was also a possibility that from among the fresh, vigorous, uncultivated races of the world, higher forms of life might arise; and on this last idea

the thought of the World has somewhat dwelt. Musing in the Old World, it might turn with some hope to the New; in the New, to the very oldest of the Old. But we, too, are old in race and civilization. It is one and the same world in Melbourne, San Francisco, or Milan. The great centres of civilization — Paris, New York, and Vienna — are alike. There is nothing in the idea, then, of any hope thus arising. Mexico is farther gone in decay than the old states of Christendom; and this Republic, shaken with dissensions and enervated with luxury, no longer charms the imagination of the World. As the eye turns to the more ancient civilizations, or the uncultivated races, they appear too effete, or too weak, for the imagination to conceive of any future resurrection of civilization in them. Dismissing, then, this faint possibility, the World feels that if it abandon Christianity, there is no resurrection for Civilization. If Christ be laid again in the sepulchre, no angels will again roll the stone away. It sees it is not possible that any other spiritual truth will ever again enshrine itself in the mind of the World. It is a dreary idea, this of a World without temples, and consecrated ground for the dead to repose in; without hallowed memories, without unerring teachings, or the promise of a brighter day. A thought of dread is this, of “a fatherless and forsaken world!” The fine talk about Natural Religion teaching the people in museums, out of dead carcasses from perished worlds, grand ideas of Truth and God, it hears without the least emotion. Let children have their playthings. If Christ be dead, and the Church cease to exist, it is wholly indifferent to what is taught, or what believed. There is a spirit in man, and humanity, with all its sickness unto death, has such deep thoughts and grand emotions, that — let us not be misunderstood — it seems to us sometimes no wonder that Satan should be earnest to destroy, and God to save it. The instinctive wisdom of the World foresees that if it gives up Christianity, there is nothing before it now but atheism; and atheism means barbarism, or rather, it means something worse than aught ever seen in barbarism — something of which

there is some faint intimation in the filth and hunger of fierce despairing wretches in great cities.

Few of the clergy seem to be aware of the thoroughness and extent of the revolt of the thinking mind of the World against the Church; and some explanation of this in this region may be found in its ecclesiastical history. There has been here a decadence of a part of the Church, a sinking into low views of the Truth, and a giving up of it here and there, a revolt which has gone to the extreme, and so, perhaps, may be returning in its cycle; and with all this, a surviving, less or more, of spiritual Life, suggesting the idea that there may be declensions not fatal, and far-wanderings without being utterly lost. And there connects with these facts the thought of the more important defection of a part of the Germanic nation, and, in the last century, of the French. But these cases, and all such cases, stand thus distinguished from the present. Their causes were local and transitory; and there was still around each, and intermingled with each of these dying parts of Christendom, a living Christendom, whose life could prevail over the local chill of death. But the cause and the effect now are universal; they are no longer felt in a part, or in parts only, but in the all.

Nor is there anything in the surprise the Copernican discoveries occasioned, with which to compare this. It was then seen directly that the Scripture described natural events in common language; and that it was no more to be convicted of error for saying that the sun stood still, than men were to be for continuing, as before, to say the sun rises. Copernicus himself went on with his discoveries without opposition, and the attempt to turn them against the Church was futile. The conception of the boundlessness of the material universe, as made known by Astronomy, it is true, did greatly affect the mind of the World, and prepared for the immediate and powerful effect of discoveries in another quarter. Beyond this, though this was and is most important, the Copernican astron-

omy had no influence in shaking the faith of the World in the Church.

That there is no error in deeming the present crisis has been underrated by the clergy, appears from the course they have pursued in this debate. At first, no doubt, they manifested a feeling of hostility to geologists. Then wiser and better feelings prevailed. The evidence of certain geological ideas was recognized, and then followed a gliding over difficulties, a resort to plausibilities, possibilities, and a general rejoicing over the harmony of Geology and Scripture. All this, no doubt, was very honestly meant; but they were easily persuaded of what they wished to believe, and they laid the case before those anxious to be, and anxious to seem to be, persuaded.

But there is a pervading and controlling logic in the mind of an opposing World, not easily satisfied, far less deluded. The battle of the Church with the World is not merely "against flesh and blood, but against principalities and against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places." A style of reasoning and thinking which is inconclusive, will be felt to be so. The effect of the argument which was deemed so satisfactory by some in the Church, never went beyond what was stated, that the Record had the benefit of a doubt.

The Book, no doubt, can be proved to be divine, and this proves the Record divine, because a part of it. But, in this contest, an authoritative, ever-existing Church, coëval in its life with the very generation which first heard, and must have truly conceived of this Record, cannot thus persuade the World to revere the Record. It cannot even hold its true position before the World while making this its chief and really its only argument. It is a virtual giving up of its own claim, and must of necessity be followed by a weakening of the rule of reasoning which had been so greatly in its favor. The World will judge the Book by the Record. It feels it has a right so to do; and if it has any right to judge the Book at all, there is some ground for the feeling. The Church must

defend the Record in the main certainly, and in the present state of things, by a defence of the Record itself, or give up its hold on the World-mind; and though it cannot itself be lost, its victory over the World must be lost, and the World must perish.

It never has defended it directly. There has not been a single argument, which had its starting-point from within his words themselves, going to prove that Moses thought a day was more than twenty-four hours long. The figurative evasion of the difficulty was only a possibility. The mode of arguing that went to show a peculiar use of the word Day, did not first ground itself in the elementary thoughts that entered into the term. *This was its fatal defect; and it is precisely this, which it lacked, that Lewis has supplied.* This mode of arguing would not have been resorted to, in a similar case, in any other document. It would unsettle all language. It might be applied to remove some minor difficulties, as to technical terms in art or natural history; but the application of it here was on too grand a scale. And the World saw and felt this. It did well enough with minds disposed to belief, or to reverence; others disposed of it by saying, as to the mention of Days before a sun, it was simply the oversight of the maker of the cosmogony; that, like all the rest of the old cosmogonies, it is somewhat inconsistent; and this was just such an error as a man would fall into, who was writing about something as to which he knew nothing, and about which he had only a few confused ideas.

The coincidences between the discoveries of science and the Mosaic facts, were overrated in their power over the World-mind. For, whether the answer reached the class that took a great and proper pleasure in setting them forth, or not, it was instantly suggested to the World-mind that, as Longinus said, Moses was no common man; that the idea of order was no difficult one; that plants might well be thought to come before animals; and so there was a ready solution of such ideas, and this fairly enough in consistency with their previous idea. For it might be said that the Mosaic

cosmogony was much the best of the old cosmogonies ; and yet, like them all, was open to unanswerable objections.

It is very evident, too, that the solutions propounded did not take into account the altered state of the World-mind. Those who propounded them did not realize how, in that mind, the rule of reasoning, as to the truths of the Church, had been altered in the course of the assault made by Science. They were such as could have been proposed only by those ready to believe on any evidence, and to a class anxious to believe. One, which had great favor, was, that between the first and second series of the Record there might be a chasm of any conceivable width ; and after that, in six days the world was fitted up for man. Arbitrary as it was, in such a homogeneous historical Record, with so direct and connected an aim, and with nothing on the face of the narrative to suggest or uphold it, thus to make such a break in it, and to divide into two such parts, it seemed to satisfy for a time the class by whom and for whom it was propounded. It was afterwards amended, by suggesting similar breaks after each day ; but in either form it was regarded by the world as delusive. Another theory will well illustrate the extent to which this easy state of mind released itself from philology and common sense. It is a theory which Professor Barrows has spoken of as "a view ably advocated by the learned and pious author, in a spirit of candor that deserves all praise ;" and such language is very convincing evidence of the state of feeling we are endeavoring to set forth. The theory was, that God created a satrapy for Adam to dwell in, somewhere between the Caspian Lake and the Persian Gulf ; and this He called the Creation of the Heavens and the Earth. Is it strange that the revolt of the human mind against the claims of the Church should be spread wide, and the feeling grow, when such an attempt to reduce it to order can be spoken of in such a way ? The theory is almost an insult to Revelation. It may be tolerated as the eccentricity of an over-learned brain, but in any other point of view it is an affront to common sense.

We have, perhaps, gone far enough to show there really was no interpretation at all of the Record on those points as to which the great debate arose. The latest theory which has been set forth, and which has been commented upon in these pages, may be taken as fixing the fact, that here at least in New England, in the middle of this nineteenth century, the Church does not know the meaning of the first chapter in her Records, as to those points concerning which the mind of man is inquiring with a world-wide interest. The pious and learned author of it gives up every attempt to explain it, heretofore made; and, proceeding on the despairing supposition that it is impossible to explain it philologically, forces directly into it the meaning wished for, asserting that it was never known to have that meaning before, and never could have been known to have it now, but for Geology. *This is no less than a concession that all is lost.*

It is plain that, from the first, the danger has been underrated. Nor does it seem to have been clearly perceived that, apart from the peculiarities of this assault, in and of itself, there was especial danger growing out of the connection in various ways, certainly in time at least, between it and a peculiar state of almost all the sciences, which here can only be hinted at. Natural science, with its *a priori* ideas modified, corrected, changed, abandoned, or established by inductive verification, had exerted an influence felt in all the departments of thought. The success which had at last attended this course in its legitimate domain, led to the attempt to make use of it in others; and the effect was to bring about in several sciences the state of things that existed in natural science before the time of Bacon. Mental-Philosophy, in a large view of it, became all theories with the smallest modicum of proof, and several mimicries of it, with no proof at all, obtained a hearing. In Philosophy it was still worse. It was all cloud-castles and dreams, as bewildering as those of the Hasheesh. Law, by its history, and the immense results of changes made in it, naturally conservative, became a field for dreamers to

exercise their wits in ; and ideas, opposed to all usage and all experience, upheld by a few ill-considered facts, hastily changed the wisdom of ages. But in History, most of all, this was felt. With a few honorable exceptions, in which this country shared, of men who adhered to the old method, History put on a new aspect altogether. Historians wrote out what should be History, according to their preconceived ideas ; that is, they unmade History, such as God and man had made it, and made it over again, to suit their individual fancies. It had taken Natural Science some thousands of years of constant trying, before she could handle her own mode in a proper way. And it is no wonder its sudden introduction everywhere, and into every thing, whether suited to it or not, and without checks, or correctives, such as nature itself gives it in its most appropriate domain, made wild work with truth and fact.

Imagine what work the spirits of such an age, in wild revolt not only against the Church, but against so many ancient modes and laws of thought, would make within the lines of the sacred Record, if they could once fairly break in, feeling they had a right to set aside the claim of its divine origin, and treat its parts as the fallible works of erring man, — an idea necessarily false to any appreciation of the divine unity and glory in the Record. They seem to themselves to have broken in ; and, in language already quoted, there is not a chapter in the Book across which they have not drawn the mark of erasure.

It must be admitted the geological assault was as fair, as legitimate, as any could be. It was not on any doctrine ; it was as to facts ; it was as to a record complete in itself, purely supernatural in its claim, and yet natural in some of its truths. It was the opening chapter of the whole Revelation, and it was on the Creation of the World. It was where the question could be raised with least presumption ; for it is not to be denied by a sane mind, that science had found out some truths about creation, in the latest significance of that term. Geology could allege—what scarcely any other science could, in any case

whatever, even in seeming controversy with the Church—that she had proof of her assertion.

All that was adduced by the Church in answer, really amounted to little, so far as this controversy went. The first attack science made seemed formidable; the second, decisive. Not a theory or suggestion was made to meet her last statement, that the scientific conception of Creation differed wholly from the Mosaic. The difficulty being met by an absolute silence, was in fact conceded to be insuperable, and so the world understands it.

But it may be said, this is not so, if in any way the days are made out to be indefinite times: however strained the argument, if this is conceded, this in and of itself comes to the same conception of Creation with the scientific. Not at all. The old idea of six flats instantaneously obeyed and distributed through six days, remains unaltered, excepting that the periods for six days are supposed to be extended, if you will, each to six, sixty, or six hundred thousand years. It is very hard to conceive of a Divine work at all, save as an instantaneous work. This was the old idea of God's work in creation. It is only when media are interposed, that the conception of vast times is accordant with our ideas of Divine working. Media mysteriously impressed by his will, and acting in obedience to the Laws of His Thought, these might fill up almost interminable periods with processions of phenomena. *But where are the media, on any theory before accepted, or even propounded?*

At this point it would seem that the idea must force itself irresistibly upon minds, which know the record is true and cannot prove it, that the true interpretation is lost: not as the last theory, which gives up everything, has it, that there never was any. Had the clergy realized their own position, it would seem as if they must have made this admission long ago. But they are not in direct connection with the world. Thoughts come to them through an intermediate class, and come veiled. They do not, and cannot, meet face to face the unbelief of the World. They walk, unconscious of its presence, in an atmos-

phere of unbelief. It is fair to assume that part of them feel that the whole controversy on Geology is satisfactorily settled; and would be surprised at the assertion, that the first difficulty which Geology raised has never been met, and that no one has attempted to meet the second. But should these truths come home to them, that in their libraries there is scarcely a line which even attempts to dispose of the last objection of Geology, more fatal than the first, as having the real power of both; and that outside of men predisposed by reverence to judge the question favorably on other grounds, there is scarcely a thinking man in this age who does not see that the scientific idea of Creation is right; and is fatal to the Mosaic Record, on any theory now known, and, if so, fatal to all Scripture; then, with this perception of this intellectual opinion, not of infidels known as such, not of sects, who have given up the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures, but of the intellect of the world, standing as a judge of the debate between Science and the Church, they would begin to realize that it could not be long before the Church would be left with few adherents in that great class which have so long crowded the outer courts of her temple.

Were the objection disposed of, were Science and the Record at last to agree, the injury done would not easily be repaired. But if the objection cannot be met, the victory of the Church over the World is hopeless; and how can it be otherwise? If her Record is wrong, she ought not to conquer with it. If it is right, and she cannot interpret it, is it reasonable to suppose, so long as this is the case, that she can win the victory over the World?

The lesson to the Church is terrible, but necessary. She is at this hour seduced in many ways into giving up the infallibility of her Records. Look into the choice books in Theological Libraries; you will find, edited at great expense of labor and learning, — and we would find no fault with this, — Neander's Ecclesiastical History and Coleridge's Works, the one treating the sacred Record as fallible history, the other, with

all his eloquence, putting in a moving plea for the Church to treat it likewise; and when thus two voices from out the heart of two nations of Christendom come so accredited to a third, a lesson on the inspiration of the Scriptures may be timely. The lesson taught by her inability to interpret one single chapter, or, more exactly, that one chapter on some points, is in the fact, that thus Theology, the Queen of all thought, seems in the imagination of the world,

“Crownless, in her voiceless woe —
An empty urn within her withered hands.”

And yet Theology is asked still to surrender chapter and book of the Bible, at the fancy of anybody or everybody, till nothing will be left to be surrendered. Surely, if any of the more important parts of the whole Record seemed of small moment in this last age, however it may have seemed in the early heathen ages, it was the first chapter of Genesis; yet what a state of things has arisen from the inability to treat of it aright!

And the lesson will be complete when it is seen that the difficulty passes away, not by leaving out the frontispiece of the volume of God; not by evasion, or subterfuges; but by giving to every word its highest, and also its plainest force. This, as has been shown, meets the difficulty.

And let us end these discursive remarks on the state of the controversy, with saying, that if these things be so, it would seem that this volume on “The Six Days of Creation,” which, in the spirit of profoundest reverence for the Scriptures, and resting on their words alone, propounds a solution of the difficulty altogether new, should have met a very different reception from that which it has met with.

We have considered its exposition. It answers Science, if it has not to meet the absolutely fatal objection, that it is a new interpretation. And this brings up the thought before alluded to, that the interpretation has been lost. But how could this be? Could such a thing have taken place?

CHAPTER XII.

ONLY when the interpretation, which discovers in the sacred oracles the thoughts which bring their revelations into harmony with the truths of science, falls back for confirmation upon the re-discovery of some old, universal, authoritative interpretation, like unto itself; only when thus it is carried back to the race, to the ages, finally to the man by whom this revealing word was authenticated, can it be accepted as true. Is there any hope that this may be? Or who is there to read backward the thought of the ages to the uttering of this word on Time and the World, and wise enough, in researches such as these, for us to deem his opinion antecedently and presumptively conclusive?

Here let us consider, at some length, if there can be any hope of any such re-discovery of lost truth. Certainly no such idea could be indulged at all as to most of that which constitutes the volume of Revelation. The idea would unsettle all theological science. The idea of a Church could not coëxist with such a thought. But there is on the face of the matter something which suggests that there may be an exceptional possibility here. The record is one of its own kind, and there is naught like to it in the volume. Nor, as in so many other cases, did the moral exigencies of the Church ever require any careful reproducing, with the utmost precision of re-statement, of all that herein was revealed. Nor did it so connect itself with any other system of truths or thoughts, as to share in its light, and from it to have its own reilluminated, if it became obscured.

All will grant, that in the interpretation of a record running through a period far longer than that of existing civilization,

and made up of elements so diverse, there might be a greater failure to keep the fulness of the interpreting thought in some parts than in others. It would be far more difficult to hold on to the full thought of the second century as to the mysterious apocalyptic vision, than as to the history of John ; it would be more difficult to keep unimpaired and complete the idea of the Book of Ecclesiastes, held by still more ancient ages, than of the Book of the Kings ; more difficult to hold on to the true idea of some brief psalm, than to the interpretation of the tables of stone. Now, by every consideration, this thought culminates in the Creative Vision. By its age, mysterious and unknown ; — for its tones may reach to us from across the flood, may come from those days when Enoch walked with God, and certainly have come from those days when the lightnings of Sinai enlightened the world ; — by its theme, out of human history, and pertaining even to the time when sun-ordered Days were not ; by its great works of God, alone in the solitude of a mindless world, a house for which the tenant was unborn ; by the solitariness of its truths, with nothing in the world to attach themselves to ; by the brightness of its truths, so bright that the page seemed all luminous, and the eye no more thought of any darkness there, than does the common eye of vast tracts without lustre on the face of the blazing orb of day ; — by all these considerations, this is the chapter of Revelation, if any such there be, as to which it might be true, that the volume of truth flowing from it might pour on forever a stream mighty, and deep, and satisfying ; yet have lost, without its being perceived by the admiring and wondering eye, something of the primeval volume and breadth with which it flowed from its far remote, unvisited fountain.

And this thought may connect itself with the idea of the vicissitudes through which the Church has passed since this Record was made known to her. We are not about to open such a line of thought as this, — that in its transmission from Enoch to Moses, something of the fulness of its exact meaning may have been lost ; nor that the keys which unlocked its

complications, and opened the storehouses of its thought, if committed to a line of wise men, may have been lost amid the wars and calamities of distracted Israel. For, with all its peculiarities, we do not think that this Scripture ever was of any private interpretation. We think the broad truths, which we claim are visible in it, were visible to the Eastern mind to which it was given ; and that if they have become obscured in the Western mind, the cause will probably refer itself to the differences between the thought of the Orient and the Occident on so many subjects, and especially on Time and the World.

Starting from the age of Moses, as a period when the full and true meaning of this ancient Record must have been known, — as a period, too, in which its ideas of Time and the World conformed to the ideas of the Church, as produced by itself through an influence beginning farther back ; or as a period in which it first conformed the thoughts of the Church unto itself, — it is seen there were great changes afterward in the history of the Church, and breaks tending to interrupt the continuity of her transmission of thought. There was the great change when the Hebraic State itself was uprooted from where it had grown to a stately nation, and transplanted from the heights of Jerusalem to the plains of the Euphrates. It returns with its old language lost. Here was a break which might well have broken the thread of the interpretation. But it did not break it. There was an accord in the thought of the Chaldean and the Hebrew mind. They were of the same stock. The Chaldean mind was as directly in the track of the transmission of inspired primeval ideas as the Hebrew. And there is no reason to doubt, none to deny, that some ideas, once common to both, but perhaps waning among the latter during their wars and commotions, may have received new vitality in the exile. They received as well as imparted, gained as well as lost. But as to Hebraic ideas of Time and the World, there was no change. The Time-thought and the World-ideas of the Orient, point to one common origin, and that origin this very Record ; and at that time there was no break or change.

But that which it seemed at first view might then have happened, did happen at a subsequent era, when events took on a larger proportion, when there was a far greater change, when there was a wider separation in space, a longer interposing duration between different states of the same ever-existing Church.

It pleased God that the Church, which from the beginning had dwelt with the sons of Shem, should take up its abode with the sons of Japhet; that it should pass over from Asia to Europe; and all its thoughts, which were born in the East, should learn to breathe the new and difficult air of the West. Not wholly forsaking the East, it was there to pass into decadence, to be given into the hands of the false prophet; while in the West it was to be the central power of a new civilization, which was to be dominant over the globe.

The preparation made for the passing of its whole volume of Truth, with all its Records, and the idéas which must pass with them as their interpretation, was on a vast scale. By this one idea might be unfolded a volume of ancient history. Events assume the unity of a grand drama when God, solitary and alone in councils into which no human mind could then pierce, began to order the course of human events for this purpose. For this purpose was the genius of Homer and the sword of Alexander. With the march of armies, and great world battles, the founding of Alexandria, and drunken revelry in Assyrian halls, fully opens the Hellenizing of the East. We might trace it from stage to stage, but here need only hint at facts that call up vividly how far it went on. On the mountain of Moriah stood once the statue of Olympian Jove. The war of the Maccabees alone saved the nationality of the Hebrew mind from a Hellenistic mania, which spared not the priests who ministered at the altar. The language of Greece became a spoken language through Syria, Palestine, Egypt; and familiar to the people of Jerusalem as their own.¹

¹ See Diodati's *De Christo Græce Loquente*, published at Naples, A. D. 1767. This very scarce book was reprinted in London in 1842.

But the end of this was not to be that the Hebraic mind should be Hellenized, but that the Hebrew mind should pass into the Hellenic mind with its whole volume of records; with all its truths, and all its history, and all its life. For this end a language was born, Greek in outline, Hebraic in its spirit and truths,—a language fitted to embody and transmit the very soul of Hebraic thought. It was fixed and determined to this end by the transferring of the whole volume of the sacred Hebraic Records into a dialect of the Greek, a dialect Eastern and Hebraic, for no other could have contained them. A world of thoughts, feelings, and truths, unknown to the masters of the Greek tongue, could not be contained and expressed in their language in its simpler and lower form. The most versatile, the most flexible, the most capacious of languages, could only by this process become a language which in outward form could embody the soul of all thought. The Hebraic truth, and the true Hebraic life, thus passed into a new language, on which it descended as the Holy Ghost descends on the soul of man. The Hebraic ideas in this quickened, spiritual, eternal Greek, the Greek of the Septuagint, and the Greek of the Apostles, is as the spirit to the life in man. The Greek mind, into which the Hebraic mind thus found a way to enter, was the soul of that civilized world of which Rome was the body. To enter into and rule the Grecian element in it, was intellectually to rule the Roman world. On the Cross of Christ the three languages appear in which his thoughts from earliest time prevailed, first in the Hebraic mind, then in the Grecian mind, then in the mind of the world. Hebraists in closest contact with the Hellenic mind, and speaking the Hellenic tongue, carried through the world Hebraic ideas fully developed into Christian truths. Such a transfusion of national ideas into another language and life, into a new world of being, never took place before, or will again. From the first distinct perception that arises of this purpose, when Alexander plans the conquest of Asia, to the end, is a period greater than that which separates us from the middle ages. There is im-

mense grandeur in the conception of this passing over of the Church, with all its wealth of truths, to dwell in a new language; but the full difficulty of the thought is not reached till to the difficulty of conceiving how the language, the Records, the ideas, of the Church could find ample room and verge enough in a language heathen in its development, there is superadded the idea of the difficulty of transferring truths, revealed under the laws of conception and emotion, under the figures and images of the East, to the mind of the West. For there are strongly marked differences between the mind of Asia and of Europe. This great work was well done, for God planned and overruled it at every step. But as done through human means, and that seemingly so remote from the end, by the dreams of poets and the passions of kings, by all the motley panorama of the world's history for centuries, it is a wonder rather that it could be possible at all, than that something of the thought passed not, or so passed that it breathed not long in the unwonted air of the West.

And, beside the intrinsic difficulties in the case, there were two causes which might account for this. Over this great highway, which bridged the chasm of the continents, passed not only the thought of the Hebraic Church, but all the forms of Asiatic thought, especially certain monstrous and grotesque perversions of the doctrines of Christ and the Apostles. And the Church, with the weapons, appliances, and powers of her new abode, had to drive them back or destroy them. The innumerable swarms of heresies which came over from Asia into Europe, were busied with the primal mysteries of being. The invasion of Europe by Gnosticism, avenged the invasion of Asia by Alexander; and the Church, with the mind of the West, was compelled to do battle against this phase of the mind of the East. She was thus in conflict, not in accord, with the mind of the East at the time when she might otherwise have fully imbibed those Oriental ideas on Time and the World, which never fully obtained a lodgement in the ecclesiastical mind of the West.

But while, as yet, these things had hardly ceased to be, came the flood of barbarism. That Ark, the Church, deep freighted with chants, and songs, and creeds, and litanies, with all its wealth of ages transferred from its home in the East, all its pearl, and gold, and precious stones, and much that was not so precious, floated on the rising waters, across the sea of darkness, which divides what in the speech of man is appropriately called the ancient, from the modern world.

Now, that which was required to unlock the ancient Record of the Creation of the World was the Time-thought of the East in its oldest ages. It was by striking upon this, in adventurous but wisest searching, the key was found. The farther key was found in the World-thought of that old mind.

Some traces of these old thoughts, as applied to the interpretation of this document, may be found on the other side of this flood, and just as the ship is lifted upon the waters; but when she rests again after the waters have subsided, they are found no more. The old were not. New Time-thoughts, and other ideas of the world's beginning, there were.

These modified the Western conception of the Creative history; still there was nothing in the circumstances to give prominence, or to call attention to the change. The chapter is a sublime lesson against Polytheism. God is seen therein creating each of the great realms over which, in heathen thought, the heathen gods reigned. This is, and will forever be, its great lesson, before which all the other truths it teaches must in comparison have small significance. Now, the ecclesiastic mind had learned this lesson ages before in all its fulness, and not from this chapter alone, but in manifold ways. It had passed away from those stages of thought and feeling when the ancient Polytheism seemed possible. And if called to meet the Polytheism of the heathen in the dark ages, it could only use the broad, obvious truths of this chapter, and not its more recondite teachings — in a word, its moral, not its philosophical, truths.

The latter only appear when the mind has somewhat of sympathy, on certain points, with the mind of the East. But there was nothing to suggest the idea of the absence of anything from

the current interpretation. It would not be likely, in the absence of all causes calling close and general attention to this Record, to be noticed in the first awakenings and stirrings of thought after the dark ages; and when the mind of modern Europe turned to study this chapter, it is not at all strange that it was not impressed with the loss of any ideas necessary to the harmonious and full evolvment of all its thought. The sense seemed full and grand; or if more philosophic minds perceived there was, here and there in it, something hinting at mysterious truths, this rather gratified wonder than excited research; so much alone and unrelated to aught save itself was this peculiar document.

It required an especial and powerful cause before the mind could be made to feel that it must wrench from it its secrets, before it wished even to question closely where it loved to wonder. The timidity of reverence, discouraging inquiry, seemed an appropriate and holy feeling in its presence. It seemed rather a chapter of the history of Eternity, than of Time. The mysterious, the vast, the unknown, seemed to have in it an appropriate habitation. It was suggestive of human ignorance. It unveiled, and it veiled. Its thoughts were not as our thoughts. Its terms were not as our terms. In its order was confusion, and in its confusion was order. It awakened wonder, but repelled curiosity. It was to be mused upon, but not to be questioned. No path seemed to lead from out our world into the Days marked by no foot-print of man,—Days when plants grew, and glorious light, born of darkness, shone over them without a sun. The moral impression of the wonder with which it filled the mind,—a religious wonder, rising into adoration,—satisfied the soul, and forbade it to search too curiously into its mysteries.

The European mind differing much from the Asiatic mind, this document, then, received in some respects a different interpretation in the West from that which it had in the East. And all the circumstances were such, that it need not seem strange that this change was unnoticed. It came about unconsciously;

and there were none to observe it, far less to correct it. Mighty indeed was the change which had come over the face of the world, and far remote was the Church in the West from her primeval scenes of thought. The knowledge of Hebrew and of Greek was, to a great degree, lost in the West. And how could the old interpretation be restored by dim and imperfect hints of it in the Latin Fathers, when there was no suspicion of its existence, no feeling of its loss? When at length the culture of Greek literature revived in the West,—a period quite recent,—it was of old heathen Greek; and though hints, helping to the true thought, might be found therein,—for the mind of the East, through channels not yet fully explored, and perhaps never to be laid open, did act directly and powerfully on Grecian thought,—still it could but poorly interpret the full life of that Hebraic Greek of the Septuagint and of the Apostles, to which, with all its beauty, it owes in truth its enduring life, its resurrection from the dead, and its everlasting existence. The Hebrew followed in its turn; but this fine outgrowth of the Shemitic mind could only be fully interpreted, in all the compass of its many novel forms of thought, by all the Shemitic tongues, by the whole oral manifestation of that Eastern Asia, which was the seat of primeval revelation, and the home of the Church, till she took up her majestic march towards the West.

These things have but just been done. For the first time in more than a thousand years, the mind of the West and of the East are in full converse, acting and reacting upon each other,—the West with its new powers, the East with its old ideas. Had, then, the loss of the ideas, which are the keys to the interpretation of this Record, been heavily felt centuries ago, they could not then have been recovered, for there had not been opened the path to these new discoveries. They came from converse with the Eastern mind, stimulated by the fact of this great debate to intense scrutiny of all the hints and indications of its ideas on Time and the World. The thinker who has fought and won this great battle, reading the inscriptions on what seemed to be the tombs of dead ideas, found them not dead, not sleeping, but waiting to do service for the Church.

CHAPTER XIII.

TRACES of the old interpretation, of the old modes of thought, should be looked for just across the night of the dark ages, in the patristic thought of the Church. Whether the Occidental intellect had been so fully impressed by them as permanently to retain them or not, it were well to look for it there ; and there they may be found.

The thought that the Mosaic Days were anomalous, comes out with distinctness in the writings of Augustine. In one place he seems to think they did not pertain to time at all, as being before time was. Whether this be altogether intelligible or not, it is interesting, as the same thought can be shown in one of the sages of the East. In the following emphatic language, Augustine says it is not possible to comprehend them: "Qui dies cujusmodi sint, aut per-difficile nobis aut etiam impossibile est cogitare quanto magis dicere." — "What kind of days they were, it is hard in the extreme, yea, even impossible to think, how much more to say." Again he says: "Quis ergo animo penetret, quo modo illi dies transierint, antequam inciperent tempora quæ quarto die dicuntur incipere?" Here he thinks it impossible to pierce into the secret of the duration of those days, which preceded that fourth day, in which the present measure of time was instituted. In another place, he extends this anomalous character to all the days: "Is enim modus non usque ad diem quartam, ut inde jam istos, — id est quartum, quintum, sextum, septimum, — usitatos esse cogitemus, sed usque ad sextum, septimumque, per-ductus est; *ut longe aliter accipiendus* sit dies et nox inter quæ duo divisit Deus, et aliter iste dies et nox inter quæ dixit ut dividant luminaria." Here, then, is a clear indication of the thought, that all the cycles of the Day of Creation were unmeasured by the Sun.

Augustine further says, that the evening and the morning are not to be regarded as referring to duration, — “*temporis praeteritionem*,” — but to the marking of the boundaries of natures, — “*per quendam terminum quo intelligitur quousque sit naturae proprius modus ; et unde sit naturae alterius exordium*.” Here the thought of the Natural in Creation is involved in this term *natures* ; so boldly applied by him to each and all the creative works, whether on the first, second, or sixth day, carrying the idea by analogy beyond where it is inwrought into the language describing the works, and applying it to all the Days. It is evident, then, that Augustine’s conception of the time, and of the mode in Creation, is different from the modern idea.

The idea of the world as of something that was born, and involving the idea that it grew, — which was the universal idea of the East, — is incompatible with the limited Time-idea. It carries with it, of necessity, something of the true Time-idea. And the true Time-idea, in like manner, necessitates the idea of a growth ; for in no other way can the durations be conceived of as being filled up. Hence we are not to expect to find them apart, but are to look for them together, and to accept clear indications of the presence of the one, as probable evidence of the presence of the other.

But this only where the two ideas have been acting and reacting upon each other for a long time, or from the first. Where the idea of vast Time is suddenly and by itself forced into the conception of Creation as scripturally revealed, this would by no means follow : there would only be incongruous ideas, on to which the mind could not long hold.

The old, limited Time-idea is not very compatible with the expectation of beholding order, harmony, and beauty in the evolvment of the phenomena of creation. Its times are so short, that it is almost of necessity felt that creation was an instantaneously perfect act ; and manifestations of wisdom are looked for only in the completed world. Hence, where this idea prevails of Creation, as of something all done at once, there would be no protracted scrutiny of the record of it ; no fine

musings, no philosophical wondering over the processes. But something of this turn of thinking is found at once within the sphere of the older thoughts.

Philo-Judæus revels in the delight with which the Mosaic account of Creation inspires him. "No one," he says, "whether poet or historian, could ever give expression in an adequate manner to the beauty of his ideas respecting the creation of the world; they surpass all power of language, and amaze our hearing, being too great and venerable to be adapted to the senses of any created being."

Philo says, "We are not to imagine that the Deity does anything according to definite periods of time, but should rather think that everything done by him is inscrutable in its nature, uncertain, unknown to, and incomprehensible by mortal men." He says, "It would be a mark of great simplicity to think the world was created in six days, or, indeed, at all in time." This remark is similar to Augustine's, as it is connected with the suggestion, that time is made "by the sun, as he passes over the earth and under the earth." When Moses, in speaking of the generation of the heavens and the earth, says, — "when they were created," not defining the time, Philo thinks he wished "to exclude the idea that the universe was created in six days." And again, he says of these words, "When they were created, they indicate an indeterminate time, not accurately described." He speaks of the world as created in six days; but it is not of duration that he thinks in connection with this. "It was not because the Creator stood in need of a length of time, — for it is natural that God should do everything at once, not merely by uttering a command, but by even thinking of it," — but because "the things created required arrangement; and number is akin to arrangement." The idea here is a striking one; but the vein of thought into which it runs is very fanciful and peculiar: "Of all numbers, six is, by the laws of nature, most productive; and it was fitting that the world, being the most perfect of created things, should be made according to the perfect number, namely, six."

Philo belongs to the order of the mystics ; his writings are the earliest, and among the best results of that strange propensity to allegorize everything, which, in all ages since Philo's, has been at work in the Scriptures. He is not at all times consistent ; and we certainly do not profess fully to comprehend all that he has written, and doubt very much if he did himself ; but it is well to look at his ideas, and to note how, on the very opening of his pages, the mind is at once transported into a circle of thoughts which are very far away from thoughts of the West. Here is a science of numbers, more strange and remote from our ways of thinking, than even the old thoughts on Time, and the World. The fact seems to be of sufficient interest, in this connection, to be illustrated by a citation. Philo says that "heaven was embellished in the perfect number four ; and, if any one were to pronounce this number the origin and soul of the all-perfect decade, he would not err. For what the decade is in actuality, that the number four is, as it seems, in potentiality ; at all events, if the numerals from the unit to four are placed together in order, they will make ten, which is the limit to the number of immensity, around which the numbers wheel and turn, as around a goal.

"Moreover, the number four also comprehends the principle of the harmonious concords in music." And so for a page or more on the mystic properties of the number four ; after which, he earnestly adds : "And the number four has many other powers also, which we must subsequently show more accurately in a separate essay, appropriated to it. At present it is sufficient to add this, that it was the foundation of the creation of the whole heaven, and the whole world. For the four elements, out of which the universe was made, flowed from the number four, as from a fountain."

Another paragraph is cited, merely to show what beautiful thoughts are intermingled with this strange vein of philosophizing. "The aforesaid number, therefore, being accounted worthy of such preëminence in nature, the Creator, of necessity, adorned the heaven by the number four, namely : by that most

beautiful, and most godlike ornament, the light-giving stars. And, knowing that, of all existing things, light is the most excellent, he made it the instrument of the best of all the senses, sight. For what the mind is in the soul, that the eye is in the body. For each of them sees; the one beholding these existing things which are perceptible only to the intellect; and the other those which are perceptible to the external senses."

The Eastern train of thought about the world comes out clearly in Philo's argument against those who hold the world is eternal. "*Every thing*," he says, "*which is the subject of our senses, exists in birth and changes. This world is visible, and the object of our senses; it follows, of necessity, that it must have been created.*" Of it, therefore, "*the great Moses predicated generation as an appropriate description.*" The line of thought in the whole passage is of remarkable power and beauty. It runs thus: only that which is unchangeable is eternal; the world was born, and grew; therefore it cannot be eternal. Fine as this argument is, how strange it sounds to a Western mind! What a grand sweep of generalization! How confidently he lays this down, as a truth known to all, and needing no argument: everything that is an object of sense, exists in birth and changes. The world being an object of sense, must, of course, therefore, come under this law. Therefore it had a Creator. We prove a Creator from the glory of the World. In this Eastern mind, the proof is reversed. The world being a sensible object, comes under the universal law of all such things, — "*it exists in birth and changes.*" It was born; it grew. It hath not the unchangeableness of an eternal reality; therefore it must have had a Creator. It is a sublime illustration of the different eyes with which the Orient and the Occident look on Truth. The argument leans upon Moses as a strong support. Philo is sure of the idea of Moses, and it being the idea of Moses, is sure it is true. "Of the World, the great Moses predicated generation as an appropriate description."

It is by no means claimed that there is a correspondence

between the ideas of Philo and the interpretation which has been given to the Mosaic narrative in detail ; but that his mind was imbued with two great ideas, wanting which, the ecclesiastical mind of the West at length wrought out for itself a conception of the Mosaic creation different in its features from that of the Eastern mind ; — two great ideas, having which, every deeper insight into philology, and every true disclosure of science, will reveal more and more of the depths of natural wisdom in this most wonderful word. Thus Philo was bound by no restricted time limit, perceiving that the time was anomalous. He perceives this so clearly, that he seems at last to feel that Moses could not have meant to reveal anything as to duration at all, the very conditions stated seeming to make the times inconceivable ; and so, letting go the Time-idea, he thinks of six great arrangements in the Creation ; and goes off in search of the reason why six, rather than three, or seven, or ten ; why that number, instead of any other ; seeking the reason in the properties of numbers.

An eminent scientific man has come to Philo's view, viz. : that Moses thought of arrangement, rather than of any particular durations, long or short. And Philo's view of yesterday, and Pierce's of to-day, seems the nearest approximation to the true view, which the human mind has made, in its attempts to understand this record. It is a true view, though not *the* true view. The eye can be placed at a point where their view must be taken. It is suggested by some of the facts in the record. It leads to this — that where all is anomalous, the rate of working must be un conjecturable ; the terms swift or slow, long or short, hardly applicable ; and thus it saves from assumptions, which Geology has unwisely made as to this anomalous past.

The idea of Philo and Pierce seems to want nothing but the cyclical idea and the idea of chronological arrangement, to make it the true view. No doubt the time was anomalous, — this idea is most important, — but if the creative works were in time at all, which Philo seems sometimes to doubt, so far is

he from the literal six day idea, that time was cyclical; and if there were six divisions of that time, there were six cycles, that is, six days. We have come to conceive of time, or rather to think we conceive of it, as rectilinear; as having a point from which it starts, a point at which it ends; while between these it is conceived of as a straight line. But this is not the natural, nor the ancient idea of time. Time-thoughts start from and copy the cycles in nature; or, rather, the soul is made so to conceive of time, and is created in a world where everything conforms to its idea, and upholds it.¹

Philo carried the idea of the anomalous so far as to lose sight of the cyclical idea in Creation; hence no trace of the idea of vast successions is found in his thoughts. They sweep far away on another road, seeking to search into the mysteries of numbers.

Philo, as a mystic, represented no one but himself. He lived in the latest period of the Hebrews in Palestine, and his mind had a Grecian training. These things go far to account for not finding clear traces, in his writings, of the old Time-thoughts. The chief value here attached to his ideas as to time in Creation is, that they show clearly how far his Eastern mind was from the current view of the later Western mind on the point of time; and that he was so much nearer the true view, that there would have been no sharp and dangerous collision between his view and the discoveries of modern science.

With the second great idea, essential to the understanding of the record, and which in the latter ages has been wanting in the West,—the idea of a natural procession of events entering as one element into the idea of the creation of the world,—with this great idea, re-discovered by modern science, as has been shown, he is familiar. Following the true exegesis, he makes the Record to commence subsequent to the call-

¹ Not only all things in nature uphold the cyclical idea, but all the things of men. We once heard a child ask a very wise question. "Mother," said he, "my school is out; the high school is out; the academy is out (it seems to have been a general vacation); and when, mother, will the world be out?"

ing into being of something which is not itself, as matter without the properties of matter, or form, forming, this is the passive subject, God himself, the Creation, according to his idea, this passive subject, in itself and without the Creator, could not be endowed with it; and then, by changing it into a world. He says: "The active cause of the universe, thoroughly unadulterated, is not inferior to virtue, and superior to the abstract good, or abstract beauty; it is something inanimate, and incapable of intrinsic power of its own; but has been fashioned, and endowed with life, and formed into that most perfect work." —

After the manner of the Hebrews, God does by his mediate agency, what he does directly; and the material creation.

Before taking leave of Plotinus, in this passage, describing God mediate, we read, this passage struck us as accordant with the later creation. By searching, something like the prevailing mode of grand use Milton would he must have read; but like it as could well be.

On the other hand, in the five exposition of the which has come from before we had thought, view from which we are impressed with their as finely illustrating the same results with the modern world. — the

— of him-
— God act-
— for a
— observed
— the plan
— before the
— were deter-
— on the stage;
— has been
— midst of which
— reference to the
— were called into
— near mutual de-
— author before it
— great drama,
— actors ap-

tian era, in its nineteenth century being in substance reproduced by Professor Agassiz.

Philo having said that God, "when he had determined to create this visible world, previously formed one perceptible only by the intellect, and made this corporeal world a younger likeness of the elder creation, embracing as many different genera, perceptible to the external senses, as the other world contains of those which are visible only to the intellect," then reverently proceeds to unfold—to use an expression of Professor Agassiz—"the conception in the mind of God previous to Creation," through the following vivid and finely-wrought image, suggested, no doubt, by the city—that magnificent creation of the genius of Alexander—in which he dwelt: "When any city is founded through the exceeding ambition of some king or leader, who lays claim to absolute authority, and is at the same time a man of brilliant imagination, eager to display his good fortune, then it happens at times that some man coming up who, from his education, is skilful in architecture, and he, seeing the advantageous character and beauty of the situation, first of all sketches out in his own mind nearly all the parts of the city which is about to be completed,—the temples, the gymnasia, the prytanea, the markets, the harbor, the docks, the streets, the arrangement of the walls, the situation of the dwelling-houses and of the public and other buildings. Then, having received in his own mind, as on a waxen tablet, the form of each building, he carries in his heart the image of a city, perceptible as yet only by the intellect, the images of which he stirs up in memory which is innate in him, and, still further, engraving them in his mind like a good workman, keeping his eyes fixed on his model, he begins to raise the city of stones and wood, making the corporeal substances to resemble each of the incorporeal ideas. Now we must form a somewhat similar opinion of God, who, having determined to found a mighty state, first of all conceives its form in his mind, according to which form he made a world perceptible

only by the intellect, and then completed one visible to the external senses, using the first one as a model."

Professor Agassiz is led, from the study of facts in the physical world, "to recognize thoughtfulness, premeditation," in its conception, and to conclude that its "plan was framed prior to the beginning of creation, and was matured in all its parts, before the actual production of any special form."

"As soon as we recognize in nature a harmonious plan pervading all its parts, — as soon as it is understood that this plan has been carried out, in the course of time, successively towards one definite end, developing always the same train of thoughts, — we are justified in concluding that as it is now, it has been from the beginning, at every following period, the result of a free determination of the Creator, unlimited, unrestrained in his works, save by his own decisions. Starting from this idea, we may now consider the Creator framing his plan of the world, devising the means of making it a material reality, and, as physical science teaches us, developing in it a series of epochs through the advancing ages.

"We have, first, from eternity, God by himself and in himself; next, God meditating upon his Creation; then, God acting as Creator, upon a plan laid out from the beginning, for a definite end, shown in connection of the phenomena observed in nature.

"The Creation may thus be compared to a drama, the plan of which was complete in the mind of its author before the first scene was written out; the actors in which were determined in their characters before they appeared on the stage; the end of which is known to him before any witness has been allowed to contemplate it; the scenes in the midst of which this action is to appear, were sketched with reference to the future performance, before any of the actors were called into being; and the whole, with all its parts, in their mutual dependence, had an ideal existence with the author before it became a reality; and, as in the progress of this great drama, new developments were brought out, the requisite actors ap-

peared in due time, and in such connection with those preceding, as to lead gradually to the final conclusion in the creation of our globe, and its successive stages, down to the present state of things." No doubt the thoughts intended to be suggested in the last sentence of the modern philosopher are beyond the thoughts of the ancient. Yet the former would, no doubt, admit that Philo, speaking of the Creation, utters what gives to them their highest value, — their germ, as it were, easily expanded into the modern conception: "In things, which exist but in part, the principle of order is this — to begin with that which is most inferior in its nature, and to end with that which is most excellent of all."

Where each comparison is so good, there is no need to pronounce either the best. But should any one think that Philo was aided by his Grecian culture, it is to be remembered, that at the moment of writing this comparison, he had been intently communing with the Mosaic Record, and had just said, that "no poet or historian could express the beauty of its ideas;" though this was "no reason for his yielding to indolence, but rather for exerting himself beyond his powers to describe them," not as having "much, or indeed, anything to say of himself, but instead of much, just a little, such as it may be probable that human intellect may attain to when wholly occupied with a love and desire of wisdom."

It may be asked, Does Josephus confirm these ideas as to the interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis? Not at all. The account of Creation which opens his "Antiquities of the Jews," might have been written in London at any time within the last two or three centuries. Is there any explanation of this? To explain it fully, would be to write an essay on the character of Josephus; and that theme so connects itself with his times, that the treatment of it would easily expand into a volume.

The explanation can only be indicated here, and even this breaks in on the continuity of the discussion; but, as the writings of Philo and Josephus are the only remaining monuments of the older Hebraic thought, beside the Sacred Writings, the

Septuagint, and the Apocrypha ; and as the fact appears to make directly and decisively against the theory here maintained, there is need that it be considered.

A true idea of the character of Josephus would not coincide with that of the fiery crusader, De Quincey ; nor with that of good old credulous Whiston. Josephus was no Christian ; neither was he half renegade and all traitor. He was a politician, as adroit, as lucky as Tallyrand. He was a man of letters, as industrious as Gibbon. His character is not pleasing ; but it may be said in his defence, that his lot was cast in a time when no course could have been both consistent and right. His sympathies were, no doubt, with his own people ; but, like the rest of the Jewish nobles, like even the citizens of Jerusalem, he saw that the fanaticism which blazed out among the country people, if unchecked, would destroy the state. This young, high-born, wealthy, and popular nobleman, accepted the command of the army of Galilee, probably with the secret determination to pacify the province, at least to keep things as they were until wiser counsels should prevail in Jerusalem, or until the overwhelming array of the army of Titus should compel even fanaticism to abandon its wild designs. No doubt the cool policy which saved only himself, is sufficiently odious to an enthusiastic mind ; no doubt he should have delivered one great battle in the passes of Galilee, or at least should have died when his brethren died, in Jotopata. The sympathies of honorable minds are not with him, but are with those who fell in the slaughter of Tarichea, or in the siege of Gamala, when the Galileans repulsed the whole Roman army — Vespasian himself fighting as in his youth, and vainly striving, sword in hand, to rally his disordered battalions, as they were hurled down the steep slope of the city by the resistless fury of Israel. Such a death would have been more heroic than to have appeared less as a captive than a prince, high in favor with the Emperor Vespasian, before the walls of indignant Jerusalem. And no doubt, had the writings of Justus of Tiberias been preserved, they would have darkened much the fame of his rival

and enemy, Josephus. The fact was, that this aspiring noble, like the rest of his order, saw and felt the desperation of the contest with Rome, and countenanced the popular movement only in the hope of controlling it, and of ending the war, by making it as hopeless in seeming as it was in reality. Still his policy cannot be wholly approved, and it is especially repulsive to the feelings, because for him personally it was fortunate; and but for one great fact, redeeming all, his character would be devoid of dignity. He did not despair of his country, even when he had no country. As a soldier or politician, Josephus is not admirable; but his course as a historian verges on the sublime; for just at the time when the eyes of the shuddering world are averted with horror from the destruction of Jerusalem, he makes a calm, learned, majestic appeal to the mind of the world in behalf of Israel. Though he had seen his race all but perish before his eyes, he does not despair of his race; but, with enduring faith in its fortunes, this scholar sets himself to win with the pen the battle which had been lost with the sword.

Writing for his own people, in their own tongue, the history of their calamities, he wrote in the universal tongue their history from the first, for the purpose of vindicating for them an honorable place among the nations. These writings of Josephus were projected and finished while he enjoyed the personal favor of Roman emperors. To his history of the Jewish war there was affixed the signature of Titus; yet his writings went forth at a time when Hebraic ideas and Hebraic character were detested in Rome; and writing when he did, where he did, and with his aims, there were ideas and facts that could find no place in his writings. He makes no mention of the life of Jesus Christ, none of the Jewish belief in the Messiah, neither of which could have been unknown to him, and the last of which was but too well known to the Romans. A knowledge of the religious ideas of their subject nations, was part of the statecraft of Rome; and the calm, sagacious historian felt that if he would avert from his race aught of Roman jealousy, it became him in

that hour to be silent as to that great fact. He might well, too, be silent concerning it, seeing into what calamities it had led his race, and perhaps foreboding the further calamities it brought upon them in the time of Hadrian.

Josephus was so familiar with the thoughts of the Roman world, that he knew perfectly what ideas would conflict with, or would hinder his historical design. His artistic conception of the work he had to do, compelled him to reproduce the Mosaic record of the Creation in its brevity, without expatiating upon it to those who would not have appreciated its wisdom — to the mocking Greek and the haughty Roman. Of the volumes of thought it suggested to him, no man knows; but this is known, that when he comes to that expression that has been so fully considered in this essay, to the "Day One" of Moses, to the peculiar day, the spirit of the Hebrew sage kindles within him; his feelings will not let him go on, as he had meant to do, in accordance with his well-planned and deep design; he will not indeed unfold all the wisdom of the great Moses, but he feels that this adaptation of his thoughts to the low conception of the barbarian West, is derogatory alike to Moses and to himself; and he must say, and he will say, "I could now give the reason why Moses called it Day One, though I put off the exposition of many such things, meaning to write a treatise concerning them."

Neither the more recondite philosophical ideas of the Hebrews, nor their more spiritual ideas, nor even the latent causes of the great war of the Jews with Rome, fully unfolded, are to be found in this Romanized Hebraic history, though this does not entirely destroy the dignity of its intent. Josephus accomplished his design. He built a monument which will outlast the arch of Titus. Josephus, though despised and hated by his countrymen, was at heart all Jew. If he accepted an estate in Judea from Vespasian, if he kept the favor of Vespasian, Titus, and Domitian, it was because he meant to be of service to his race. He had all the craft, all the versatility, all the enduring courage of his race. He belonged not to the spiritual order in his nation; he had no more sympathy with

heroic elevation of soul, or with high spiritual emotions, than Macaulay; no more conception of the highest glories of the Hebrew religion than Gibbon had with those of Christianity. He was as graphic as the one, as learned as the other, and his history will outlive theirs. He was the first of those Jews who, ever since the destruction of Jerusalem, wearing a mask, disguising more or less their Hebraic feelings, giving no full utterance to their Hebraic ideas, yet true in their hearts to their own race, have dwelt in the palaces of kings, and more or less controlled the destinies of the world.

The ecclesiastical mind of the West, seizing upon the idea of instantaneousness as a chief glory of the Divine work in Creation, has so far misled, that it is difficult to enter into a mode of thought which proceeds on a very different idea.

It is necessary to assume its existence before due weight can be given to the indications of it. But the assumption is not without abundant evidence. The most ancient nations seem universally to have conceived of immense periods in Creation. The Etruscans, the Egyptians, the Persians, the Hindoos, embodied this idea in their cosmogonies or mythologies. Beyond all doubt, their ideas came from that most ancient and ever authoritative document which opens the Book of Genesis, and so are decisive of its interpretation through all the earliest ages. But, on any supposition, they go very far to show that the interpretation given to it, as setting forth vast times in the Creation, is in harmony with the earlier thoughts of the world.

It is in harmony, too, with all natural thought. Unwarped by false teaching, that easily runs thus,—it can run in no other way:—There were Days before men, when God wrought alone; they were immense Days, unlike in duration the brief Days of man. To uphold this idea, there are not to be looked for, beyond this ancient cosmogony itself, any direct and formal statements of this idea in the Hebraic writers. It was altogether too natural a thought for this. But there is not, by any of the Hebraic writers, an allusion to Creation, which looks as if they conceived of its Days as brief solar days, forming a

week of common time; although, had this been their idea, it seems impossible it should not have been expressed or alluded to over and over again, as the Creation is a great theme with the Hebrew poets. On the other hand, all their many allusions to Creation harmonize with the idea in it of vast times, and some imperatively require it. Little can be added to the force of the argument on this point in the treatise by Lewis. The argument there, from the eighth of Proverbs alone, is enough. Nor is there any resisting the conclusion there set forth, that when the goings forth of the Logos are said to be from the Days of Eternity,¹ there are meant, there can only be meant, the Days of Creation; and this, too, it might be added, on a principle before alluded to, that the Divine Word suggests no inquiry which it does not somewhere answer.²

Another passage presents the thought more in what has been conceived of as its natural form; that is, somewhat more as it might suggest itself to the general mind. "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever Thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting Thou art God. Thou turnest man to destruction, and sayest, Return ye children of men. For a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night." The bard had been musing on the times in Creation, and the idea of a thousand years as God's Day follows almost instantly. To one who can at all appreciate the connection of the ideas, this passage goes far to prove that the writer conceived of the Days of Creation as God's Days, and hence of immense duration. The writer was Moses, and to his thought the idea of all the sacred writers conforms, as to time in the Creation.³

¹ Micah v. 1.

² This idea would seem to follow from the harmony of plan and thought throughout the Word. It is not thought the Word answers every possible question, and by every mind; still it is believed the idea is of great value. It has at least been tested in parts of the historical Scriptures, where multitudes of questions have been raised by some who study them for that purpose only, and who never think they may answer them, or disregard their answers. One who will proceed upon the idea, that no question do they properly raise which they do not answer, will seldom fail to find the one as well as the other.

³ While the larger portion of Part II. of this Essay was in press, there was

The apostle Peter, going back in thought to "the beginning of the creation," to the days "when by the word of God the heavens were of old and the earth," also proceeds almost immediately to say, "One day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day." Here, too, this thought again arises in close connection with, and as if born of the thought of the Days of Creation; and thus the earliest and latest inspired thoughts of those Days, as Days of God, Days immense, or inconceivable in duration, agree.

In proof of the universal and ancient conception by the Hebraic mind of Creation as a birth and growth, — for the one idea involves the other, — the title given by the Seventy to the first of the Mosaic books is decisive. They named it from its first chapter. And their idea of what therein is described is stamped on this title. They bring in an idea as remote as possible from the idea which, for so many ages, has been dominant and alone in the West. They evidently had not in their minds the modern metaphysical tenet of a creation out of nothing, in so short a space of time that it comes in thought to an instantaneous creation, perfect at once. Their idea might involve the idea of its creation out of nothing, — it might most forcibly present to them God, as the author of the world, as it did to Philo, — but their radical conception of the whole process is different from the later Western idea. They entitle the book "The Generations of the Heaven and Earth." And this version of their ancient Scriptures was held in fabulous honor by the Hebrews; it was read in their synagogues outside of Palestine. There could be no more decisive exponent than this version, of Hebraic modes of thought, wherever it illustrates them; and no fact more decisive than this, on the matter in question.

Moses himself, in various ways, authorized this idea. From

received a learned treatise on the Mosaic Cosmogony, entitled *Archala*, — by J. W. Dawson, Principal of McGill College, Montreal, — written in an admirable style, and abounding in valuable thoughts. To it we are indebted for some ideas on page 281, and also for the thought above. Also, to an attentive reader of the Scriptures for the reference to the Apostle.

the 90th Psalm it appears that he carried this idea into the work of the third day, where it does not, beyond all question, appear in the words which describe it in Genesis. He says, "Before the mountains were born." In the same verse he describes the whole creation in the same way, — *or ever Thou hadst brought to its birth the world.* It is apparent from the order of his thoughts, that this was farther back than the third day in time. Precisely as the Seventy, after him, described Creation, so he prefixes to his brief summary of the creative process, this title: The Toledoths, — The Generations of the Heavens and the Earth. Thus, as Philo said, "Of the World the great Moses predicated generation as an appropriate description."

Moses, then, thought of the world beginning as a birth, and of all the subsequent phenomena which he describes in his vision as its growth; and the thought of Moses agrees as closely with the scientific thought of the West, as the ecclesiastical thought of the West, in its conception of Creation, differs from both.

This debate in the end will not be useless, if it shall teach the Church the lesson she now so much needs, to guard every thought in the sacred Records; for she knows not at what instant its loss, or its obscuration, may imperil her existence: and this lesson also, that she cannot tell, while a truth is obscured, how valuable it may be. This Time-thought, far from being valuable only as a key to open this difficulty, opens the Time-thought of God, which runs through all his revelation. Its value may be measured by the value attached to scientific ideas of space, as compared with those when the known world was bounded by unknown waters and deserts, and the heavens on high were diagrams of astrologers. This may be taken as the measure of its worth; but it is more fruitful in sublime moral emotions; and without its recovery, the soul would be without one of the ideas essential to its advancement. By its aid it may yet be able to understand the prophecies, which

seem, in some way not yet apprehended, to conform to these great Time-thoughts.

As to the importance of the true conception of the creation of the world in itself, there is another idea which here can only be glanced at. There has grown up a vast volume of philosophical thought, formidable in the evils it has wrought, in the evils it threatens, which, seeking to pierce into the primal mysteries of being, has resolved Creation itself into a dream, the world into a phantom, and sets forth Pantheism as the sum of all truth. Conceived in the brain of Spinoza, and since propounded with a marvellous consecutiveness of thought, it would seem from its history that the Church has need of some missing truth, which would have made such speculations impossible, or at least powerless. Only in a world which has the present ecclesiastical conception of Creation, could these things have been. If this be so, then it may be, that the mode of Creation which the Creator saw fit to adopt, was chosen not without reference to the moral dangers of man ; it may be, that thus only could he best set himself forth as a Creator, and yet so that never, in any nation or age that receives his teachings in the way in which they were received by them to whom he was first pleased to teach them, shall He be confounded with the universe. The opening of his Word was in the eldest ages directed against Polytheism. This chapter of Moses, which did its work so well against the Polytheism of old, rightly interpreted, will be equally destructive to this modern philosophy.

We have endeavored to illustrate, and enforce, these re-discoveries of most needed truths : and we would there might be enlisted in their elucidation and defence, the energies of scholars everywhere ; foreseeing a long and difficult struggle before they will penetrate and pervade the thoughts of mankind.

It is desirable and proper that these re-discoveries should have the authority they may reasonably derive from the character of the person by whom they were first laid before the world. The last part of this Essay is given to his

Writings. In it may be gratified a desire, perhaps enkindled in some to whom he is unknown, which seems to ask, Who is this man that lifts the guantlet Science flung at the feet of the Church? that reinterprets for the Church the oldest of her Records, as interpreted by her in the scenes of her youth? that carries out the incomplete triumph of Hebraic thought over the West, and compels the mind of Europe to do homage to the mind of Asia?

PART III.

THE LITERARY CHARACTER OF TAYLER LEWIS.

TWENTY years and more have passed, since a man gifted with the genius which instinctively recognizes genius, described to us a scholar then teaching in one of the lesser towns on the Hudson. These pages but reproduce and verify the veneration which, even then, in advance of any public manifestation of his powers, the character of Lewis had inspired in a very competent judge of men.

In 1838, in compliance with a wish of the venerated Dr. Nott, who had discerned the qualities of his pupil in his college course, Lewis was called to address the Phi Beta Kappa of Union College. His subject was, "Faith, the Life of Science." In his treatment of this difficult and novel theme, he showed an acuteness of analysis, a power of generalization, and an affluence of classical learning, which justified the intuitions of those men of genius who had divined his genius. The edition of the address was exhausted at once; copies of it could not be kept; in widening circles they passed beyond all hope of return. More or less in consequence of this address, he received invitations to Professorships in three colleges. He accepted the Professorship of Greek and Latin Literature, in the University in the city of New York. The Rev. I. M. Matthews, the founder of the University, was then its Chancellor; and there were connected with it during Lewis' professorship, the Hon. Theodore Frelinghuysen, Chancellor in 1840; Professors Mason, C. S. Henry, Joslin, Draper, Loomis, Da Ponte,

Adler, and Nordheimer. The Greek Professorship was conferred on him, in part, through the influence of Hon. S. A. Foot, an eminent jurist of Albany, and of Hon. William Kent, of New York, — as appears from a biographical sketch of Lewis in Duyckinck's *Cyclopedia of Literature*, from which the following is an extract :

“Tayler Lewis was born in Northumberland, in Saratoga County, New York, in 1802. His father was an officer in the Revolutionary War, and served with distinction in the battles of Monmouth, and Germantown ; at the siege of Fort Stanwix, and in the storming of the redoubts at the taking of Cornwallis at Yorktown. His mother was of a Dutch family in Albany, a niece of John Tayler, from whom our author derives his Christian name, for many years Lieutenant Governor, in the days of Tompkins and Clinton. Mr. Lewis graduated in 1820, at Union College, Schenectady, in the class of Judge Kent, Governor Seward, and Comptroller John C. Wright. He studied law in the office of Samuel A. Foot, in Albany, in company with William Kent. Though attracted by the study of such writers as Coke, Fearne, Blackstone, and Butler, and much interested in logical questions of the law of evidence, and real estate, he was not at ease with the practical conduct of the profession, touching which he had some conscientious scruples. He, however, rejecting offers of partnership at Albany, pursued the profession in the retired village of Fort Miller, Washington County, New York, where he had sufficient time for reflection, and where, at the suggestion of a clerical friend, he entered on the study of Hebrew. The new occupation engrossed all his time and attention. He gave his days and nights to Hebrew. This led to a close and diligent study of the Bible in the languages of the Old and New Testament. Homer and Plato followed, with equal zest. Six years were devoted to biblical and classical studies, pursued with a scholar's unction, and a pure love of literature, with no thought of using the stores thus accumulating in teaching or composition, or with any prospect of leaving the humble vil-

lage. In 1833 he married, abandoned the law, and took a classical school in the village of Waterford. In 1835 he went to Ogdensburgh, St. Lawrence County; and shortly afterwards, through the influence of Mr. Foot, and his old classmate Judge William Kent, was appointed Professor of Greek in the University in the city of New York."¹

The city of New York, though it may seem to some only a mart of trade, or house of luxury, has never yet failed to welcome men of genius. Lewis' fitness for his position was at once recognized with enthusiasm by the friends of the university. It was also immediately perceived by them, that his entire mastery over Greek Literature merely indicated, and did not measure, the force of his intellect. Those who have read of his writings only his volume on Plato, might suppose him an enthusiast, absorbed in Greek Philosophy; but, if there ever was a period when his mind was absorbed in the study of Greek Literature, it had passed before he was called to the university. There was not room enough in it for his mind. It was his favorite haunt when thinking on certain themes; but Lewis was never the slave, never even the disciple of Grecian thought. The bent and training of his mind were mathematical, and, had he been elected to the chair of pure mathematics, he would there have been quickly and decisively eminent.

The critic, whose depreciation of Lewis has compelled us to essay his vindication, charges him with ignorance of natural history. We are rather anxious to concede that he is not minutely and laboriously versed in the details of conchology, mineralogy, ichthyology, ornithology, or zoölogy; for a special training in such things is apt to destroy the proportion of the development of the intellect, and a minute knowledge of them is no more indispensable to the wise man, than an apprentice's knowledge of setting up types is to an author, or than seven years manipulating bricks is to an architect. A more than

¹ *Cyclopedia of American Literature*. By E. A. and G. L. Duyckinck. Charles Scribner, New York. 1856. pp. 195, 196, 197, 198.

common knowledge of natural history, Lewis shows throughout his writings; and not of natural history only, but of the whole range of scientific thought. His critic designates him as "the man in the cell;" probably because he feels that his acquisitions could have been made only by a recluse. But Lewis was no recluse. It would have been marvellous indeed, if the present had not lived for him for whom all the past was living still; if he could have traced the principles of life and death through all dead generations, and have felt no interest in them as they mould and make the living generation. To Lewis the world was a fearfully living world. Its life-currents, whose pulsations may be felt so well in the metropolis, he scanned with his seer-like eyes, and analyzed in the deep musings of his meditative mind.

The lives of men are ordered from on high; and there was in the university one fit to be the guide of Lewis. Lewis was an earnest Hebrew scholar; but Isaac Nordheimer, Professor of Arabic, and other Oriental Languages, was the finest Hebraist of his age in the world. Robinson,—and no man's word could have more weight,—in a biographical sketch of Nordheimer, says, he stood "at the head of the scholars of the New World in an exact and familiar acquaintance with the whole range of the Hebrew language and its philology." Nordheimer awakened around him an intense interest in those Shemitic languages of which he was so grand a master; and Lewis was well prepared to profit by friendship with him. His mastery of the Shemitic languages is no doubt to be referred, in no small degree, to this felicitous conjunction with this admirable scholar, too soon ended by his untimely death.¹ Could Nordheimer have foreseen how his friend would be vilified for his

¹ This incident may interest some who knew Nordheimer. Going from Munich to Augsburg, we fell into conversation with a venerable man, who asked after Nordheimer with deep interest, and seemed much gratified by the esteem in which he was held by scholars in this country. "He used to write me," said he, "but for two or three years I have not heard anything of him." We had to tell him he was dead. "Nordheimer! O, Nordheimer!" cried the old man, big tears rolling down his cheeks, "he was my best pupil. *I taught him Arabic.*"

labors in elucidating that volume to whose language his own life was sacrificed, what indignation would have kindled in that gentlest of hearts ! And seeing such things can be, we cease to wonder, forget to mourn, that this enthusiastic genius, so simple and guileless of all knowledge of the world, was so soon called to his everlasting rest.

Lewis was Professor in the University eleven years. In 1849 he accepted the Professorship of Greek in Union College.

The Cyclopaedia says, the topics of the writings of Lewis "have been the relations of theology and philosophy, — the questions of the day in morals, politics, church and state government, and natural science, regarded in their religious bearings. His special classical studies have been subordinate to these philosophical discussions."

In opposing the errors of these times, it was inevitable that such a scholar as Lewis should arm himself with those weapons which Socrates was commissioned to forge for all times resembling his ; for the license, the disorganization, the corruption of the Athenian democracy, springing still out of the same root of Atheism, whether materialistic or pantheistic, is now reproduced on a broader theatre ; so that were Socrates to arise from the dead, he would wonder less at the new Atlantis, the steam-engine, the voices whispering under the floods, than at meeting again the same Atheism against which he contended unto death. While then, from his mind and office, it could have been foreseen that Lewis would enter upon an exposition of the Platonic Philosophy, it might also have been foreseen it would be a revivification of that philosophy under the guidance of Revelation, to meet the errors of the time. Such is the aim of a Treatise which he published in 1845, entitled, "Plato against the Atheists ; or the Tenth Book of the Dialogue on the Laws ; accompanied with Critical Notes, and Extended Dissertations on some of the Main Points of the Platonic Philosophy and Theology, especially as compared with the Holy Scriptures."¹

¹ Harper & Brothers, 1845, pp. 373.

To appreciate this volume, it is prerequisite to consider two facts: first, that the Dialogue is from a portion of writings of Plato on which scholars have bestowed the least labor, and this because of the difficulties which beset it.¹

The second fact to be noticed in criticizing this volume is, that the Tenth Book of the Laws requires for its elucidation a complete knowledge of the Platonic system, as it suggests more references to other parts of his system than any other part of Plato's writings of the same extent. The author says, "It was chosen as forming one of the best central positions, from whence to make excursions over a large part of the Platonic philosophy."

This Treatise was very elaborately reviewed by Professor Woolsey in the Bibliotheca for August, 1845. His criticism was constructed on the plan of setting forth the differences of opinion between him and his author on points in philology, on opinions of Plato, and on the uses of the Platonic philosophy; and a wide field was before the critic, as the text is so

¹ President Woolsey says: "It seems strange, if we take into view the intrinsic value of Plato's Laws, and the difficulties attending upon the text and explanation of this work, that so little labor has been bestowed upon it by scholars. Nor are we much better off in regard to translators. Schleiermacher went no farther than the Republic; and we know of no other translator besides Cousin, who unites scholarship with a philosophical spirit and familiarity with the Platonic Dialogues to such a degree as to secure confidence in his interpretation." With this agrees the following, from a recent translation by Burgess, of Trinity College, Cambridge, except as to Cousin's translation: "In this volume will be found the only English translation of the Laws hitherto made directly from the Greek. For although they form a part of Taylor's publication, it is not too much to say, that he can scarcely have looked at the original, but must have depended on the Latin version of Ficinus. For this dereliction of the first duty of a translator, Taylor would perhaps have pleaded, that, as he never presumed to rival Ficinus in his knowledge of Plato, he conceived it far more advisable to follow the Latin version, than to attempt to unravel the original Greek, where, so numerous are the difficulties, and so unaccountable the corruptions, as to render it frequently impossible to give a readable, much less an elegant translation. And so, too, it would seem thought the French translator, Grou, who, as remarked by Cousin, has frequently followed Ficinus. Cousin has himself been content to adopt Grou's translation as a basis, rather than make a new one from the original, which he says is full of novelties of syntax, or rather of the want of all syntax. Boeckh, after penning some first-rate remarks on the three opening books, gave up the task in despair. He saw that the nine remaining presented a series of obstacles which it was useless to encounter, and hopeless to overcome."

very corrupt, and as the author had to treat of so many points in the Platonic system. Such a construction of criticism is often a high compliment to a book, as it assumes that its opinions are of such weight that it can bear the severest testing, and should be tested even on trivial points; and yet, such a criticism can hardly fail to produce an effect unfavorable to the author, unless the critic has an ardent sympathy with him in his aims. One of the aims of Lewis was to counteract, by the higher and purer philosophy of Plato, the rationalizing tendencies of the time; but Professor Woolsey does not sympathize with this aim, for he speaks of "supposed tendencies;" and he seems to have little sympathy with Plato himself.¹

His critique should be criticized minutely, and on its own plan; but our space limits us to a few of its points: these, in connection with extracts, presenting its character and spirit. On his first page, the critic argues against this opinion: "A misconception of the end and scope of the Republic has subjected the name of Plato to great reproach. He has been charged with maintaining, in the fifth book of that dialogue, sentiments which, if carried out, would result in the utter overthrow of all the domestic relations. A defence, had we space for it here, might be derived from the peculiar parabolical or allegorical nature of that work, and from the evident absence of any design that it should serve as the model of any actual existing polity."² President Woolsey contends against this

¹ The aim of Socrates (and Plato was his disciple) was to save the souls of men. Imperfectly as he conceived of salvation, this was his calling, and to it he was faithful. In view of this, it is impossible to mark without pain the tone of Prof. Woolsey on the punishments prescribed for incorrigible Atheists: "The few closing pages of the tenth book contain the penal code for crimes against religious faith, and are of a nature, only not severe enough, to please the followers of St. Dominic. The following words sound like a regulation of the Spanish Inquisition: 'During this time let no one of the citizens be with them except the members of the night council, who are to converse with them for their admonition, and the salvation of their souls.'"

² The passages alluded to are generally thought to be an ineffaceable blot on the pages of Plato. Were Lewis, as President W. ventures to intimate, a partisan of Plato, it would detract from the weight of this very interesting assertion; but while the heart of Lewis is warmer towards Plato than his critic's, his intellect is more cold and clear. As an illustration of his superiority to anything

opinion, as if he had Lewis' argument before him; but he does not even attempt to explain the contradiction between the common idea of the obnoxious passages in the Republic, and the Tenth Book of the Laws, as brought out by Lewis; and the common idea of those passages which the critic upholds, is so obviously their literal import, that no importance attaches to his opinion in the absence of any new argument on the subject tending to change the current opinion as to their meaning. The case, then, stands thus: there are the passages, as plainly to be seen as the zodiac of Denderah: no solution of them compatible with the fair fame of the writer has yet been pro-

like favoritism towards his favorite, we make a long citation from Lewis as to the plan of the Republic, a matter of much interest. He says: "Its most appropriate designation is *Περὶ Δικαίου*, or, *An Inquiry into the Nature of Right*. The imaginary state is evidently made subservient to this; or, as he expressly tells us in the second book, intended only as a model of the human soul so magnified that we might read therein, in large letters, what would not be distinct enough for the mental vision when examined in the smaller characters of the individual spirit. The comparison of a soul to a commonwealth has been a favorite, not only with Plato, but with the most philosophical minds in all ages. We find it on a much smaller scale in the eleventh book of the Laws, where the nightly conference, or the most solemn legislative and judicial body in the state, is compared to the head in the human system. In the Republic it is the great idea, to which the construction of the fancied state is altogether secondary. Sometimes however, it must be admitted, the author seems so taken up with this imaginary commonwealth, that he, unconsciously perhaps, brings it into the primary place, and thus distorts his plan. It is this occasional forgetfulness of his main design, that has introduced into Plato's 'Republic' those incongruities which in all ages have been so much complained of. Sometimes the consistency of the under or fictitious part is overlooked; or, in other words, the state is utterly forgotten, while we are carried away to some of the most abstruse of all metaphysical discussions, such as may be found in the sixth and seventh books. Again his attention seems to be so occupied with the outward drapery, that he loses sight of this main theme, and, pleased with the efforts of his own fancy, dwells at great length on what, in reality, is merely external to the higher or inner sense. In the third, fourth, and last three books, the harmony of primary and secondary is well preserved. In the sixth and seventh he seems to lose sight of the commonwealth almost wholly, while in some parts of the second he appears to have nothing else before him. The fifth may be regarded as a sort of hybrid production, arising from a confusion of both views. Some of its arrangements are altogether too unnatural to allow the supposition that they were ever intended for a real state; and yet it is very difficult to discover what bearing they can have upon higher philosophy, to which the whole scheme was intended to be subservient. The least we can say is, that Plato here lost himself, and produced something which was neither allegory nor reality, neither philosophy nor legislation."

pounded: one Platonist has put on record his belief that he can solve the enigma; but the argument which convinces him has never yet been given to the world; it is locked up in his brain. The last part of the case may be illustrated by another fact. The first of Genesis has in these times generally been held to teach a creation in six days of twenty-four hours each, and no other exegesis of it had been so presented, as to have conclusive force, before Lewis published "The Six Days of Creation." Now, had he merely indicated his opinion, and expressed the belief that he could maintain the principles established in that treatise, few would have credited that he could have done it; and as he has done so in the one case, it is to be presumed he could in the other; though it seems as difficult to anticipate the power of his argument in the one case, as it would have been in the other.

The critic next considers the fact, that Plato "speaks, like the rest of his countrymen, of the gods in the plural number, without being very careful to draw a line between the Supreme Ruler, whom he elsewhere recognizes, and inferior deities," and defends him against those who impute these passages to "unworthy motives." The idea on which he mainly rests his somewhat labored defence of Plato on this point, is brought out by his author; but the reader cannot discover from the criticism that he has made this matter the subject of a Dissertation, or penned a line concerning it.

The Reviewer next takes up the "interesting" question, "Did Plato believe in a creation out of nothing?" and states that "Mr. Lewis, in a long excursus upon the maxim *De Nihilo Nihil*, has examined this point, but seems to have arrived at no certain conclusions." As evidence of this, he cites three sentences: "It is by no means clear that the eternity of matter was ever held by Plato." — "Some ἀρχή, or principle, seems to have been in his mind as the origin of matter, which was not matter, and yet, something separate from the Deity, and existing with him before the formation of the outward universe." — But, "in a passage of the Sophista, Plato speaks of a creation

by the direct act of God, and that too from things which before were not." The first of these sentences merely opens an argument *against* those who say that Plato held to the eternity of matter. The second is connected in the volume with this, — "We are confident he did not hold to its necessary eternity." The third, as it makes directly against the critic's position, seems quoted to show that the author was inconsistent.

The critic's position is wrong. Of some expressions in the *Timæus*, on which "have been grounded the argument for the common position that Plato held to the eternity of matter," Lewis says: "Should it be admitted that our philosopher is justly chargeable with inconsistency, still we contend that the positions in the *Laws* in respect to the inertness of matter and the superior antiquity of the soul, should have the greater weight, inasmuch as the extracts from the *Timæus* are merely incidental declarations; whereas the latter form the very heart and substance of one of his most studied and elaborately prepared arguments." But Lewis does not even allow that Plato is inconsistent on this subject. In one place he says: "It seems to us perfectly clear that, in every sense of the word, as used in modern philosophy, Plato held matter to be junior to soul,"¹ — and this is no incidental remark, but the main idea in the Dissertation, *Soul older than Body*. Lewis thinks that Plato not only held this of matter, in the sense in which the term is commonly used in philosophy, but in a far more metaphysical sense. We cite from the discussion of the whole question in the Dissertation *De Nihilo Nihil*, in which he argues that Plato did not hold to the eternity of matter, either in an organized, or unorganized state, and did not hold even to the eternity of the *hyle*, whatever the difficult conception which he

¹ To the first of the three sentences, before spoken of, as cited by the critic, this sentence is appended in a note, seemingly to show vacillation or inconsistency. It should have put the critic on a more careful reading of the context of his citation. As the passage cited in his text is given by us in full, the reader, as he follows on from the lines cited by the critic, can verify our statement, and also see there is nothing in the lines inconsistent with those appended to them in the critic's note.

would intimate by that word. "It is by no means clear that the eternity of matter was ever held by Plato; and, although some things in the *Timæus* may look that way when only partially considered, yet *they are all capable of a consistent interpretation on a different hypothesis*. His doctrine of the inherent evil of matter does not at all, by any necessity, involve its eternity. It was not connected with any necessary existence of matter, but with certain necessary properties which it must possess, if created, — without which it could not be matter, and without which God could not cause it to exist. In the *Laws*, as we have seen, his evil principle is spiritual, and has therefore nothing to do with the dogma *against which we are defending him*. *Even if he had held it*, it would not have been a heresy fatal to his claim to be regarded as a pure theist, although an inconsistent one; and the circumstances in which he was placed would have presented the same palliation as we have offered for his doctrine of evil. *But indeed we know of no system of Philosophy to which the tenet in question, in this gross form, would have been more foreign*. *To have allowed any necessary self-existence to matter, would have been directly in the face of some of his most favorite notions*; and especially opposed to that grand division in the *Timæus*, in which, under the general name τὸ ὁπατόν, it is expressly excluded from the class of the τῶν ὄντως ὄντων, and assigned to that of the γυγνόμενων καὶ οὐδέποτε ὄντως ὄντων. Nothing can be more express than the declaration that matter — not as organized, but in the most extreme or lowest state in which it can be matter, or, as he defines it, in the most general terms, the tangible, the visible, the extended — belongs to the class of generated, in distinction from eternal existences. And when we connect this with another proposition in the same passage, — that everything which is γυγνόμενον must have been produced by some cause, — it seems impossible any longer to maintain *that Plato regarded matter in any state as belonging to the world of necessary entities; and if not necessary, then not eternal; for he ever uses the two terms as mutually implying one another*. It would also be in

opposition to that high and even hyper-spirituality, which runs through all his writings, and which would warrant us in giving to them collectively, as their compendious title, **THE SOUL**; its eternal nature; its infinite value; its superior antiquity to matter; the immense præminence of incorporeal when compared with corporeal substances, and the utter worthlessness of the whole material universe in itself, or when not viewed as subservient to the higher wants of the spirit."

"It is true, that in conformity with this ancient maxim, *De Nihilo Nihil*, — *ὡς οὐ δύναται οὐδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γενέσθαι*, — which, as it stands in the Greek, unmarred by any attempt to transfer it to a more imperfect language, is one of the clearest axioms of reason,—he held to an elementary principle or *ἀρχή* more ancient than matter, even in its lowest organized state, and which he and others styled *hyle*. Although he sometimes seems to use this term in the sense of material, or source, yet he could not have meant by it matter in itself as something solid, extended, or resisting, since he expressly denies to it any of these properties, or indeed any connection in itself with this sensible world; regarding it in fact as belonging to the *νοητά*, rather than, in any sense, to the *αἰσθητά*. No sublimation or refinement of the conception of the resisting substance, even when carried to its most ethereal limits,—not even the nebular star-dust or rudimentary fluid of the universe, which some modern writers find so convenient an aid in the construction of planetary systems,—made the least approach to it; for it was not a mere difference of degree, but a metaphysical entity altogether distinct. It is very difficult to understand precisely what idea Plato and other Greek philosophers attached to this elementary *hyle*, without form, extension, parts, or divisibility. Some *ἀρχή*, or principle, seems to have been in his mind as the origin of matter, which was not matter; and yet something separate from the Deity, and existing with him before the formation of the outward material universe. *We are confident, for the reasons assigned, that he did not hold to its necessary eternity*; but it is not easy to determine whether he regarded it

as an emanation, a generation, or a creation, in the more modern sense of the word."¹

After remarking that the Dissertations of his author "chiefly aim at a comparison between the Scriptures and Plato, at illustrating portions of his philosophy, and at applying his views to the correction of some wrong principles which are *supposed* to prevail in the present age," the critic says, that in drawing parallels between the Scriptures and the writings of Plato, "a writer is in danger of being partial and one-sided." He sets forth "some considerations" "which ought to be borne in mind in such cases," and even denies the possibility of finding resemblances between the Scriptures and the heathen moralists; for, he says, that when "a man sets out with the object of finding parallels between a favorite author and the Scriptures, he

¹ The critic's discussion of Plato's doctrine of an Evil Principle, is even more unhappy than that of Plato's idea of the eternity of matter, which it follows; but we have not space to show this in full. Lewis holds, and beyond doubt correctly, that Plato, in some places, advances the idea of an eternal principle of evil; that in others he is inconsistent; in short, that his mind wavered on this difficult question. It is a fact not without significance for those who would study the thought of these times, that the critic who thinks that Plato believed matter eternal, thinks he did not believe in an evil deity; but we have to confine ourselves to the critical aspects of his remarks. Arguing against his author's position, he does not fully set forth his author's exceptions to it. He alludes to his author's reference to the *Timæus*, and, explaining the passage very much as he does, without quoting his language, makes the impression that the author had mistaken its force. Basing his argument mainly on a passage in the *Politicus*, he does not allude to his author's remarks upon it, and thus makes the impression, on those who do not compare the criticism and the treatise, that the author had overlooked it.

Following this discussion are a number of philological criticisms, as to which it is enough to say, that scholars will as often differ with the critic as they agree with him. Though set forth in a peremptory, oracular way, the criticism often resolves itself into a difference of opinion on a point where certainty is impossible. The critic seems solicitous to show his difference from other scholars, as well as from his author. Thus, in the second of these strictures, he states that Ast's version of the passage is inadmissible, and that Cousin mistook the meaning. In the next he objects to a correction made in accordance with a suggestion of Stephanus. Again, the author prefers an emendation of Böckh to Ast's, and the critic sides with Ast. Intermingled with these strictures are some critical remarks, such as where he dissents from the idea that the Athenian is Socrates. On this question his own remark, — "that the soul of Plato world is here wanting, notwithstanding the extreme weight and importance of the matter," is quite enough to decide the case against him.

necessarily conveys to the reader false ideas of the relations between the objects compared, if he does not change those relations by putting a higher sense upon the heathen author, than his words will warrant." In terms he decidedly exonerates his author "from throwing out of view the differences between Plato and the Bible,"— which is no more than just, for no man was ever more intelligently aware of them than Lewis, and this is one of the finest points in his Platonic criticisms, — yet he points all his remarks at him by this note. "Mr. Lewis shows 'that many of Plato's thoughts are capable of being accommodated to a spiritual sense, higher than the author himself had intended to convey,' and closes with advising preachers 'to read the Bible in close connection with our philosopher, and they will understand Plato better than he understood himself,'—if this is anything more than a strong expression of enthusiastic admiration, it puts an elasticity of import into Plato, something like that which certain writers have given to the word of God, to make it suit their theories." The critic himself says that Plato's mind "was preëminently fitted to see and receive that part of religious truth which lies open to the reason of mankind." Now, "if this is anything more than a strong expression of enthusiastic admiration," something of religious truth is embodied in the writings of Plato. Yet he had from without only the corrupted teachings of the primeval religion to aid him. Truth was something which he felt must be so, rather than something which he could prove to be so; truth he was groping after with his intellect, feeling after with his heart; truth he possessed more through his heart than through his intellect; through his heart enlightened by "the true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world;" and therefore it is not possible to study his soul by the light of the Bible, and not to understand him better than he understood himself.

This brings us to the grand difference between the critic and his author. The critic looks upon the Socratic system as he might look upon the systems of most modern philosophers, as a thing of the intellect, as a mere abstraction. While "an advo-

cate for the study of Plato," he thinks "that Platonism, in some degree, unfits its adherents for active life;" separates them from the mass of mankind; trains up men "who, like Plato himself, have more faculty for seeing the evils of society, than of mingling with it and improving it."

President Woolsey errs in his historical idea of Plato, when he thinks he had little faculty for mingling with the world and improving it. Pointedly opposed to his ideas, and more just, are those of Professor Sewall, of Oxford:¹ "Plato's great object was man. He lived with man; felt as a man; held intercourse with kings; interested himself deeply in the political revolutions of Sicily; was the pupil of one whose boast it was to have brought down philosophy from heaven to earth, that it might raise up man from earth to heaven; and, above all, he was a witness and an actor in the midst of that ferment of humanity exhibited in the democracy of Athens. We shall never understand the value of Plato's philosophy, and still less the arrangement and dependence of its parts, without viewing it as a practical, not a speculative system. No men have more mistaken the nature of Plato's system, than those who have regarded it as a speculative fabric; such as men of powerful intellect have wrought out at times in schools and cloisters, when the tranquillity of society enabled them to think without any necessity for action." "The young men of Athens were the persons expressly addressed. The purification of their morals, — the refutation of their corruptors, the Sophists, — the elevation of the standard of private and political morality, — the laying a firm foundation for a new national character, — the cleansing, or endeavoring to cleanse, the Augean stable of the Grecian democracy, — and the opening a new world of thought and feeling, as yet hidden behind the veil of a gross sensualistic materialism, — these, and not merely the foundation of a metaphysical school, or the development and propagation of barren truth, were constantly before the mind of Plato, guiding his thought

¹ Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato. By W. Sewall. Oxford, 1841.

and his pen throughout." "These works were intended to do all that mere philosophy could do, — to raise a solemn protest against the sins which it witnessed; to overthrow the sophistries which pandered to those corruptions; to open a nobler scene, and to create some yearning for its attainment in those few untainted minds, which nature had prepared for its enjoyment." "Many points will assume a wholly different character, whether we consider Plato's work as intended to declare his opinions, or as constructed for the purpose of extricating, by a tried and thoughtful process, the minds which it was still possible to save from the follies and sins and miseries in which the madness of the age, and a vicious system of education were plunging them."

The Socratic life was born of the heart of Socrates. Its spell controlled to its aims the marvellous intellect of Plato. The writings of Plato embody in words the spirit of a teacher who, through the same spirit with the Hebrew prophets, lived that by all means he might save some. It is beneath the praise of Socrates to call him a philosopher; he was one of those who "feared God, and worked righteousness." Such is the consenting voice of the Fathers. Such is the impression his life has made on the Church. It is, then, with sufficient warrant, said that Socrates lived the life of a missionary, sealing his confession with his blood, receiving from the common Lord alike of Gentile and of Jew, the glory of the crown of martyrdom.

Socrates was a practical philanthropist, as truly so as Paul, and this determines that Plato was also. His relations to Socrates, like those of Mark to Peter, or of Luke to Paul, are inexplicable, unless his heart and will were in his Master's work. His system is the highest affirmation by the moral nature of man, outside the Hebrew Theocracy, yet under higher influences than those of humanity, of eternal truths; its most earnest protest against the perishable wickedness of a perishing world. Its open secret is this, that its aim was practical, like that of the gospel.

This idea of master and disciple illuminates the Platonic writings. Though a philosophical religionism ever tends with

accelerating degradation to the abyss of atheism, there may be a religious philosophy, the handmaid seated in humble lowliness at the feet of Religion, or reverently busied under her guidance, in the outer courts of the Holy of Holies. Gratitude and truth will call this philosophy the Platonic; though purer and higher than that he knew, it has ever borne, ever will bear, his name. In this evil world, even as President Woolsey objects to it, it will in some measure "unfit its adherents for active life," will separate them from the masses of mankind. It will hinder them from the inordinate pursuit of gain, as the highest good; it will deliver them from the shallow fallacies of rationalism; it will forbid them to countenance wild schemes of disorganization, however popular, and to esteem the riches of a good conscience above the favor of the world.

To those who do not consider that the author designed to make a text-book which should awaken interest in the study of Plato, there will appear serious defects in the *form* of Lewis' Treatise. He felt that the Socratic system could only be of use through its being studied. His book is adapted to this precise end; it has in many cases accomplished it. But while in form an edition of a brief Dialogue of Plato's, it is in substance no less than a volume on Platonism; and the author's mode of presenting his ideas has this great disadvantage, that it limits him to themes suggested by the text, and in its order; it compels him to mingle dissertations of lesser and greater moment, shorter and longer, philological and metaphysical, in a way that detracts from the effectiveness of the volume, and may blind some to the value of the three hundred pages which follow the text. Scholars will agree with President Woolsey, that the author "unfolds his views with great ability;" that the three hundred pages "are not too long;" and, with another able writer, that "he has made a remarkable volume of it for this age and country;" — yet the work has, from its plan, a fragmentary character; and the breadth of its aim is not equal to the powers of its author, as an expounder of the Platonic writings. With all its fine philosophizing, its hundred refer-

ences to the other Platonic dialogues, or to ancient writings, it does not begin to exhaust the resources of Lewis on the subject of the Platonic writings, and of the whole circle of philosophical thought in the ancient world. It is only the spray of a fountain.

Professor Sewell, referring the tendency to revive the study of Plato in Europe to "the meanness, coldness, and barrenness of prevailing materialism and rationalism," and showing how the conservative instincts and moral sensibilities have driven men to this philosophy, frightened by the demoralizing lawlessness of the times, makes this remark: "We may evidently obtain more insight into the true nature of the Platonic system than any former age of philosophy; and the reason is, we are ourselves living in a period corresponding most remarkably with the times for which Plato wrote. We are beginning to feel his wants, to be perplexed with his difficulties, to witness the evils and the enormities with which he was surrounded; and these are the best interpretations of the course which his thoughts took." This remark is more applicable to some parts of this country, than to any part of Europe. In this democracy there is a spiritual, speculative audacity, questioning or denying all sacred, ancient things; a corruptness of thought, a confusion of moral ideas, a sinful unrest, a hungering and thirsting after unrighteousness, like that against which Socrates lived to protest; and as the evil in the Athenian democracy, acting upon his soul, and reacted upon by it, brought out his system fully in opposition to it, his system may be studied here with more practical comprehension of its meaning, and more living sympathy with the emotions through which it existed, than is possible elsewhere, or than ever was possible before.

Professor Sewell has some interesting remarks on the seeming want of system in the Platonic writings, and the real want of one to point out the system which is there, which we quote, putting together passages in his volume detached from each other. "To speak," he says, "of system as applied to the works of Plato, will seem very strange to those who have only

seen them bit by bit, and probably from a false position. They seem a collection of fragments, here a line and there a line, hint and hypothesis, doubt and dogmatism, feeling and reason, cold mathematical abstraction, and the most gorgeous poetry, the drama and the lecture, the serious and the ridiculous, all thrown together with a hand careless in the profuseness of its riches. The whole of Plato's works have been viewed in inextricable confusion. Even Schleiermacher has failed in his clew. Men seem to have wandered about as in a maze, here admiring, there perplexed, — then completely at a stand. No order, no limits, no end. Fragments have been dealt with as wholes, and wholes as fragments; irony mistaken for earnestness, and earnestness for irony; play for the fancy, gravely dealt with as meditation for the reason; and exercises for boys treated as the serious occupation of men. All have been impressed especially with his exquisite skill as an artist, or constructor of his works; and none have drawn a plan, which gives harmony and symmetry to them all. Some plan, however, must exist. No theory, which leaves them as they are in the eyes of the world, an undigested mass of oratory and poetry, skepticism and dogmatism, irony and seriousness, more like the wreck and ruin of a noble mind, than a system organized and revised by him to the last moments of his life, can do justice to the intention, or can interpret the sentiments of him who, by common consent, is the 'father and king of philosophy.' We require a clear, intelligible outline of the Platonic philosophy; then distinct introductions to each of the dialogues, pointing out the course of the reasonings, and fixing attention on the thousand minute delicacies and incidental hints, which give shape and animation to the whole. Something of this kind — but, it must be confessed, very briefly and imperfectly — has been attempted by most commentators. Cousin's are short headings, where the subject is treated in a bold, off-hand, sketchy, French style, too pleasing to be very deep, or to create much confidence in the writer. Schleiermacher's are profoundly obscure, and not sufficiently detailed to initiate the student into the whole art and

beautiful coherence of the several structures. And until some person, thoroughly inspired with the soul of Plato, viewing things with his eyes, and devoting his whole mind to that one object, shall have examined the minutest point, with the same confidence in their use and design with which an anatomist regards some newly-discovered fibre, or apparently superfluous vein, and has thus mastered and can explain their whole arrangement, we shall still encounter infinite perplexities." In this last sentence Lewis himself is described; and it is deeply to be regretted that the reception given to his volume on Plato — a volume too profound to be at once appreciated, too earnestly and skilfully opposed to our cherished rationalism to be warmly welcomed — was not such as to have compelled him to have given to his country the honor of the noblest exposition of the works of Plato the world has ever seen.

In a humility so intense as to be a practical defect, Lewis, though superior to the lust of fame, seems to need the appreciation of men. In his volume on Plato he promises another, if that work shall be acceptable to the public. Similar intimations may be found in each of the volumes he has published. But none of these works have ever appeared. We sympathize with this lone thinker, in great solitudes of thought, craving a little of that human sympathy which gives wings to genius, and steals from time its weight; yet so abstruse and grand are themes to which he is called, that in this age and country this condition of his working cannot be fully supplied. In no country, in no age, was there ever, or will there ever be, a public for such a mind. In this country there are peculiar difficulties in the way of its reaching those trained intellects through which, after that some time is passed over, its powers will make themselves widely felt. Our institutions of learning, instead of being concentrated as in England, are divided; and, besides the rivalries between them, there are the jealousies of sections and sects. The literary world has a sort of unity; but there is little unity in the scholastic and religious world. Lewis' writings are purely scholastic, and though so catholic in their spirit

as hardly to disclose to what school of faith he belongs, are intensely religious ; more so, even on scholastic and social topics, than those of some divines on sacred subjects. Had he identified himself more with some one sect, and less with the Christianity common to all, or had his zeal been less uncompromising, less ardent, and less holy, his fame would have been easier and wider. The true explanation of the reception here of his volume on Creation is, that it was too wise and too holy for this meridian. Bitterly mortifying as the fact is, it is better to confess it, than vainly to palliate, or disguise, or deny it. The reception of that volume by the organ of those religious scholars in these provinces, to whom, on such a theme, the heart of the writer must have instinctively turned for words of cheer, is but another of the ever-repeated illustrations of the disheartening truth, true from the foundation of the world, that while in every age, in every land, God raises up men with a special aptitude for eternal truths, they are never duly honored till they are mourned, — never, till they take their predestined place

Among the great of old,
The dead but sceptered sovereigns, who still rule
Our spirits from their urns.

The years Lewis has given to his volume on Creation might have produced an exposition of Platonism such as the scholastic world has vainly waited for for ages ; but the volume he has written disposes of a question, compared with which those debated in the schools are insignificant. We have spoken of its discoveries. We add a few words as to its literary character. Finer English has not been written. As an argument, it is a wonder of sustained power. Its tone is that of a soul which sees clearly into things mysterious, and is awed and exalted by what it sees. It is a poem in prose. The grand emotions it awakens make it a fitting comment on the wonderful vision of the Creative Ages. Its perfection as a work of art is not through art. Unconsciously, in the mirror of his style, the

writer's soul is reflected. Buffon said, "Style is the man himself," and for once the definition has come true.

"The Bible and Science," is a thesaurus of the ideas of its author, suggested in the preparation of the volume on Creation, or by criticisms upon it. It is three or four hundred pages of the printed conversation of Lewis, on themes revolved by him in the silence of thought. Hence its discursiveness, its windings, its free eloquence. It should be read till the reader has an index of it in his brain, and can bring together all it says on the same topics. This especially applies to what it says on science, which, when brought together, is a very full exposition of the relation of scientific to eternal truth. The key to it is this luminous thought: "Revelation is the great first supernatural fact of facts, the solid ground of credence in all other supernatural." The book is the musing of a seer on Nature and Revelation. It is a book of thoughts. The names of certain critics are strewn so thickly along some pages, that at first view they are unattractive; but these gentlemen detract but little from the pleasure the volume gives. They are but organ-blowers to music that peals along cathedral aisles.

Besides these three volumes, and his recent volume on Inspiration, the writings of Lewis consist of six addresses, and of articles in reviews, magazines, and newspapers. These miscellaneous writings would probably make five volumes, of four hundred pages each. As a whole, they have been printed rather than published. Lewis has treated his audience as De Quincey did his. He has suffered his writings to lie so scattered about, that it is very doubtful if any one has a complete collection of them, — doubtful if he has himself.

It may be asked, Can disconnected, casual, fugitive essays, have any great and lasting value? A perception of how and why these were written, is the best answer to this. Imagine, then, a genius, born with an aptitude for seizing upon difficult truth, severely trained in classical and mathematical studies, in the most abstruse walks of the legal profession also, and there

acquiring a judicial thoroughness and fairness of reasoning, not always the result of scholastic training; — imagine him setting himself to explore in solitude, with the aid of the wisest of the heathen world, of the fathers, the schoolmen, of metaphysicians and sages, and under the controlling guidance of Revelation, thoroughly, honestly, reverently, the great problems of life and being; imagine him with a mind at once solitary and social, content with no society save that of the teaching dead, while for years he searches into problems which require time and silence, yet with a heart drawn to study all the phases of society; imagine in his life contrasted periods, one of seclusion from the world, one in the centre of its whirl; — and you will see that if the writings of such a genius, commencing when this long preparation was complete, were elicited by circumstances around him, and if the time was full of bewildering novelties, of audacious speculations in religion, in morals, and politics, — if all truth was questioned, all error affirmed, — that such writings must have a great and lasting value, and might constitute a very complete system of truth. And what has thus been imagined, many, no doubt, would like to have done in this very form. Our democracy is so unlike anything ever before; there are so many new or seemingly new theories afloat; the human mind itself seems so madly bent on testing everything; many are so willing to actualize the most rash, or even wicked speculations; the most presumptuous innovations upon the opinions and practices of all past time, the most fundamental changes in the laws, leading directly to changes of moral sentiment, and often insidiously growing out of them, are so incessantly proposed or made; and all these novelties have so many brazen-throated, fanatical advocates, that, deafened by the clamor, and perplexed by seeing the few as mad as the many, we crave one mind competent to see how these novelties stand in the light of the world's better thinking, of experience, and of revelation.

Lewis, having a very complete system of truth, commenced to write in the presence of a very complete system of untruth.

"There is," as he says, "a harmony of truth, and there is a unity and affinity of error." Opposing error encircling him on all sides and on all subjects, there is in his writings a roundness and completeness of truth. There is no error which could suggest itself to man, which has not here been suggested and acted upon. There is no known truth the converse of which — it may be in most jesuitical disguise — has not here been advocated. But so subtle, so piercing, so clear is his intellect, that it seems almost intuitively to discern the counterfeit from the true ; and it has this advantage over its antagonists, that it has accurate knowledge of the past phases of human thought. Half the phantoms which crowd the field, he conjures into non-entity by one word, proofs and illustrations of which abound in his writings : "These are the newly-risen ghosts of ancient errors."

If ever brought together, his essays will present a very complete system. They treat of moral and social problems, and form an ideal and practical philosophy. They discuss the true idea of the Church, the true idea of the State, and carry out the principles established to many of their consequences.

The way in which he has strewn his sibylline leaves about, suggested to us to illustrate their character by the essays of two writers, the fragmentary character of whose writings has not hindered their being sought for—Coleridge and De Quincey. But in learning, logic, and intellect, they are too inferior to be brought into the comparison. His parallel must be sought among writers of a wider and less perishing remembrance. Not indeed but that Coleridge has put forth a widely-felt and still extending influence, — more so in this country than in England, — but, in its last analysis, his philosophical speculations are brilliant failures to reconcile principles not fathomed, with doctrines not believed.

Time furnishes one parallel to the genius of Lewis, so exact that it might almost lead one to believe in the old doctrine of metempsychosis. The only name which that of Lewis suggests, is the name of the greatest of Frenchmen — the name

of Pascal. The genius of each is the same. Each has the same mathematical genius, fitted for the safe examination of abstruse problems, and irresistibly compelled to grapple with them. In each is the harmony of the ideal and the practical. Great as writers, they are greater as men. Each have heroic fealty to truth, making them earnest in its defence, unsparing in the exposure of its counterfeits,—Bayards in the world of mind, without fear, without reproach. Each are masters of resistless logic, terrible invective, keen sarcasm, delicious irony; the wit of each is allied to unearthly sadness; and each, in their true devotion to truth, make it subservient to fairest reasoning. The writings of each have passages of crystalline clearness, in which abstruse ideas are pictured with the brilliancy of poetry, and the accuracy of mathematics. They are endowed with an imagination entirely unique, a revealing rather than a creating faculty, effective of all the sublimity imagination can awaken, yet resolving itself into clearness and far-reachingness of intellectual vision. Nor are their lives so unlike as it might seem. The one throws all his soul into a contest with the order of Jesuits; the other, into a contest with an age more jesuitical than the Jesuits.

Pascal having surveyed all truth, projected a work which should embody that survey. The substance of it exists in fragments. What he did first for himself, then as preparatory to his work, that Lewis has done for himself. Something, too, of that which Pascal did for his work, he has done; and from all that he has written, it might be possible to compile a book of thoughts so wide in their range, yet so related, so ultimate yet clear, so wise, so true, and many of them so condensed, pointed, and felicitous in expression, that it would be worthy to be laid beside that of the great Frenchman.

The papers of Lewis, though on a variety of subjects, are homogeneous. Each is a chapter or section from his brain; and there is no want of unity in what he has written, as there is none in what he has thought. And, above even that unity which comes from his mind, there is in them that unity which

comes from a fixed centre and rule for his thinking. As with Pascal, that centre and rule is the word of God.

He holds, that any idea of God, other than that revealed, comes far short of the glory of "that Being who, to separate Him on the one hand from the idols of superstition, and on the other from the cold abstractions of philosophers, may be styled, by way of eminence, the God of the Bible." In the following extract he shows wherein the philosophical conceptions of the Deity come short of his true glory, revealed through the Scriptures, and through them alone. His knowledge of systems and schools furnishes him with significant illustrations of his positions, — to some, no doubt, with the most convincing arguments for them, for the power of certain errors lies in their seeming novelty.

ON THE TRUE IDEA OF GOD.

"The doctrine of the *anima mundi*, or universal life, *although revived in every age as a high philosophical speculation unknown before*, may in fact be traced among some of the oldest developments of the human mind. It was one of the earliest forms in which the fallen nature of man manifested its dislike of a personal God, a righteous Governor, as revealed in the Bible.

"There is a charm to many minds in such views of the Deity, *if so they may be called*, because they invest Him with no moral character. *It is a mere personification of power, motion, and extension*, which, while its contemplation gratifies the pride of intellect, produces no effect upon the heart. It can be the object of no spiritual communion. It can be the hearer of no prayer. A Rousseau and a Byron could approach even into the very presence of their idolized abstraction, whilst no conviction of sin troubled their consciences, or disturbed that complacency in emotions of their own creating, which they mistook for lofty communings with the spirit of nature. Even the professed atheist will have his universal power; *only call it a principle, a property, a cause, or anything but a God, and he is content. To this word also would he have no objection, could*

he only separate it from the idea of moral retribution. Every view which stops short of the moral attributes of Deity, or does not assign to them the highest place, is essentially atheistical. The contemplation of power may awe the soul into a feeling of sublimity, or blind veneration; but it matters not, as far as this effect is concerned, *whether it be styled a first cause, or the attraction of gravitation.*

“The intellectualist, or natural theologian, may rise a step higher. He may assign to his deity the attribute of wisdom as well as power, whilst he regards the ascription of feelings, or passions, in any other except some transcendental and unintelligible sense, as a derogation from his perfections. The wisdom he adores is the wisdom of natural adaptation, of natural means to natural ends, manifested in the regular orbits of the planets, in the curious structures of the vegetable and animal worlds, in the minute wonders of microscopic organization. Final or moral causes he gravely pronounces not to fall within the legitimate province of science,—condemns their investigation as only prompted by ignorance and superstition; or, with a skeptical sneer, transfers the whole subject from science to that ‘faith which does not permit itself to be too closely questioned by reason.’ His deity is too wise, too immutable, too much like nature herself, to condescend to the details of a special moral Providence. He would rather adopt that lofty and more philosophical view, which regards him as the *causa causarum*, the main spring, placed at an immense distance, of a long train of secondary influences, which, together with their primary, operate by a supposed necessity, arising out of the nature of things,—thus *denying to the Creator that individuality of will and action which he is compelled to attribute to some of his works.*

“*Such a one has not arisen to the true idea of a God. There have been those who have gone nearly as far as this, and yet did not even rank themselves among theists.* The ancient Hylozoists believed almost if not quite as much as some who have written works on natural theology, and treatises to prove the existence

of a Deity. Their universal life possessed intelligence, but it was regarded as unconscious intelligence, because there was no world external to itself, which could objectively give rise to the phenomena of consciousness. It was *nature's instinct*, possessed of the highest wisdom, but only of a natural wisdom arranging physical means in reference to physical ends, with no more choice or exercise of will than is manifested in those animal instincts which were considered a part of this universal plastic principle of adaptation. As a necessary consequence, it was regarded as destitute of personality ; and, *in fact, whatever system of philosophy is adopted, whether of the sensual or transcendental school, the personality of the Deity is not truly acknowledged, until he is regarded as possessed, in addition to power and intellect, of moral attributes, and viewed in relation to beings, whose conduct may be the object of his love and aversion. In the conviction of sin, we find alone a true conviction of a personal God — the God of the Bible.*

“The representations of the Scriptures are equally opposed to pantheism or materialism on the one hand, and to idealism on the other. In the one system, God is often regarded as a necessary conception, an idea, a creation of the human mind ; and *this idea, as we attempt to grasp it, keeps ever vanishing away, until it becomes only another name for truth, or, in other words, an apotheosis of human reason.* In the other, he is identified with physical power, connected with an unintelligible property of adaptation — *the result, and not the cause, of the organization of the universe, or rather the organization itself.* The Scriptures everywhere present the most sublime descriptions of power and wisdom, but *unite them in an essence, which imparts to both reality and energy.* This essence, or third thing, is the moral nature of the Deity ; and thus they reveal to us an individual, personal, acting, feeling, loving, and angry God, — knowing all things, moving all things, designing all things for moral ends ; loving all which is good, or that which is like himself ; hating all that is opposite ; having intellect, power, passions, — Jehovah — the living God — our God — the God of his

people — the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. *In the contemplation alone of the moral attributes, and especially as they are exhibited in the cross of Christ, we arrive at a true belief in that God with whom we have to do.* It is this view which invests him with such an awful personality to us as sinners, and which, when deeply impressed upon the soul, will ever save it from both the extremes of false philosophy. *The belief in a God of power and intellect, has no real advantages over atheism. Such a being is nothing to us, or we to him.*"

In the thoughts of Lewis, the question of questions is this : Has a supernatural Word indeed broken through the stillness of nature and time ? The answers to this question he traces in all their consequences. *If not*, then man is shut up to nature, and "cannot escape from the thought, which, revelation once gone, or once supposed to be gone, presses so heavily upon the soul, — *the thought to which every true thinking man feels he must come if he has to give up the Bible*, — the thought which he may dread, as a sane mind sometimes dreads the horrors of apprehended insanity, but knows of no true security against it, unless it be a voice from heaven, — the thought so feared by some, so loved by others, *because it is so natural*, — the thought that perhaps all is nature and nature all, — eternal law, eternal nature, — unmodified by anything that has ever come into it from a higher world of being." If not, there is left to man but blank atheism, — confusion of right and wrong in morals, license and corruption in practice, and in death annihilation. But if the All-wise, the All-holy has indeed uttered his voice, he is sure it will seem to the human conscience the voice of the Maker and Judge. Therefore he rejects all attempts to prove the inspiration of the Scriptures "by their conformity to what is termed right reason ; by this term being meant, our views of what *ought* to be true in theology or ethics." In all this he says — and it is a saying to be remembered — "*We bring to the clearing of the Scriptures the very darkness they were intended to illuminate.*"

In his view, the true internal evidence of the Scriptures is

of a very different kind: "*It is the recognition of the majestic Voice of God speaking to us therein, and in every part. It is not simply the intellectual assent to the logical consistency of its doctrines, however defectively or partially seen; it is not that 'beautiful morality,' which some infidels have been so fond of praising; it is not the loftiness of its oratory, or the sublimity of its poetry; but distinct from all these, and above all these, it is that impress of Divine authority, which comes from long and devout and loving communion with the sacred volume. It is that 'satisfying light,' evidencing itself to be the true light by the fact, that it enables us to see not only itself, but other things by means of it; making reason more clear, by revealing its limitations, and other knowledge more valuable, by the discovery of its true and inferior position. It is what one has called, 'the Divine Majesty beaming in the Word.'*"

With a Pascal-like condensedness of thought, and luminousness of expression, he thus sets forth the claim and authority of the Bible: "It comes not to be judged, but to sit in judgment on us." The whole passage is deeply fraught with much-needed truth. "The Bible comes not to crave the respect and homage of mankind; but *is sent into the world as a test of moral character.* It is not a mere work of taste, submitted for our approval or disapproval. It allows no compromise of its claims. *It comes not to be judged, but to sit in judgment on us.* It admits not for a moment that the internal evidence of its divine origin is at all insufficient. In vain is the plea, that belief is involuntary. *The fact, that the heart was not in a condition to be influenced by the moral evidence which appears upon the pages of the Bible, seals its condemnation.* The belief or disbelief of the Scriptures is not a question presented alone to the intellect of man. It brings its claim before a different tribunal. It comes as a tryer and discernor of spirits, piercing into the inmost recesses of the soul, and revealing the thoughts and intents of the heart. No plea against it will be allowed at that judgment-seat at which its statutes will constitute the supreme law, and the only interpreter of the conscience."

With such a view of the Bible, it is to him the Word of God, which "indeed should control our ethics, our politics, our literature, our philosophy, our science." On the absolute authority of the Bible, in all matters of which it professes "to treat, or even to speak," he says: "*A revelation received as coming from God, must be everything or nothing. It must be exclusive as well as conclusive. It can allow no concurrent, no collateral authority. Nothing else that is styled a revelation, whether in nature or in history, can be put on a par with it, or in any sense placed in parallelism with it. Once admitted as indeed the Divine supernatural voice, nothing else can approach it; nothing else, that calls itself authority, can hold up its face before it on its own field.*"

These words express the sentiment which pervades, the rule which governs his writings, whether they touch on moral, political, or social, on literary, scientific, or historical, on classical, or metaphysical subjects. They correspond with what might be anticipated from these sentences: "If admitted as a Revelation, the Bible must have the supremacy in all things. Consistency requires that it should be regarded not only as occupying the highest place, *but as having a bearing on every other pursuit, and every other branch of knowledge.*"

Lewis holds that "the Family, the State, and the Church, are three divinely ordained societies on earth, each inculcating the same lesson, although with sanctions continually ascending, each successively in the order of their rank, supplying the defects of the lower, yet each aiming at the same high destiny, and each to be regarded as divinely appointed by the same eternal source of all law and rightful authority in Heaven and Earth." According to Lewis, then, the State is a religious institution, *a power ordained of God*. This truth he unfolds in a discourse on "The True Idea of the State," from which we shall make full citations.

It would have been easy for its author to have shown the fallacy of the popular theories of government which are opposed to his idea, and in doing this there would have been an

open field for his wit, irony, and sarcasm ; but he prefers the more difficult, direct method. He sets forth the True Idea of the State, the consequences of it, and of its converse, and leaves it to the moral sense to affirm that such an idea must be the true, and its opposite the false. This True Idea of the State is made to throw light upon political questions, and to receive confirmation from them. The argument for it is cumulative, continuous ; gaining strength as the idea, growing more and more luminous, is more and more clearly apprehended.

Following the exordium, is this passage, which is a good preface to all the philosophical writings of Lewis.

ON THE TWO SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY.

Adverting to the famous question disputed between the Ionian and Eleatic schools, Do all things flow, and does nothing stand? he says that almost all metaphysical disputes resolve themselves into this, and right views in almost every department of science are more or less connected with this subtle inquiry. Its odd phraseology he interprets thus : "Are there merely phenomenal facts, or is there a world of truth and being, separate from the perceived and apparent, not merely as generalizations of the mind, but as realities more stable than the earth, more permanent than the old rolling heavens, — *ideas* fixed, eternal, which were never born, and which can never die, — from which all individual things derive reality, and by partaking of which alone they become objects of science ?

"Discussions growing out of this prime question, *embrace the whole circle of the mind's inquiries*. In the one school, all physical science must be but a knowledge of the various sites, motions, and aggregations of atoms. Organic *wholes* are not distinct realities, but the mere *numerical sums* of parts and laws, — the *results*, instead of the *causes*, of organization. Life of any kind is but a harmony — a mere effect. The soul is but a series of acts, or feelings, without any connecting

essence, as the body is a mere accumulation, and nothing more, of ever-flowing atoms. Ethics becomes a calculation of physical pleasures or pains, *a mathematical summing of the nervous vibrations*. Law and government are but *the temporary will of the stronger*,—the physical result of the aggregate force of a numerical majority, the preponderance of mere *volition* in the masses, instead of that *Will*, which is ever in unison with the permanent Reason of the State; and the State has no other being than the numerical aggregation of its population at any one time,—willing as it wills, changing as it changes,—and, in this everlasting flow, never maintaining for two consecutive moments a fixed identity.

“It is sufficient to say, that the opposing school, although under various forms, and with various modifications and corruptions, has yet held substantially to a system in all respects the reverse. Above physics, it places the *μεταφυσικά*, or *those everlasting ideas, of which natural organisms are but the diagrams*. In the science of life or being, it regards both soul and body as possessed each of an *essence, aside from the temporary exercises of the one, and the mere anatomical organization of the other*; so that even the body is viewed as having its identifying principle in itself, as living on amid all the mutations of its individual atoms,—like a river of life, which, although its particles are continually changing, yet ever remains one and the same, in its everlasting motion. In Ethics, it holds to an *eternal rule of right, imparting character to actions—not deriving it from them—by an induction of consequences*. It maintains that the State is something more than its *present masses*: that it is a living *whole*, distinct from the dead sum of its present parts; and that Law is something higher than the popular will. It places absolute and ultimate sovereignty neither in the fluctuating governors, nor more fluctuating governed, *but in fundamental Law as controlling both, and existing as the true representative on the earth of the Majesty in the Heavens*. In this system, Theology is no suspected or excluded foe. It forms not only the foundation, but

is diffused through the whole, connecting every part with the eternally and unchangeably true."

The following passage may well be read in connection with the preceding :

"There is one characteristic which pervades almost every department of modern speculation. The knowledge of universals is sought only from the inductive examination of particulars, and a *whole* is regarded as being an aggregation of *parts*, instead of that unity which gives to each part its distinctive character and notion as a part, and which it cannot possess separate and alone. It is only a partial view, and in all scientific investigations, a higher truth is kept out of sight when this method is exclusively pursued. We never in this way arrive at a true idea. Whether conscious of it or not, the mind, in some way, with more or less of truth, makes the idea of a *whole* antecedent to a knowledge of the *parts*. The latter cannot really be known, unless there is some *à priori* view of that unity, of which they are parts ; and this unity is never rightly comprehended, as long as it is regarded as nothing more than the arithmetical sum of contiguous portions. Thus in respect to government, the tendency is to proceed from individuals to the State, and to regard the latter as an aggregation, and nothing more, of the former. When the mind has long practised this oblique, and, we have also reason for saying, unnatural method, it is found very difficult to conceive of anything beyond this — a substantial reality in the State, which, although never *in actu* existing separate, is yet logically (*ἐν εἶδει*) a distinct thing, aside from and above the individuals who compose its ever-flowing masses, — of which these individuals must partake, in order to live their true life, and to form true members of a body politic ; just as some naturalists cannot understand the difference between *body* and *mass*, or that unity implied in the former term, by which a *metaphysical whole* is superadded to the parts as a distinct thing from their *physical sum*."¹

¹ In confirmation or elucidation of his views at various points in this discourse,

In unison with such ideas as these, but basing the doctrine on the Scriptures, this discourse maintains, in distinction from that theory which regards the State as a mere civil compact, having no reference to man's spiritual nature, and no higher aim than self-defence, or the security of the rights of person and property, that it is a religious institution, ordained of God. In discussing this proposition, it makes a distinction, not attending to which, great mistakes have been made by most political writers, — a distinction between

Lewis refers to the ancients. Thus he says: "Some politicians conceive of no life in the State apart from that of the men and women who compose it. Not so, however, the great minds of antiquity, to the diligent study of whom I would earnestly urge all the educated youth of our land, with the firm belief that in no other way could I confer so real and lasting a benefit upon my country. The State, says Cicero, should be so founded that it may be eternal.—*Debet enim sic esse constituta civitas ut aeterna sit.*"^a Aristotle says the life of the State is ever one and the same, although its masses are ever in the act of being born and perishing.^b He tells us we can alone determine its identity by having regard to its idea, its polity, or fundamental law, and not to the generations who may be at any one time inhabiting the same space. He does not, like Hobbes, regard government as a mutual treaty of defence, but as something pertaining to man in his most perfect state, and as absolutely essential to that perfection.^c Man could not be strictly man without it. He is by nature *πολιτικόν ζῶον*, a political animal. An existence in the State is required for the completion of his humanity, even although his wants and his vices did not render it essential to his protection against himself.^d Man, according to this noble philosopher, follows that law of organization which prevails throughout the physical and moral universe, and which requires that the perfection of parts can only be obtained as members of a whole. So different is the current of modern philosophy, that we find it hard fairly to appreciate our author's meaning, when he declares that in the order of nature *wholes* are before *parts*, and that, therefore, the State in some form is essential to the perfect existence of other relations; so that without it, even the family, could we suppose it to exist, would be a mere herding together, and not that holy community, which derives not only its security, but its perfection from established law. As the foot, he says, or the hand, when severed, no longer retain their perfection as members of an organized system, and are no longer strictly entitled to their former name, so man, when the organic whole of which he forms a member is gone, is thenceforth no longer strictly man, but loses his distinctive humanity,^e and sinks even below the brute. Law is the breath of his higher or spiritual life, and he cannot exist as such without it."

^a Cicero *Repub.* *Leip.*, p. 273.

^b *Arist. Politica*, *Leip.*, p. 74.

^c The same, p. 81. Compare also Cicero, *Repub.*, *Leip.*, p. 220.

^d *Arist. Politica*, *Leip.*, p. 87.

^e *Arist. Politica*, *Leip.*, p. 4, 5.

THE IDEA AND THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE.

"The internal idea of the State has been confounded with its external origin. Because the very laws of our own souls compel us to regard the former as *one*, theorists have been ever seeking for some *one* origin of the political fabric under which every other may be generalized. Not having found this, they have been compelled to resort to fictions, which have seldom, if ever, been exhibited in the realities of history. They are, however, no more the same than the life of the body is identical with the external circumstances under which it was first exercised. The idea is, and ever must be, one; the origin may be as various as the ever-varying conditions of mankind. In some one case, the origin of the State may possibly have been this social compact, of which so much is said; in another, it may have been the result of a long series of causes, gradually forming men into a certain society, gathering the scattered parts into a whole, and thus slowly producing an organization cemented by unwritten, yet long-established principles. It may have been the production of a wicked revolution, from which, although the authors could claim no political authority, yet God and time may have built up a State demanding obedience on a higher principle than that in which it originated; or it may have sprung from one of those extreme cases of justifiable resistance, which are undertaken for the maintenance rather than the subversion of law. It may have been a colonial scion, severed in this way from the parent stem, and conveying the old organic life, with the necessary modifications, into its new state of being. It may have come from some act equivalent to national suicide, in which the primitive organization suffers a violent death, and another (obedient to that law of political life, from which man cannot escape without becoming a savage) arises out of its ruins. It may have grown up, as most of the earlier states did, from an amplification of the family or particular relation. It may have been a theocracy formed by express Revelation. It may have arisen from a

political chaos. It may have been the offspring of conquest or seeming chance."

Another error which hinders the reception of The True Idea of the State, is the not distinguishing between

THE IDEA OF THE STATE AND ITS FORM.

"The *idea* of the State has been confounded with its *εἶδωλον*, its image or outward form. There is a very ancient division of government into the monarchy, the aristocracy, and the democracy, or rather the republic. This distinction is well understood, but it should be borne in mind that *it relates more to the form than to the essence.*

"In each of these there may be freedom or tyranny; and this depends upon a still higher distinction, having relation to the essential idea, irrespective of the outward form. Each of these species may be based upon fundamental Law — whether written or unwritten makes no difference — in which resides that ultimate sovereignty, by which the acting sovereignty, whether regarded as exercised by king or people, bears rule. There may be preferences in respect to these forms, but they are all legitimate, — all, when thus established, are powers ordained of God. *All may be free governments; for the essence of freedom consists in the supremacy of abstract Law over personal will, whether the will or wills of the one, the few, or the many.*

"Again, all these forms may exist without any fundamental Law, with nothing to control the absolute will of the present acting power, whether lodged in the monarch, or the masses. In this case the government is properly styled *absolute*. *There may be the absolute democracy, as well as the absolute monarchy.* The essential feature in both is the same. They are governments of *will*, in distinction from *Law*; of the *personal*, in distinction from the *abstract*; of the uncertain and temporary, in distinction from the known and permanent. There is in them nothing connected with the common and higher reason of the

race ; nothing above man ; nothing which affords any security against the tyranny of human passions. It is an essential despotism, whether of the king, or of the masses ; whether of an imperial edict, or of a corrupt public sentiment. The sacred spirit of law is utterly unknown to it."

In governments of passion and will, whether autocratic or democratic, he does not find the State at all ; but wherever the True Idea of the State is to be found, "in respect to the *perfection of the Idea*, external forms make no difference. If based on settled and well-known law, controlling alike the governors and the governed, then whatever may be its external forms, it is a *free State*. It may be more or less popular. The fundamental law may commit to God the choice of the rulers, to be determined by the law of descent, or the decisions of the lot ; or it may be one of the provisions, under which the same Providence has placed us, that the magistrate receives the personal designation from the ballots of the people ; still the sanction of the law and the authority of the ruler remain unaffected by the difference. The one is to us the voice of God ; and the other is not, what the demagogue so hypocritically styles himself, *the most humble servant of the people*, but the appointed delegate of the Most High, bearing the sword not simply of utilitarian, but vindictive justice. Here is the majesty of the law. Here is a noble ground of obedience."

In all cases in submitting to government, based on fundamental law, "we submit to an ordinance of God, not in the vague sense, in which everything in the natural world may be called the act of God, but because the State is something above nature ; it claims to exercise the spiritual prerogatives of moral law ; it becomes allied to the moral legislation of the universe ; *it asserts power over man, and therefore must derive its true authority from a superhuman source*. It claims to bind the future as well as the present ; and must therefore be allied to the fixed and the eternal."

This is a part of what is said of the creation of our National Government: "We find attached to our Constitution the most

revered names in our nation's history, but it would be a most limited view which would regard it merely as *their* act. Should we even take in the States and the people of the States by whom it was ratified, we do not even then form an estimate sufficiently high and deep, of that, which constitutes its solemn obligation. No, it was not the act merely of part or all of these. Its paper enactments, its formal legislative or popular ratifications even, contained in themselves no validity. It was beyond their power to transform a mere voluntary human compact into a living nation. This belonged alone to Him 'who knoweth the way of the Spirit,' and whose power is as much engaged in quickening the national, as the individual embryo. It was not with the acts of men, but with the lives of infants, as by thousands and tens of thousands they came into being under its provisions, that the life of the nation was fully consummated. It was when those who had assisted at its birth, had passed or were passing away, and another generation was standing up in its place, when a new race arose, who first received from it the baptism and the name of citizens, and to whom it became the fountain of those political, social, moral and religious rights, which have no existence in a state of nature — then was this nation fully born. Then did this Promethean image, this thing of conventions and paper constitutions, become a thing of life. Then did it truly begin to *bind*. Before this it was merely the obligation of man to man, that general duty of obedience to the acts and recommendations of the wise and good and patriotic of our fellow-men, which no one can lightly despise. Then it took root in a deeper principle. The divine became connected with the human. The State became a power ordained of Heaven, and its obligation the solemn obligation of a law of God."

The True Idea of the origin and Life of the State is well illustrated by this extract from a part of two passages on the Death of the State: "The State itself in its idea, and in all the true sanctions of its authority, is essentially a religious, a spiritual power. This may be the case practically, *even after*

the idea has been abandoned in theory, but when totally lost, the State, as such, no longer exists. When no higher source or sanction of law is acknowledged than the popular will, when all recognition of spiritual authority is rejected, when there is no holy time, no appeal to the invisible, by that last remnant of State-religion, the solemn rite of the oath, — when its life or identity is broken up by practically denying the civil connection of the generations of the living with the dead, — when the magistrate is no longer in any sense regarded as the minister of God, but as the humble servant of the popular will, — when the right of appeal from the sacred bench to the volition of the masses is sustained, — when law is no longer regarded in its spirit, if not in its forms, as an invisible religious power, connected in its sanctions with the Divine Law, but as the mere public sentiment for the time being of the present population, — then we say the State no longer exists; its radical idea is lost; it is no longer a State, but a mass-meeting. Having cut loose from the only true source of all authority, its power is an usurpation; its decrees are tyranny; its law is force. No man under it can lawfully claim power over his fellow-men. Its parts have no cohesion. It has committed political suicide. It has undergone a civil death; and the men and women, whom it once held together in the bonds of political life, are in that savage state which has been styled, though falsely, the state of nature. ‘The State,’ says the great philosopher of Rome, ‘undergoes no natural death; that is, no death in the ordinary course of nature, like a man; but when taken away, is utterly extinguished and blotted out. It is as if a world had perished, — simile est ac si omnis hic mundus intereat et concidat.’ Even the external form is gone; there is no longer anything to define its outward or internal boundaries. Its people are in that case no longer fellow-citizens, or even citizens of anything. They are mere men and women, with no other relation than that of mere contiguity. Its territorial limits vanish or remain only as enclosing a political vacuum, surrounded by other states. A political death comes over what

before was full of social life, and society is decomposed into its individual elements. *It is no longer a BODY, but a MASS—a mass of putrescent and fermenting atoms.*

“At whose command shall these fragments again come together? Who by any inherent political power shall again breathe into them the breath of life? From this valley of dry bones a State or States may at some future time arise; but God alone can determine the time and manner of its resurrection.”

Adverting to those lower views of the State, which look merely to secular welfare, as the preservation of order, of property, of personal security, he says, *even these “must be based on principles deeper than themselves.* It would not be difficult to show that, even in human governments, *the punishments of crime must be to a certain extent vindictive; that is, contain an appeal to the conscience, in order that it may have a hold upon the moral sense, and by being thus connected with the Divine,* may sustain those inferior principles of order and prevention, which are often assumed as the only ends of human law.”¹

These passages, elucidating the True Idea of the State, well prepare for this noble passage on the ends of Government: “Government has been called a libel on human nature, a necessary evil. We contend, on the other hand, that existence in that relation which is styled a State, is essential to our highest dignity,—that the falsely called state of nature *is never found, except as a degradation from higher relations that once existed,*—that obedience to law constitutes man’s highest glory,—and that he owes submission to it, *not because he has made it, but because it is required to make him what he should be,* to elevate him above that brute nature to which the idea of law is utterly unknown,—*to deliver him from that servile tyranny of his own*

¹ The thought just alluded to in this sentence he has elsewhere expanded in an Essay on the Nature and Ground of Punishment, of which a critic has well said, that means ought to be taken “to place a copy in the hands of every legislator in the land; for we know not where the ground and basis of all true government and law are more forcibly set forth.”

passions which he mistakes for freedom ; and to make him a living member in living communion with that universal, intelligent, rational, and religious society, of which God is the head and established Law, in some form the presiding Spirit. The grand object intended by God in the institution of the State is, that training to obedience to law as law in this world, which, *instead of being superseded in another*, is there carried to its consummation, and made the Essential Element of the perfection and happiness of that blessed State, — a state in which law still reigns, although without the ideas of force or coercion, — *where it is none the less real, because it is never disobeyed*, — where its subjects are no longer ἀνομοι, or even ὑπὸ νομόν, but have so far advanced in this process of education as to have become ἐννομοι, in all the glorious perfection which the Apostle intends by that most expressive term."

In this connection should be read, this from an Essay on the Statesman : "It is the very inferiority of the mere animal, as distinguished from the rational existence, *that it knows no law out of itself connecting it with larger organizations.* To be thus at the same time the subject and object of law, is the glory of man and of all higher beings between him and the throne of the Eternal. *Individualism, which is only another name for sensualism, is the death of the rational nature. Law is its nurse, its aliment, its life, its regulative exercise when in health, its curative medicine when diseased.* To acknowledge the necessity of right outward authority binding us into organic connection with other beings, is the highest act of the intellect ; to submit to it, instead of being a servile and degrading obedience, is the highest glory, and the highest freedom, too, of a responsible spiritual agent. Hence a man may be said to live two lives, — the lower as an individual, the higher as a member of a social communion. The latter is, in truth, the higher, because it is the life he lives in common with others ; and which, in proportion to its universality, rises above the animal and sensual, into the sphere of rational existence. The Greeks, of whom some say they had no political science, denoted this civic

existence by a peculiar word, which, to the disgrace of our philosophy, has no counterpart in modern tongues. Πολιτεύεσθαι, was to live the life of a citizen, or member of a state, a political, in distinction from an individual or animal existence; just as in the New Testament the same term is applied to the still higher life the soul lives as a member of the Church, or that *Politeuma*, whose visible body is on the earth, while it ever has its true vitality in the heavens."

Lest any one should imagine that this address looks towards a union of Church and State, we cite from the same Essay, where, speaking of "the essential religious element in the State, and the impossibility of there ever being a true State without it," he says he has not in view a "Church by law established; but the great idea of the inseparable connection between all true government on earth, and the invisible government in the heavens, — an idea indispensable to any true nationality, involving, as it does, the sacredness of the oath, the true right to punish, the true ground of obedience to law, the true doctrine of a national conscience, and of a solemn national accountability.

Some will wish to know wherein the sovereignty is to be found on this Idea of the State, for it either conflicts with, or greatly modifies, the meaning of such popular catch-words as these, — the majority have a right to rule, — the sovereign people, — the people govern.

OF THE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE STATE.

"It is in this view of the State, as a religious institution ordained by God, that we arrive at a true idea of sovereignty. He who is King of kings and Lord of lords, is also Ruler of the people. He who is the only true Head of the Church, is also Sovereign of the State; not in that vague sense in which he is lord of all things in the natural world, but by direct, positive, moral institution. We speak not now of those which we have characterized as governments of will, whether the turbulent mass-meetings of a wild democracy, or the dead despot-

ism of a single will, in both cases owning no higher power as presiding in the State, than human authority, derived from the law of force, or nature. In the other class, God, we say, is sovereign; because there is acknowledged something higher than the governors and the governed, even Abstract Law,—as an image, however imperfect, of the Eternal Reason,—connecting human government with the divine, or rather, making the former a continuation or delegation of the latter, with the same sanctions, the same appeals to the conscience, and the same general grounds in the infliction of the punishment of crime for its intrinsic demerit: with this difference, however, that human legislation has, in addition to its higher aims, a subordinate sphere of expediency, prevention, or order. In strict accordance with this sovereignty of fundamental law, there is also that which, in a popular or republican form of government, may be styled *the sovereignty of the people*, but not of the people composing one generation, whether at the first, or any subsequent stage of its history. *It may, more properly, be styled the sovereignty of the State, regarded as delegated by God, and deriving its sanctions from the one source, whether of individual, or organic social life.* This *ultimate* or absolute sovereignty, as it may be styled in distinction from that acting or mediate sovereignty, which is lodged with the present rulers as representative of the present generation,—this ultimate sovereignty, we say, is to be sought, not in the will of the majority for the time being, which may be the opposite to-day of what it was yesterday, but in the permanent *will*, or rather *reason* of the State, regarded as a living organization, extending through successive generations, like the reason of an individual, controlling its own temporary volitions, even when expressed by temporary majorities. This it does by a standing appeal to those higher and more solemn acts, which are not of one period of time, but belong to its whole corporate existence; the same yesterday, to-day, and throughout all the years of its organic life. In subordination to this idea, it may be safely said, that, in a republican State, this mere mediate sovereignty, or carrying out

of the fundamental law, resides in the *present* people ; and *this is all our ablest statesmen and jurists have ever meant by the term*. It is true that Marshall, and Jay, and Madison speak of *the will of the people*, but that they used it in the same sense with Jefferson, and Paine, and Bancroft, is yet to be proved. The former ever had in view that will, not as the will of temporary and fluctuating majorities, but as exhibited in the fundamental laws of the nation, or in modifications made in accordance therewith ; and that too, ever as expressed through the regular organs for those purposes appointed. It was to be a will joined with law and reason ; that *voluntas quæ quid cum ratione desiderat* ; and they would as soon have thought of applying the term to the spasmodic volitions of a madman, as to desecrate it in the manner in which it has been often done by demagogues. In the same manner may we say, and just as truly as matter of fact, that the acting or mediate sovereignty of a constitutional monarchy is vested in the king, for precisely the same reason as in the other case, because the law of the State fixes it there. But in neither case, whether it be the king or people, are they absolute sovereigns ; and in neither case could there be anything like true freedom, if it were so. To say nothing of the divine authority, *the absolute sovereignty in each lies back of and above both king and people*. It is to be found in the fundamental law, written or unwritten, controlling these temporary, acting sovereigns, and declaring unto them, thus far shall ye go, and no farther. In neither case, nor in the one case more than the other, are they sovereigns in their own right ; and when asserting a personal *jus divinum* on the one hand, or *jus naturale* on the other, they break through that fundamental bond of political life, the rightful authority of both is gone, the popular and monarchical thrones are overturned, and the sceptre and the ballot-box sink together in the dust."

In this connection, he takes up the common doctrine that "in this country, we, the people, govern ourselves." Through his dissection of this dogma we cannot follow him, save to cite the following observation, by which, as in so many other cases,

he ends the argument at once by his clear insight into the logic inherent in the words in which the proposition to be proved or disproved is conveyed: — “In the very nature of things, and according to the unperverted use of language, *government implies something out of and above the governed.*” We must also cite the following: “The modern theory, that the people are the ultimate and absolute source of all political power and right, was not so profound as to escape the notice of Solon, Plato, or Cicero. This doctrine, which many speak of as unknown until the days of Godwin and Paine, *this grand discovery that men have the physical power to demolish a frame of government, for this is the whole of it,* was too easy and plain a matter, it lies altogether too near the surface to admit of such a supposition. *It was not because they did not see it, but because they saw through it at a glance,* that it is so little adverted to in the writings of the sages of antiquity.

“They saw at once *that here there could be no foundation for the State*; and, although their want of revelation prevented their ascending to its highest idea, they came as near to it as possible, by basing government on that Divine constitution of man, which compels him to live in society, not merely in self-defence, or for mutual aid in the promotion of mere personal happiness, but as a state essential to the highest perfection of his humanity. Hence we may say, that the ancient political theories regarded the sovereign power as lodged in the State, as distinguished from the acting Rulers on the one hand, and the People on the other. In the middle ages, this idea was lost. Sovereignty was supposed to be vested in the monarch, or rather the monarch came to be regarded as the State itself.¹ Hence the personal divine right of kings, and all those unfounded assumptions, which in modern times prepared the way for the opposite doctrine, equally false, which confounds the State with its ever-flowing masses, which prates of the *jus di-*

¹ He traces a similar process in the history of the Church, in notes on the Church and its government. These should be studied in connection with his Essay on the Church — the most important of all his essays.

vinum of the multitude, and the unqualified capacity of man for self-government."

Here is part of the reply to the objection that the view presented is ideal and abstract, that it makes a groundless distinction between the State and the people: "Abstract as it may be, it has entered into the thoughts of mankind respecting government in all ages. The other is the modern theory, and boasts of being such. To us it is an argument of great weight, that the *vox humanitatis* is on our side. We also appeal to the people, — to that steady voice of humanity, which though often, doubtless, as now, opposed by local and temporary expressions of public sentiment, has yet survived them all. It may with some reason be styled the voice of God, for from no other source can we imagine principles and feelings to have been derived, so difficult to explain, and yet so universal. Yes, nature, when rightly understood, is on our side; and we appeal to her. We appeal to the unperturbed feelings of our childhood, to that hallowed period when the soul responds to the genuine voice of humanity and of God, with less perhaps of speculative reasoning, but with more of philosophical truth of feeling, than in any other portion of life, — that period in which we think of law as an awful power above us, closely associated with the Divine majesty, — when we have not learned that it derives its sanctions wholly from our own will, — when the sentiment exists in all its sacred freshness, coming we know not from whence, not derived to us from our parents, — for few parents in these days ever teach the doctrine, — but abiding as the voice of God in our souls, until lost in the prevailing current of opposing thought in other minds, and the perpetual reiteration of the doctrine that what our own hands have made our own hands may lawfully destroy.

"It may be said, that in this view, the State and the Law are mere abstractions. If the term is used, as it generally is, to signify something *unreal*, we protest against it. In its genuine sense, we cordially admit its application. The State, or rather the fundamental Law of the State, whether written or unwritten,

is the *pure reason* of the race *abstracted* from the propensities and temporary wills of the mass, regarded as individuals. *It is only in this way we get what is absolutely essential to government, something above our individual selves, something above present majorities, something which we may reverence, something which may be regarded as having a divine sanction, because it belongs to the common reason of the race ;* especially if centuries have been abstracting and purifying it from the dross of the individual corruption. *Man is always better in the abstract, than in practice ; the laws are always better than the people.* Man in the abstract, that is, severed from the corrupting influences which bear upon the individual, almost always reasons correctly. In the abstract, man is religious ; he is conscientious ; he has even a keen perception of right ; he is benevolent ; he sees and even loves an abstract beauty in virtue, which contrasts strangely with the total depravity of his individual and selfish nature. *He could not be depraved if he had not this abstract moral being,* which viewing things aside from his individualism, decides according to reason and truth. It is for this he needs society and government, not so much for his physical protection, as most writers of the Hobbes and Bentham school would represent it ; but that this superior part of his nature may be cultivated ; — that he may live this *common life* of humanity ; have his selfish individualism merged in this higher existence. It is not good for man to be alone. This solemn declaration is applicable alike to his domestic, civil and ecclesiastical relations. God meant that men should live in nations and states, as well as in families ; and patriotism is a virtue sanctioned by the Bible, whatever a spurious philanthropy may assert to the contrary. *The no government, the no family, the no church, and the no religion systems are closely connected. One instinct prompts them all ;* and, whatever may be the pretensions of their advocates, whatever claims to piety and benevolence they may put forth, however much they may adopt the modern cant about the connection between democracy and Christianity, *their schemes are not simply disorganizing ; they*

are essentially irreligious ; and their authors should be addressed with all plainness by their true name, as destructive and licentious infidels.

“ We heed not this cant about abstractions, when we remember that our idea is found in the inspired Word of God. The Bible never deals in that which is unmeaning. *Though full of mystery, it is of all books the farthest removed from mysticism ;* and yet throughout, it speaks of nations as continuous beings, with all those fearful responsibilities, which are based on no figure of speech, no legal fiction, but upon the solemn reality of national life, as distinguished from the ever-flowing stream of individuals by which it is exhibited.”

However abstract, metaphysical, ideal, the positions taken in this address are of the first practical moment. It is the usage to speak of our government as something new, as an untried experiment, and there is some truth in this ; but it is also true that its founders inherited the experience of mankind in matters of government, that they were heirs to Law coëval in its beginnings with the world, and were imbued with that veneration for Law, that naturally arises in the soul, which is touched by its mysterious antiquity, and conceives of it as the purest embodiment of the reason, abstracted from the passions of the race, as an image of the Eternal Reason, and deriving its sanctions from it. A great fact in our history, without appreciating which it is impossible to appreciate that history, is that we have ever been a Law-abiding, a Law-respecting, a Law-venerating people. From the beginning, the course of events through all our colonial history, through the entire revolutionary period, viewed as extending down to the ratification and successful working of the Constitution, is impressed with the signs of a Providence mercifully ordaining that such should be the character of this people. And the same is true of the post-revolutionary generation. The great chieftains of its opposing political parties were for the most part men personally impressed with a profound veneration for Law. Over the great tribunal of these confederate States was placed a man who has silenced

many fears, approved himself worthy of the ermine of Marshall, and deservedly inspired the veneration of the legal profession. Nor will it escape the reverential mind, that coincident with the first great questions, which arose under the Constitution, there was raised up a providential man, learned in all the wisdom of the Law, who, during that formative period, when so much was to be settled, was, to a degree seldom witnessed, himself the stability of Law. He was a man, physically and mentally, and by all the events of his life, in courts, and in the senate, ordained to embody before the eyes and to exalt in the thoughts of his countrymen the majesty, the peace of the Law. The work he was called to do that he did — even unto the end.

Veneration for Law, a pervading, controlling, intelligent veneration, — lacking which we had been as Mexico is, — was born with us as a people, was cherished in the course of events by a merciful Providence; but a sentiment, too little noticed, has grown with great rapidity, which confounds Law with popular will, and which, if not enlightened, checked, withstood, may transform our institutions into a pure despotism, even while the forms of our institutions are scrupulously and superstitiously preserved. Its only corrective is in the ideas set forth in this address. By them only can it be resisted. “Our danger is not so much in open resistance to authority, *as in the silent growth and spread of a doctrine, which supersedes all law, by substituting for it the will of present majorities, not so much by way of direct defiance to the Constitution, as by assuming this will or public sentiment as its arbitrary interpreter; thus rendering us in fact that unchecked democracy, than which nothing was farther from the minds of the founders of our national polity.*”

The True Idea of the State is made in this address to throw light on several questions touching the powers of the State. One of these is the question as to the life or perpetuity of the State, leading on to the question, Can one generation bind another? This last question is almost settled by the putting it in this its proper form, viz., Can the State bind itself? From the discussion of neither of these subjects will our limits permit

us to cite more than the following sentence, which illustrates the practical value of the Idea of this discourse, and the dangerous nature of the theories commonly held in lieu of it. Of the power of the State to bind itself, it is said: "On the theory against which we are contending, viz., that the State is a mere aggregation of individuals assembled only for self-defence, this power might with reason be denied: on this theory every conclusion deduced by the most radical disorganizer is radically correct. On this hypothesis there is no resisting the doctrine that the will of a majority, of any majority, whether of a State or of any part of its territory, is the supreme law of the State or of that part; and any attempt to place restrictions on such majority is *ipso facto* void; all this comes at once, if we allow in government nothing of an ideal or spiritual character, no element above what is falsely styled the law of nature."

As a last illustration of the practical value of the ideas of this address, and of the keenness with which its author reads the public heart, we cite a page

ON THE JUDICIARY.

"The Judiciary is that part of the State which seems to possess more of the sanctity of a religious institution. The veneration for the Bench, next to the Altar, has ever found a place in all thinking and serious minds. It is to be found in the legislative systems of the great minds of antiquity. Plato, in his treatise on Laws, would impress it indelibly upon the mind, by regarding the judicial edifice as possessed of a peculiar sanctity, and by giving it a locality among the sacred temples of the gods. He would even have the judges chosen in a consecrated building made holy by peculiar rites and sacrifices, as a standing witness of the indissoluble connection between law and religion. The common sentiment of mankind is shown by the fact, *the idea is so engrafted into language that it cannot be taken out without destroying some of the most expressive and time-honored terms.* The Hebrews actually gave to judges one

of the divine names; and the Greek poets everywhere apply the most religious epithets to the minister, as well as to the altar, of Themis. The oath, so essential a part of the solemn services of this temple of law, is so intimately connected with religious feeling, and is, when properly administered, so solemn a religious rite, that *while it remains, the true idea of a State, for which we are contending, cannot be wholly lost.* We have a confirmation of this in the action of infidels themselves. *Their keen unbelieving instinct discovers in the oath this mark of the State's true nature.* They are aware that the Bible lays this down as the sign of a religious nation, 'that they swear by His name.' They regard it, as indeed it is, a solemn recognition of Christianity, as not only part, but foundation of the law of the land. *Hence their deep hostility to the oath;* and their persevering efforts, in some of our States, for its abolition from the statute-book. *The same Satanic sagacity directs them to the Judiciary, as possessing more than any other department, the spirit of religion.* That calm and elevated and holy tribunal *through which the ages speak,* — which disclaims the individual judgment of the moment, while it seeks in precedents, which time has choicely gathered and laid by, the most perfect expression of the pure and abstract reason, — that sacred bench, so free from passion, presenting an image so vivid of divine authority, — producing an impression so awe-inspiring of the holy dignity of law, is rendered by all these circumstances peculiarly odious to the demagogue, and hence he is ever getting up some popular movement to shorten the term of the judicial office and take away that independence in which its purity so much consists. In the Executive and Legislative departments of the State he finds something more akin to his own views and feelings, more of tumult, more of low and mercenary motive, a closer alliance of sympathy and interest with the popular will, and hence he magnifies these, while the other is the object of his bitter hatred. In no other way can we account for that strange feeling, so much cherished in this country from the days of Jefferson,

which regards the Supreme Judiciary of our land as hostile to liberty ; which is eagle-eyed in watching the judge on the sacred bench, while it sees no danger in the arts of the demagogue, the corruption of executive patronage, and the turbulence of legislative bodies."

Lewis, in discussing social questions, shows the same keen insight into the bearings of specific laws, as into the principles of government. As an illustration, take his opinion on the popular legislative tendency in regard to the property of married women :

"There is danger that laws giving the right of separate property, and of course the management of separate property, to the wife, may in time virtually affect that oneness which has ever been at the foundation of the marriage idea from the primitive declaration in Genesis, to the latest decision of the Common Law. *Let this kind of legislation, which is now so great a favorite, only proceed a little farther until the personal and property interests of husband and wife become as distinct as those of any other outward parties, and marriage is at an end. We may call it by what name we please, it is no longer the marriage recognized by the Church, it is no longer the marriage known to the Common Law,* which, with all its alleged barbarisms and feudalisms, was more distinctly built upon the authority of Christianity and the Christian Scriptures than any other system of jurisprudence the world ever knew. Let families be brought up with the clear knowledge that *this* belongs to the father and *that* to the mother, that each party has its separate rights, its separate interests, its separate dealings with the world without ; let this become the predominant feeling, and the family itself, with all its sacred associations, will soon be numbered among the "things that have waxed old and are ready to vanish away." Marriage is then reduced to the nature of a contract simply. Where the wife and the mother are equally engaged with the husband and the father in all the employments of the same *forensic* life, they may be styled joint partners in business, but are no longer "members one of

another." And then follows the inevitable consequence. "That which has no higher sanction than the will of the contracting parties, must, of course, be at any time revocable by the same authority that first created it. That which makes no change in the personal relations, the personal rights, the personal duties, is not the holy marriage *union*, but the unholy *alliance* of concubinage."

In further illustration of the Literary Character of Lewis, citations will be made from another of his discourses,¹ — citations many and long, for this discourse is not accessible to the public, and its truths are well-timed and important. It examines certain prevailing theories in the department of History, and sets forth the True Idea of the Divine Imperium. Its spirit may be inferred from its motto, from the Principia of Newton: *Deus enim sine dominio et providentia nihil aliud est quam Fatum et Natura.*

The meaning of History cannot be read through physical and psychological agencies alone. No doubt there is in it something deeper than human causation. Before this, above this, ever controlling it to its own ends, is the will of the Most High. To do away with this truth is the design of "the doctrine of ideas, or of ideal causation. It goes below the outward facts. It goes below the passions and motives, the wants and fears and sins of mankind, regarded as directly affecting individuals, or collective bodies through individuals, and as working in connection with providential or supernatural agencies. In other words, it goes beyond motives and reasons regarded as subjectively existing in individual minds divine or human, to a sort of objective existence which it styles *ideas*."

The inventors of such speculations are much given to mourn, or rather to boast, that they are not comprehended — and certainly these "children of the mist," as Lewis styles them, take much pains to bring about what they deplore; but no such

¹ A Discourse on Naturalism as opposed to the Doctrine of the Divine Imperium. Delivered at Union College, July 24, 1849. Schenectady: G. Y. Van Debogert. 1850. p. 56.

vain charge can be alleged against his mind, which comprehends them much better than they do themselves. In this case, as in many others, his intellectual vision of that which is propounded is so much clearer than that of those who propound it, that, while nothing can be fairer than his presentment of their theory, it ends the need of any discussion of it. In a spirit of "truth and soberness" endeavoring to ascertain what "those of this school in Germany, France, England, and our own country mean by it," he resorts to a historical illustration of

THE THEORY OF IDEAS IN HISTORY.

"Let us take for this purpose the famous battle of Tours, in which Karl Martel defeated the Saracens, — or rather the then state of Europe regarded as depending on the issue of that eventful struggle, — and of which state the conflict and those engaged in it may be taken as the representative. In some sense the battle itself was the fact for narration. The strife, the blows, the flowing blood, the deaths, the eventful changes of that long, agonizing struggle; the seeming turns of chance, the final route, the merciless slaughter, — these furnish the more *outward* picture.

"Another view rises higher. Transcending the mere chronicle, and even the more graphic heroical or epical legend, it brings in the moral and physical states of the parties, and their moral and physical relations. These form the more inward or real event, of which the outward strife is but the exponent. This moral state again is compounded of various elements; the degree of civilization, the predominance of certain passions, the power of certain forms of religious belief. All these united, form that collection of events, or rather that combined event, of which it is the duty of the chronicler accurately to inform us, and on which it is the higher historian's province to philosophize. So far all is sober and rational. But the most modern philosophy of history is not content with such materials. Beyond and above all this must be brought in the wondrous and transcen-

dent power of *ideas*. These wild men of Tours, these ferocious Franks, these fanatical Saracens were fighting for *ideas*, and under the invisible power of Ideas. In other words, *the ideas themselves were fighting through them*. Great ideas were fighting through them. *Of all this, however, the actors were utterly unconscious*, at least as individuals, whatever may have been going on in the sphere of their generic humanity. In other words, the ideas cannot be resolved into motives and thoughts, then present to any individual minds, and thus affecting collective masses. These, instead of being the ideas themselves, or "the spirits of the age," as they have been called, were in fact only the psychological media of their development.

One side thought of plunder and Papal indulgences; the other of the tempting vineyards of France, or, if they fell, the joys of a sensual paradise. The leaders may have had something of a higher aim, either religious or worldly, yet still as individual *thought* or *motive*. Thus stood the combatants outwardly, physically, morally, intellectually. It might be supposed that these terms would embrace everything belonging to the event. But no. *Through all this, and back of all this, and in a manner utterly unknown to the actors themselves, were contending, as some say, certain ideas or 'spirits of the ages,'* like the gods in Homer's battles, — *ἡέρα ἑσσάμενοι* — clothed in mist, yet ruling all the strife; and only to be revealed in their objective forms to the historic idealists of future ages. Had there been intended by these ideas of the transcendentalist the physical and moral influences then operating on the minds of men, and thus in a sober sense forming the spirit of the age, the doctrine would have been most undoubtedly correct; but *then its profundity, its higher philosophy is all gone*. Had it meant something more than this, — the gathering into a system, and thus into outward or objective distinctness of influences, which, although long felt by individuals, had not been distinctly recognized, until they had assumed form by affecting masses, or taken that generic shape, which although essentially

the same, is divested of the private peculiarity, just as any thought or motive, to use Plato's comparison, is more easily read in the large inscription, which has become enstamped in large letters on the public mind, than in the minute alphabet of the individual soul, — had they meant this, we say, *it would have been all very intelligible ; but then it would have ceased to be transcendent ; it would have been but common truth and common sense, perfectly adapted to the comprehension of the common understanding.*

“ In fact these *ideas* are not to be regarded as acting at all on the individual directly, but only as reaching him through a transcendent action in another sphere ; that is, on the generic mind of the race or age in the first place, and thus descending from the generic or ideal to become finally objective in the concrete humanity. An idea, then, is not motive ; it is not simply past experience, or present fear, or future hope. It is not passion or emotion, high or low. It is not intelligence. No ; it is something rising above all this. It would seem to have ascribed to it a sort of semi-animate personality. It sways the mind not as a thought or a collection of thoughts, or as any combined influence of past and present impressions, but rather as a sort of possession or instinct. The souls of men are unconsciously possessed by it, as by a good or evil spirit. It is the instinct of the race, as a race, or of a particular race, or of an age. It operates therefore alike, if not equally, on all ; on the masses, on the ignorant, on the learned, on the merely animal, on the reflecting. It is a development, an unfolding, a coming out, — an invisible power working inwardly before it has any historical outwardness (we are using the best terms with which the school furnishes us), or any form by which the most keen-sighted would be able to connect it with any ordinary physical or moral causes. Again, the ideas must be supposed to have an existence *somehow* in *rerum natura*, until the time comes for their outward appearance in history, or during the period of their interior working ; but then this is *nowhere* objectively in time and space ; neither have they as yet any subjective res-

idence strictly, that is in any thoughts distinct, or indistinct in any individual human souls. *What* then, it may be asked, and *where* are they? They are the transcendental Genii, the spirits of the ages, possessing the ideal soul of the ideal humanity, until through the workings of this generic power, the individual spirit is led to recognize the presence of these 'air-born divinities;' and they burst at last upon the view of the world, emerging as in the Homeric strife, from the clouds and forms of smoke they had assumed to hide themselves from the profane, premature gaze of mortals."

Through this "cloudy region," he guides our steps by the aid of several illustrations. "Chivalry becomes one of these genii, δαίμονες, spirits of the ages, πνεύματα τοῦ αἰώνος, or semi-spiritual, semi-personal ideas. True, chivalry or the spirit of chivalry had some outward connection with the physical condition of the northern races, and with the peculiar state of feeling which arose from the mixture of imperfectly taught and imperfectly understood Christianity with their unsubdued, warlike propensities, and yet heathen notions. But then, be it noted, *these did not constitute or even generate the spirit itself. They were not its origin. They were not its cause. The distinction becomes of consequence in such analysis.* They were only the *conditions*, or to use a favorite phrase, the *occasions*, through which the waiting or developing spirit was to make its full outward manifestation. Chivalry in itself was something higher. It was one of these self-subsisting ideas, a transcendental power destined to enter into or take possession of the inner consciousness, and thus to be outwardly born into an existence in time and space. It was to be a necessary phase of our historical life, a necessary unfolding of human progress; and therefore, instead of being a mere result of antecedent physical and moral circumstances, its own strange invisible formative power was actually shaping those circumstances for its own theophany in 'the fulness of times.'"

According to this historical school, as Judaism had been before it, so Christianity is said to have been one of these ideas

or developments: 'As an *idea*, it *naturally* developed itself in the human consciousness, and the historical facts were nothing more than the manifestation of its struggling forth to this conscious objectivity in the souls and actions of men; in other words, the throes and travail of humanity at the outward birth of the great idea; *just as Spinoza's God arrives at personality only in the outward energies and epochs of the natural and intellectual universe*; hence the actual, the historical, the miraculous in Christianity, even if true, is nevertheless of small and secondary account; it may be easily disposed of as belonging to the outward, the mythical, to the letter that killeth, to the unrepresentative.'

This transcendental doctrine, as Lewis says, may be called misty rather than either mystical or mysterious: and his clear presentation of it merely, is its sufficient refutation. Mark now his handling of the word — Progress; a word, the symbol, with some, of thoughts claimed to be of immense compass; a cabalistical word significant to them of no less than all the mystery of the universe; a common word, too, in the streets, used, it might be said abused, by all, it is reiterated with so little thought as to what it does, or ought to mean.

"Progress," says Lewis — "Progress towards what? It is not enough to reckon *from* a point of departure, without having in view any point of approach, either given to us by reason or disclosed by revelation. As long as it computes its rate of movement in the first mode, and thus presents no other than the barren conception of onward, onward, forever and forever, it is unmeaning, incommensurable, irrational, — an everlasting *marking time*. . . .

"Progress *in* what? A movement in one department, or in one direction, may be a going backward in another. Thus physical progress may be moral deterioration: a merely intellectual movement may be irreligious and atheistical. Great advances in experimental or outward science may be at the expense of that health of soul, which is only to be found in habits of inward contemplation.

“Progress in respect to what portion of our existence? Has it relation to that infinitesimal period we call the present life, or does it take into view the whole of our being? If its tendency is to occupy the mind exclusively or even mainly with the former, and if one of its most peculiar attendants is the corresponding growth of an all-pervading secularity, then may there be a reasonable doubt whether it is rightly named, — whether indeed much that is called progress may not be a hinderance, or retrograde movement in respect to that which constitutes our most essential well-being.”

As to the great end of man's life on earth, much of that which is called progress seems to him a hinderance by the secularizing spirit to which it has given birth, and so irrational, that a world pervaded, animated, controlled by this spirit, resembles “a vessel wrecked on a lee shore, — death impending in every wave, — and yet the passengers are filling up their little moment with boasts of splendid improvements in the conveniences of their berths, of most ingenious facilities for more rapidly traversing their heaving and disparting deck, of wonderfully scientific discoveries in relation to the movements of their compass.”

Nor does he think the secular principle can secure the well-being of man even within its own province. It cannot “remove the primal curse;” cannot end “the unrest of humanity;” and it soon begins to work evil within its own sphere: “commencing the generation of a vicious circle, which in the end brings round the very evils it affects to cure. A wrong elevation given to the physical, in distinction from the spiritual or moral health, tends to sink morals in physics. The wrong importance attached to our worldly conveniences, and to the scientific inventions by which they are promoted, gives rise to universal worldliness of thought and feeling. Thus, naturalism begets secularity; and secularity begets selfishness; selfishness, unchecked by that which alone can hold it in, the thought of the world to come, breaks through all obstacles, which human morals and legislation and schemes of social or agrarian reform may present to the unequal acquisition of wealth at any cost,

or at the sacrifice of any principle. Gross inequality of wealth begets poverty ; not the healthful and virtuous Πένια, daughter of rugged Nature, spouse of Content, and mother of Eros, but degraded, diseased, and vicious poverty, prolific mother of the worst brood of evils that ever infest the human race. From her are born despair, and ignorance, and wretchedness, and recklessness, and squalidness, and all uncleanness both in respect to the body and the soul. And thus the cycle is completed."

"There never has been, there never will be, a true reform, or a true reformer, where there has not been predominant, both as *motive* and *principle*, the light and power which come from the abiding thought of another life. Without this all *forms* are dead, and all pretended *reforms* only serve eventually to turn the human selfishness into worse channels than those from which it had been temporarily diverted. . . .

"When the spiritual good takes precedence, the physical welfare must follow in its train. 'He that would save his life, shall lose it ; he that would lose his life, shall find it,' is as true of ages and communities as of individuals.

"Is a generation mainly occupied with the great concern of another life, in other words, living for eternity ? we would say, *à priori*,—such a generation would not be squalid, it would not be unclean, it would not be depressed with reckless and debasing poverty. The supposition would be at war with all the laws of associated ideas.

"Even as regards this life, then, the true progress during any given period must be measured by the number of individual souls who have been brought into a right mind in regard to their eternal destiny.

"This is its direct estimate ; whilst it acknowledges as an indirect and collateral aid, whatever in thought, or act, or knowledge may tend to favor such a result. All else is of a different tendency ; whatever may be its pretensions, it is only darkness, confusion, impediment, essential retrogradation ; whether it be the misplaced facts of science, the inanities of

literature, the cant and affectations of art, or the bewilderments of philosophy.

"We should ever bear in mind, that it was of the Grecian and Alexandrian philosophy in its best state that Paul pronounced the condemnation, when he spoke of it as 'a vain deceit;' as being 'after the rudiments of the world,' the secular elements, and not after Christ. All modern schools, whether sensual, ideal, or eclectic, do but repeat its old wranglings; while they fall short of its earnestness and of its ancient glory."

This theory of progress may be called the popular, rather than the scholastic; there is another, more extended in its range of facts, and especially magnified in the resonant periods of itinerating lecturers. It is common too, almost as much so as the former, and almost as much of a favorite. It is therefore amusing to find our philosopher more puzzled by it, than by almost any other phase or phantasy of thought.

"We find one aspect of the doctrine of progress to which it is difficult to attach any meaning at all. It would seem to proceed from some such theory of naturalistic fatalism, as would bring under this name all events whatever. In this system of blind optimism, whatsoever takes place is progress, from the mere fact of its taking place. In other words, *everything must get out of the way of everything else; and so each event becomes a necessary antecedent; and the world is farther on in the eternal progression, than it was before. Thus everything becomes progress, or development.*"

According to this phantasy, which influences so much of what is called history, every event was progress — slavery and freedom, the revivifying of Greece, the death of Poland. It appears not only in secular history, but in ecclesiastical: "Neander, in his famous Church History, finds some good development everywhere. Nothing so dark, but what presents either a sideway or rear phase of some great truth. Every heresy is but a necessary aid to the development of an orthodoxy; and every orthodoxy itself is but the transition to a higher and still higher form of truth, in reference to which,

all before it passes over to the side of comparative error, and takes its place among the things that have fulfilled their mission."

Newman, as well as Neander, maintains this doctrine in respect to the highest truths of Christianity: 'These also grow and are developed, sometimes through the nurturing aid of the most pernicious errors, — Gnosticism for example, was a necessary transition in the life and development of Christianity. The same view is taken of Manichæism and Arianism. In fact, heresy and seeming orthodoxy are alike developments, are alike progress. *The heretic does not create or cause the heresy, but the heresy, coming along in the natural course of development, gives birth to the heretic.*

'In this way, all opinions, and all philosophies, even those most opposed to each other, are progress, — all forms of philosophy, all developments in the church had their mission to fulfil; and, having fulfilled it, must hereafter all alike repose in honorable remembrance. In short, all is progress; and *thus the word, by being made to mean everything, comes to signify nothing.* This eclectic optimism utterly stultifies itself.'

The presentment of the theory of Ideas was so clear, as almost to render argument against it superfluous. It is very much so here also. But should any one, therefore, fancy it easy thus to seize upon and lay open to view the unsoundness of these theories, let them recall to mind the celebrated names which have sanctioned them, the laboriously learned treatises constructed in accordance with them, the strong hold they have taken on the writing and thinking of the time.

Lewis' argument against optimism is a good illustration of his logic, — logic exalted and vivified by right feeling into eloquence.

"The grand objection to this is, that *it leaves no place for evil or falsehood in the universe.* All things are true — all things are right. There is no *malum in se*. Evil is only relational. Whatever may be the appearance it assumes, it is only disguised good helping on to progress. But if there is no *malum*

per se, then there is no good *per se*. This too becomes relational, and capable of being resolved into something else. Viewed aside from its antithetical bond, the essential idea is lost. It becomes confounded with being. If compelled to choose, we would much prefer the old doctrine of an eternal principle of evil. Zoroaster and Plato were led to their hypothesis by following their moral sense, although it ran them into a speculative difficulty. The optimists avoid this, — for nothing can be more intelligible than their system, — but it is only by doing violence to the conscience. We know that there is evil. Every man knows it, because he feels it; — evil intrinsic, evil in himself, evil in others, evil in the world, evil where no relation can change it to the idea of good, and out of which no good can be evolved, although it may be controlled and counteracted; evil, in short, with which God is maintaining a perpetual and unintermitting war, — a war, too, in which there is no sham fighting, but carried on with a real and powerful enemy, over whom he is ever victorious, it is true, but only by maintaining a real, an earnest, an ever-watchful struggle. We may hope to be forgiven, if, in consequence of the inability of our reason to solve the high mystery involved in the problem of evil, we may even seem to limit the Divine power; but we insult his goodness, and give the lie to the moral sense, with which he has furnished us as our highest guide, if we adopt any system of optimism, which ultimately denies a place for the idea of evil, by ever resolving it into the idea of some disguised utility.”

A third form of the doctrine of progress is grounded on two assumed conditions, — the *solidarité* of the race, and its indefinite duration on the earth. Of this, he says: “There is no great difficulty in understanding what is meant by that progress which consists in one generation’s accumulating and adding on to the experience of another; or in the process of individual minds contributing to a growing stock of collective knowledge, and thus bringing out in an improved form the manifestation of the common humanity. But all this comes not up to the

transcendental idea. In this profounder philosophy of *solidarité*, progress somehow affects the race before it reaches the individuals of which it is composed. The human nature, the human mind in general, is under a transforming progressive power; so that now the individual child, partaking of this, is actually born with higher faculties and ideas. He comes into the world not merely the heir to a more accumulated inheritance of knowledge, — that would be intelligible enough, — but he is born into, and it may also be said out of, a higher humanity." In opposition to this, he lays down this proposition: "*Of itself*, the humanity is not the subject of change, except through influences operating first upon the individual parts, and then through them upon the collective organism. Thus human nature makes no progress *per se*; but men make progress, and men recede, that is, fall behind, or get in advance of other men, or other societies, or other ages; and this affects the humanity in its outward manifestations. When such change assumes the marks of permanence or universality, we call it the progress of the race; but the fact, that an apparent decline immediately commences when the outward productive influences are withdrawn, shows that it was only a generalization of individualities; and that the reverse process is only a return to the old, *per se*, immutable nature. This is the general law of organic wholes. The other view is as much opposed to a true idealism as it is to the common logical understanding of mankind." He then brings this doctrine to the bar of the Scriptures: "How shall we dare to talk of progress in any worthy moral sense of the term, or perfectibility in human nature *per se*, in view of the awful revelation, that it required a divine assumption of humanity, a divine incarnation, as the only means even of raising it from the dead, or introducing into it the least degree of spiritual life?"

Upon this form of the doctrine of progress we cite several remarks: "It were well if it were nothing worse than simply nonsense; but in this word *solidarité*, which comes from the worst French school, there is the concentrated poison of mod-

ern atheism. It would seem to ape some of the highest mysteries of the Christian theology. It has its incarnation, its redemption, its ideal Christ, but no Christ crucified."

This very remarkable sentence might have been uttered of every form of the doctrine of progress, as held in infidel schools: "*Christ crucified — this is the name it cannot utter — its word of dread, refusing all alliance or affinity with its views, and which becomes, therefore, the exorcising test of its diabolism.*"

In the Bible, "individual importance and responsibility stand out with fearful prominence. The doctrine of solidarité would completely reverse all this; and, *therefore*, the delight which its advocates take in dwelling on the immortality of the race, as a race, and its indefinite duration upon the earth. They may affect to regard this as coming from a feeling of brotherhood; but the true secret of the matter is, that the indulgence of the notion helps to keep off the dreaded sense of the individual accountability, as connected with the idea of the individual immortality.

"On this theory progress is ever the progress of the race; accountabilities are the accountabilities of the age; crimes, too, are the crimes of the age. The tendency of it all is, — and some of the most modern productions of this school are coming right up to this extreme position, — that the individual can do no wrong; he commits no crimes; he is buried in society; he is lost in the race.

"With all this talk of the organic, nothing can be practically more disorganizing. Whilst its theoretical motto is socialism, fraternity, solidarité, its practical language, if properly translated, would be, each man for himself, each man for his own rights *per se*, each man for his own passional attractions, until all organic institutions are of necessity dissolved into a vague cosmopolitanism, having no strength, no union, no power over the affections, and therefore no benevolence, and no true brotherhood."

These theories of progress describe larger and larger circles;

there is a fourth, which may include them all, as supposed forms of the working out of one vast progress or development, including all the worlds, whether of time or space. This hypothesis may hold to a progress "without curves, cycles, or retrogradations, and so may be called the rectilineal, or there may be modifications of it, which admit of apparent backward movements, but still with an advance on the whole."

In discussing this hypothesis, as applied to the universe, some general suggestions are made: "In respect to universal progress, or progress of the universe, regarded as the whole work that God worketh, there would seem to be danger on both sides; whether we hold it to be ever perfect, that is finished as a whole, however changing in the parts, or ever progressive, that is imperfect, or unfinished, as a whole, so as to be at some period immensely beyond its state during a former assignable period of its existence. The one view runs close upon the borders of pantheism. It is hard keeping it clear of the notion of some inherent connection between the world and God; some *necessary* creation, or emanation rather, making the universe so far one with Him, as to be always and necessarily a partaker of his perfection. The other seems very naturally, if not necessarily, to involve the idea of the world's eternity. An eternal and infinite advance in time to come would seem to require, as its complement, an eternal advance or growth in time past. Hence its once highest rank of being must have been immensely farther down than what is now the lowest manifestation of life, or form, or bare material; and this exceedingly low and imperfect state, it should be kept in mind, must have been, too, when the world was already an eternity old. Amazing period of protracted infancy! *What difficulties in the Scriptures are to be compared to these?*

"The shadow of theism is preserved by admitting that God, at some period of the eternal past, created what is called the matter of the universe, in other words, infinite space filled with gas, or a gaseous substance, if substance it may be called,—just rising by an infinitesimal of the infinitesimal, or of infin-

its-imality above the old Epicurean *vacuum*, or the *inane* of Lucretius, — without form, without division into parts, without diversity, — monospernal, monomerial, monomorphous. It is also monophysical, that is, without the least appearance or rudiment of anything like commenced organization. But the soul that thinks, and has come thus far, cannot rest in this idealless conception. It rejects it as a minus, or rather an imaginary quantity, of no value whatever, and rushes on, with a bold consistency, to atheism and the eternity of the universe."

On the question of the indefinite or eternal progression of the universe, he thinks we can only avoid the darkest conclusions by resorting to the Scriptures; and that the subject transcends the finite reach of the human faculties. The other position, which affirms the eternal progression of our part of the universe, of our world and our race, we are more competent to examine: "An eternal progress of the whole is consistent with perpetual change and loss in the parts; nay more, might seem to require at times a reverse movement in them, as auxiliary to the grand advance. What right, then, have we, on any scientific hypothesis, to assume our own portion as one of the ultimates destined to an eternal growth and duration?" — "Every merely natural or scientific view presents a similar difficulty, — runs at last into the same darkness in respect to the individual parts. There was the old Stoical hypothesis of the great cycle and the lesser cycles, in which was involved their much misunderstood doctrine of final conflagrations, or periods when all things, having been for ages condensing, are again, after reaching their maximum or minimum in this direction, rarefied to their rarest state, and absorbed into God, or the original seminary element that remains for the conception, and birth, and outgrowth of the future *Kosmos*. The most modern aspects of geology or astronomy, whether true or false, would seem to favor the same theory in substance, if not in detail. They would force us to the idea that nature in herself, even the universal nature as a whole, is but a series of ever recurring cyclical developments, and that this is the very law of her

eternal preservation, and of her eternal youth. Take away the supernatural, and *we seem driven by necessity to regard nature as something ever returning into itself. The cyclical idea is inseparable from it.* A continued movement in one direction would seem to be inconsistent with the preservation of the law, on which the movement depends. Be it condensation or rarefaction, there is destruction at either end." After illustrating this idea, he continues: "Thus we get the notion, not only of *successive*, but also of *alternating* contemporary cycles, keeping nature from stopping or running down, or, in other words, preserving the balance-wheel of the universe, and thus in turn accomplishing the *magnus annus*, or great year, *ever returning into itself.*"

"Now, whether we hold to something like this, or maintain the other theory of a rectilinear progress, that is, a movement of the whole eternally in one direction, in which great progress of the whole as a whole, all seeming retrogradations being but of parts, are really necessary links, or loops in the machinery required for carrying on the general advance, — yet still for us has it no less of despairing gloom. For we are but parts, exceedingly small parts too, when regarded only in the physical relations that connect us with the physical universe, whilst nature must ever look to the ultimate whole, and in all her movements as an *artistic* power, tending only to artistic ends, must ever work *with* and *through* the parts for the whole. This is the law of every work of art, considered in itself as a work of art. It is ever the parts for the whole; and science as science, and art as art, can know no other view. The proposition of *the whole in any sense for the parts*, only begins to assume rationality in connection with the idea of a moral system." — "There is an atheistic aspect to this doctrine, because it would seem to include the original developing power, as sharing in the eternal movement, and denies in fact any rest or absolute perfection to the whole, as well as any of its parts. It allows, also, of nothing, as preceding from the Divine hand, either as finished, or with any assignable degree of development, which

had not come from previous stages. All worlds commence with star-dust, or seminary gas, a mere infinitesimal above inanity, and so work up through vortices, and gyrations, and coolings, and condensations, into systems, suns, and planets. All life must commence in the most rudimentary motions, and so work up into those higher stages, in which, nevertheless, it is never to find rest or perfection, but to proceed onward, — onward, — forever, and for evermore, to other generic forms, ever mercilessly leaving behind it, as of no account, the extinct individual personalities through which it has been manifested.

“In all this it is easy to see that *the universe is regarded solely as an artistic work*. The God of the scheme, even in the highest rank it can assign him, is merely the great Artificer. The perfection of the machine, as a machine, is the great end for which it is originated, and is sustained, and carried on. *The Creator's artistic, instead of his moral glory, is the end of the universe. Hence apparent ruin or disorder in the physical system, is no real disorder, no real evil, but only a step in the march from the lower to the higher.*”

Referring to certain attempts to prove, astronomically, the stability of our world and our universe, he says: “Science has never shown this, and never can show it. The fallacy of the pretended demonstration all proceeds from applying to a part of the phenomena of the universe, a very small part too, what can only be conclusive when it embraces all phenomena; and then, too, only by bringing in something above nature as a regulative force.” The doctrine of the eternal progression of our world and our race as derived from nature and science alone, is, too, in opposition to all analogies. “Everything in nature certainly points to periods and cycles, *maxima* and *minima*, growth and decay, to forces reaching their limits in one direction, then passing their perihelion point, and then returning in the other. Some of these cycles may be comparatively very short, as is the case with the smaller organisms of vegetable and animal life; others endure for many years before they yield full obedience to the cyclical law; and others, again,

extend to those immense periods which the geologist obscurely traces in the rocks of our earth, and of which the telescope is beginning to discover the evidence in the skies. Throughout the phenomenal world, as far as we can go, the same process is presented,—growth, progress, decline, *ortus, transitus, interitus*, beginning, continuance, passing away.” The ideas indicated are unfolded in pages of powerful eloquence, which lead on to one of those passages in which he vindicates the glory of the Scriptures, as the only light shining in the darkness of nature and time. “To the truly thoughtful mind, nothing is more gloomy than the conception of the universe, as viewed alone through the telescope of science. And philosophy, too, without revelation, how utterly hopeless and depressing! What a lesson is taught by her strange history! How sinks the soul at the contemplation of her futile mockeries, her vain attempts to solve the great problems of existence, her nightmare efforts to throw off ‘the covering that is cast over life,’¹ the veil that is spread over the face of all nature, and tell us *whence* we are, and *where* we are, and *what* we are, and *why* we are here, and what we have *to do*, and *whither* we are going!”—“Amid the ever-gathering, ever-deepening shades, there is but one great question for the truly rational soul,—Has God indeed spoken unto man? Has his own voice been uttered from his holy temple? Then, on the great problem of human destiny, let every other voice be hushed; let all philosophy keep silence before him.”

This discourse does not discuss whether there be that which the term Progress may fitly represent, and if so, with what meaning. In not doing this, it cannot be said to err through deficiency; it errs, if at all, rather by excess in the number of its topics and thoughts. On progress, it would ascertain the fair import of the word, and its philosophy, as used in certain schools, and in much of the writing and thinking of the day,—and this in its various significations,—and would expose the fallacies of the arguments by which they are upheld. Farther

¹ Isaiah xxv. 7.

than this the writer could not go within his limits. Still, as there is beyond all doubt that which suggests something, which gives rise to the various untenable and irreligious theories of progress discussed and refuted, the complete answer to them would require the presentation of the true scriptural theory of human progress, if indeed there be any such. On this subject the address awakens a strong curiosity to learn the writer's opinion. There are here and there a few brief hints, or indications of it, and from them it seems to follow, that he thinks some theory may be deduced from them. In one place, of an idea of progress, he says, "it might be received on the faith of the Scriptures, but then, of course, with their modifications, — they must determine in what it consists, towards what it tends, what are its true agencies : the advocates of the common idea have little thought of any such standard." Again, he says, that "in Christ alone is the true life, and the true progress : in him there is a new humanity, redeemed out of a ruined humanity." Besides these indications of it, this passage, though still in a very condensed form, sets forth his opinion more fully :

"The doctrine of eternal rectilinear progression, as commonly held, is not true of man, either physically or morally. Nature and revelation both discard it. They differ widely, however, as to his final destiny, though each is true in its own department. Of man, viewed simply as a physical, terrestrial being, Lyell's analogy must hold good in all its gloomy sternness. There is an artistic maximum he is perhaps destined to reach ; after which the die will be broken, as others have been, and the race, as one of those organisms that have successively inhabited this planet, must pass off, although its present abode may, perhaps, again and again be fitted up for other types, to follow either in the ascending or descending scale. Again, in his moral aspect, too, may man be said to have a consummation, a maximum development, in other words, a perfection, or finish, to which he may attain, or in respect to which he may become irrecoverably lost. But here may be said to be the wide and striking difference. His moral maximum once attained, he

never more declines in pursuance of any organic law; neither does he, on the other hand, according to any warrant from the Scripture, or analogy, move on in an endless progress, at war with the very idea of finish, or the rest of perfection; nor does he become thenceforth the subject of any cyclical period, but passes off into the eternal, the changeless, the supernatural, as distinguished from the temporal, the flowing, and the physical. *He arrives at the promised rest.* In other words, he reaches that perfection of being for which he was created, and tried, and disciplined, and redeemed from his state of nature. He is immutably placed in that condition, *which is better than progress*, and from which all movement, in any direction, would be a retrogradation and a fall. Here is found his highest good, his true and eternal *εὐπαιγία* or 'well-being,' in distinction from that restless happiness, which is but a continual inflowing to supply a never-ceasing outflowing, and that never-satisfying knowledge, whose very law of accumulation ever converts its past acquisitions into comparative ignorance, by ever keeping them in the same state of comparative imperfection."

From the refutation of these theories, which enter so largely into what is known as the philosophy of history, from the exposure of their atheistic or infidel character, we turn to some general remarks on the science itself. We cite first the points he makes against that philosophy, which proposes to explain events by moral, physical, or ideal causes, if any such there be, without admitting any higher influence in history.

"*It does not solve the problem of life.* Its failures, its false predictions, the many unexpected transitions, of which it can give no account, show that it is useless, even if it be not wholly untrue—just as an estimate is utterly worthless, if it has omitted one figure, although all the rest may have been cast up with the utmost accuracy. That figure alone may make the difference of millions in the final account. So, also, facts show that the view of history, to which we are taking exceptions, must somewhere labor under a most serious defect; and the only conclusion is, that such defect must be in consequence of its

overlooking some most important class of originating or intervening causes." "It is well for the credit of much that is called the philosophy of history, that the science in its present form did not come into being a thousand years ago. The falsity of its best predictions would long since have utterly destroyed its reputation for profundity; even as its discovered fallacies will doubtless have that effect, long before the end of a thousand years to come."

To this thought he would call especial attention, as showing there must be some latent fallacy in this pretended absolute science: — "From any point of the past we choose to assume, the stream of history might have taken a different direction, and maintained forever thereafter an ever-widening divergency; *although*, up to that point of divergency, all *knowable* causes had remained identical with those that actually concurred in producing the present existing series; whilst still it might also be true, that, in the subsequent line of this changed direction, some idealist could have found the links of an entirely different chain of causation, different after the point of divergency, and yet all running up together and back into the common section, with the same naturalness, the same coherency, the same or equally tenable grounds for any theory of ideal development, as are presented in the actual course of events."

Mere sequence is often confounded with causation. Hence it seems as if the course of events, the known or at least knowable course, must have been as it was. The position that past events could not have been otherwise than they were, might be accepted, if there be taken into account the purpose and the intervention of God. But the writers on this science usually proceed irrespective of them in fact, though often using a jesuitical language, which seems to recognize them. Looking on the past intelligently from their point of view, and excluding what they really would exclude, the fixed, unchangeable character of history passes away from it. — "History is full of cases in which the destinies, sometimes of races, sometimes of nations, and sometimes of the world, have been suspended on turning-

points, whose deflexions from the tangent line of visible causality no science or philosophy this world has ever had, or ever will have, could hope to estimate with even an approximation to correctness. The breaking of an oar, in the boat which carried the message of Themistocles to the Persian admiral, the night before the battle of Salamis, might have founded an oriental supremacy upon the debasement of the occidental races, and, instead of a Grecian, have given a Persian literature to tinge the course of European thought for many succeeding ages." It may be thought that 'the great chain of appreciable causes, if impeded in one direction, would have brought it about in another, nearly if not quite parallel to the old channel from which it may have been diverted. Had not a revolution, it might be said, or some great political change happened just when it did, or where it did, it would only have been delayed for a few years, or a few generations. But then this other direction takes us at once out of the elements of the previously estimated line of causation; and in that case, no political or ideal calculus of differentials can determine the new law, and thence the rate and consequent extent of divergency.'

"In estimating possibilities and probabilities of this kind, *we impose on ourselves by a fallacy arising from inveterate associations*. It seems impossible that there could have been a state of things widely different from what has actually taken place. All, when traced up, appears so consistent and coherent, that we can hardly imagine any other series. As the scroll of history is unrolled by time, there appears to be unrolled along with it a most natural chain of causes, connecting it all together. But this is only because we see not lying hid beneath the ever-opening page the numberless possible disturbing powers, which, at the least touch from a higher sphere of influence, might from any point have rolled out another series of like consistency, of like coherence, and equally well adapted for the formation of a profound philosophy, with all its early causes, or those preceding the disturbing divergency, the same as in

present theories, and yet all its effects subsequent to that period, exhibiting the widest dissimilarity.

"A tribe of rambling Danes, or of Norman pirates, sailing a few degrees farther south, — a slight change in the latitude of the Reformation, — a Charles V. in England, — a Henry Eighth in Spain, — the one, if God had so willed it, burning Protestantism clean out of our mother isle, — the other, through circumstances apparently the most capricious, giving it root in a clime where its first efforts manifested more of evangelical strength than was exhibited in the less pure reformations of England and Germany, — circumstances like these, in the hands of the invisible Controller of events, might have changed the whole course of modern history, both civil and ecclesiastical, might have reversed all our present boasting of manifest destiny and Anglo-Saxonism."

These considerations prepare for the scriptural view of history, — too seldom found in what is called the philosophy of history, — a fact much to be regretted, as so large a part of the teaching of the time is conveyed in a historical guise. The infidel naturalism, often so painfully conspicuous in the department of science, appears also in the department of history, and there seems to be a close relation between them.¹ Lewis gives the view of history which has always been taken in the Church, but presents it with uncommon clearness and force:

"In the contemplation of any historical event, or of the position of the world, or of a nation, at any historical period, three classes of elements may be regarded as entering into its essential constitution: the powers at work in the human soul, the powers at work in nature, and that agency of God, which must be regarded as separate not only from both, but also from that general

¹ In a criticism on Hegel's Philosophy of History in the National Review, referring to the ideas of God held by this writer, it is said: "*Strange and repulsive* as such theories may appear to every man whose mind has once been imbued with deep religious sentiment, it is undeniably the tendency of mere science, unchecked by other considerations, to introduce such bare abstractions into circulation, and to replace personal agency by mere law, as the ultimate fact of the universe."

divine agency which is always working in and through both. This third element stands by itself; and this appearance of isolation it must possess. That is, if we think of it at all as a distinct power, we are compelled thus to view it in our minds, or it loses its logical difference. It must be so to us, or as viewed from our stand-point. We can link it with no natural series of cause and effect, — no series at least whose laws are known. When this is attempted, it sinks down into nature; it has no idea which we do not recognize in nature; the religious element, though it may seem in words to remain, is wholly absorbed in the natural.

“Instead of allowing itself to be reduced to a science, or a philosophy, its very maintenance, in all its moral integrity, would seem to demand, as to us at least, the idea of pure sovereignty, — of a wind that bloweth where it listeth, — of a power that worketh where it willeth; although, doubtless, having in itself the most transcendent of all reasons for the very smallest of its acts. When the ultimate reasons thus transcend our highest intelligence, as must be the case in the inquiries of a finite mind respecting God and his moral government, the most pious conclusion must ever be the most rational. The moral consciousness is here the surest guide to the intellect. A system which makes prayer intelligible, and has a place for faith and a particular providence, is, *on this very account*, more rational than one that has not; although the first may have more difficulty, that is, may seem less rational to the scientific intellect, — especially in regard to the great question of the divine immutability. We might say, too, whether we can explain it or not, that such an appearance of absolute and even arbitrary sovereignty would seem to be demanded as an element in history, if for no other reason, in order to break up from time to time that strong tendency to an atheistic naturalism, which would bring morals, and religion, and Christianity as much under a determinate calculus, as any operation in chemistry and mechanics; or would apply to the relations connecting us with the eternal and the infinite, a rule, which of necessity

becomes false and distorted when carried out of the temporal and the finite.

“Of the three departments, then, we have just mentioned, the first two may be said to form the legitimate province within which the philosophic historian may modestly pursue his investigations. In doing so, however, he should ever take for granted, in a spirit of the deepest reverence, that his best conclusions will require continual correction from that other great and unknown region, — unknown except so far as we can trace it by the light of the written revelation, — and that without such a wise and pious reserve, the unrolling of the future may justly make them objects of derision, by revealing how utterly inadequate were the data he had assumed for the solution of the most profound of problems. If even the astronomer, who boasts of ‘the exactness of his science,’ has to make such a reserve in allowing for the unknown influence of unknown planets yet beyond our estimated sphere, how much more should he of whom we now speak, exercise this reverent caution in judging of the ways of Him, whom the Scripture describes as being ‘verily a God who hideth himself.’”

We cite what he supposes may be an illustration of the invisible moral agencies, the secret, unappreciable operations on the human mind, such as the Scripture speaks of when it says, “The hearts of men are in the hand of the Lord, to turn them even as the rivers of water are turned.” We cite this, because it elucidates so well the truth that a very slight deflection of the course of events in the first instance, may bring the future under a very different law; and because of the spirit and power of the answer to an objection, with which it ends.

“Hannibal had crossed oceans, deserts, mountains; he had faced every danger, with the vindictive purpose of destroying Rome. What philosophy of history could ever estimate the single or combined influences which, after the battle of Cannæ, produced the first slight and perhaps unconscious deviation from his purpose of marching directly to the then defenceless object of his deadliest hate? What scientific calculus can give

us the law of the diverging series, as this deflection becomes wider and wider, until, through strange infatuation, the moment passed by which was charged with the destinies of Europe and the world? the moment, which might have transferred to northern Africa the empire, and moral and political influence, which Rome afterwards so long and so proudly exercised?

“ But this idea of special intervention, it may be said, sometimes creates difficulties, instead of solving them. If God did not intend that Hannibal should destroy Rome, why did all influences carry him thus far, and then fail him at the critical period? Why all this expenditure of natural and moral means to no apparent purpose? It was to teach the world, we reply, that ‘the Lord God omnipotent reigneth,’ and that He is exercising everywhere a sovereignty, the same as that from which the prophet withdraws the veil in his message to the proud King of Assyria, who also came, like Hannibal, to the very verge of triumph, only to be driven back with deeper ignominy. ‘I know thy abiding, saith the Lord God of Israel, and thy going out, and thy coming in, and thy rage. Thy tumult comes up into mine ears, and, therefore, will I put my hook in thy nose, and my bridle in thy lips, and I will turn thee back by the way by which thou camest.’ Is it said, that this mere assertion of the divine *imperium* is too plain a truth; that its autocratic exhibition in this way presents too low a motive for the divine conduct; that, if ever meant to be taught at all, it is a lesson intended rather for the infancy, than the maturity of the race? *Let us learn it then, we answer: let us at length learn the alphabet of moral truth, before we demand a revelation of its deeper mysteries.* Perhaps when the world has been brought to a thorough understanding of this first element or ‘principle of doctrine’ (τὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς λόγον), has received the lesson in all docility, as it never yet has received it, some other leaf in the catechism may be turned over for us; some other chapter of more transcendent aspect may then be presented for human study and instruction.”

Our final citation presents the clearest elucidation of the

doctrine of a Special Providence, acting within the realm of physical laws, with which we have ever met.¹

"There is a large class of facts, which our philosophic historian cannot directly link into his chain of visible causation, and yet they must be regarded as furnishing influences, that enter largely into the sequence of events: there must be acknowledged a class of agencies, which must be viewed as occupying a mid-region between the simply natural on the one hand, and the miraculous on the other, and to which we have given the name *providential*, using the term rather in the ordinary sense of intervention, than in its strict etymological import. In the other class, or the simply natural, there is supposed to be no special control of ordained physical laws, aside from what is necessarily involved in the idea of maintaining in exercise and vigor the power or properties originally conferred upon them; in other words, no interference exerted *against* them, or *upon* them, or even *through* them, in such a way as to turn them aside from any result, that would otherwise have been produced. In this mid-region of causes, however, God may be supposed to work, — *through* nature indeed, yet still *above* nature, that is, *supernaturally*, or specially, — and thus to

¹ There was delivered, at the Andover Theological Seminary, in 1854, a discourse on the Relation of Divine Providence to Physical Laws. The position taken by the speaker seems to have been, that the Creator gave nature laws by which it goes on without subsequent interference from its Maker. In short, the discourse was an argument against the doctrine of a Special Providence in the Physical World, as it has ever been held in the Christian Church. The ideas, however ably propounded, are no doubt common enough, but there is something startling in the unconsciousness of the learned scientific professor that he was uttering ideas not to be propounded within the pale of Christianity, and the necessary implication of ignorance of the fact that some truths are so well known to the Church that they cannot be called in question within it. The discourse elicited several answers. So far as the arraying against it the authority of Scripture, they were, of course, decisive. The discourse, however, proceeds mainly on the idea that physical agents have specific offices, on the due performance of which depend the stability of the order of things, and that "it is not easy to see" how they can be diverted from their obvious design without disturbance of the order and harmony of nature. In the passage above cited, this difficulty is met. We have said that, like Pascal, Lewis was endowed with an imagination which, on being looked at, seemed to resolve itself into clearness and far-reachingness of intellectual vision. To this passage we point as illustrating that idea.

turn nature herself to special results lying out of the straight track of her undisturbed movement, but at the same time without breach, visible or invisible, of any of her laws or sequences. It is an *interference, a diversion, but not an infringement*. As far as the most acute science, even with the aid of her most powerful magnifying-glasses, can trace the process, every step will be found to be in an unbroken chain of natural causation : and yet away back of nature, or *on that other side of nature*, where her sequences, however long to us, terminate at last in the supernatural, and where the prime motors of her machinery ever stand ready to receive any new or special impulse — on this remote side, we say, towards which science has not yet made even an infinitesimal progress, although to the Infinite Mind its whole immense extent may be but as a thin screen kindly interposed to shade and protect the weak finite eye from the insufferable brightness of the supernatural, — away in that distant region, ‘even in His secret chamber,’ in the ‘hiding-place of His power,’ in the telegraphic centre of instantaneous communication to all parts of the universe, springs may have been touched by the finger of the Almighty, which have vibrated all the way down this chain of natural causation, until, in each case calling for interference, it has terminated in a result specially connected with some providential event, so styled, some prayer, it may be, some crime calling for speedy vengeance, some purpose of mercy or grace ; and all this, too, as directly as though it had been proclaimed by a voice from the third heavens, and had been brought about by some visible miraculous agency crushing through all the laws of nature and the universe. *Science has nothing to say in opposition to this ; whilst that which is higher than science, even our moral constitution, imperatively demands it.* . . . “ It is demanded by that interior department or tribunal of the soul, that speaks with the most authority, as with the voice of God, and therefore, whether we can prove it to be true or not, it must be taken as true for us ; as the truth with which we cannot dispense ; as *the* truth, which alone gives an interest, a rational interest, to all other truth ; as *the* truth, without the

recognition of which, it becomes a matter of the very smallest consequence whether anything else be true or false. . . .

"It must be so, or every element of a moral system perishes. It is demanded by the conscience. We cannot pray in faith without it; we can have no trust in Providence; we can have neither the fear nor the love of God. But we *must* pray, we *must* believe, otherwise our souls have no true life. This, then, is the argument."

No one can read this address without perceiving that in the writer of it there is united trained logical power, and subtlety of analysis, with quickness and justness in appreciating the character and bearings of thought, and that he is not to be deceived by pretence, or overawed by assumptions. The same characteristics appear in a few thoughts he has put forth on the latest phase of skepticism, some of which we present. The assumptions of unbelief are now so coolly and scornfully made, as to perplex and almost to intimidate some who will here find them treated as they merit.

"THE LATEST RUSE OF MODERN INFIDELITY,

"Is the most significant name we can give to a movement which, for tactical skill in its managers and timely adaptedness to some of the superficialities of our age, bids fair to be one of the most mischievous that ever originated in the camp of unbelief. To every well-balanced and well-informed mind, its bare exposure is its refutation; and yet, with many, its very impudence is its strength, while its bold assumption of victory is the very thing which gives it an apparent triumph, and sometimes a real success. It can no longer be called *the latest form of infidelity*, as it was not long since styled by a learned theologian, himself of the most liberal school of Christianity, for since that day it has ceased to have *form* altogether. It has retired even beyond the region of negations. It presents no more anything tangible, anything visible, anything that can be reduced to logical statement or definition. It would have

astonished the old infidels of the eighteenth century. Hume and Voltaire and Paine would not have known what to make of it; though, doubtless, a kindred instinct would have suffered them to entertain no doubt of its spirit.

"It has no *dogmas*, no first or last truths, no premises, no conclusions. But it has abundance of *names* as shadowy as itself. It calls itself 'the new phase of faith;' it is the 'breadth and scope of modern thought;' it is the 'religion of the intuitions,' as distinguished from the dogmas of the 'logical understanding;' it is the 'old creed,' if any would prefer to call it so but 'lifted into higher forms of thought;' it is the 'spirit in distinction from the letter;' it is the new translation of the gospel from the 'historical' into the 'ideal;' it is *Christianity come of age*, and having outgrown those mythical and miraculous swathing bands that were indispensable to its Jewish infancy; it is the eclectic synthesis of all creeds, 'the harmony of all opposing polarities.' . . .

"Is it the old Infidelity? Oh, no! — Infidelity, once so called, is vulgar, ribald, coarse, and blasphemous. It had its narrow dogmas, as well as the narrow creeds which it assailed. It was unphilosophical, unspiritual. It had no subjective 'insight.' It was all 'outward,' like the Christianity it rejected. It belonged to the soulless and faith-lacking eighteenth century. It was a poor, cavilling, word-disputing unbelief, as ignoble as the common faith itself. . . .

"It would be churchly, too, and use a churchly language. With gracious condescension it admits the church is an 'immense reality;' it 'accepts the church;' it tells us, it 'adopts the church;' it most benignantly takes under its care a word and an idea, which has been so wretchedly misunderstood by almost all in every age, who have borne the Christian name. It would adopt, too, with equal graciousness, the most sacred language of the Scriptures, and employ it with as much familiarity, as if it had been its first-formed, first-lipped, vernacular tongue. It has its baptism, its regeneration, its incarnation, its redemption, its '*at-one-ment*,' and even its 'justification by

faith.' A late and much lauded writer of this school 'accepts' this doctrine too. It was thought to have something about it so peculiarly uncompromising, as to render impossible all attempts to find an easy and harmonious place for it in the new gospel. But he gives us to understand, that all that need be done is to pull off the deforming disguises in which the ignorance of Paul had wrapped the dogma, and then it stands forth at the very summit of philosophy. It is the faith by which the individual 'comes into unity with the universe.' This is a meaning, to be sure, of which apostles never dreamed. But, then, this only adds to its value, it makes it so much more transcendental an affair than that vulgar dogma which has so long usurped the name. . . .

"But, what then is this new faith, or this new believing skepticism, that so transcends all creeds, all forms, all dogmas, all miracles, all historical facts, all objective statements, all outward literality? Define to us its lineaments. Give us at least its position in the field. How unreasonable the request, they would reply. The very making of such a demand, betrays the inveterate influence of the old dogmas. It is the low appeal to the mere 'logical understanding.' Who can give the infinite in the forms of the finite? Who would attempt to confine within any dogmatic enclosure the limitless intuitions of the spiritual insight?"

Few, especially if they read the whole paper, will deny that Lewis has caught the outlines of this threatening shape,

"If shape it may be called, that shape hath none,
Distinguishable in member, joint or limb."

We cite parts of some paragraphs in which he lays open some of the arts which give to it all it has of success:

"Its chief weapon is the *ad captandum* assumption that there is something in the modern skepticism far more profound than anything the world has ever seen, or known, or thought before. . . . This has a most powerful effect on certain minds. Its

constant reiteration gives it the appearance of something no longer to be called in question. The immense pains that are taken to spread it, in every form, on the wings of our most widely circulated periodical literature, are producing an impression which is due neither to its argument, nor to its originality."

"Another part of the game consists in that affected longing to believe, which is so taking with young sentimentalists, — the representation, they would call it, of a spirit, a noble spirit, 'yearning' for faith, yet distressed by those 'cruel old dogmas' which 'its higher intelligence' cannot 'accept.' There is the struggle of the 'transition' period, the elevating, though painful, skepticism that vulgar believers cannot feel, and which is at the same time the grief and the glory of its possessors. Oh! could we but believe, say some of them, could we but rest in that simple faith in which our fathers trusted, and which is the consolation of common souls! But, alas! our 'higher intelligence' is our severe misfortune! The food that once gave nourishment to an Augustine, an Anselm, a Baxter, a Butler, an Edwards and a Wesley, fails to satisfy the 'higher longings' of our famishing spirits! All this has a mighty charm for many souls; — it combines so many elements of egotistical vanity, of pseudo-spiritualism, of a false inflating humility, as far as possible from that repentance which 'brings down every high thought and vain imagination in subjection to the cross."

"Especially is this ruse played off with most appearance of triumph, when an opportunity is presented in a notice or review of some work on the Evidences of Christianity. The whole of this department is sometimes ignored with one sweep of the pen. We have nothing more to do with such books. The treatises of Paley, and Lardner, and Chalmers, were very well in their day. They were quite respectable productions, well adapted, perhaps, to meet the objections of the vulgar infidels of the eighteenth century; but similar treatises now do not and can not, as a matter of course, at all come up

to the 'new phase of faith.' . . . We say it in sorrow, says a writer in the *Westminster Review*, the received theory of the divine origin of Christianity, can no more be *restored*. Let the reader mark the word we have italicised. It contains a dispensation of all argument, and for the shallow admirer of the school, this contemptible trick of rhetoric often stands in the place of all logical proof. 'We had *hoped*,' continues this sorrowing apologist, 'that our modern defender was about to take up the problem of Christianity with a real appreciation of its altered conditions;' but, alas!—we paraphrase instead of quoting farther—it is only the old story to which this enlightened age, with all its immense discoveries in science and philosophy, can never listen. It is the old argument about miracles and the supernatural. . . . And so, through reviews, essays, lectures, novels, poetry, newspapers, paragraphs, in every form through which the most intolerable sameness of ideas can be combined with the greatest variety of expression, is the same everlasting round of vaunting assertion with the most sparing amount of proof.

"All this is very taking; but there have been times—to their disparagement shall we say it, or their credit?—when its effect would have been just nothing at all. There have been ages which, although far behind us in objective science, would have, at least, held those who wrote for them to the necessity of having distinct ideas expressed in clear language, fortified by coherent, logical, and probable proof. There have been ages, unscientific, yet of intellectual force and intellectual honesty, prone to believe in the marvellous, yet intolerant of nonsense; ages in which the writers of the transcendental phase of faith would have obtained no hearing from any class, because there was not enough of false learning in the masses to make them pleased with what they did not understand, and yet enough of true learning and logical training in the better educated to enable them to have discovered at once the inanity of its pretensions. The Schoolmen would have dispersed it with one chapter of analysis and definition; the Reformers would have laughed it to scorn for its utter want of all logical

as well as moral power; the condemned Eighteenth Century would have annihilated it with one blow from the hammer of its plain, common sense, 'logical understanding.'

"It is often made a complaint by writers of this school, and it is a prominent part of the general ruse, that they are not understood, not appreciated; that the old mind of the age fails in coming fairly up to their 'stand-point.' And this, too, is very taking. . . . With many, especially the young, it has all the effect which the obscure adds to the sublime, and the cant of mysticism imparts to the conception of vast profundity. It is only the love of the marvellous of former days now turned into a different channel. . . .

"And yet it may be safely as well as boldly affirmed, that there is nothing in Strauss, or the profoundest German of them all, that has not been advanced for *substance*, and we might say in *form*, too, by the old English deists, who called themselves deists and infidels without any disguise. We challenge them to produce a substantial objection to Christianity derived from anything latent or patent in the Old and New Testaments, that is not more than a century old. We might even go farther, and maintain that most of the German objections now paraded as something new, and against which, it is said, former defences will not avail, are as old as the days of Porphyry and Celsus. There may be some new verbal difficulties, raked up by German exegesis, but involving no really new objection, — for this is the great point, — presenting no 'new aspects,' no 'new problems,' no 'altered conditions.' The questions arising from the apparent discrepancies in the Gospels, the diverse genealogies of Matthew and Luke, the seeming misapprehension in regard to the second coming of Christ, the alleged difficulties of the Old Testament, the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, the destruction of the Canaanites, etc., all of which Newman and others parade as though they were fresh discoveries, are coëval with the first centuries of Christianity. Even the stale witticisms of Jonah's fish and Balaam's ass have about them the mould of almost two thousand years. They all date

from that early period when the gospel first aroused the critical acumen of the depraved soul in calling forth its sleeping enmity to the highest forms of truth."

The following passage is cited—one among many—to illustrate Lewis' ability to apply to the elucidation of the present the history of the past: "Any one well acquainted with the previous forms of philosophical or theological error, might have predicted that the infidelity of the eighteenth century must inevitably run its course, and run out, just as had been done by that old Roman Epicurianism, to which in many points it bore so close a resemblance. Until experience, however, had convinced us of the fact, it was not so obviously certain, that from its sweltering ashes would have exhaled the stupefying gases of the German pantheism, or the nitrous fumes of the new atheology. And yet a careful study of profane and ecclesiastical history might have given us a clew to the moral chemistry of the transition. When the Pagan philosophy was receiving its death-blows from the preachers of Christianity, *out of the dying carcass came forth the monstrous forms of that vaunting Gnosticism, which so much troubled the early Christian Church. It professed to be more spiritual than the gospel itself. It contemned the Old Testament as gross and carnal; its God as a malign and vindictive Deity. Christ was but an appearance—an idea. It, too, had its higher form of faith, its higher law, its subjective insight, its ideal, dispensing with the historical and the actual. It had its æons, its spheres, its new spiritual world.* And yet, as we now look back upon it through the cleared-up glass of history, we see 'how earthly it was, how sensual, how devilish.' With all its boasted spirituality, it had no cross, no repentance, no humility, and therefore no true faith. Will not a similar spectacle be presented, when some similar vantage-ground in the future enables the observer to look back upon the then stale and decomposing elements of its modern antitype?"

It has been said that the philosophy of Lewis is practical, as well as ideal. This appears in the wonderful manner in which,

in his papers, the most ultimate ideas in philosophy and religion are woven, as it were, into the warp and woof of life ; or rather, in the way in which they point out how they should enter into all social existence as its controlling or organizing principles, and in which they make known the evils which result from the want of their influence. In this point of view his writings are among the most original which this age has seen, though certainly in a very different and much higher sense than that in which this term is sometimes used. Not by any means as the most striking or apt illustration of precisely what we mean, but because, while answering this end, it presents so clear a view of one of the most important and least understood of the powers of the soul, and of the evils which follow its perversion, we present portions of a paper

ON THE CONSCIENCE.

“Conscience is imperative within its own domain. But this domain has two departments, or rather, there is attached to its exclusive realm, to its *sanctum sanctorum*, or holy of holies, an outer court. In the first, or inner region, the decision is primary, absolute, and without appeal. In the other, it is ever conditional, ever modified by expediences whose right consideration falls not within the conscience directly, but belongs to the reason or intellect, judging, as in other rational problems, by data that lie wholly without the moral sense, and which may vary in each particular case. Within the first are embraced the *states* or dispositions of the soul in its relations to God and man, together with the immutable intuitions that pronounce one *state* good, righteous, holy, the other unrighteous, unholy, accursed. These lie, or ought to lie, right under the eye of the conscience. The true inner light shines, or ought to shine, and if not put out, or turned into darkness by being ever directed to things without its sphere, *will shine*, directly upon them. Thus the propositions — we *ought* to love God supremely as our Father and Creator — we *ought* to love man

as our brother—we *ought* to make the moral glory of the Divine Being the highest aim of our existence—we *ought* to seek the best good of our fellow-men and their highest virtue, whatever that good and that virtue may be,—these, and such as these, the conscience decides, or *ought* to decide, intuitively. We have known large volumes of theology written to prove them, but the conscience, the true inner light shining in its own inner sphere, does not need them at all. It affirms all these truths without ratiocination. If conscience does her true office, no reasoning can make them clearer. If she is dead, or blind, no reasoning, in itself, can restore her to life, or heal her spiritual malady. In this higher region there is no modification by circumstances or expediences, as when we judge of outward acts and relations. There is no lowering the standard of truth. A man may see it, and even rejoice in it, although at the same time he sees himself far below it. We must *come up* to it, says the healthy conscience; it can never *come down* to us. To these decisions of the higher law there is no dispensation or supersedeas possible. There is no writ of error, such as may be brought against every human judgment when rendered of outward rights and duties. Here we have our eternal and immutable morality. We may safely speak of it in as high terms as any of our higher law transcendentalists could desire.

“And so, too, on the other hand, the decisions of the conscience as to what is wrong, are alike imperative, alike irrevocable, alike incapable of all modification, when kept within this field. Thus it says—and says intuitively—it is wrong to be selfish, or to love ourselves to the disregard of others; it is wrong to be cruel or tyrannical in disposition or practice; it is wrong to use men, whether we be employers at the North or masters at the South, for the gratification alone of our selfishness, independent of what we see to be for their secular and eternal good. In all these cases it is the state of soul that conscience *looks at*. She will not decide, cannot decide, as some would have her, that it is wrong for one man to be the monarchical, or, if you

will, the despotic ruler of millions of other men (since that may, or may not, be a wise form of government under the outward expedencies of the case) ; but she does say, both to the governor and the governed, that for the temper, dispositions, and states of the soul they manifest in these relations, they will both be held accountable at the bar of Eternal Justice. . . . She says promptly, it is wrong not to love our brother man of every race and condition, or to fail in doing him all the physical and moral good compatible with his own and our circumstances. She tells us, too, just as imperatively (if we will but hear her voice amidst our noisy logomachies), that it is wrong to judge of those circumstances, and that we will be held accountable if we judge of those circumstances by any abstract rules, or abstract rights, while contemptuously ignoring the expedencies of actual present or probable future facts. The reason is given to us to judge of these. Conscience only holds us accountable that that intelligence be faithfully exercised in view of all the facts, while she herself is directly occupied with higher matters, even those higher moral intuitions which no expedencies can modify, no change of facts impair.

“ Here, we say, conscience is imperative, and the reason is, that in thus judging intuitively of states, and motives, and dispositions, or, in other words, the moral diathesis, she looks from her high place, her Heaven-appointed watch-tower, right down into the soul without media of any kind. The whole region lies before her. If the vision be healthy, it is a direct *beholding* of what is, in its true nature, whether that sight be pleasant or painful, beautiful or deformed. In such beholding, conscience has not to suspend her decision until she has consulted consequences, or reasoned about causes or effects. The judgment is as independent, and as immediate, as that of the æsthetic sense. This state of soul, it says, is fair, it is lovely, it is right ; that is ugly, unlovely, unrighteous. It says this simply because it judges what it *sees*, and was made to see, as falling directly within its inner field of light.

“ But now present to it an outward act, and outward relation.

Here it cannot judge directly. Such act or relation lies without its telescopic range. It can only decide at all about it according as there is reflected from the outward act some clear evidence of the inner state, and for this end it has to call in aid from the reason; it must get from the intelligence a *verdict* on the facts, on all the facts; in other words, a careful induction of preceding causes, of attending circumstances, and probable future results. The real responsibility of conscience is that this induction be made with the utmost care, that nothing ascertainable be left out, that there be no rash jumping to conclusions on the ground of any assumed abstract rights to the ignoring of expediencies that might essentially affect them.

“Let us, then, start another series of questions. Is monarchical government right, under any circumstances? Can one man rightly have and hold power more or less stringent over another? Ought one man to be indissolubly bound in marriage to one woman? How long should the parent rule over the child? Should the wife have separate property or be in social subjection to her husband? Now these, it will be seen at once, are a very different class of queries, and their decision must belong to a different tribunal. The conscience has a duty indeed in respect to them; but it is only to obtain and follow the best outward or objective light, whether derived from experience or history, or Scripture, or from all combined. It is evident, too, that if she steps at all from her appropriate sphere, she has as much right to decide intuitively, or *per se*, as it is called, on any one of these questions, as on that one which the modern higher-law doctrine claims so confidently as falling within her jurisdiction. And such a view is becoming every day more distinctly advanced. It is well known that the pioneers in this progress have already planted their standards on every one of these fields. Those of our religious men and clergy who have followed them thus far, must make a quick retreat, if they would not get into a position from which every old landmark of the Bible, as well as of history, bids fair to be swept away.

"Conscience, as its very name implies, is *self-knowledge*. It can only judge of outward acts and relations according as they furnish evidence more or less clear of an inward state of soul. Hence it is only by an accommodation of speech that we can say it judges of such outer relations at all. An error in respect to them is not an error of the conscience, except so far as the perverted inward state has darkened the outward intelligence. This may be the case, but it is much more likely to be the other way. It is by far the more common fault that the continued habit of looking out has blinded the eye of the conscience to its true inner work, and made the soul itself, with its moral states, its dispositions, its ultimate motives and emotions, as dark as Plato's cave, where nothing is seen but ever passing, ever changing shadows dimly reflected from its outer wall.

"Again, hardly any outward act is an exact representative of an inward state, so as to be an unfailing evidence of its moral character. A vast variety of preceding and attendant circumstances must be known to make it even an approximation to such evidence. There are, indeed, some that come so near to it as to have been regarded in all ages as crimes *per se*, such as the violation of the oath, a breach of solemn compact; but these are not the acts which most especially call out the modern higher-law conscientiousness. It rather chooses to exercise itself upon those outer relations that involve the greatest difficulty in their political or social settlement. And hence it is, that this department of casuistical ethics is now, as it was in the Apostle's time, and ever will be while self-righteousness exists upon the earth, the fruitful field of endless abstract disputation, or what the sacred writer so significantly characterizes as *logomachies*, or strifes of words. It is, at all events, a peculiar trait of our own age and land. The straying conscience sees, or thinks it sees, the exact right and wrong of acts and relations involving the most uncertain and complicated expediences. It sees distinctly the dim, the obscure, the far off. It is, in other words, employing the inner light to see what it cannot see, what it was

not made to see. It is straining the inner eye to behold objects that lie quite beyond its range, and thus blinding it to those that approach the nearest to its appointed healthy vision.

“And this thought is the key to what might otherwise seem a wondrous mystery. If conscience is only to see directly, or intuitively, what lies within the soul itself, or what we have called the subjective state, if she sees this by her own light, and without the aid of any reasoning from abroad, just as the bodily eye sees colors, or the æsthetic taste perceives beauty or deformity, — if this be so, why does it make such strange mistakes? Why does it so much overlook what lies nearest to it, and right before it, in its own sphere, and on its own plane? How is it that men can be so mistaken, so widely mistaken, as to the state and temper of their own souls, . . . and ‘know not what manner of spirit they are of’? This is indeed a marvel, an astonishing marvel. And yet the explanation comes directly from the phenomena we have been laboring to set forth as the main moral mischief of our times.

“‘They that look out of the windows shall be darkened.’ It is, we admit, but an accommodation of Scripture intended for another purpose, but we may employ it as presenting the briefest illustration of our idea. It is this continual outgazing of the soul into the field of objective or extrinsic relation that has bleared the eye of the conscience, and dimmed the true inner light. Had it been ever faithfully employed within its own province, it would have been indeed ‘the candle of the Lord searching all the deep places of the spirit.’ It would have lit up all ‘its chambers of imagery’ with a pure and growing illumination, driving out the malign shadows like evil birds that cannot bear the day. But in the other process the soul is ever growing darker and darker. Men have looked abroad until they can no longer see themselves; and hence this exceeding conscientiousness — where conscientiousness strictly has little or no place — in the region of outward political relations. . . .

“‘Blessed is the man,’ says Socrates, τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων, ‘who

minds his own affairs.' The maxim may seem, at first, to have a selfish or unsocial aspect, but it is pregnant with the holiest meaning. It is very similar to that of the Apostle, 'Let each man study to be quiet and do his own business.' In both there is enjoined the care of the spiritual state, the inner *commonwealth* of each man's own soul, as the necessary preparation for any good he may ever do, or any true conscientiousness he may exercise, in his outward political or social relations.

"A striking evidence that there must be something spurious in this outward conscientiousness, arises from the fact of its endless differences, so irreconcilable, yet all presenting equal claims to whatever merit there may be in this poor virtue of sincerity. We need not charge any of them with downright hypocrisy. There is an easier solution of the mystery in the blinding effects of this continual roaming of the conscience outside of its appointed bounds. Yes, all are sincere — equally sincere. What an enthusiastic zeal for principle, what a devoted love of righteousness pervades the ranks of all parties! And so, too, every class of reformers are sincere, however much they may impugn the sincerity of all patriots and reformers except themselves. Who that is familiar with the literature of platforms and resolutions can have any doubt of this? Even lynch-law mobs are sincere — very sincere. What an irrepressible love of justice fills their souls! how intense the working of their 'higher law!' how very honest their fanatical hatred of fanaticism! Who are not sincere? If that saves us, then, indeed, are there few that be lost. A higher ethical authority than Wayland or Paley assures us that 'every way of man is right in his own eyes, but the Lord trieth the spirits.' There must be, then, a standard 'which is higher than the highest.' There is a law, a true objective *written* law, by which the conscience is to be judged, and its moral character — as a good or bad conscience — definitively determined.

"Our modern society is certainly presenting, in this respect, a most remarkable spectacle. We are all so burdened with responsibility. Each man, and each woman, too, is responsible

for every social evil, and every political measure. What is still more strange, the pressure on the conscience is generally in proportion to the remoteness of the cause. Not only, too, is there this responsibility for far-off sins, but each man is burdened with the comparative deadness of his neighbor's conscience. He is distressed that his clergyman does not every Sabbath bear his testimony against the particular offence, which seems to him to involve the essence of all evil. He will not hold Christian communion with such an offender. He will not commune with the man who would commune with him. Nay more, such is his moral heroism, he will not commune with the man who will not condemn the man who is willing to commune with him; and so on *ad infinitum*. Such a conscience is like the fabled house of the nursery rhymes. There is no end to its spacious stories, or the heavy bales of conscientiousness with which each department is crowded almost to bursting.

"We are not making light of sacred matters. They do so who present the human conscience in a manner so different from that of the Divine Word. In the Scriptures, faithful self-searching, penitential self-humiliation, is set forth as its chief, if not its only office. In the modern reform, it becomes only another name for the most bitter railing against other men and other consciences. *They* make light of this sacred faculty of the soul who are ever allowing it to roam abroad, to the neglect of that spiritual home which God has entrusted to its care, and for which He has given it so full and clear a directory. They make light of it who, in the luxury of a false conscientiousness, hold themselves responsible for every thing but that for which alone a man is truly responsible, *his conscience itself*, or the state of soul which gives moral character to all outward acts.

"But what a melancholy contrast to this universal sense of responsibility is presented in the actual condition of the world! How full of conscience, and yet how full of crime! How full of patriotism, and yet, from the politician's own showing, how

fearful the amount and steady increase of political corruption! The most direful passions, too, are called out, and all in the name of truth and righteousness. How different from the spirit of the New Testament! How refreshing, after having listened to the heated harangues of one of our reform conventions, to turn to the pages of Paul and John! It is like emerging from the suffocating atmosphere of the sultry vault into the pure and balmy air of heaven. How serene the repose of the Scriptures to one who turns away in weariness from these chafing logomachies, these fierce battles of the spirit, in which, could we only see the invisible essences of things, there might be discerned a more bitter enmity, a more malignant strife of soul, than ever rose up to Heaven's eye from the blood-stained fields of the Crimea."

Lewis seems to us to have in biblical criticism the most appropriate field for his endowments and attainments; and we regret not to find more of literary criticism from his pen, as the full exertion of his powers in this, would have secured for him the more earnest attention in that higher field. This little fragment is all that we have met with:

"In the old mythologies, Night is the mother of Day; and hence the epithets poetry has ever conferred upon her,— Sacred Night, Divine Night, Holy Night, most Venerable and Religious Night. But not only has she been regarded as the mythological *mother* of creation, but as ever the *nurse* of the purest emotions and the truest thoughts. On this account the Greek poets gave her that beautiful name, *Euphrone*— indicating the season of good feeling,— the hour of hope, of calm yet joyous contemplation. It is true, the inspired description of the heavenly state says, '*There shall be no night there.*' But in our present imperfect being, the idea of the highest earthly bliss would be marred by its absence from the picture. As yet we cannot dispense with the shade. The

Sacred high eternal noon,

is for beings of another order and another life; and, however

much we may admire the pure sublimity of this fine line of Doddridge, we feel that we must be endowed with new emotions before we could truly enjoy the never to be remitted splendor of such a state as it describes.

“Although affected by particular circumstances, and expressed with great variety of imagery, there has been a wonderful harmony in the spiritual conceptions, which the contemplation of night has ever called forth. We have, therefore, thought it might interest our readers to present a few of the most striking night-scenes from ancient and modern poets. The first from our portfolio, of course, is Homer’s. The selection is from the close of the eighth book of the *Iliad*. Its introduction partakes of the warlike character of the poem, but softened into that holy calmness which the scene ever assumes, whatever may be the circumstances in which it is presented. We give Pope’s splendid translation, although some might prefer the more accurate version of Cowper :

‘As when the moon, refulgent lamp of night,
O’er heaven’s clear azure spreads her sacred light,
When not a breath disturbs the deep serene,
And not a cloud o’ercasts the solemn scene;
Around her throne the vivid planets roll,
And stars unnumbered gild the glowing pole,
O’er the dark trees a yellower verdure shed,
And tip with silver every mountain’s head;
Then shine the vales, the rocks in prospect rise,
A flood of glory bursts from all the skies.’

“But neither Pope nor Cowper can be said to have caught the spirit of the original as well as the old ballad version of Chapman :

‘As when about the silver moon, when air is free from winde,
And stars shine cleare, to whose sweet beams high prospects and
the brows
Of all steep hills and pinnacles thrust up themselves for shows;
And even the lowly vallies joy to glitter in their sight, —
When the unmeasured firmament bursts to disclose her light,
And all the sigus in heaven are seen, that glad the shepherd heart.’

"Apollonius Rhodius, in the *Argonautica*, presents a greater diversity of imagery. He has not in view, like Homer, the unity of a single scene, but calls up similar emotions by a dispersed variety of the most impressive pictures. We present a translation, which, if it have no other merit, may at least be said to be almost word for word :

'Now Night had thrown her shadow o'er the earth.
Far out at sea the sailors stood and gazed
On wheeling Arctos and Orion's stars.
The traveller longed to hear the warder's voice
Invite to rest; and even the mother's eyes
That drowy hour pressed downwards, as she watched
By her dead child. The watch-dog's voice was mute:
The city's thronging noise had died away,
And stillness reigned o'er all the shaded realm,
Save in Medea's restless soul.'

"Virgil closely imitates the Greek poet in the designed contrast, if not in his scenery. Even those may appreciate its exceedingly liquid flow, who are compelled to resort to the translation for its meaning.

'Nox erat, et placidum carpebat fessa soporem
Corpora per terras, sylvæque, et sæva quiérant
Aequora: cum medio volvuntur sidera lapsu:
Cum tacet omnis ager, pecudes, pictæque volucres
Quæque lacus late liquidos, quæque aspera dumis
Rura tenent, somno positæ sub nocte silenti,
Lenibant curas, et corda oblita laborum.
At non infelix Dido.'—*Æneid*, Lib. iv.

'T was dead of night, when wearied bodies close
Their eyes in balmy sleep, and soft repose.
The winds no longer whisper through the woods,
No murmuring tides disturb the gentle floods;
The stars in silent order moved around,
And peace with downy wings was brooding on the ground.
The flocks and herds and particolored fowl,
Which haunt the woods, or swim the seedy pool,
Stretched on the quiet earth securely lay,
Forgetting the past labors of the day;—
All but unhappy Dido.'

“Dryden is very far from doing justice to Virgil in the translation of this passage; and yet we must say the original, much as it has been praised, falls greatly short of the exquisite description by Apollonius. How much does that most impressive image in the sixth line of the Grecian poet exceed any effect produced by Virgil’s *pictæ volucres*, or ‘particolored fowl,’ however ornate the language and liquid the melody of his highly-wrought lines.

“But Byron, — shall we risk the criticism, — Byron, in our judgment, surpasses every example we have quoted, and even had we added, as we might have done, Shakspeare and Milton to the list :

‘T was midnight. On the mountains brown
The cold, round moon shone deeply down;
Blue rolled the waters; blue the sky
Spread like an ocean hung on high,
Bespangled with those isles of light,
So wildly, spiritually bright.
Who ever gazed upon them shining,
And turned to earth without repining?
The sea on either shore lay there,
Calm, clear, and azure as the air;
And scarce the foam the pebbles shook,
That murmured meekly as the brook.
The winds were pillowed on the waves;
The banners drooped along their staves;
And that deep silence was unbroke,
Save where the watch his signal spoke;
Save where the steed neighed oft and shrill
And echo answered from the hill.’

“Our concluding example is from the Scriptures. We challenge not for it a superiority simply on the ground of its inspiration. Every reader may judge for himself, how immeasurably it excels anything of the kind to be found in ancient or modern poetry. How full of *natural* sublimity, and at the same time how profoundly impressive the *moral* lesson of this night-scene from Job! —

‘In thoughts from visions of the night,
When deep sleep falleth upon men,

'Fear came upon me, and trembling,
 And made all my bones to shake.
 Then a Spirit passed before my face;
 The hair of my flesh rose up.
 It stood. An image was before mine eyes,
 And yet I could not discern the form thereof.
 There was silence —
 And yet I heard a voice, saying, —
 Shall a mortal be more just than God?
 Shall a man be more pure than his Maker?' "

The *opinions* of Lewis, now to be presented, may give some idea of the system of truth which gives unity to his writings. The reader should bear in mind that these opinions in this somewhat aphoristic form, as severed from their contexts, are deprived of their illustration and argument where in some cases both are required, and where in others they give to the enunciation of some familiar, undisputed truth, unwonted clearness and power; and that their selection, their combination and arrangement, made by a single mind, shares in the peculiarities and imperfections of its judgment. Were it our sole aim to illustrate the literary merit of the writings from which these opinions have been compiled, it would be putting them to a test unreasonably severe to print these pages; but beyond and above this, we would thus bring the authority of his name to uphold some truths too faintly affirmed or too often denied.

I.

The necessary idea of God is the ground of all Truth.

II.

Truth is inseparable from *thought*. Thought is inseparable from a *thinker*. The first is inconceivable without the second. The second is inconceivable without the third. There are certain truths which the laws of our minds, out of which we cannot think, compel us to regard as independent of time, and space, and all created things; in other words, as necessary and eternal. Necessary and eternal truth cannot be conceived of

by us except as necessary and eternal thought ; necessary and eternal thought is inconceivable by us except in connection with an eternal thinker, or rather with an eternal intelligence. If we think steadily upon it, we shall find that by the laws of our own minds we cannot take the one without taking the other. But we are compelled to take the one, therefore we must take the other. If we sever the chain, all collapses and falls to the ground, the first proposition as well as the second. The word *truth* loses its meaning, and only gets vitality again by connecting it with *thought* and *mind*.

III.

The doctrines of an immutable standard of morals and of an immutable standard of taste, must go together. Both are necessarily and consistently rejected by the atheist, and both should be strenuously maintained by all consistent theists. Physical, moral, intellectual, and religious beauty, although not the same, can all be traced to one common foundation. All are harmonies ; all spring from one root, and all are alike unmeaning notions, unless connected with that idea of God in which the Beautiful, the Righteous, and the Good — τὸ καλὸν, τὸ ἀγαθὸν, τὸ δίκαιον — are all embraced.

IV.

The Divine Character is the ground of the Divine Law.

V.

If in God's government sin is not punished for its intrinsic demerit, there are no grounds on which it can properly be punished at all. In regard to the universal spiritual law of God, a universe of beings who are just kept from overt acts by the *in terrorem* principle of punishment, are already intrinsically sinners, and have already incurred the penalty.

VI.

The Divine Mercy has no meaning separate from the Divine Justice.

VII.

It is the glory of the gospel that God is *παραιτητός* — that he can be propitiated ; while the awful sacrifice by which it is accomplished levels in the dust all the pride of human virtue, and all the lofty aspirations of human philosophy. It relieves the penitent and believing spirit from that gloomy sentiment of the Grecian poet, which has ever weighed so heavily on the dark heathen mind —

Διὸς γὰρ δυσπαρήτοι φρένες —

while yet it gives no countenance to that false, presumptuous belief in the Divine placability on which some lay so much stress. With such it is not the Divine mercy they would exalt, but rather that idol attribute of their own imaginations so well expressed by the Greek word *ῥαθυμία*, that sluggish indolence, indifference, or good nature, — to use a common expression, — which constitutes the prime attribute of the Deity of the ancient Epicurean, and the modern sentimentalist.

VIII.

The Divine Justice is the ground of Human Law.

IX.

A denial of punishment, as based upon intrinsic desert, must be a denial of such intrinsic desert itself, and results in the position that what is styled sin, is a disease, a nuisance, a political mischief, a mere state to be regretted.

X.

Our first ideas of law, of punishment, of justice and desert, do necessarily receive their first objective suggestions and illustrations from earthly laws and earthly tribunals. The latter are the necessary chronological antecedents through which the former are developed. The lower law and the lower justice are the first media through which the higher are necessarily read and contemplated. If the former are held to have no ref-

erence to desert or retribution as the ground of punishment, such will necessarily be the first, and because the first, the most lasting impression connected with the term as used of the government of God. If our earliest conceptions of human law should lead us habitually to regard it as having strictly no moral character, the soul is just in a proper condition to receive the doctrine that what is called the divine government is merely a scheme of physical laws for physical ends, punishing, as is commonly said, by necessary physical consequences, and with nothing strictly of a penal, retributive, avenging character, as those terms have ever been used in human language. If the one has no other and no higher aim than what is usually styled expediency, the conceptions of the other will partake of the same character; and thus, in place of a true morality, the Epicurean doctrine that happiness instead of right, or happiness as synonymous with right, is the end of being, becomes the law of the universe. There is, in other words, nowhere any *right* except success in the attainment of the greatest amount of '*pleasing sensations*;' there is no *wrong* except an intellectual mistake as to the method by which this attainment can be secured; there is no other punishment than the physical ill consequences of such mistake, producing a reform consisting in the rectification of such error; there are not only no acts, but also *no states of soul*, which, in themselves, and irrespective of consequences, have an eternal right or wrong; there is strictly no morality, no desert, no retribution, and of course no genuine conviction of sin, in the universe.

Those who deny the doctrine of retribution and desert as an element of human justice, seldom stop short of the same denial in regard to the divine government. Some expressly repudiate the words penal and punishment, as conveying false ideas and openly and boldly avow the safe keeping of the criminal and his reformation to be the only grounds on which society can employ towards him any violence or constraint; with them crime is disease and punishment is cure, not only on earth, but throughout the universe.

XI.

We cannot sufficiently estimate the Law's educating power for good or evil. Although justice is most highly useful to preserve society, yet in fact the great end of society itself, is the conservation of justice, and in that the conservation of our moral nature. It is not merely to preserve the social peace, to maintain personal rights, to secure property, but above all these to school the moral sense, to train the soul to reverence for law as law, and to a constant contemplation of moral ideas, through those temporal forms, which God in the divine institution of government intended as real, although imperfect types, of a higher law and a Holier Justice.

XII.

Where human law is treated with contempt, positive Divine law is ever less honored.

XIII.

Morality is something absolute, or an end in itself, to be sought and upheld for its own sake.

XIV.

A sound moral sense is a higher good, and more to be desired by every rational being than any amount of happiness.

XV.

Every man must act according to his convictions. But here is not his chief accountability. There is another, which in the clamor about all kinds of outward responsibilities, is hardly thought of, but which the Scriptures make all in all. It is a man's responsibility for his feelings, his states of soul, his convictions, yea, his conscience itself.

XVI.

The anatomist or physiologist traces the movements of the complex animal economy when once set in motion, but the

mystery even of animal life escapes their keenest investigations : even so may the metaphysician trace the operations of the soul in action ; he may unfold the laws and the phenomena of intellect ; but that deeper and more powerful moral nature *which commands the intellect*, which forms the essence of the soul, which determines its condition in the scale of being, is left unvisited and unexplored. Notwithstanding the absurd attempts to resolve it into the calculations of the understanding, or into a mere department of sensation, or an unmeaning theory of blind sentiments and instincts, that part of us which lies beneath sensation and reflection, and thoughts and feelings, and the deductions of the reasoning faculty, that more mysterious essence *which controls all their movements, and imparts to all of them their character*, has never been fully explored by any who discard from their philosophy an implicit submission to the guidance of revelation.

XVII.

There are truths which experience awakens the soul to find within itself as among the conditions of its own being. There is a consciousness that the relation, which these ideas bear to the mind, differs in some way from that of truths of fact and experience, and that when suggested by the latter, instead of any new knowledge from without being acquired, the soul is only revealed to itself and awakened to a perception of its own previous possessions. Numbers have a real existence in the soul, not as mere umbræ or conceptual images, the way in which any outward thing may be said to be *in the mind*, but as part of its own most interior furniture, without which it could not be a rational soul, but only a sensitive life, — belonging to mind, in fact, just as truly and inseparably as figurative forms belong to matter, or forms of motion to any idea that we can have of life.

XVIII.

Those affirmations which the immutable laws of our own souls compel us to make, form not only our highest, but our only idea of truth.

XIX.

If there are ideas which are not conventional, ideas eternal and immutable, which the soul knows as such, or knows them not at all, and never can acquire from any foreign source, in respect to these, language must be our clearest and most trustworthy guide. Outward forms, or the names of things, are but the smallest part of a language. They are but the external drapery varying in every age and nation, but within and beneath all, there is the soul, which in all languages, utters the same spiritual voice. The soul of language being an emanation from the human soul, must, therefore, be the best interpreter of its intuitive ideas.

XX.

What are words — we speak not now of sounds or articulate enunciations, *ὀνόματα* or *ῥήματα*, but of the higher term, *λόγοι* — what are words in this sense, but outward expressions of the inward logical necessities of our own minds? And what can be stronger proof for us than those affirmations, which the immutable higher laws of our own souls compel us to make, in respect to what is included or not included in a certain idea? Whatever belongs to the idea is necessary; so, on the other hand, whatever is necessary pertains to an idea, and the exclusion of any part involves for our minds a logical contradiction. The naming of them, therefore, cannot be arbitrary, except so far as mere outward sound is concerned. There are certain ideas which are not dependent on language, but language on them. The idea which calls for the name is implanted by God as one of the fixed parts of our being.

XXI.

There are three energies of the soul ideally distinct. There is that within us, which takes notice of appearances or phenomena. There is another which takes cognition of things and events. There is another power of the spirit which occupies itself with the meaning of things. Thus we have appearances, things, and the meaning or reason of things; we have

the phenomenal, the natural, the supernatural; we have the present, the temporal, the eternal. Appearances have construction in space and time, although without some other faculty than the sense they would come and go isolated and unremembered. Things and events are connected by the notions, cause and substance, into a system we call nature; but without some other faculty than the understanding, it would have only a scientific value, raising no question of a higher interest, and doing nothing to answer such a question when raised in some other way. But there is an operation of the soul, which, however obscure in some, and however limited in all of us, does to some extent comprehend sense and nature, or at least awaken the interest which demands such comprehension in order to give meaning and reason to appearances and things.

We might vary the view by presenting it in the form of the three great questions in regard to the universe of being, — The what? The how? and The why? — The $\tau\iota$ and the $\delta\tau\iota$, and the $\delta\acute{o}\tau\iota$. The sense and the understanding would try to find an answer to the first, understanding and reason to the second, and the reason, especially the moral reason, to the third; and this answer in its most comprehending terms would be given in the words, God, the Soul, and Immortality.

In regard to the first of these, or the Great Reason of Reasons, the scientific understanding might likewise attempt, and does attempt, the solution; but it would ever bring it under the how, the $\pi\acute{o}\varsigma$, instead of the $\delta\acute{o}\tau\iota$ of the universe. It has ever been inquiring whence came nature and the world, and how do they exist, or trying to explain the fact ($\delta\tau\iota$) that they do exist; but ever as questions of curious or scientific interest. In such inquiries the understanding seeks its God, but it never gets anything more than a first cause, a first power, a first mover, a developing principle, taken, too, at last, as a necessary notion of the wearied mind, and although assumed as a beginning of nature, yet never in fact regarded as out of nature.

The true meaning of the universe is a question put by the

moral reason. Reason and conscience ask what is the design of all designs, going clear out of nature into some acknowledged region beyond and above it. Here even reason requires aid from above, and it is at last 'by faith we know that the worlds were made by the word of God,' and for his glory were they made.

XXII.

Materialism in respect to man, is atheism in respect to the universe. The views entertained in the one case will ever run parallel with those entertained in the other. There is a doctrine which regards all the phenomena of spirituality as but the results of the material organization of our finite microcosm. Such a view cannot long be held without transferring, in the end, the same conception to all the phenomena of the great world around us. This is atheism. Or if the notion of something to which we give the name of God, comes in at all, it can only be, legitimately, as the last product, — if there ever is any such last and perfect product, — of nature and matter working up through seminary gas, fluid, solid, vegetable, animal, to the human vitality, and thus, finally, to Deity itself. But as this term includes, by logical necessity, the idea of the highest and most perfect, it, of course, is never reached, and never can be reached, in this eternally moving and eternally unfinished progression.

XXIII.

There is a doctrine which might seem, at first view, the very reverse of the preceding. It would regard all the phenomena of materiality, and, in fact, its very *ἐντελέχεια*, or reality, as but the outward evolution of spirit. In the cant of a certain mystic school, soul is the *interior*, of which body is the necessary *exterior* or *ultimate*. This carried out to the universe, is Pantheism, or that revived modern Gnosticism which now charms so many minds by its false show of spirituality. As the human body, in this scheme, is the exterior, the ultimate, the outgrowth and *correspondence* of the soul, so the visible universe accord-

ingly is the *necessary* correspondence, emanation, or outgrowth of God. In other words, it is his body regarded as a necessary manifestation of the *outworking* spirit. The world is, therefore, not his voluntary work, or creative act, as the Bible plainly teaches, but comes from him by natural law or development, just as the plant grows out of the seed and the soil. In the one case, *all is matter*; in the other, *all is soul*. A mighty difference it would seem. The latter claims to be infinitely removed from the gross materialism of which it asserts itself to be the only true antagonist. It affects a wondrous spirituality. And yet, in fact, both views come in the end to just the same thing. Both alike deny the true idea of God by confounding him with the universe.

There is an aspect of this philosophy which indignantly spurns the name of materialism; it would even seem to ape the highest spirituality; it talks boastingly of faith, and declaims against sensualism, and yet, after all, makes out man to be but a microscopic lens, refracting and transmitting the panorama of nature, and has, even for its highest thought of God, nothing more than the idea of the wind-harp, or organ, through which is ever pouring the eternal anthem of the universe.

XXIV.

The Understanding and the Reason have each their Deity, but with this immense difference. In the judgment of the one, God is *for* the universe; in the *à priori* demand of the other, the universe is *for* God. In the one the Deity is needed as the first term in the infinite series, or as some assumed unknown quantity without which it could not be mathematically summed, or as some first mover, without which the dynamical problem cannot be solved. The pantheistic understanding, too, according to the one or the other aspect of its most ancient philosophy, requires a similar conception, either as the *starting* principle of the world's outgrowth, or as its *terminating* development. In all these cases, when once brought in it is needed no more for any moral or religious ends. God is for the universe.

Reason and the conscience, on the other hand, reverse this entirely. They demand the idea of a God, such as revelation more clearly presents, who is not only beginning, but end, who is Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, by whom, and through whom, and for whom, are all things, and who 'for his own eternal glory, hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass.' It is only in the doctrine of *à priori* moral decrees that we escape that iron-bound fatalism which the superficial sciolist is so fond of charging upon the creed most opposed to his own. The reason finds refuge in the supernatural, not regarded as something away at the end of nature, and thus, in fact, a continuation of it, but as everywhere above, or as reigning high over nature in all its extent of time and space.

And thus, too, can the human soul alone truly comprehend itself. So far as humanity is nature, and nothing more, it comes and goes like all other nature; it is *γεννόμενον καὶ ἀπολλυμένον*; it is born, and perishes, just like all other physical powers. But as belonging also to the supernatural, it has immortality, and as thus connected with the Father of Spirits, all things are for it, as one of the ends, or rather as included in the great end for which nature and the world were made.

XXV.

There are times when the bare thought that God *is*, comes home to the soul with a power and a flash of light which gives a new illumination and a more vivid interest to every other moral truth. He who thinks most deeply, and has the most intimate acquaintance with human nature, as exhibited in his own heart, will be the most apt to resolve all unbelief into Atheism.

XXVI.

The next great battle-ground of infidelity will not be the Scriptures. What faith there may remain will be summoned to defend the very being of a God — the great truth involving every other moral and religious truth.

XXVII.

Does the mind revolt at the thought of seeking religion for its utility instead of its intrinsic excellence? The same feeling, though perhaps in a less degree, should exist in relation to the claims of science.

XXVIII.

The true idea of Education is catholic, in distinction from what is partial in human pursuit. . . . There is knowledge which, to a greater or less extent, is for all men as men, for all ages, yea, for all worlds of rational beings. Each particular world in the universe may be supposed to have its own botany, its own geology, its own mineralogy, its own natural history; but a spiritual necessity, a behest of the reason, compels us to say that in all worlds there must be the same logic, the same grammar, or universal laws of language, whether by sounds or signs, the same laws of thinking, the same geometry, the same pure mathematics, the same ultimate rules of taste, the same principles of art, the same elements of the beautiful, the same æsthetic and moral philosophy. In other words, the good, the beautiful, the true in themselves must be essentially the same for all rational souls, and cannot even be conceived of as having a diversity for different parts of the universe.

XXIX.

Science commits suicide when it separates itself from religious belief. Poetry, Philosophy, Art, all that is spiritual in eloquence, all that is inspiring in nature, all that is stimulating and elevating even in Science, are inseparable eventually from religion, even as religion is inseparable from revelation.

XXX.

Facts alone can never make a science. The most accurate description of a plant, of a bird, of a fish, or a mineral, is not science. It is only an enumeration of facts. It is yet only *historia*, and not *scientia*. So also the most ingenious classifica-

tion or arrangement of such facts is not science, because it has not yet risen to the dignity of a law. There may be nothing in all this that unites itself with the soul's own necessary thinking, so as to suggest that conception of the necessary and the universal, which is inseparable from the idea of science, and without which knowledge can never rise above sense and memory.

XXXI.

With many scientific men, so called, law is but another name for generalization. It is not the cause, but the effect of phenomena. It is not the expression of the thought of mind, finite or infinite, and thus a living energy distinct from the facts, but merely an order of events. By the same dead process they might just as well make language a generalization from letters and syllables; and the thought which speech conveys, but the summation of series of aërial undulations.

XXXII.

Laws themselves may be regarded as facts, and thus grouped into higher classifications suggestive of higher laws, and so on, until the mind reaches out to some great principle, uniting not only all facts, but all departments of science, all thinking into a catholic unity, which is fully believed and acted upon, even though never reached or expected to be reached by any scientific induction. It is a faith which goes beyond sense, or any knowledge which is but a generalizing and classifying of the facts of sense. It is to this unity all true science tends, and it is alone as it has this direction and this spirit that it deserves the name.

XXXIII.

- There are facts, laws, principles. By the latter are meant those *thoughts* of the universal mind, of which the second may be regarded as the words, and the first the letters through which they are articulated. There is an intense interest in the question, *What* is it? its class, its order, its outward description, and

hence its scientific name? There is a higher interest in the question, *How* is it? its law, its cause, its effect, its outward energizing life? There is a still higher interest in the inquiry, *Why* is it? *Why* is it so in itself? *Why* is it so in its relations to other things? *Why* is it so in its relations to the Great Whole, of which, however minute it may be, it forms a necessary part? Above all, *Why* is that Great Whole itself, whose ground, end, or destiny, is the ultimate inquiry which makes the real value of every lower question? It is this mode of thinking that brings in the moral and theological as those upper departments of scientific inquiry which give interest and value to all below.

XXXIV.

There is a darkness in nature, there ever will be darkness in nature, growing ever the more we explore her by her own light alone. God meant it should be so — we may reverently say it — to drive us to himself without this endless circuitous mode of seeking him.

XXXV.

We know nothing of origin except from a Divine Revelation. Of the origin of our planet, of the origin of life upon it, and of the origin of man, we must have a revelation from the Creator himself, or remain in impenetrable ignorance.

XXXVI.

There are two positions which are out of harmony both for the reason and the imagination: the astoundingly supernatural in the creation of man, the unbroken natural in all God's dealings with him since. One or the other of these must be given up. The human race is uncreated, or He who made it can speak to it, and does sometimes speak to it. Nature is from *eternity*, or it may be interrupted, and has been interrupted, *in time*. The rejection of the supernatural all the way up to creation, is the rejection of creation itself, both for man and the world.

XXXVII.

All skepticism may be ultimately resolved into a misgiving as to the real existence of anything strictly supernatural.

XXXVIII.

Revelation is the great first supernatural fact of facts; the solid ground of credence in all other supernatural.

XXXIX.

The Bible is to be interpreted, not reconciled with anything but itself — the very thought is almost equivalent to a rejection.

XL.

No book is so purely human as the Bible; there is no one in which the actors are so purely men. Its language, idioms, figures, are all addressed to our most intense, and therefore most universal humanity. This is proof of its divinity. Nothing but an inspiration in the human breathing through it, penetrating and sounding every part of it, could have so brought out the human.

XLI.

As the divine to the human nature in Christ, so is the divine thought, the divine life in the Scriptures to their human form. In both we have the infinite in the finite, the divine in the human, the ineffable in the forms of sense, the essential as exhibited in the phenomenal, — the absolute, the eternal, the unconditioned as represented in the relative, the temporal, the flowing images of time and space.

XLII.

The language of Scripture, as well as the thought, is strictly designed by the Divine Wisdom. The supernatural impulse, though distinct and special in itself, and having a special purpose, yet works in perfect harmony with the laws that connect utterance, conception and emotion. And yet there is a reason

for every metaphor, for every mode of speech, for every peculiarity of style, that grows out of the individual mode of feeling and conceiving. Such metaphors and peculiar modes of speech, therefore, instead of being overlooked as no part of the true word, or treated as mere matters of rhetorical criticism, may oftentimes require the deepest study as manifesting the divine no less in the *manner* of utterance than in the *matter*. Yet still, these conceptions have their true and orderly growth in the human soul, and after the laws of the human soul. If God employs true human language, he employs also the human images that lie at the foundation of such language,—nay, more, the feelings, whether naturally existing, or supernaturally aroused, that gave to *birth* such images and conceptions. The dignity of revelation is no more impaired by the one supposition than by the other. The opposite view seems to take high ground, and to honor the Bible, by depressing the mental condition of the medium. It gives, however, the lowest and loosest results; for by denying any fixed and fundamental conception having a natural and therefore determinable place in the mind of the sacred writer, it becomes the cause of all looseness and arbitrariness in the conception of the interpreter.

XLIII.

The language of Scripture, the very words, the very figures outwardly used, yea, the etymological metaphors contained in the words, be they ever so interior, are all inspired. They are the specially designed products of *emotions*, supernaturally inbreathed, these becoming outward in *thoughts*, and these, again, having their ultimate outward forms in *words* and figures as truly designed in the workings of this chain, and thus as truly inspired, as the thoughts of which these words are the express image, and the inspired emotions in which both thoughts and images had their birth. The supernatural action beginning with the most interior spirituality, ends with language as the last outward result. It is a product of a series, yet, as such product representative of the entire spiritual action that

has terminated in it, and having something corresponding to every step of such spiritual action in the whole course of its procession from the primal generative emotion to the ultimate sound or sign. It is all here, and a devout study of the language, aided by the spirit that gave it, will carry back the soul from the words to the images, from the images to the thoughts, from the thoughts to the spiritual emotions, or to communion with the *living word* from whence the whole sacred fountain has flowed.

XLIV.

The Bible is not mere ink and parchment: it has been written on the heart of the Church, and thus has been from age to age, the living as well as the *uttered* word.

XLV.

The Almighty alone exists *per se*. The true dignity and worth of every created thing and of every created intelligence, is found in its settled relations to the organisms of which it is a more immediate member, and in the relations of that organism to higher, and so on evermore as we ascend upward in the vast scale of organized being.

XLVI.

How did Christianity enhance the importance of the individual man? Manifestly by revealing a higher organism than those social or political systems, which it was never intended to supersede, the higher organism of the Church, that celestial *πολιτευμα* or citizenship, which was to have its place among visible societies on earth, whilst its Head abode in heaven. It was the introduction of a new and higher order of organic life, to resist more effectually than the others could do, that principle of death, or tendency to decomposition which had been introduced by human depravity, and which ever threatens to resolve society into a disorganized mass of separate, selfish, individual, right-asserting and warring atoms.

XLVII.

The doctrines of the Church may be regarded as contained not merely in symbolical writings and dogmatic statements, or in the decisions of ecclesiastical bodies, articles of faith, and the writings of theologians, but also, and in some respects more properly, in forms of worship, in prayers, in hymns, in books of devotion and experimental religion. Here we have what may be called the living doctrine.

XLVIII.

The soul may be subjectively in harmony with the truth, so as cordially to embrace it in its creed before scientific knowledge, or an objective presentation of it to the speculative reason. It may have the life before it possesses a clear apprehension of the doctrine.

XLIX.

Christianity is a *life*, in distinction both from *truth* and *external order*. Between Christ and every Christian there is a real union, and of course all Christians hold to each other the relation of a real, and not merely a figurative or moral brotherhood, — a brotherhood as intimate, if not more so, than any natural affinity, because they all live one common life in distinction from maintaining common truths, or thinking common thoughts, or professing common feelings.

L.

All who recognize each other as Christians in the same convenient locality, should worship Christ together, and should act together as one visible organization against the world.

LI.

The serious student of the Bible must see that its great historical idea is, the world for the Church, and not the Church for the world, which is the favorite notion of modern secularized Christianity.

LII.

The Written Word — the Incarnate Word — it is no mere fanciful or verbal analogy that connects these two ideas. This is shown by the fact that there are passages of Scripture where it is difficult to distinguish between them, or to determine with certainty that one of them is the exclusive sense, or that both are not comprehended in one essential and inseparable significance.

LIII.

In the first great article of our religion, we are taught to recognize three distinct personalities, and the same nature; in the second, we have a still deeper mystery, the union of two distinct natures in one person.

LIV.

Doubtless the union of the divine and human nature in the one person of Christ, may be regarded as preëminently the mystery of Christianity. The doctrine of a plurality of hypostases in the Divine nature, does not transcend the reason, as is shown by the fact, that, independently of the written revelation, it has been a favorite hypothesis of minds that had meditated most deeply on the necessary conditions of the Divine nature. But the doctrine of the God-man, of the Divine not simply superadded to, or in connection with, either as a temporary or abiding indwelling, but as forming one person with the human, yet remaining Divine — this baffles reason.

LV.

They deceive themselves, who imagine that the real ground of their objections to the doctrine of the Trinity is its repugnance to reason. The real difficulty lies in a different quarter, namely, in the connection which this doctrine has with the atonement, and the light in which, when thus connected, it presents to us the deep sinfulness and perilous condition of humanity.

LVI.

If He who died on Calvary was in very deed the only begotten Son of God, existing before all worlds, and the Maker of all worlds; if this death and these sufferings were truly expiatory; if without the shedding of that blood there could have been no remission of any, even the least sin — how awful a book is the Bible! how fearful are its doctrines! how can we escape if we neglect so great a salvation. If Christ be God, then surely man was lost, hopelessly lost, without his mediation. In the light of this truth, how infinitely magnified the value of the soul, yet when viewed in another aspect, how utterly out of place the common cant respecting the dignity and purity of human nature! Surely, beyond all conception must that nature have been stained and polluted with sin, which, even in the holiest of men, required for its cleansing expiation nothing less than the life-blood of incarnate Deity.

LVII.

There are some truths of such a nature that they reject all compromising partnership, and sternly refuse all modifications that might seem in the least to detract from their absolute conclusiveness. They are wholly true or wholly false. They are supreme, controlling all related truths, or they are the most baseless of all delusions. The doctrine of justification through faith in the blood of Christ, is one of these. The doctrine is true in the highest sense, in a sense far beyond any conceptions we have ever formed, or it is wholly false. There can be no middle ground here. There is no space on which we can stand between the Socinian, who wholly rejects, and the rigid view of Augustine and the Reformers, the doctrine of justification by faith only in the blood of Christ, as the sole ground of our acceptance by God, to the utter exclusion of all works, and with the necessary implication of hopeless ruin for the whole race had such a sacrifice never been offered.

LVIII.

The feeling of the need of expiation was in some obscure way expressed in all the religions of antiquity. The true and perfect *mode* forms that peculiar doctrine of Christianity which distinguishes it from all others, and the belief in which, either in the substance or the type, has been, in all ages, the essential element of the righteousness which is by faith.

LVIX.

The New Testament not obscurely teaches, that a most important part of Christ's work was "the redemption of the body" as well as of the soul. If there is anything in Christianity fundamental, it is this. With its rejection must go all that has ever been regarded as distinctive in the creed, as well as in the philosophy of the Church.

It has, we trust, been made apparent, that the writer of the treatise on "The Six Days of Creation," has such endowments as should secure for that volume whatever of authority it can reasonably derive from its authorship; and such, too, as should secure the most earnest heed to all his contributions to sacred criticism. Believing this the appropriate field for his genius, we cannot but indulge the hope — much as we prize what he has accomplished in other departments of literature — that to it he will consecrate the remainder of his life. Though his years tend to their allotted bound, he may yet achieve much; for he has but to bind together for others, the sheaves he has reaped for himself. What he has already done is indeed much. His treatise on Plato inaugurated a new era in classical criticism in this country, and we do not doubt that other writings of his are destined to do the same in biblical criticism.

Of that criticism which collates manuscripts, and decides on various readings, or is busied with archæological matters, or preaches dull homilies from the text, there is no lack; but of the highest order of criticism, as applied to the Scriptures, how little there is! It is true enough, that with the Bible before

them, even stupid intellects will sometimes glow with a transient illumination, that weak men will say strong things, and dull men bright things; but the qualities really pre-requisite for sacred criticism are exceedingly rare, and the combination of them in one person rarer still. Many seem to suppose that the art of reading the Scriptures in the original, of necessity renders a man competent to their criticism; but tens of thousands have parsed the finest passages in *Paradise Lost*, or the *Seasons*, whose critical judgment as to their excellence, if indeed they can be said ever to have had any, would neither be valued by themselves or by anybody else; and if this be true of them as to classics in their own tongue, far more would it be true of such, had they an equally good grammatical knowledge of writings in foreign and ancient tongues. For fine criticism, surely something more is required than such knowledge as plodding dulness may attain by spelling-book, grammar and lexicon. For such criticism there is required a nice insight into the power of words; but by this is meant something much beyond the reach of mere pedants, though such knowledge as theirs has constituted the entire staple of some scholars of celebrity. The wide difference between the classes of minds here in view, is seen in Milton and Bentley, as illustrated in the ridiculous revision by the latter of *Paradise Lost*. The union of the higher and lower knowledge is quite possible, as is seen in Milton and Gray, in Arnold and Lewis. The merely pedantic or lexicographic knowledge is of no avail in sacred criticism, save as one means to its end, the higher knowledge. Where it constitutes the ultimate achievement of a critic, it is merely pernicious, and when critics of this grade sit in judgment on the decisions of men of a higher order, as — to repeat our illustration — Bentley did on the finest passages of Milton, the results are laughable or deplorable. It may seem to some that the deepest insight into the power of words might belong to a mind observant, retentive, acute no doubt, but perhaps of very narrow compass; but language is so mysterious an emanation of the soul, is such a reflex of our humanity, that

its entire mastery has been attained only by men of the highest intellects and of the very widest range of thought. The power spoken of is strong presumptive evidence of force of intellect, and can hardly exist without great acuteness of perception, and a wide range of sympathy. It is not an acquisition, but a gift. In Lewis it is innate. It was born with him, as power to mark and appreciate the harmonies of sounds was born with Mozart. This gift has not been left to rust unused, nor has it been spoiled in cultivation. It has been most assiduously, thoroughly, felicitously cherished, trained, developed, and applied.¹ In seizing upon universal intuitive ideas, and tracing them in human speech, his strong common sense, his logical acumen and universal learning work in perfect harmony with subtlety of philological insight. He has also the power of putting himself in magnetic communication, as it were, with souls of men

¹ No one can study the Dissertations in the Treatise on Plato, and not be struck with this. The eighteenth, on the Distinction between λόγος and ονόμα, contains, within the compass of four or five pages, the pith of much that has been written on Words in the fifteen years since it was published. The twenty-fourth, on the Platonic use of εἶμι and γίγνομαι, — the one, in its highest sense, expressing essential, eternal, necessary, self-existent, independent, uncaused being or essence, having no dependence on time and space, the other expressing phenomenal, temporal, contingent, dependent being, generated in time and space, — is one of the very finest of the illustrations of the higher uses of philology. Prof. Woolsey, referring to the "valuable remarks on the very important distinction" between these words "in their strict philosophical use," adds, "which is, however, as might be expected, not always strictly observed." In this he is anticipated by his author, who says, on page 174: "It must not be expected always to find these two verbs used with philological precision even in Plato." We refer also to the sixty-eighth, on The Moral Significance of the Greek Words for the Four Cardinal Virtues; and to pages 217, 218; to page 325; and to the fortieth dissertation, on the word ἀποδιοπομπεύομαι. Prof. W. says he sees "no so very great strength of meaning" in it, and refers to passages where it is used with less of significance than in those cited. The composition of the word, and its use, as cited by him, justify the author; and the argument that it is sometimes used with less meaning, merely shows that this word shares in the fate of sacred terms which in every language are used with meanings below their highest, and tend to sink towards meaninglessness. As illustrations of this tendency now, take the terms inspiration, revelation, sin even, which may be found with differences of power on the same page. Illustration of Scripture words, though this is not marked by the critic, is a striking feature in that volume. This abounds in Lewis' writings, and make them invaluable to divines. His writings overflow with it. See the notes to his volume on Inspiration, and on Creation.

of other races, of other ages, of other modes of thought, and forms of language — doubtless through some very peculiar gift, but not without the utmost patience of study and thought — and of tracing out and comprehending their emotions and ideas, both in their causes and in their results, as embodied in their utterance or illustrated in their lives. This quality, which so eminently fits him to interpret the thoughts of past ages, appears in his *Essays on the Astronomical Ideas of the Ancients*, on *Names for the Soul*, on the *Spirituality of the Old Testament*, and indeed in many of his writings.¹ In his volume on *Creation*, illustrations of it may be found in the chapters proving the *Antiquity of the Mosaic Record*, tracing the derivation of the heathen *Cosmogonies* from it, elucidating the old *Idea of Creation* as a *Genesis* or *growth*, and unfolding the *Time-Thought* of the ancient world.

Of his spirituality, that highest of all qualities in an interpreter of Holy Scripture, without which all other qualities are worse than useless, nothing need be said after the citations already made from his writings. Nor will our limits allow us to say more than that he possesses in an eminent degree the power to grasp the Scriptures in their unity of design and truth, and the power to unfold their bearings upon our whole life, individual and social, domestic and public. Something of that which might have been said of him, as an interpreter of the Sacred Books, has been rendered needless by his recent volume on *Inspiration*. On that theme, — so difficult that had he failed in its treatment it need have shaken no man's confidence in his genius, — on that theme which has so thoroughly engaged the intellect of the Church from the first, he has written in entire accordance with the belief of the Church universal, and yet has brought to its elucidation — to repeat the admirable judgment concerning it already cited — “a method

¹ In the treatise on *Plato* it is illustrated by the *Essays On the Ancient Doctrine of the Four Elements*; *On the Ancient Maxim, De Nihilo nihil*; and by several others. A somewhat complete list of the writings of Lewis may be found appended to the sketch of his life in *Duyckinck's Cyclopaedia*.

the most spiritual, the most erudite, the most philosophical, that has ever been applied to it." When the many centuries are recalled to mind in which the theme of that volume has been revolved in the Church, it will appear that the force of language can hardly go beyond the praise of this criticism ; and yet it is just. The opinions from that volume, embodied in these pages, are so ultimate that human thought will never go beyond them. Its historical argument is mathematically clear, precise, and sure. The treatment of this part of the subject might have been expanded, the whole Scripture might have been viewed from this stand-point, but artistically the book would have been less perfect for this. Its style is faultless. The style of Lewis is marked by what some would call the common, others the uncommon merits of clearness and precision, and in estimating these qualities in his case the depth and difficulty of many of his thoughts must be taken into account. It has also the merit, on account of which some would pronounce it perfect, of attracting little or no attention to itself. It awes, enkindles, instructs, without suggesting itself. It is eloquent, producing the very rarest effects of eloquence, yet is not thought of as such. A remarkable evidence of this is, that in one full review of his volume on Inspiration, by a critic anxious and earnest to make known its merits, there is not an allusion to the style. The critic seems unconscious that it has any style. This peculiarity of style, of which the highest illustration is the Scripture itself, many critics think its highest possible excellence. There is, however, a quality higher still, though in its perfection never separate from the former. It is that of life. It makes a style, in distinction from the clear, the chaste, the ornate, the forcible, or any of the varieties which rhetoricians make, a living style. Of this, again, the Scriptures are beyond and above all comparison the highest illustration. In virtue of this quality, which in some measure presupposes all minor excellences of style, a few human writings — how very few — in prose, where perfection is much rarer than in poetry, not more than two or three in a century — are immortal. The book we speak of is

so vital in every part, that we are persuaded it will never die. Its intensity of life triumphs over what in other of its author's writings is an excellence so prominent and recurrent that paradoxically it may be called a blemish. Lewis is one of those very few writers at whose touch the soul awakes. He brings not fuel, which, after a time, the intellect may ignite, if it be not smothered with it, but the Promethean fire which kindles fire. In a good sense, therefore, his books are unreadable books; for on opening them, almost at once is met some principle so finely conceived and clearly said that the quickened and delighted mind seizes upon it as on a blazing torch, and passes with it far away from the book into realms of thought before dim with shadows. So the book is laid down and taken up again, to be again laid down, till it seems as if it would never suffer itself to be finished; and this influence is not exhausted by repeated perusals. We cannot close its pages forever, saying it has no more to say to us. Of his last book, too, this is true; yet it carries the reader with it, without pausing, from beginning to end. Passages abound in it which fasten themselves upon the soul, which awaken it to long and intense reflection; but meditation upon them is reserved for its second or third reading. The book is an admirable introduction to the Scriptures themselves. Taking the place of none of the really good books intended for that end, occupying ground heretofore occupied by none, it will itself never be superseded, but will hold a place among sacred classics while language endures.

From writings less accessible to the public than this, following the plan heretofore pursued, of giving our readers some means of judging for themselves of the accuracy of our criticisms, we present a few extracts; confident that while they do not present in the fullest degree all the traits of which we have spoken, as indeed it were not possible for a few extracts to do, apart from the manner in which they illustrate the qualities of their author, they will be felt to have a great value in themselves. The first, broken away from an essay on Human Justice, or Government a Moral Power, ends, as it commences,

somewhat abruptly. It is an exposition of the passage where Paul speaks of

THE DIVINE AUTHORITY OF GOVERNMENT.

“ ‘Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves (μὴ ἑαυτοὺς ἐκδικεῖν), for it is written, vengeance is mine :’ — (ἐμοὶ ἐκδίκησις.) How often is this text quoted to show ‘the error of those who,’ in the language of a writer in the Democratic Review, ‘would grasp the awful power of retributive justice, and drag it down from the high and holy sphere to which it belongs, into the lower regions of human polity — thereby giving to earthly rulers, under the notion of a divine right, not only to protect society, but also to punish what they may view as moral guilt.’ Truly it might seem so, had the apostle gone no farther ; but how little is it generally adverted to, that closely following this, and in close and necessary connection with it, is the very passage which most conclusively proves the divine and retributive authority of the magistrate as the minister of God. ‘Vengeance is the Lord’s,’ says the apostle ; but then, after a brief exhortation to abstinence from individual righting of wrongs, and as a reason for it, he immediately proceeds exegetically to show how, and through what means, this vengeance of the Lord’s is exercised upon actual outward crimes upon the earth ; as a *part*, though a far lower part, of that great administration of justice which embraces both worlds.

“ ‘Let every soul,’ he immediately proceeds, ‘be subject to the powers that are over us. For the authority is not, except from God. And even the present existing authorities are appointed of God. So that he that resisteth the authority, resisteth the ordinance of God. For magistrates are not a terror to the good, but to the wicked. Wouldst thou then not be afraid of the authority, do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. For he is God’s minister to thee. But if thou doest evil, be afraid ; for he beareth not the sword in vain ; for he is God’s minister, an avenger (ἐκδικος) upon him that doeth evil.’ ”

"It is quite common, on questions of this kind, to set off the New Testament against the Old; but here both breathe the same spirit. In both, the divine authority of the lawful magistrate, as a minister of God, is not so much taught in the way of a new truth, as it is assumed as one long established and acknowledged. Among all nations, Gentile as well as Jewish, the judgeship has ever been esteemed a sacred office, and he who held it, even ranking among the ministers of religion, as *Diis immortalibus proximi sunt magistratus*, says Cicero. 'And Jehoshaphat said unto the judges, Take heed what ye do; for ye judge not for man simply, but for THE LORD. And now let the FEAR OF GOD be upon you, for with the Lord your God there is no injustice.'—2d Chron. xix. 6, 7. The same idea is presented in the general directions given to magistrates, Deut. i. 17: 'Ye shall not respect persons in judgment; the cause of the small and the great alike shall ye hear; ye shall not be afraid of the face of man, for the judgment is God's.'

"It is not extravagant to suppose, that the apostle had these and similar places of the Old Testament in view when he made the declaration on which we are commenting. This remarkable passage in Romans is introduced by him both as a motive and as a reason for individual forbearance. It most certainly assumes to set forth the true power of the magistrate, the sanctions of his authority, and the grounds on which he is to be obeyed. He is the minister of God; and so, some would say, is every thing in the natural world; can we suppose then Paul made these solemn declarations, in the connection in which they stand, with no higher sense than might be true of the wave that cast him on the shores of Melita? Can it be possible that he would thus have trifled with his readers, by meaning no more than a physical power, when he calls it a 'fear to the wicked, and a praise to those who do good'? The moral aspect pervades every part. The ideas of desert, and of moral guilt, as the ground of punishment, meet us in almost every word. How little, on the other hand, does it savor of, or rather, how utterly

alien is the whole spirit of the passage to, those ideas of expediency, of convenience, of the merely economical authority of the magistrate as the majority's servant, to which some would give the chief place in criminal jurisprudence. 'For he is the avenger' (ἐκδικος), the same radical, which, in the verse introducing the whole passage, is applied to God (ἐμοὶ ἐκδικησις), 'vengeance is mine.' It is, therefore, the same vengeance, the same in kind, though lower in degree, and in application. It contains the same essential idea; an idea which is not in nature, nor in physical laws, nor in expediency. It is an idea which must belong to a true morality, and in whatever system it is not acknowledged, there this word has no real application. Such a system is merely physical, under whatever disguises it may seek to present the appearance of belonging to a higher department. The most rude and imperfect administration into which the idea of desert truly enters, is better entitled to the name, moral, than any scheme, however apparently refined and civilized, that rejects it. . . .

"The then existing authorities spoken of are doubtless those of the Roman Empire in its various departments. This fact is sometimes adduced in argument from two opposite motives. One class of writers would urge it in support of the higher sense; for the purpose of showing, *à fortiori*, that the divine sanction was essential to the idea of present governments, because it had been declared to belong even to one of the worst of past times. If the Roman authorities were ordained of God, much more, would they say, should we regard in this light the magistracy of modern Christian countries. Others would contend that the very fact of this being thus spoken of the wicked and corrupt Roman powers, as they are pleased to style them, shows that it was never intended to be taken in that higher sense which is maintained by the former class. Both, we conceive, in certain respects, to be wrong. We do not think that the apostle had in his mind the *à fortiori* view; and much less that he meant to reason so absurdly, as by the particular instance to abate the force of his own general proposition. There

is, besides, upon the minds of many, a popular delusion in reference to the civil condition of the world at that time. The imagination is filled with the thoughts of Tiberius, and Caligula, and Nero; whereas, it was not so much Cæsar, as the Roman State and its collective authorities, to which allusion is made. This state, and these authorities, imperfect as they might be, were the grand conservatories of the justice and order of the world. The city Rome, or the immediate contiguity of the palace, was the chief seat of those tyrannies and cruelties which stand out so prominently on the page of history. The great mass of the people, in the different departments of the Empire, were as well governed under a Nero as under a Vespasian, or a Trajan, or even an Antonine, with all his stoical philosophy. The general and ordinary administration of justice was little affected by the personal wickedness of the emperor. In the age in which St. Paul wrote, the Roman Empire was, in general, under a system of law administered on as pure principles as even now prevail in most parts of the civilized world. When the immediate passions and jealousies of the great were not concerned (which they in general gratified within the circle of their own aristocratic class), crime was, for the most part, impartially punished, and innocence protected in its rights. Indeed, in the abstract, the laws of the worst men, and even their abstract administration of justice, may be safely trusted, as being mainly founded on the sound principles of the moral sense, in all cases where individual feeling or interest does not control. If this had not been the case in the Roman Empire, the apostle would never have thus spoken of the then magistracy as ‘a terror to evil-doers and a praise to them that do well.’ . . .

“ Besides, the Roman Empire was a collection of states, each of which retained, in a great measure, its own laws and its own system of jurisprudence, which had come down from the ancestral times. It is evident, then, that the apostle had reference, not to Cæsar, but to something far higher, which no Cæsar and no people had ever created, or could ever destroy; which lived on, and was destined to live on, amid all the con-

vulsions of Roman despotism, or of that Gothic turbulence by which it was to be succeeded.

“ We have here to do simply with the general position, — the state as a power ordained of God, — without pretending to decide some difficult questions which grow out of it. We believe that there are extremes, which, although they may be called states and governments, are really not entitled to the name. The essential idea may be lost in two ways, namely, by substituting in place of true law the unchecked will of a despot, or the unrestrained passions of a mass or mob. But where the state practically ends, and what may be justly styled a mere aggregated mass begins, it does not belong to our present argument to decide: although we think there are certain principles on which this matter admits of a tolerably accurate determination. Neither would we meddle with the question of the right to revolutionize, or violently modify the forms of government. Even through all such changes the state ever survives. The political life which now flows in our own civil institutions, apparently so young in respect to their outward forms, may be shown to be older than the Norman Conquest, and in some respects to have been derived even from the old Roman State. However this may be, it does not affect the position, that in all established governments based upon law, and carrying on a regular administration of justice under acknowledged religious sanctions, there is a branch — it may be a very inferior and imperfect one, yet still a branch of the great law system of the universe — exercising a moral power, not given generally, like the laws of nature, but specially bestowed, as upon a divine institution; and that thus the magistrate is truly a minister of God, wielding a retributive power — *ἐκδικὸς τῷ το κακὸν πράσσοντι* — ‘an AVENGER upon him that doeth evil.’ In other words, he punishes crimes *because they are wicked and wrong*.

“ Does any one say that this is extreme doctrine — it may be well worth inquiring, whether it may not be safer than that other extreme, into which our own age, and especially our own country, is so inclined to run. An affected reverence, and an

undisguised irreligion, are both striving to carry to the widest extent the separation between the human and divine, the moral and the economical, the political and the religious. The danger is increased by the fact, that along with this, a spurious philosophy, assuming to be transcendental, is producing the same mischief by a seemingly contrary process, viz., by confounding them all indiscriminately together. This latter class profess to have an extraordinary faith in morality, in the Eternal, the religious, the absolute, the ideal. They adore the 'holiness of nature;' they reverence the human as the divine, or rather 'the divine in the human;' they are very fond of all 'high and holy principles.' But, study their system as far as it can be studied or understood, and it comes out that morality and nature, physical laws and moral laws, religion and science, grace and philosophy, spirit and matter, gravitation and holiness, heaven and earth, God and man, are all one; and all is nature; and the fear of God is the adoration of the universe."

ON THE TWENTY-EIGHTH CHAPTER OF JOB.

"In this chapter we have a splendid and graphic comparison of natural science with a higher knowledge, which the author styles wisdom, and makes synonymous with the fear of the Lord. Every student of the Bible knows that this is the Hebrew phrase for religion, including all which enters into the modern idea of the term, when taken in its most general acceptation, as expressive of the whole relation of man to God. We have, in this chapter, one of the most interesting and sublime portions of Holy Writ. To be ignorant of it is no less an impeachment of taste than of piety. Aside from the deep solemnity of its religious bearings, the whole passage is undoubtedly calculated to draw forth the warmest admiration of the mere critical scholar, or the mere man of taste; but there may be a doubt whether such a one would not feel something like disappointment at the manner of its termination, and be ready to imagine that there was a falling off from the high

ground the writer had assumed in the preceding verses. He would expect something which, according to his view, would better correspond to that elevation of thought which had previously been sustained; that this path, so little known, and which the keenest eye had failed to discover, would have led to some different termination; that this wisdom, the place of which is inquired for by so many animated interrogatories, and in comparison with which the most precious productions of the earth are represented as valueless, would on its disclosure have appeared worthy of all this grandeur of description, and would have brought to light some deeply hidden knowledge, of which the human mind had long been in search, and which was most essential to its happiness; that this something, which had been hid from the eyes of all living, of whose fame destruction and death had scarcely heard, would have indeed appeared an object worthy of the keenest search and most laborious investigation; that it would have proved some notable discovery in physical science, some mysterious secret which had escaped the earnest search of the alchemist, and which would turn all our dross to gold, or some long hidden principle applicable to the political condition of mankind, and which would banish misery and discontent from the earth. These might be some of the fancies which would cross the mind of one who was reading the passage for the first time, and was but little familiar with the spirit and nature of the volume which contained it. There is, indeed, something humbling to the human intellect, but, at the same time, when viewed in a proper state of mind, an awful grandeur in the final disclosure, that 'the fear of the Lord that is wisdom' the highest, and in respect to its superlative importance, and the deep darkness of the soul without it, the only wisdom.

"The chapter commences by calling the attention to some of the most obscure departments of physical science, and which remain, even amid all the progress of modern discovery, almost as much unexplored as in the days of Job. . . . But, were the whole vast mine of natural science fairly laid open to view,

and the clear light of day poured in upon its long concealed recesses, still would the soul remain unsatisfied. It would still feel that it possessed only an accumulation of physical facts and of laws, which had no real or necessary existence except as the products of their generalization; that the efficient causes (if any such existed except the first great cause) were still beyond its grasp; that the end was not yet; that the pearl of great price was as remote as ever from the track of its discovery. It would still, in the language of the passage, return upon itself, again and again, with the anxious inquiry, 'Where then shall wisdom be found, and where is this place of understanding?' The books of nature, to which the attention has been confined, return him no satisfactory answer. The deep saith, It is not in me. The sea saith, It is not in me. Destruction and death say, We have just heard the fame thereof with our ears. It is only when, wearied with the search, it turns from the book of nature to the book of revelation, that it receives an answer to the inquiry; and the soul is only satisfied when, with the submission and docility of a true disciple of the school of heaven, it bows to the declaration, that 'the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom.' Divest this sublime passage of its Oriental imagery, and bring it into modern language, and we have the great truth expressed — religion is the only true and eternal science.

"The same lesson is taught, and the same contrast presented, in the Nineteenth Psalm. No reader can avoid being struck with its unusual and apparently abrupt division. The transition is so sudden, from the description of the highest natural phenomena of creation, to the moral law, statutes, and judgments of the Deity. 'The heavens are telling the glory of God — Day unto day uttereth speech — night unto night showeth knowledge. There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard. Their line has gone forth unto the ends of the world, and among them hath he set a tabernacle for the sun. His going forth is from the end of the heavens, and his circuit unto the ends thereof, and there is nothing hid

from his heat.' To one unaccustomed to the study and the spirit of the Bible, how strange would seem the transition which immediately follows: 'The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul. The testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple. The statutes of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart. The commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the eyes. The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring forever. The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether. More to be desired are they than gold; and in the keeping of them there is great reward.' A celebrated Biblical critic thinks that in this division of the Psalm there is a falling off from the grandeur of the commencement. The student whose mind has been imbued with the true philosophy of the Bible, will feel that the writer, instead of falling, has most sublimely ascended by a climax unsurpassed even in the Scriptures for beauty and moral grandeur, although none have ever used this figure with more effect than the Hebrew poets."

In Lewis' Essay on the Spirituality of Job — a massive and masterly fragment — there is disclosed the very rare quality of keenness to discern, and skill to trace, the finest threads of the sensibilities, the interblending relations of feelings and thoughts, of thoughts and feelings. In psychological insight, aiding a true critical insight to seize upon the leading ideas of the character, this fragment may be placed beside Goethe's criticism on Hamlet; but such insight as that of Lewis into a soul such as that of the Idumean sage, in which there is the breath of the eastern and the primeval world, and in which the human spirit is moved upon by the breath of the divine, is beyond Goethe, though — within the sphere of mere human emotion — perhaps the greatest of critics.

This fragment has all the excellences of the highest order of criticism, — the believing instinct looking for high truths, — strong common sense logically trained and philosophically developed, — true psychological insight, — clear views of the man in his relations to his time, — a comprehensive idea of the unity of all Scripture, and of the harmonious revealing more

and more of its truths, — artistic conception of the plan of the drama, — elegance and eloquence. Even its profusion of classical quotations is in harmony with this antique poem, which breathes something of the universal breath of the world's earlier ages.

The class of critics to which the critic himself belongs, in virtue of a believing instinct, without which even orthodox interpreters slide down unconsciously into low rationalizing exegesis, appears from the opening paragraph.

“ Critics of the unevangelical or Grotian class generally profess to be, beyond all other expositors, free from any bias that may lead to results not sanctioned by the most legitimate principles of hermeneutics. And yet it may be maintained, that even they, with all their boasted claims to fairness and freedom from prejudice, do actually start with a prejudged theory, which modifies, controls, and in many cases suggests, the very interpretations on which they so strongly insist, as arising directly from the *usus loquendi*, or strict philological examination of the text. They too, we maintain, have *their* prejudged theory. They start with the assumption, that neither the writer of the Book of Job, whoever he may have been, nor the age, nor the country in which he lived, could have had any idea of a future, separate, spiritual state of existence, much less of any future judgment, much less of any resurrection of the body, and still less of any divine Redeemer to appear in the flesh.

“ By the light of this theory, opposed as it is to what we know of the most ancient nations mentioned in profane history, must its advocates, of course, decide all questions of probability. When, therefore, they meet with passages which, as far as grammatical interpretation is alone concerned, may present either a spiritual or a naturalistic aspect according to the side from whence they are viewed, such interpreters do not hesitate to adopt the latter as the most easy, the most obvious, the most in accordance with what they assume to be the *usus loquendi* of the writer and of the age in which he lived. What makes this, in some respects, the more strange, is the fact, that such an unevangelical view is held the more firmly by those, who insist

upon bringing down the date of the book to the latest period ; even to the time when, according to another of their favorite theories, the Jews themselves began to learn the doctrine of a future life from the nations among whom they had been led captive. These nations, too, they can believe, had long been in possession of it, whilst the chosen people of God had never risen above the grossest materialistic belief in our merest animal existence, and had never exhibited the least trace of that, which forms the first essential element of spiritual religion."

His power as a philosophical reasoner is illustrated by the following passage :

"We may keep very far from that extreme, which finds almost any doctrine of the New Testament in the Book of Job, and yet believe, both from external and internal evidence, that it manifests a higher spirituality than has generally been conceded to it. The internal evidence of this kind may be concisely presented under three heads.

"1st. *Its pure moral theism*, embracing such sublime views of the Divine purity, holiness, and uncompromising righteousness, *as have never, in any other age or country, been found associated with materialism in respect to man.*

"2d. The positive doctrine of a spiritual world, as presented in the introductory chapters ; and to which we may rightly attach a similar inferential scholium, namely, that the belief in angels, or sons of God, and ministering spirits, and evil demons, *has never since been found joined with that remaining dogma of the Sadducean creed, which denies a separate spiritual life of the human soul.*

"3rd. The revelation of an antagonism going on in this spiritual world for the trial of our moral integrity ; *which representation necessarily suggests the correlative idea of some great beneficent heavenly power, contending on our behalf against the evil adversary ;* thus making probable, what have been regarded as Job's allusions to a Redeemer or Messiah ; and also rendering easy of belief the supposition, that he sometimes speaks of deliverances, connected with another state of existence."

His critical faculty appears, as he thus seizes upon the artistic idea of the drama :

“ The true key of the poem, we assume, is most naturally to be sought in the first two chapters. Nothing could seem at first view, and on almost any view, to be fairer than such a position as this ; and yet it has been strangely overlooked by almost all who have written on the book. In these introductory chapters there can be no doubt of an intention to bring before the mind in some way vivid ideas of invisible or spiritual beings and of a spiritual world. This would seem clear enough as a fact in itself, whatever we may think of the manner of making the representation ; whether we regard it as subjective, or objective, as mythical, or real. The poem most strikingly commences with the supernatural, the superhuman, and the unearthly. It also most impressively closes in the same remarkable manner. It is not easy, therefore, nor natural to suppose that the intervening parts suddenly lose every trace of this character, and have reference only to *earthly* trials, *earthly* retributions, *earthly* vindications of the divine justice, and contain only a sort of Confucian morality, presenting the merest *earthly* manifestations of man’s highest accountabilities. Again, it is hard to believe that the writer meant to represent the great evil spiritual being as playing so important a part in these impressive opening scenes, and then that there should not be the least allusion to him in anything that follows.” . . .

“ In the view we have thus presented of the book, it would indeed be — what it has so often been styled, without much meaning — a *grand drama*, or rather epic, — a most sublime poetical representation, in which revelation withdraws the curtain from *one scene* in that universal battle (μάχη ἀθανάτων) between good and evil, and between good and evil powers, which has been going on from the creation. In this sacred Iliad, if we may so speak of it, the field of the strife may be said to lie in the hopes and fears and faith of the tempted sufferer. The prize of victory is his moral integrity, in view of all the influences that might be brought to bear upon it both from the

good and evil department of the spiritual or superhuman world. There is a more than Homeric grandeur of conception here. The ἀθλον proposed in this spiritual ἀγών is something far transcending that of the ordinary heroic

οὐχ ἱερῆϊον οὔδε βοεΐη
ἀλλὰ περὶ ψυχῆς μάρνανται ἀθανάτοιο.—*Iliad*, xxii. 161.

“Again, this grand conflict necessarily suggests the idea of two chief antagonistic powers essentially pertaining to it. In respect to one of these, the introduction or argument of the poem leaves no doubt. It is Satan, the old adversary, the enemy of man, the accuser, who is represented as roving to and fro in the earth in search of the victims of his never-sleeping malice. *Who then can be the other, but He* who, as we have good reason to believe, is repeatedly alluded to throughout the book? Who else can it be but Satan’s ancient and everlasting opponent?—The Only Begotten among the Sons of God—The Angel of the Presence—The Guardian Angel of the people of God in all ages—The Goel, or the Near Kinsman—The Angel Mediator—The Interpreter—The Witness on high—The Friend of Man—The Divine Redeemer, whose incarnation was promised away back in the very beginning of the roll of revelation,—HE ‘whose delight had ever been with the sons of men, rejoicing always in the habitable parts of the earth,’—HE whose theophany at some future period was the theme of obscure tradition all over the eastern world,—HE in whom, unless we are to discard the express testimony of the very men commissioned by our Lord for the very purpose of declaring the truth respecting himself, the most ancient patriarchs did, in some shadowy, it may be, and yet consoling form, hope and believe.”

The argument which vindicates the spirituality of the Book of Job, is an on-flowing, deepening, expanding argument; like that of the Six Days of Creation. In each a logic never losing sight of, always tending to, one end, pervades all its philos-

ophy, all its philological criticism. The extracts made are conformed to one aim, and that without affecting their individual character. Looked at without reference to the scope of the essay, they are perfect in themselves; yet they are as perfect, looked at with reference to that aim. In the volume, and in this essay, there is a protean skill, ever varying its shape, but ever advancing to one result, and giving to each a marked unity of effect. As farther illustrating this, we make another citation. It also illustrates the writer's mode of starting from some admitted truth, and winding along to a higher truth. That which he asks to have conceded, is ever something which cannot in reason be denied; and, being conceded, the next concession asked for is equally reasonable. Thus, arm in arm with the sage, reasoning as we walk along, we ascend the height whence the whole subject lies open before us, the mount of vision whither our persuasive guide had meant to bring us, and has been bringing us at every step.

“Without asserting that the doctrine of a future life distinctly conceived was the formal, habitual belief of Job and his immediate contemporaries, we may, at least, regard him as having occasionally recurring to his mind some such hope as Paul says the patriarchs possessed, when they called themselves pilgrims and sojourners upon earth, thereby professing to seek an unearthly *abiding-place*, a city with foundations; which hope was grounded mainly on those oft-repeated declarations, with one of which Christ confounded the Sadducees, — ‘*because He was not ashamed to be called their God.*’ With them a spiritual theism and a moral providence were connected with the hope of an abiding life for man; which hope necessarily grows out of the sense of such a relation to the Eternal One. So our Saviour taught the neologists of his day, when from one of the most common texts of the Old Testament, chosen because it was so common, and not because it contained any peculiarly recondite meaning, he showed the inseparable union of these truths with any scheme which had the least claim to be called a spiritual religion. Such a connection is also taught

by reason, and by that which is higher than reason, the human conscience. It may, therefore, be maintained, that it is not *improbable* that the soul of Job (even on the supposition that he lived in the days of the patriarchs) did at times, in the midst of afflictions, so adapted to drive him out of all earthly expectations, and in view of the dark dispensations of God in this world, revert to a more spiritual hope, although such hope might be of the most shadowy kind, and almost instantly lose itself again in the gloom of his desponding spirit. We say, then, that it is *improbable*, in view of all the considerations suggested, that Job should, under no circumstances, make allusion to the hope of another life.

“Our second proposition is, that it is a *still more improbable* view, which represents him (according to Rosenmüller and others) as *expressly denying* it; and not only that, but also as using terms which would seem to imply, that the thought could not be for a moment entertained, and should it ever occur to the mind, must be silenced by the strongest form of negation. We may have doubts about the distinctness and firmness of his faith; but the supposition that would make him a dogmatic materialist, a stubborn denier of any spirituality in man, or of any connection with an unseen world beyond what belongs to the lowest *animality*, — this, we say, ought to transcend the credulity even of the most stubborn rationalist.

“The third proposition is, that both these improbabilities are greatly enhanced, even on the reasoning of the neological interpreters themselves, in view of that theory which brings down the writing of the book, if not the life of Job himself, to the later age of the Jewish state, or to a time near or subsequent to the Babylonish captivity.

“Our ideas of a future life, generally, as one doctrine, and of the resurrection of the body as another, are usually kept tolerably distinct. It was not so, however, in the time of our Saviour. He himself, in his reply to the Sadducees, did not deem it necessary to view separately the then existing spiritual state of the Old Testament saints (as affirmed by him), and

their more distinct and higher life after the general resurrection. There was, doubtless, still more of this blending of the two ideas, or rather this dim accompaniment of the latter was still more obscurely apprehended, if at all, in the earlier periods of the Old Testament history. And yet the idea once received of a renewed life for the spirit, *it would seem to be most naturally followed by a shadowy hope, that the body also might, in some way, be a partaker of the same.* It seems difficult on any other ground to account for the early and universal care manifested in the embalming, careful sepulture, and solemn funeral rites, which have ever attended the last disposal of the poor remains of our corporeal humanity."

Adequately to illustrate the psychological power of this fragment, would be to cite the larger part of it. It shows a quick and piercing insight into the quick-shifting, various moods of the agonized, desponding, believing soul of the hero of the drama. As the writer says, the discourses of Job partake largely of the nature of soliloquies; in them well connected trains of thought, regular transitions, are not to be looked for; nor are they to be interpreted by the principles and rules of a direct, uninterrupted logical or rhetorical discourse.

"Mingled with appeals, now to God, and again to his interlocutors, together with occasional direct notices of their arguments, there is, throughout, a continued communing with his own soul, and with the wondrous thoughts concerning his own present and future destiny, which God's dealings were suggesting to him. He turns them over and over; surveys them in many varied aspects,—now in the shade of his despondency, and again in the light of his hope. The transitions, of course, are sudden, apparently abrupt, sometimes seemingly contradictory; and in this lies much of the dramatic power of the unknown author of this wondrous production."

The criticism manifests a true insight into the spiritual ideas of the early world; and in this point of view, as in every point of view, will repay intense and thoughtful study. The criticism is no less than a grand argument, wrought with dialectic

tact and power, in support of a proposition, vital to belief in the Scriptures, a proposition whose importance is indicated in the following question, for which the introduction prepares from afar, and which is the key-note of the criticism :

“What faith can stand the shock, or rather, who can have any faith in revelation at all, if he is compelled to believe that those who are called God’s chosen people, and even the most pious among them, were for so many centuries the veriest materialists, or annihilationists, destitute of the first elements of anything like spiritual religion, in perfect ignorance of any key to the mysteries of God’s providence or of his moral justice, inferior, in this respect, not only to all the other nations of antiquity, but even to the savage tribes of our own continent ; — in short with no more conception of another life, *or of the eternal moral ideas, that have no true existence apart from it,* than the beasts that perish?”

Against the low idea of the spirituality of the Hebrew Scriptures held by a large class of commentators, Lewis has contended on various occasions. The spirit, imbued with his reasonings, is proof against all that has been urged by this school of criticism, though embracing great names, and though its errors have been sown broadcast in volumes read by tens of thousands. That which Lewis has written bearing on this subject, if printed together, would make a volume. And a smaller volume might be made in the same way on the spiritual illumination of the ancient world, on Natural Religion the Remains of Primitive Revelation.

Interspersed through the fragment on Job, are passages worthy of the weightiest names in the church. In verification of this we submit our last citation. To the concluding page we ask the reader’s earnest attention, it being, so far as our knowledge goes, *the highest critical word ever pronounced with reference to the Scripture*. Speaking of the modified aspects under which it was held, the circumstances to which are to be ascribed its growth and development in the world, he says :

"OF THE ANCIENT BELIEF IN A FUTURE STATE,

"There may be traced, we think, two several kinds, or rather grades of belief. There was, *first*, the common *creed*, or rather *sentiment*, of which we have spoken as being universal in the age of Job. It was the bare notion of a continued spiritual existence after the dissolution of the body. This was in some unknown, though generally imagined subterranean locality. It was thought of by means of conceptions derived, in a great measure, from the impressive phenomena of the dying hour, and of the grave, or funereal rites, and therefore tinged with many sombre and fear-inspiring shades. To this extent, at least, the dogma of a ghostly world seems to have been held, *semper, ubique et ab omnibus*. *Pages of antiquarian research could produce no surer conviction of its universality, than the repeated Homeric expression, κλυτὰ ἔθνεα νεκρῶν* — *The renowned, the far-famed nations of the dead of whom all have heard* — who were everywhere the subjects of religious rites, and addressed with sacrifices and supplications.

"Again, there was, in the *second* place, what may be styled the occasional or *individual* belief, brought out by peculiar circumstances; and, though naturally connected with the first, yet still held as a matter of experience or personal interest, rather than as part of some universal tradition, which the individual soul holds, not so much of itself, as through its participation in the common mind of the nation or period. This mere personal belief, thus manifesting itself in occasional hopes and fears, brought out by inward workings, or prompted by outward suggestions, may be the commencement of a new modification, which becomes afterwards more and more common among reflecting souls, and in this way finally assumes the form of a settled and universal creed. It is first the strong desire, having its birth in their souls, and then the incipient belief, that, from the prison of Hades, undesirable even for the good, there would yet be a deliverance to some better state. In minds of a certain cast, this might give rise to the idea of a metempsy-

chosis, or a continual transition to a higher and still higher condition of corporeal being. In others it would assume a more spiritual or transcendental aspect; as in the Platonic idea of an existence, which although not wholly disembodied, recedes more and more from matter, in its approach to a reünion with the universal mind. Others again, possessing more of the devout than philosophical temperament, and living nearer to the stream of primitive revelation, would give this hope more of a moral aspect; they would connect it with the idea of a general future judgment. The death of the body, and the imprisonment in Sheol being regarded mainly as a moral penalty, their hope of deliverance from it would assume the form of a *new* life, to be shared by the body, in some unknown isles of the blest, or in some celestial region, or in some future renovation of the earth on which we dwell.

“Such prayers, and hopes, and ejaculations, as those of Job, may have been the germ of what afterwards became a common idea, assuming a statement more and more definite, until finally it grew into that doctrine of a resurrection, which is obscurely hinted at in some of the Psalms, and in Isaiah; which is so manifestly taught by Daniel; which undoubtedly existed among the Jews at the coming of our Saviour; and to which, finally, Christ gave his sanction, as to a truth, not then first taught by him, but which had for ages been known in the Eastern world.

“Mr. Barnes asks, Can we believe that God would reveal such a doctrine to an Arabian sage? *Why not?* Although his question, we think, is an absurd one, yet still we say, why not? Why not to an Arabian, as well as to some Babylonian or Chaldean sage or sages, from whom the unevangelical commentators contend the Jews derived the doctrines of a future life and of the resurrection of the body? The important question is not *to whom* God first revealed it, or whether he ever expressly revealed it at all to certain individuals, but how we are to account for its being in our world as a fact, which revelation acknowledges, when it comes to speak in the most direct terms about it, and on which acknowledged fact its subsequent

communications do seem most evidently to proceed. The truth must have had a beginning somewhere and at some time. It requires no very profound rationalizing to show, that it must have been small before it was large ; and if the Chaldeans generally, or even the Chaldean sages, had it as an acknowledged dogma at the time of the captivity, it must certainly have been growing for many centuries at least. It must have been gathering strength from those more remote periods, when it had its origin, perhaps in ejaculations, and sighs, and hopes, and prayers brought out by peculiar circumstances in God's providence, such as now surrounded Job, and which may have been designed for the very purpose of thus giving the initiative to this great doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. Or it may have been the result of some early, special *inspiration* ; and this term may be used of just such a state of things as we have supposed in the other case. It may not have been by way of a formal dogma historically viewed, or regarded as oracularly announced. Although not revealed in any prophetic ecstasy, or in any vision of the seer, or by any voice from the shrine, yet it may have been truly *inspired* by being gently breathed into the souls of tried and suffering saints, in the sore travail of whose earth-wearied spirits it was born into the world ; not in the form of a dogma, precise and well defined, but rather as an embryo or germinal sentiment, at first faint and obscure, though afterwards unfolded more and more, until it became part of the common mind, and grew up into an established and universal article of faith.

“ Such questions, as this of Mr. Barnes, seem to proceed from what we must deem erroneous views both of the matter and manner of revelation. *No one can produce a passage from the Scriptures*, — the challenge is made in reference to the New Testament as well as the Old, — *in which the resurrection, or even the future life, is presented as a newly announced truth*, then formally proclaimed, and treated as something unknown before. *The same may be said of almost all the great truths of religion*. They have either been in the world from the begin-

ning, or they have thus come into it in the course of the providence of God introducing them historically in some known or unknown way, and then treating them as known grounds of appeal in the *written* word. This is certainly true of the great and fundamental articles of the divine existence, of the divine moral government, and of the general doctrine of a separate spiritual life of the dead. The first two are *assumed* throughout the Scriptures. The third, if it did not exist from the beginning, is at least presented in the Old Testament in its incipient growth; in the hopes of the pilgrim patriarchs; — in the common popular language respecting the dead, who are gathered to the congregation of their fathers; in the apparently casual, yet on that account the more significant mention of the popular belief of some kind of intercourse with departed spirits; and in the superstitious regard for a certain class, by whom, it was supposed, such intercourse could be maintained. To one who views this doctrine from a still higher ground, it manifests itself in those highly spiritual ideas of the divine moral government, and in those sublime expressions of faith in the eternal righteousness, *which have no meaning* when the rationalist forces them down to a connection with the idea of a mere animal existence of the briefest kind for man. And finally it reveals itself in the praises and prayers of God's beloved saints, growing clearer, and loftier, and more animated, until we come down to the manifestation of the Desire of all nations, and to those teachings of the New Testament, in which the spiritual life is everywhere assumed as something long previously maintained, whilst it is nowhere announced, as that which was utterly unknown before.

“We may say the same of the primitive dogma of sacrifice, and of the need of some form of expiation for acceptance with God. So also of that most solemn of all doctrines, *without which all the rest, even the being of God and the question of a future life lose all their interest for the soul*, — we mean the fundamental truth, that man, frail and finite as he is, is the subject of a moral law connecting him with the infinite and eternal

Justice, and imparting to his actions an incalculable importance, which must extend far beyond the brief period of his present phenomenal existence.

“What, then, it may be asked, does the Bible most truly reveal? We answer, Jesus Christ and Him crucified, as the great fact, which gives its highest meaning to every other fact and doctrine. It was not the knowledge of sin, of wrath, of the need of expiation. It was not the atonement as a doctrine, nor the redemption, nor the moral law, nor the resurrection, nor the life to come. It was no one of these as an abstract dogma. It was the person and life of the incarnate Redeemer. — He of whom Moses in the law, and the prophets did write, and of whom evangelists and apostles testified. It was Jesus the Messiah, the Expiator, the Mediator, the Redeemer, and who embraces all these doctrines in himself, when he is called the Peace, the Redemption, the Way, the Truth, the Resurrection, and the Life.”

It is the strange delusion of some, that belief in the Scriptures shackles the intellect; and so pertinaciously do they insist upon this, that they even cause some, who hold the Scriptures to be a revelation, to feel as if the freest, mightiest, highest movements of the mind, were incompatible with faith. This delusion — so opposed to facts — springs in part from a mistake as to the relative rank of believing and of reasoning. Some belief is a condition precedent to all reasoning. And as from belief reasoning proceeds, so in belief reasoning ends. It is the sphere of belief to which reasoning aspires, and there, in something higher than itself, its journeyings would end. Belief is the assent of the heart conjoining with the perceptions of the mind, — of the heart, which is more spiritual, more ultimate in its decisions than the intellect, and without whose assent the

intellect finds no rest in its conclusions. The intellect is discursive, vagrant, fitted to chase the changing phenomena of a fleeting world, and only through the aid of the heart can it lay¹ hold upon eternal, immutable truth.

There is a world of truth and being whose creator is Christ. It exists because He existed. Over its gateway are inscribed conditions of belief similar to those over the gateway of that world into which man is naturally born. This Christ-created world of truth and being throws its light athwart that world into which man is naturally born. It intensifies its light and its darkness. Everywhere it interposes its powers and its facts ; so that he, who knows nothing of this Christ-created world, is hopelessly confused and confounded in the attempt to comprehend, what else had been in some measure comprehensible. Plato reasoned well on life and being when as yet this new world had not come down from heaven ; but if, while it encompassed him on every side, he were to try to reason now, though he closed his eyes to its presence, he would reason no better than the blind Pagans in Christendom reason now. There can now be no right reasoning on the problems of life and being without right believing ; and hence it is, that the visions of so many philosophers are as wild, as bewildering, as worthless, as evanescent, as those of the Hasheesh, and their speculations sound like the dialectics of the underwitted, the sentimental reveries of mildly-struck lunatics, or the haughty ravings of exalted madmen. It is not belief in those great truths, which in Scripture stand out as its own truths amid, and apart from, others which it takes for granted as discernible by the mind ; it is not belief in truths which without revelation neither man nor angel could have divined, which in any degree hinders the freest, mightiest movements of the reasoning. If reasoning within the high sphere of Christian thought be constrained, it is only because of the want of perfect belief. He who does not believe, cannot reason. He who half unconsciously mistrusts, fears to reason. He who unconsciously but half believes, reasons where he should not reason. If faith be entire, then thought

is free, and thought is not given to problems where thought avails not.

There can be no philosophy worthy of the name of which revelation is not the life. As Lewis has said, "Without revelation, all philosophy inevitably terminates in a dark wilderness of skepticism." Even Socrates, finding nothing else on which he could rest his teachings, was compelled to rest them on traditions, in which his heart felt and revered something of primeval revelation; although for him no history disclosed its true origin. As truth can be known to be in philosophy only when revelation sanctions it, as the great problems of philosophy must be settled by revelation, as the Scripture is a revealing light before which the fallacies of error appear as they are, as faith is the evidence of things not seen, therefore it must be that it is the believing spirit which looks most wisely into the things of nature, and into those truths which pertain to the soul, to immortality, and to God. Without faith there can be no wisdom.

There are some men who seem born to search into moral and philosophical truth. They are endowed with that clear, exact, logical intellect, whose processes are so cohering and far-reaching that it naturally loves to unfold itself through severest mathematical studies. They are born mathematicians — as Plato was born, as Kepler, as Pascal. Such mathematicians, when their souls are touched with fire from above, are true poets, hearing in numbers something typical of worlds above the senses, beholding in them an unveiling of truth, a veiling of mystery. The mind thus mathematical and poetical, is the true philosophic mind. The logic of this philosopher is controlling. How far soever he may mount to the empyrean of thought, he climbs step by step, as the mathematician climbs step by step the heights of the visible heavens. Like the mathematician, he can mark each step of the ascent. In him there is no mysticism, though he stand face to face with all mystery. He knows the unknown from the known, and is as sure of his ground in the highest problems of philosophy as in the highest problems of mathematics.

For the wisest investigation of the highest problems of thought, a mathematical mind mathematically trained is prerequisite, and with this an especial training at the feet of those Grecian sages whom the Western nations honor as the pioneers of their philosophic thought. But neither by the sages of Greece, nor when with their culture was combined the higher wisdom of the Fathers, nor by the acuteness of the Schoolmen, were these problems definitely and forever solved. They are world-problems; and soluble, if at all, only by the world-mind. The European intellect, however disciplined by the Grecian, however it rise, through the aid of sages and saints, to a plane higher than that on which they stood, is not competent to the work. Into the rill of Grecian thought, widening and deepening into the river of European thought, must the Euphrates flow, before the stream becomes oceanic, and sweeps around the world.

The man most truly wise must be deeply and reverently wise in the Scriptures. Pedantry here will not avail at all. With thorough philological training there must be an intellect that can wield the knowledge which the pedant helplessly parades—a soul vitally, magnetically imbued alike with the genius of the Hebrew and the Greek, which is able to pierce into the inner life of words, the conceptions and modes of thinking of other races and ages, and to commune in spirit and in truth with the great seers of Scripture. In these qualities over which we have thus rapidly glanced, Lewis has few peers among the living or the dead. In the wide realms of mind there are many mansions; there, to the elect teachers of humanity, God appoints to each his place. In the sky of thought he sets his stars, and it becometh us to mark his ordaining will, which maketh one star to differ from another star in glory.



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